Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-411 (2026)

Case Notes

Construction.

Allowing the offsets pursuant to the clear language of subsection (a) did not violate § 11-9-109, stating that the claimant could not be required to pay the employer's workers' compensation premium. Dooley v. Automated Conveyor Sys., 84 Ark. App. 412, 143 S.W.3d 585 (2004).

When the claimant did not receive any of the additional workers’ compensation benefits awarded because of the offset required by this section of his disability retirement compensation, § 11-9-715 required the employer to pay the injured worker's one-half portion of the attorney's fees due from the workers’ compensation benefits awarded. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).

The General Assembly intended the attorney's fees awarded under § 11-9-715 to have priority over the offset provided for in this section. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).

Plain language of § 11-9-715(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that the attorney's fees awarded will be paid one-half (½) by the employer or carrier in addition to compensation awarded; and one-half (½) by the injured employee or dependents of a deceased employee out of compensation payable to them. The employee’s half comes from the payable amount owed to the employee before any offset. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).

Purpose.

This section applies to retirement-disability benefits, as the overriding purpose of this section is to prevent a double recovery by a claimant for the same period of disability. Henson v. GE, 99 Ark. App. 129, 257 S.W.3d 908 (2007).

Employer's Setoff.

As a general rule, there is ordinarily no reduction of compensation benefits because of payments made from private pensions or health and accident insurance, whether provided by the employer, union, or the claimant himself; however, the employer may be entitled to a setoff where the employer clearly establishes that (1) the claimant has received payments from insurance provided by the employer; and (2) sums paid to the injured employee were intended as advance payments of compensation. Riverside Furn. Co. v. Loyd, 42 Ark. App. 1, 852 S.W.2d 147 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in, Dooley v. Automated Conveyor Sys., 84 Ark. App. 412, 143 S.W.3d 585 (2004).

Only where the employer clearly establishes that sums paid to an injured employee are advance payments of compensation is the employer entitled to any setoff; in all other situations, the employee recovers the full amount of his disability benefits provided under the Workers' Compensation Act. Riverside Furn. Co. v. Loyd, 42 Ark. App. 1, 852 S.W.2d 147 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in, Dooley v. Automated Conveyor Sys., 84 Ark. App. 412, 143 S.W.3d 585 (2004).

Appellate court affirmed a workers' compensation award that denied a school district and its insurer a credit as statutes in Arkansas are to be strictly construed and nothing in this section indicated that the school district and the insurer were entitled to a credit for the life insurance proceeds the decedent's wife received subsequent to his death. Dollarway Sch. Dist. v. Lovelace, 90 Ark. App. 145, 204 S.W.3d 64 (2005).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err under subsection (a) of this section in allowing the Arkansas Second Injury Fund to receive a dollar-for-dollar credit for disability benefits against any workers' compensation payments where the employee conceded that the employee's long-term-disability benefits fit within the definition of a group-disability policy under subsection (a) of this section. Henson v. GE, 99 Ark. App. 129, 257 S.W.3d 908 (2007).

When the employee's left shoulder was injured when a door-hanging mechanism fell, three co-workers witnessed the incident and it was immediately reported to his supervisor; after surgery, a doctor assessed a five-percent whole-person-impairment rating. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission determined that he sustained a compensable injury under § 11-9-102(4)(D) and was entitled to temporary-total-disability benefits; the case was remanded to the Commission to determine whether the employer was entitled to an offset under subdivision (a)(1) of this section for benefits already paid. Potlatch Corp. v. Word, 2009 Ark. App. 772, 359 S.W.3d 426 (2009).

Workers' Compensation Commission provided no facts in support of its conclusion that the Second Injury Fund was not entitled to an offset for VA benefits received by an employee pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Remand was required for additional findings as to whether the VA benefits were related to the period of disability covered by the Fund. Second Injury Fund v. Osborn, 2010 Ark. App. 120 (2010).

As the 2009 statutory amendment to subsection (a) of this section dealt with the substance of a firefighter's entitlement to retirement disability benefits, the statute was substantive and could not be applied retroactively to cover the firefighter's injury; consequently, the city was entitled to an offset against his retirement disability benefits. Clevenger v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. App. 579 (2011).

Workers' compensation award to an employee who sustained a compensable injury and later received disability-retirement benefits through his retirement plan, part of which he had paid for out of his wages, was subject to an offset based on the extent of the employer's contributions to the disability policy under this section. Brigman v. City of West Memphis, 2013 Ark. App. 66 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission correctly determined that, pursuant to this section, the employer was entitled to a setoff in an amount equal to the disability insurance benefits paid to the employee where the employee had suffered only one period of disability, and he had received the disability benefits for a portion of the same period as his workers' compensation disability. Lewis v. Calfrac Well Servs. Corp., 2015 Ark. App. 141, 457 S.W.3d 313 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly determined that the city was entitled to an offset for wage-loss benefits from the Arkansas Local Police and Fire Retirement System where subsection (a) of this section did not limit the type of benefits for which an offset was available, other than via an inapplicable exception, and the Legislature had not amended the statute in light of previous case law allowing such offsets. Bowmaster v. City of Jacksonville, 2016 Ark. App. 572, 507 S.W.3d 526 (2016).

Reduction of Benefits.

Under the plain meaning of the language in subsection (a), it was clear that medical expenses that were paid directly to the medical provider were paid on behalf of the claimant and, thus, the workers' compensation benefits payable to the claimant were properly reduced dollar-for-dollar. Dooley v. Automated Conveyor Sys., 84 Ark. App. 412, 143 S.W.3d 585 (2004).

Cited: Ayers v. Domtar Indus., 2010 Ark. App. 208, 374 S.W.3d 188 (2010).