The Seventy-Ninth General Assembly realizes that the Arkansas workers' compensation statutes must be revised and amended from time to time. Unfortunately, many of the changes made by this act were necessary because administrative law judges, the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Arkansas courts have continually broadened the scope and eroded the purpose of the workers' compensation statutes of this state. The Seventy-Ninth General Assembly intends to restate that the major and controlling purpose of workers' compensation is to pay timely temporary and permanent disability benefits to all legitimately injured workers that suffer an injury or disease arising out of and in the course of their employment, to pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses resulting therefrom, and then to return the worker to the work force. When, and if, the workers' compensation statutes of this state need to be changed, the General Assembly acknowledges its responsibility to do so. It is the specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or decisions of any administrative law judge, the Workers' Compensation Commission, or courts of this state contrary to or in conflict with any provision in this act. In the future, if such things as the statute of limitations, the standard of review by the Workers' Compensation Commission or courts, the extent to which any physical condition, injury, or disease should be excluded from or added to coverage by the law, or the scope of the workers' compensation statutes need to be liberalized, broadened, or narrowed, those things shall be addressed by the General Assembly and should not be done by administrative law judges, the Workers' Compensation Commission, or the courts.
“All provisions of this act of a general and permanent nature are amendatory to the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated and the Arkansas Code Revision Commission shall incorporate the same in the code specifically including Section 35.”
Acts 2001, No. 1757, § 9, provided in part:
“Nothing in the act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001, nor in Act 1552 of 1999 shall impliedly repeal any part of Act 796 of 1993. Act 796 of 1993 is expressly reaffirmed by this act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001.”
Construing the provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act strictly, the Workers'
Compensation Commission abused its discretion in dismissing as untimely a worker's pro se notice of appeal from an order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) denying permanent total disability for carpal tunnel injuries because the ALJ's order could not become final under § 11-9-711(a)(1) until 30 days after the worker received a copy where the worker's attorney was disbarred 26 days after receiving a copy and thus did not have a full 30 days to appeal.
Kirkendolph v. DF&A Revenue Servs. Div., 2009 Ark. App. 629 (2009).
Burden of Proof.
The strict construction mandate of Acts 1993, No. 796 and the requirement that the appellate court view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision and uphold that decision if it is supported by substantial basis for denying relief do not change the requirement that the Workers' Compensation Commission must have, in fact, a substantial basis for denying a claim for benefits; the substantial evidence test is not satisfied by evidence which merely creates a suspicion. Matlock v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001).
Common-law Remedies for Retaliation.
By enacting § 16-118-107, the General Assembly did not intend to revive the individual cause of action for common-law remedies for retaliation under Arkansas workers'
compensation law which it expressly annulled at § 11-9-107.
Lambert v. LQ Mgmt., L.L.C., 2013 Ark. 114, 426 S.W.3d 437 (2013).
Dependency Benefits.
The legislative intent as expressed in this section contains nothing to support the view that prior case law in regard to dependency benefits was repealed. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 60 Ark. App. 64, 958 S.W.2d 538 (1997), aff'd, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).
Second Injury Fund.
Because this section discourages judicial lawmaking and because the Court of Appeals must defer to decisions of the Supreme Court, the appeals court could not broaden the scope of workers' compensation law so that the Second Injury Fund would become liable for wage-loss disability benefits payable to a disabled worker in the event of successive injuries during the same employment. Maxey v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 341 Ark. 306, 18 S.W.3d 328 (2000).
Cited:
Torrey v. City of Fort Smith, 55 Ark. App. 226, 934 S.W.2d 237 (1996); Duke v. Regis Hairstylists, 55 Ark. App. 327, 935 S.W.2d 600 (1996); Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996); Daniel v. Firestone Bldg. Prods., 57 Ark. App. 123, 942 S.W.2d 277 (1997); Tillman v. Baldwin & Shell Constr., 58 Ark. App. 177, 948 S.W.2d 118 (1997); Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997); ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 60 Ark. App. 310, 961 S.W.2d 36 (1998); Nelson v. Timberline Int'l, 332 Ark. 165, 964 S.W.2d 357 (1998); Superior Indus. v. Thomaston, 72 Ark. App. 7, 32 S.W.3d 52 (2000); O'Hara v. J. Christy Constr. Co., 101 Ark. App. 212, 272 S.W.3d 842 (2008); Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 102 Ark. App. 305, 285 S.W.3d 253 (2008); Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Narvaiz, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012); J.M.E. v. Valley View Agri Sys., 2016 Ark. App. 531, 505 S.W.3d 211 (2016); Birtcher v. Mena Water Utils., 2017 Ark. App. 210, 518 S.W.3d 707 (2017).
