Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-519 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Workers' Compensation: Value of Expenses Reimbursed by Employer as Factor in Determining Basis for or Calculation of Amount of Compensation Under State Workers' Compensation Statute. 63 A.L.R.6th 187.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Workers' Compensation Laws to Claim for Hearing Loss — Resulting from Long Term Noise Exposure. 99 A.L.R.6th 643 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Statutes limiting recovery for permanent total disability resulting from a second injury while working for the same employer, but leaving open ended the recovery for permanent total disability from a single injury are not unconstitutional as an unreasonable classification, since the purpose is to encourage employers to retain injured employees. Corbitt v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 256 Ark. 932, 511 S.W.2d 184 (1974).

In General.

Benefits claimant was not awarded permanent total disability after an amputation of four fingers in a work-related accident since she could have performed other jobs. The employer offered her another position, which would have allowed her to sit as needed and do janitorial work in administrative offices. Crelia v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 99 Ark. App. 73, 257 S.W.3d 115 (2007).

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division One, declined to conclude that a claimant's residence could be considered in assessing total disability given that subdivision (e)(1) of this section makes no provision for whether employment was available in any particular geographical area and § 11-9-704 requires courts to construe the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law strictly. Birtcher v. Mena Water Utils., 2017 Ark. App. 210, 518 S.W.3d 707 (2017).

Applicability.

Claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits governed by the 1993 amendment of this chapter where she was injured before the effective date of Acts 1993, No. 796, even though she did not suffer a loss in earnings until after the act's effective date. City of Fouke v. Buttrum, 59 Ark. App. 219, 956 S.W.2d 193 (1997).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in interpreting §§ 11-9-521(g) and -519(b) as barring an employee, who suffered a fifty-percent impairment to his left lower extremity, from recovering permanent total disability benefits because he had suffered a scheduled compensable injury to his right leg. In finding that a scheduled-injury claimant was prohibited from entitlement to permanent total disability benefits in excess of the percentage of his physical impairment and that such a claim had to meet the multiple-loss requirements, the Commission impermissibly expanded the statutory prohibition of a claim for permanent partial disability benefits except in a case of multiple losses. McDonald v. Batesville Poultry Equip., 90 Ark. App. 435, 206 S.W.3d 908 (2005).

Burden of Proof.

Where the claimant was prima facie within the former “odd-lot” category based on the Workers' Compensation Commission's factual findings of disability and borderline mental retardation along with the undisputed evidence of claimant's advanced age and lack of education or vocational training, the burden shifted to the employer to show evidence that suitable work was regularly and continuously available to the claimant, and where the employer failed to do so, the claimant was awarded total and permanent disability benefits. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 108, 842 S.W.2d 456 (1992), rehearing denied, 40 Ark. App. 113, 846 S.W.2d 188 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in, Buford v. Standard Gravel Co., 68 Ark. App. 162, 5 S.W.3d 478 (1999).

Although employer argued that the only evidence of employee having muscle spasms was her self-serving testimony and the subjective history that she gave to an emergency room nurse five months after her alleged incident, it was undisputed that, at the time of the accident, the employee was diagnosed as having suffered thoracic and lumbar contusion and strain and that the company physician prescribed a medication for the relief of muscle spasms and other musculoskeletal conditions; thus, employer's argument that there was no medical evidence supporting objective findings of an injury was rejected and employee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Fred's, Inc. v. Jefferson, 89 Ark. App. 95, 200 S.W.3d 477 (2004), aff'd, 361 Ark. 258, 206 S.W.3d 238 (2005).

Substantial evidence supported a determination by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that an employee was not permanently and totally disabled pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, as the employee made no attempt to look for work since his injuries, he offered no functional capacity evaluation or permanent physician's restrictions, and he was still able to engage in at least some recreational activities. Hensley v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2011 Ark. App. 593 (2011).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that an employee failed to prove that the employee was permanently and totally disabled under subdivision (e)(1) of this section after a 400-pound steel bar hit the employee on top of the head because although the employee testified that the employee was still in pain after neck surgery, the employee acknowledged that the employee's symptoms had improved since that time. Kelley v. Cooper Std. Auto., 2011 Ark. App. 665, 386 S.W.3d 570 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant failed to prove that the claimant sustained a compensable head injury in a motor vehicle accident because there were no complaints by the claimant regarding the claimant's head or brain having been injured in the accident until more than two years following the event. Furthermore, there was no evidence that an MRI finding of scarring was related to the accident. Myers v. City of Rockport, 2015 Ark. App. 710, 479 S.W.3d 33 (2015).

