Ark. Code Ann. § 1-2-120 (2026)
Effect of repeal of statute
- When a statute is repealed and the repealing statute is afterwards repealed, the first statute shall not thereby be revived unless by express words.
- When any criminal or penal statute is repealed, all offenses committed or forfeitures accrued under it while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in force, notwithstanding the repeal, unless otherwise expressly provided in the repealing statute.
- No action, plea, prosecution, or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending at the time any statutory provision is repealed shall be affected by the repeal but shall proceed in all respects as if the statutory provision had not been repealed.
History. Rev. Stat., ch. 129, § 31; Rev. Stat., ch. 146, § 1; Acts 1846, § 1, p. 93; C. & M. Dig., §§ 9757-9759; Pope's Dig., §§ 13282-13284; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 1-102 — 1-104.
Cross References. Effect of amendment or repeal of statute defining criminal offense, § 5-1-103(e).
Case Notes
Purpose.
It is not the purpose of subsection (c) of this section to prohibit the passage of subsequent legislation regulating the venue of actions to enforce existing rights, nor to regulate the procedure under which those rights might be enforced. Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Kincannon, 202 Ark. 216, 150 S.W.2d 968 (1941).
Applicability.
Subsections (b) and (c) of this section apply only to statutes of the state and not municipal ordinances. Helena v. Russwurm, 188 Ark. 968, 68 S.W.2d 1009 (1934).
Criminal or Penal Statutes.
Force and effect of subsection (b) of this section recognized and upheld. McCuen v. State, 19 Ark. 630 (1858); Volmer v. State, 34 Ark. 487 (1879); Cloud v. State, 36 Ark. 151 (1880); Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 82 Ark. 309, 101 S.W. 748 (1907).
Indictment for illegal sale of intoxicating liquor was still valid after passage of act incorporating city which repealed all laws theretofore passed respecting the sale of liquors with respect to such city. McCuen v. State, 19 Ark. 634 (1858).
Where person was tried for selling liquor to minor prior to enactment of statute making it an offense to be interested in such sale, instruction in conformity to later law was improper. Cloud v. State, 36 Ark. 151 (1880).
Statutes on rape and carnal abuse, which were repealed after the offense was committed, would be treated as remaining in force for the purpose of a trial for those offenses. Clark v. State, 246 Ark. 876, 440 S.W.2d 205 (1969), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Townsend, 314 Ark. 427, 863 S.W.2d 288 (1993) (decision under prior law).
A change in the definition of murder was substantive rather than procedural, and the older definition would be controlling even if it had been repealed after the commission of the homicide. Degler v. State, 257 Ark. 388, 517 S.W.2d 515 (1975).
Although the legislature dropped prophylhexedrine from the statutory schedule of controlled substances after the date of the offense, the delivery of prophylhexedrine was not effectively decriminalized and defendant could be convicted of the charged offenses; the amendment did not decriminalize his or her conduct. Hudson v. State, 53 Ark. App. 111, 919 S.W.2d 518 (1996).
Defendant convicted on a plea of nolo contendere to sexual misconduct was not entitled to an arrest of judgment; although § 5-14-107, the statute defining sexual misconduct as a criminal offense, was repealed before defendant entered his or her plea of nolo contendere, the statute was in effect at the time he or she committed the offense. Holt v. State, 85 Ark. App. 151, 147 S.W.3d 699 (2004).
Pending Proceedings.
Act repealing law which permitted citizens to sign petitions for change of the boundaries of school districts applied to proceedings on such a petition pending in a circuit court at the time of passage of the act as no private rights were involved. School Dist. No. 11 v. School Dist. No. 20, 63 Ark. 543, 39 S.W. 850 (1897).
Repealed by laws held applicable to proceedings pending at time of repeal. State v. Lane, 134 Ark. 71, 203 S.W. 17 (1918); Carle v. Gehl, 193 Ark. 1061, 104 S.W.2d 445 (1937); Wallace v. Todd, 195 Ark. 134, 111 S.W.2d 472 (1937); Kosek v. Walker, 196 Ark. 656, 118 S.W.2d 575 (1938); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Moss, 196 Ark. 553, 118 S.W.2d 873 (1938); McAllister v. Wright, 197 Ark. 1156, 127 S.W.2d 645 (1939).
Where the chancery court assumed jurisdiction in proceedings to wind up the affairs of a highway improvement district before repeal of act which created the highway district, the court had jurisdiction to continue the proceeding to completion. South Miller County Hwy. Dist. v. Dorsey, 174 Ark. 553, 297 S.W. 833 (1927).
Subsection (c) of this section has reference to substantive law and does not apply to mere changes in procedure. Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Kincannon, 202 Ark. 216, 150 S.W.2d 968 (1941); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Robinson, 228 Ark. 418, 308 S.W.2d 282 (1957); Office of Emergency Servs. v. Home Ins. Co., 2 Ark. App. 185, 618 S.W.2d 573 (1981).
Where case was pending when statute was repealed, the substantive rule of comparative negligence embodied in that statute was continued in force by the saving clause of this section. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Robinson, 228 Ark. 418, 308 S.W.2d 282 (1957); Johnson v. Brewer, 228 Ark. 946, 311 S.W.2d 301 (1958).
Revival.
Subsection (a) of this section prohibiting revival not applicable where repeal of special exception to general law expressly made preexisting law applicable to counties previously excepted. White River Lumber Co. v. White River Drainage Dist., 141 Ark. 196, 216 S.W. 1043 (1919).
When a statute is repealed and the repealing statute is later repealed, the first statute is not revived unless by express words and this cannot be done if the intent is to pass a local or special act. Cragar v. Thompson, 212 Ark. 178, 205 S.W.2d 180 (1947).
Cited: Faucette v. Patterson, 140 Ark. 628, 216 S.W. 300 (1919); Gill v. Saunders, 182 Ark. 453, 31 S.W.2d 748 (1930); Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark. 936, 311 S.W.2d 297 (1958); State v. Ziegenbein, 282 Ark. 162, 666 S.W.2d 698 (1984).