Chapter 10
Division of Workforce Services Law
A.C.R.C. Notes.
References to “this chapter” in subchapters 1-8 may not apply to subchapters 9 and 10 which were enacted subsequently.
Research References
ALR.
Alcoholism or intoxication as ground for discharge justifying denial of unemployment compensation, 64 A.L.R.4th 1151.
Burden of proof as to voluntariness of separation, 73 A.L.R.4th 1093.
Liability for retaliation against at-will employee for public complaints or efforts relating to health or safety, 75 A.L.R.4th 13.
Eligibility of employee who left employment based on belief that involuntary discharge was imminent, 79 A.L.R.4th 528.
Employee's loss of employment because of refusal to submit to drug test as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 86 A.L.R.4th 309.
Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings in unemployment compensation proceedings, 90 A.L.R.4th 532.
Employer's state-law liability for withdrawing, or substantially altering, job offer for indefinite period before employee actually commences employment, 1 A.L.R.5th 401.
Eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts for domestic or family reasons, 2 A.L.R.5th 475.
Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by claimant's voluntary separation or refusal to work alleging that the work is illegal or immoral, 41 A.L.R.5th 123.
Leaving employment to become self-employed or to go into business for oneself as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 45 A.L.R.5th 715.
Leaving employment in pursuit of other employment as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 46 A.L.R.5th 659.
What constitutes ‘agricultural’ or ‘farm’ labor within social security or unemployment compensation, 60 A.L.R.5th 459.
Leaving employment, or unavailability for particular job or duties, because of sickness or disability as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 68 A.L.R.5th 13.
Eligibility for unemployment compensation of employee who retires voluntarily, 75 A.L.R.5th 339.
Ark. L. Rev.
Benefits from Social Legislation and Labor-Management Contracts: Accommodation of Collateral Sources in Arkansas, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 126.
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
Former similar law was not violative of the due process clause of the federal constitution, nor of constitutional provision guaranteeing right of trial by jury. McKinley v. R.L. Payne & Son Lumber Co., 200 Ark. 1114, 143 S.W.2d 38 (1940) (decision under prior law).
This chapter does not violate the constitutional provision forbidding the general assembly from creating any permanent state offices not provided for in the constitution. Hickenbottom v. McCain, 207 Ark. 485, 181 S.W.2d 226, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777, 65 S. Ct. 189, 89 L. Ed. 621 (1944).
This chapter does not violate the constitutional provisions dividing the state government into three distinct departments. Hickenbottom v. McCain, 207 Ark. 485, 181 S.W.2d 226, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777, 65 S. Ct. 189, 89 L. Ed. 621 (1944).
This chapter was enacted under the general police power and not the taxing power and therefore the contributions involved do not constitute taxes within the meaning of Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 3. White v. Thornbrough, 229 Ark. 96, 313 S.W.2d 384 (1958).
Construction.
This chapter must be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the state. McCain v. Crossett Lumber Co., 206 Ark. 51, 174 S.W.2d 114 (1943).
This chapter must be given an interpretation in keeping with the declaration of state policy. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, 227 Ark. 288, 298 S.W.2d 56 (1957).
This chapter is designed to protect the employee from becoming unemployed through no fault of his own; it is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in order to accomplish its beneficent purpose. Graham v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 774, 601 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1980).
Purpose.
This chapter is intended to encourage employers who meet all requirements by conducting business in a way to promote social security. Lion Oil Ref. Co. v. McCain, 204 Ark. 995, 166 S.W.2d 249 (1942).