Compensation.

Employees of cleaning establishment who worked for the most part at a ranch owned by insured which was maintained primarily for advertising value were entitled to compensation. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 221 Ark. 469, 254 S.W.2d 322 (1953).

If claimant would have been able to work longer if his injuries had not occurred he is entitled to compensation. Minor v. Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co., 235 Ark. 195, 357 S.W.2d 504 (1962).

After the healing period has ended, an injured worker who is totally unable to earn in the same or any other employment the wages he or she was receiving at the time of the injury is entitled to receive current total disability benefits during the continuance of that total disability. Guffey v. Arkansas Secretary of State, 18 Ark. App. 54, 710 S.W.2d 836 (1986), rev'd, 291 Ark. 624, 727 S.W.2d 826 (1987).

Disability.

Substantial evidence supported the award of additional temporary total disability benefits to a claimant based on the injuries he sustained when the bucket of the front-end loader he was driving unexpectedly dropped, causing his face to hit the steering wheel and dashboard. The Arkansas Worker's Compensation Commission credited an ear, nose, and throat specialist's opinion that, after nearly a year of treatment by the specialist, the claimant was unable to perform work of any kind, that he later reached a plateau with regard to the treatment provided by the specialist, but that he needed complete diagnostic testing before a final determination regarding maximum medical improvement could be made. Owens Planting Co. v. Graham, 102 Ark. App. 299, 284 S.W.3d 537 (2008).

Employee should have been awarded temporary total disability benefits where his healing period did not end on November 4, 2004, and the employer and insurer refused to authorize treatment that would be administered for the healing and alleviation of the employee's condition; the employee had not reached maximum medical improvement. Luten v. Xpress Boats & Backtrack Trailers, 103 Ark. App. 24, 285 S.W.3d 710 (2008).

After appellant sustained a compensable injury to his back on January 20, 2005, while taking the front-end loader off of a tractor, his employer and its insurer, paid temporary total disability (TTD) compensation to appellant through June 29, 2005; at that time a doctor assigned, and appellees paid out, a five-percent impairment rating. Where two doctors recommended surgery based on appellant's symptoms of radiculopathy, positive straight leg tests, an MRI, a nerve conduction study, and a CT, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission ignored relevant evidence in finding that appellant was not entitled to additional medical treatment or TDD benefits for his back injury. Diggs v. Cattlemen's Livestock Mkt., Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 249, 306 S.W.3d 20 (2009).

Where the employee sustained compensable knee and back injuries when he fell off a flatbed trailer on May 4, 2005, he was provided workers' compensation benefits and remained off work until December 6, 2005, when a doctor assigned him a five-percent anatomical impairment rating; when the employee returned to the doctor on August 8, 2006, the doctor did not take him off work. When the employee's doctor signed a letter on February 12, 2007, at the request of the employee's attorney to confirm that it was necessary for the employee to remain off work pending additional treatment for his compensable injury, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission considered the doctor's two inconsistent acts and resolved the issue against the doctor's opinion that the employee's condition precluded him from working; the Commission did not err by denying the employee's claim for additional temporary-total disability benefits and medical treatment. Pyle v. Woodfield, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 251, 306 S.W.3d 455 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that an employee did not meet his burden of proving his entitlement to permanent-total or wage-loss disability benefits because the employee's compensable injury did not require surgery, he was issued only a one-percent impairment rating for it, the functional capacity evaluation evaluator concluded that the employee was capable of performing medium work, and neither of the employee's treating physicians opined that he was permanently and totally disabled or that he could not work, and the employee never presented any evidence that no “suitable work” existed for him; there was substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding that the employee was not motivated to return to work because the employee admitted that he had not looked for work within the medium-work classification and that he had not contacted the employer to inquire about positions that were within his restrictions, and the Commission did not arbitrarily disregard the credibility of the employee and his complaints of pain. White v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't, 2009 Ark. App. 768 (2009).

Sixty-one-year-old workers' compensation claimant with a compensable back injury failed to prove that the claimant was permanently and totally disabled because although the claimant could no longer be a construction worker, a functional capacity evaluation showed that the claimant had transferable skills, a college degree, experience, and was capable of performing light duty work. Maulding v. Price's Util. Contrs., Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 776, 358 S.W.3d 915 (2009), rehearing denied, 2010 Ark. App. 51 (2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 222 (Apr. 22, 2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 227 (Apr. 22, 2010).

