Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as a result of nonsudden stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 97 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability. 106 A.L.R.5th 111.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances. 107 A.L.R.5th 441.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances. 108 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions and requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability. 109 A.L.R.5th 161.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular physical injuries or illnesses. 112 A.L.R.5th 509.

Compensability under occupational disease statutes of emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli. 113 A.L.R.5th 115.

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, Workers' Compensation, Exclusivity, and the “Balderdash” response, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Ark. L. Rev.

Newell, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Smith: Arkansas Employers Are Exposed to Greater Liability, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 503.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Lucy, Workers' Compensation Law: Act 797 of 1993 and the Definition of “Compensable Injury,” 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 265.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Legislature had a rational and legitimate public purpose for distinguishing between mental and physical workers' compensation injuries under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, limiting compensation for mental injuries to 26 weeks, because there was a greater potential for fraudulent claims being advanced for mental injuries, and permitting more extensive benefits for mental injuries would act as a disincentive for workers to devote themselves fully to psychological or psychiatric treatment and recovery. Therefore, subdivision (b)(1) did not violate equal protection under Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 3. Pat Salmon & Sons, Inc. v. Pate, 2009 Ark. App. 272, 307 S.W.3d 46 (2009).

Action by Spouse.

Because action for emotional distress by wife of injured employee was one manifestly premised on a nonphysical injury, and because her injury was not compensable and beyond the scope of coverage of this chapter, the claim was not barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of this chapter. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 329 Ark. 336, 947 S.W.2d 382 (1997).

Bipolar Disorder.

Employee's bipolar disorder was not compensable where there was no testimony as to whether the bipolar diagnosis met the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Hope Livestock Auction Co. v. Knighton, 62 Ark. App. 74, 966 S.W.2d 943 (1998), overruled in part, Polk County v. Jones, 74 Ark. App. 159, 47 S.W.3d 904 (2001).

Although it would be preferable in cases of mental injury or illness for a psychiatrist or psychologist to correlate the basis of his opinion to the DSM criteria, substantial evidence supported the determination that the claimant's bipolar disorder was a compensable work-related injury where a physician, in both his deposition and progress notes, described the claimant's bipolar disorder in such detail that the Workers' Compensation Commission could easily make the finding that the diagnosis met the DSM-IV criteria. Hope Livestock Auction Co. v. Knighton, 67 Ark. App. 165, 992 S.W.2d 826 (1999).

Duration of Compensation.

Court rejected employee's claim that under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, he was entitled to an additional 26 weeks' compensation for mental injuries on top of the more than 26 weeks he had received of temporary total disability benefits. The statute was clearly designed to limit the duration of compensation for mental injuries, not extend it beyond that to which the employee was already entitled. Pat Salmon & Sons, Inc. v. Pate, 2009 Ark. App. 272, 307 S.W.3d 46 (2009).

Evidence.

Where claimant sustained compensable physical injuries, and his primary care physician recommended that he not return to work until he had a psychological evaluation, claimant seeking to determine whether his mental distress was the result of his physical injuries should have been provided with a full psychological evaluation by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. Terrell v. Arkansas Trucking Serv., Inc., 60 Ark. App. 93, 959 S.W.2d 70 (1998).

Compensation denied where the claimant failed to meet the subdivision (a)(2) requirement of showing that the diagnosis of the condition met the criteria established in the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; the burden of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. Branscum v. RNR Constr. Co., 60 Ark. App. 116, 959 S.W.2d 429 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support an award of 26 weeks of disability benefits to the claimant where there was testimony from the claimant, his wife, and two physicians regarding the claimant's problems being around people and functioning in society due to his bipolar disorder. Hope Livestock Auction Co. v. Knighton, 67 Ark. App. 165, 992 S.W.2d 826 (1999).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was correct in affirming the denial of a claimant's request for additional disability benefits for the claimant's mental injury; the claimant failed to show entitlement to compensation by a preponderance of the evidence and the Commission displayed a substantial basis for the denial of the relief requested by the claimant. Marshall v. Madison County, 81 Ark. App. 57, 98 S.W.3d 452 (2003).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his cognitive dysfunction and psychological problems were causally related to his having being accidentally shocked with 440 volts of electricity. Arbaugh v. A.G. Processing, Inc., 360 Ark. 491, 202 S.W.3d 519 (2005).

Substantial evidence was lacking to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding of a compensable mental injury under this section, as there was no medical opinion offered to show that a meat cutter's mental condition was caused by his physical injury. Kroger Ltd. P'ship v. Fee, 2014 Ark. App. 577, 446 S.W.3d 628 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in denying an employee's request for psychological treatment because there was evidence in the record that a licensed counselor and a neurologist diagnosed the employee with a psychological disorder after she sustained an admittedly compensable injury to her head during the course and scope of her employment, and that diagnosis had been reviewed and approved by both a licensed psychiatrist and a psychologist. Kuakahela v. Rose Aircraft Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 350, 465 S.W.3d 1 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission's ruling that a claimant suffered from a major depressive order was reversed where the licensed psychologist's medical evidence established, at best, only four of the five symptoms found by the Commission, there was no time frame to indicate that the claimant's symptoms occurred within the same two-week period or with the frequency required, and thus, the supporting medical evidence did not meet the established criteria for depression in accordance with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Lincoln Pub. Schools v. Secrist, 2016 Ark. App. 315, 496 S.W.3d 396 (2016).

Injury Held Compensable.

Where employee began stuttering and having difficulty walking after receiving an electrical shock, and his physicians concluded that the psychological disorders were the direct result of the electrical shock, and where employee also received a burn on his hand from the shock, i.e., a physical injury, then employee's mental injury was compensable. Dugan v. Jerry Sweetster, Inc., 54 Ark. App. 401, 928 S.W.2d 341 (1996).

Jurisdiction.

Supreme Court of Arkansas did not need to decide whether sexual assault is a crime of violence under this section as a matter of law, because a factual inquiry existed regarding whether the employee's alleged mental injuries were derived from any physical injuries and whether a crime of violence occurred. Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court, 2017 Ark. 94, 513 S.W.3d 838 (2017).

Employer's petition for writ of prohibition was granted because the Workers' Compensation Commission, not the circuit court, had exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions of fact regarding the applicability of the Workers' Compensation Law to the employee's claims. The employee's claims of negligent hiring and retention were claims of negligence, not intentional tort; the question whether the alleged sexual assault arose out of the employment was a factual inquiry; the causal relationship between the alleged physical and mental injuries raised issues of fact relevant to subsection (a) of this section; and the facts as presented in the complaint could not be determined to fall outside the Workers' Compensation Law as a matter of law. Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court, 2017 Ark. 94, 513 S.W.3d 838 (2017).

Requirements.

This section and § 11-9-102(5)(A) set out a requirement that a physical injury precede and cause the mental injury in order for the mental injury to be compensable under this chapter. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 329 Ark. 336, 947 S.W.2d 382 (1997); Amlease, Inc. v. Kuligowski, 59 Ark. App. 261, 957 S.W.2d 715 (1997).

Cited: Phillips v. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't, 52 Ark. App. 170, 916 S.W.2d 128, 1996 Ark. App. LEXIS 116 (1996); Ritchie Grocery v. Glass, 70 Ark. App. 222, 16 S.W.3d 289 (2000).