The benevolent purpose of this chapter is to provide unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Wells v. Everett, 5 Ark. App. 303, 635 S.W.2d 294 (1982); Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Stiles, 17 Ark. App. 20, 702 S.W.2d 421 (1986).
Federal Legislation.
The federal congress has not preempted the state legislature in the matter of coverage and exemptions in the field of employment security legislation. Arkansas Valley Indus., Inc. v. Laney, 242 Ark. 261, 412 S.W.2d 817 (1967).
Retroactivity.
The legislature had power to substitute this chapter for former acts and to make it retroactive, provided it did not disturb any vested rights, but since legislature expressly reserved in former acts the right to amend or repeal and provided there would be no vested private right of any kind, provisions of this chapter should control in adjudication of cases pending and not finally determined at its effective dates. Crossett Lumber Co. v. McCain, 205 Ark. 631, 170 S.W.2d 64 (1943), superseded by statute as stated in, Morris v. Everett, 647 S.W.2d 476 (1983).
Rights and liabilities arising under the former law but still undetermined when this chapter became effective were to be determined under the provisions of this chapter. Southern Kraft Corp. v. McCain, 205 Ark. 943, 171 S.W.2d 947 (1943).
Cited:
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Thornbrough, 232 Ark. 929, 341 S.W.2d 1 (1960); Thornbrough v. Gage, 234 Ark. 15, 350 S.W.2d 306 (1961); Hanford Produce Co. v. Clemmons, 242 Ark. 240, 412 S.W.2d 828 (1967); Middleton v. Arkansas Employment Sec. Div., 265 Ark. 11, 576 S.W.2d 218 (1979); Loftin v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 611, 594 S.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1980); Victor Indus. Corp. v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 6, 611 S.W.2d 794 (1981); Area Agency on Aging of W. Cent. Ark., Inc. v. Everett, 279 Ark. 47, 648 S.W.2d 467 (1983); Feagin v. Everett, 9 Ark. App. 59, 652 S.W.2d 839 (1983); Jones v. Singer Career Sys., 584 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
Subchapter 1
— General Provisions
Cross References.
Unemployment compensation income withholding for alimony or support payments, § 9-14-227.
Effective Dates.
Acts 1971, No. 35, § 25: approved Feb. 3, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that an unemployment crisis exists in this State and in order to give better protection to the unemployed and their families extended benefits of the unemployment insurance program should be made available and to alleviate as much as possible the suffering and distress caused by unemployment, it is necessary to work in cooperation with the federal government; and in order to receive the benefits of federal law and comply with the mandate of the United States Congress as provided in United States Public Law 91-373, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”
Acts 1977, No. 366, § 14: Mar. 17, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that various provisions of the Arkansas Employment Security Law of the State are in need of immediate clarification and revision in order to provide adequate protection to the employed and unemployed citizens of this State and that this Act is immediately necessary to accomplish this purpose. An emergency is, therefore, declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”
Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 37, § 11: Dec. 2, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to bring the Arkansas Employment Security Law in conformity with the amendments to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act contained in Public Law 97-35 and to comply with other provisions of Federal law mandated by Public Law 97-35 so that Arkansas employers may continue to receive tax credits accorded by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and so that Arkansas workers may receive unemployment benefits when unemployed and qualified to receive such benefits, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1983, No. 482, § 41: Mar. 16, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to conform with P.L. 97-300 and to bring the Arkansas Employment Security Law in conformity with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act as amended by P.L. 97-248 and to insure the future solvency of the unemployment insurance fund so that Arkansas employers may continue to receive the tax credits accorded by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and that Arkansas workers may receive unemployment benefits when they are unemployed, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1985, Nos. 8, 9, § 34: Jan. 30, 1985. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to bring the Arkansas Employment Security Law into conformity with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended by P.L. 98-21 and P.L. 98-369, so that Arkansas employers may continue to receive the tax credits accorded by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and that Arkansas workers may receive unemployment benefits when they are unemployed, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1987, No. 753, § 30: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to correct certain inequities in the payment and in the denial of benefits to unemployed workers, to make needed technical corrections to the Shared Work plan provisions which enable employers to avoid layoffs and to bring the Arkansas Employment Security Law into conformity with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended, so that Arkansas employers may continue to receive the tax credits accorded by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and that Arkansas workers may receive unemployment benefits when they are unemployed, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1987.”
