Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114 (2026)
Heart or lung injury or illness
- A cardiovascular, coronary, pulmonary, respiratory, or cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction causing injury, illness, or death is a compensable injury only if, in relation to other factors contributing to the physical harm, an accident is the major cause of the physical harm.
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- An injury or disease included in subsection (a) of this section shall not be deemed to be a compensable injury unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability or death was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee's usual work in the course of the employee's regular employment or, alternately, that some unusual and unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have been the major cause of the physical harm.
- Stress, physical or mental, shall not be considered in determining whether the employee or claimant has met his or her burden of proof.
History. Acts 1993, No. 796, § 8.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1757, § 9, provided in part:
“Nothing in the act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001, nor in Act 1552 of 1999 shall impliedly repeal any part of Act 796 of 1993. Act 796 of 1993 is expressly reaffirmed by this act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001.”
Research References
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Lucy, Workers' Compensation Law: Act 797 of 1993 and the Definition of “Compensable Injury,” 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 265.
Case Notes
Construction.
Logical interpretation of subdivisions (b)(1) and (2) of this section is that if a heart attack is proved to have been caused by the physical or mental stress arising out of the performance of work that is extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee's usual work, the heart attack is compensable; but where an employee suffers an on-the-job heart attack in the absence of work that is unusual and extraordinary, or in the absence of the occurrence of some unusual or unpredicted incident, it is not compensable, regardless of the level of physical or mental distress the employee experiences. Family Dollar Stores v. Edwards, 97 Ark. App. 156, 245 S.W.3d 181 (2006).
In interpreting the statute, courts hold that preexisting conditions do not preclude a finding that a work-related incident is the major cause of physical harm. Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton, 98 Ark. App. 409, 255 S.W.3d 872 (2007).
Accident as Cause Shown.
An accident was held to be the major cause of the claimant's heart attack where he suffered the attack immediately following exposure to unusually heavy and thick smoke while ventilating the roof of a burning building, and where the work that precipitated the heart attack was unusual and extraordinary because the claimant usually drove a fire truck. City of Blytheville v. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997).
Where an employee had a fatal heart attack while he was assembling lawn tractors and other equipment while at work, and his wife was awarded dependency benefits, it was not error for the Workers' Compensation Commission to find that the work-related conditions were the major cause of the employee's heart attack; the same evidence supporting the Commission's findings that the employee's accident was the major cause of his heart attack and that his work required extraordinary and unusual exertion also supported the Commission's award of dependency benefits. Huffy Serv. First v. Ledbetter, 76 Ark. App. 533, 69 S.W.3d 449 (2002).
Appellate court affirmed a workers' compensation award to the wife of decedent, who had a heart attack after he broke up a fight at school, as a medical doctor testified that the energy expended in breaking up the fight was the major cause of the heart attack and, thus, it was a compensable injury under this section. Dollarway Sch. Dist. v. Lovelace, 90 Ark. App. 145, 204 S.W.3d 64 (2005).
Employee was properly awarded workers' compensation benefits for a heart attack that she suffered one day after she was robbed at gunpoint while working as a cashier as no serious argument could be made that the combined physical exertion and emotional distress that she experienced while being robbed at gunpoint were not “extraordinary and unusual.” Family Dollar Stores v. Edwards, 97 Ark. App. 156, 245 S.W.3d 181 (2006).
Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in denying a widow's claim for temporary total disability benefits and the payment of expenses where the employee's treating physician was resolute in the opinion that the accidental inhalation of chlorine gas was the major precipitating event that led to the employee's respiratory failure, not the employee's HIV or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) in the form of emphysema. Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton, 98 Ark. App. 409, 255 S.W.3d 872 (2007).
Employee's exertion in carrying sheets of drywall on an extremely hot day when the employee assisting him was small and inexperienced were unusual conditions that allowed the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits for a myocardial infarction, or heart attack, under subsection (b) of this section. Ayers Drywall & Insulation v. Carey, 2009 Ark. App. 749, 352 S.W.3d 334 (2009).
Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to an employee, a truck driver, for a compensable injury in the form of a heart attack, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, because exposure to extreme heat while installing a new mud flap on a truck was the major cause of the employee's heart attack and death; despite any preexisting propensities for such an event, the employee had performed the job duties without restrictions. J Mar Express, Inc. v. Poteete, 2011 Ark. App. 122, 381 S.W.3d 159 (2011).
There was substantial evidence to support the denial by an administrative law judge and the Workers' Compensation Commission of an employee's claim pursuant to this section, as the employee did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a compensable heart attack while working for the employer; there was no evidence to show what caused the type of plaque rupture that he suffered. Kimble v. Hino Motors Mfg. United States, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 646 (2012).
Evidence.
A fireman's activities within 48 hours of his death may have been the major cause of his heart attack where those activities included participation in a strenuous encounter and agility test on a very hot and humid day and it appeared that a physician who testified in the proceeding was not aware of the fireman's activities. Williford v. City of Little Rock, 62 Ark. App. 198, 969 S.W.2d 687 (1998).
Substantial evidence supported the decision that the claimant suffered a compensable injury where the claimant testified that he engaged in unusual and extraordinary exertion on the day of employment at issue. Mountain Home Mfg. v. Hafer, 66 Ark. App. 127, 991 S.W.2d 127 (1999).
Finding by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that the truck driver's cardiac injury was work related was supported by substantial evidence when the cardiac incident occurred after the driver assisted others in moving 800 pounds of equipment and the driver's treating cardiologist testified that the strenous work conditions were a major cause of the driver's heart injury. Cloverleaf Express v. Fouts, 91 Ark. App. 4, 207 S.W.3d 576 (2005).
Substantial evidence existed to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant failed to prove a compensable injury. Conflicting medical testimony was for the Commission to resolve, and reasonable minds could determine that the claimant suffered a cardiac arrest for reasons other than work-related heat exhaustion. Robbins v. Hilark Indus., 2017 Ark. App. 431, 526 S.W.3d 895 (2017).