Acts 1991, No. 100, § 58: July 1, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the provisions of this act should become effective at the beginning of the next fiscal year; that the next fiscal year begins on July 1, 1991 and this act may not go into effect until after July 1, 1991 unless an emergency is declared. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1991.”
Acts 1993, No. 6, § 21: Feb. 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to correct certain inequities in the payment and in the denial of benefits to unemployed workers, to make needed technical corrections and to bring the Arkansas Employment Security Law into conformity with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended, so that Arkansas employers may continue to receive the tax credits accorded by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and that Arkansas workers may receive unemployment benefits when they are unemployed, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1997, No. 234, § 32: Feb. 21, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in order to correct certain inequities in the payment and in the denial of benefits to unemployed workers, to make needed technical corrections and to bring the Arkansas Employment Security Law into conformity with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended, so that Arkansas employers may continue to receive the tax credits accorded by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the Arkansas workers may receive unemployment benefits when they are unemployed. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”
Acts 1999, No. 1116, § 19: Apr. 5, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that in order to correct certain inequities in the payment and in the denial of benefits to unemployed workers, to make needed technical corrections and to bring the Arkansas Employment Security Law into conformity with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended, so that Arkansas employers may continue to receive the tax credits accorded by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the Arkansas workers may receive unemployment benefits when they are unemployed. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”
Acts 2007, No. 490, § 18: Mar. 26, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the act should go into effect as soon as possible in order to make needed technical changes; to enable the state to capture and utilize penalty and interest owing from claimants; and in order that the state might continue to be in compliance with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”
Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.
Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 49 S.W.3d 126 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 12דAct 796 also contains the following declaration of legislative intent at Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 : It is the specific intent of the Seventy Ninth General Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or decisions of any administrative *132 law judge, the…”
Stewart v. Arkansas Glass Container, 366 S.W.3d 358 (Ark. 2010). · cites it 9דArkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-1001 (Repl.2002) declares that if "such things as the statute of limitations .”
Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 984 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 5דLawhon relies on Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996), which is that part of Act 796, entitled “Legislative Declaration,” which provides in part that “it is the specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or…”
Cedar Chem. Co. v. Knight, 273 S.W.3d 473 (Ark. 2008). · cites it 4דMoreover, the legislature has expressly declared that: [T]he extent to which any physical condition, injury or disease should be excluded from or added to coverage . . . shall be addressed by the General Assembly and should not be done by administrative law judges, the Workers'…”
Maverick Transp. v. Buzzard, 10 S.W.3d 467 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 10דAt Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl.1996), the General Assembly declared: It is the specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or decisions of any administrative law judge, the Workers' Compensation Commission,…”
Superior Indus. v. Thomaston, 32 S.W.3d 52 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6דWhen our General Assembly enacted Act 796 of 1993, it issued the following "Legislative Declaration," codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl.1996): The Seventy-Ninth General Assembly realizes that the Arkansas workers' compensation statutes must be revised and amended from…”
Waldrip v. Graco Corp., 270 S.W.3d 891 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 8דSee Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-1001. In this instance, our decisions have not only impermissibly broadened that plain and ordinary meaning but turn on construing the word "drug" to mean something that it does not mean.”
Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 69 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 2דArk. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996). When the meaning of a statutory term is ambiguous, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate…”
Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 958 S.W.2d 538 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 12דUnder the legislative declaration of Act 796, “all prior opinions or decisions of any administrative law judge, the Workers’ Compensation Commission, or courts of this state contrary to or in conflict with any provision in this act” are nullified ( Ark.”
Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 984 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 6דLawhon relies on Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl.1996), which is that part of Act 796, entitled "Legislative Declaration," which provides in part that "it is the specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or…”
Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 950 S.W.2d 472 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4דArk.Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996). Were we to interpret the Act so strictly as to require objective medical evidence to prove nonmedical elements of compensability, we would defeat the overriding legislative intent.”
Collins v. Excel Specialty Prods., 69 S.W.3d 14 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 2דArk. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996). When the meaning of a statutory term is ambiguous, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.