There was a substantial basis to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that an employee failed to prove that he was permanently and totally disabled because there was evidence demonstrating that the employee was not completely unable to earn meaningful wages; functional capacity evaluations rated the employee in the light-duty category of work, and even after his third surgery, the employee worked for more than a year in a light capacity. Tucker v. Cooper Std. Auto., Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 7, 374 S.W.3d 44 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported the denial of permanent total disability benefits under subdivision (e)(1) of this section, although the claimant presented medical evidence of an inability to work, because the administrative law judge was more persuaded by the opinions of the claimant's treating physician and the functional capacity evaluator that the claimant was capable of performing light-duty work. Evans v. Bemis Co., 2010 Ark. App. 65, 374 S.W.3d 51 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion displayed a substantial basis for denying an employee's claims for permanent total disability under the Worker's Compensation or additional wage-loss benefits because noting the employee's testimony and the reports of his surgeon, the Commission concluded that the only change in physical condition related to his compensable cervical injuries was the fact that his cervical problems had dramatically improved following his third cervical surgery; the Commission found that the employee was vastly improved since its prior decision awarding him benefits. Martin v. Jensen Constr. Co., 2010 Ark. App. 294, 374 S.W.3d 774 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 448 (May 12, 2010).

Employee was properly found not disabled under this section for back strain based on a lack of objective medical evidence and her complete lack of credibility. She denied under oath having prior back problems, yet her medical history was full of back complaints and treatments based on scoliosis and a prior car accident. Harris v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2011 Ark. App. 672 (2011).

Award of permanent total disability benefits to the employee was appropriate pursuant to subsection (c) of this section because the employer offered no proof to rebut the medical opinions that the employee's condition prevented him from working. The fact that the employee testified that he drove on a limited basis and that he drove some 305 miles over 13 hours to attend the hearing was not sufficient to prove that he could earn meaningful wages. City of Forrest City v. Mun. League WCT, 2011 Ark. App. 736, 386 S.W.3d 711 (2011).

Claimant was not entitled to permanent-total-disability benefits under subdivision (e)(1) of this section because, following the claimant's most recent injury, his treating physicians were unable to make any new objective findings, and a functional-capacity evaluation indicated that he was able to perform medium-duty work. Lunday v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 169, 392 S.W.3d 887 (2012).

In light of the claimant's scarce attempts to return to work, her changing testimony regarding her abilities, and the lack of any opinion by a medical or vocational expert that she was unable to work, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying her permanent and total disability benefits under subdivision (e)(1) of this section was supported by substantial evidence. Milton v. K-Tops Plastic Mfg. Co., 2012 Ark. App. 175, 392 S.W.3d 364 (2012).

Although the employee might be right that the factors considered by the Workers' Compensation Commission would also support a claim of total and permanent disability under this section, the court could not make that determination because the Commission's finding of permanent disability was supported in part by the improper odd-lot doctrine finding, and thus the court reversed in this regard and remanded. American Eagle Airlines v. Berndt, 2012 Ark. App. 220 (2012).

Denial of claim for permanent and total disability and an assignment of 25-percent loss in wage-earning capacity was supported by substantial evidence, because the functional capacity evaluation and vocational evaluation both indicated that the employee was capable of performing sedentary and light work; there was no evidence that the employee could not find employment in or successfully perform any of the types of jobs listed in his vocational evaluation, not least of all since the employee never attempted to look for or apply for any job after his injury. Rendell v. Ark. Children's Hosp., 2012 Ark. App. 539 (2012).

Benefits claimant failed to prove that she was permanently and totally disabled under subdivision (e)(1) of this section where a neurosurgeon concluded that the claimant was able to work with restrictions, and a vocational-rehabilitation expert agreed based on the neurosurgeon's opinion and the results of a functional capacity evaluation. Little weight was given to another doctor's opinion that the claimant was unable to work because she relied on subjective and generalized information. Gibson v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 2012 Ark. App. 560 (2012).

In a workers' compensation case, an applicant was found not to be permanently disabled based on an alleged failure to prove an inability to earn any meaningful wage in the same or other employment; there was a substantial basis for reducing the finding of permanent disability to a 40 percent wage-loss disability. It was within the Workers' Compensation Commission's authority to assess that weight and credibility differently than did the administrative law judge. Pruitt v. Community Dev. Inst. Head Start, 2013 Ark. App. 548 (2013).

—In General.

Disability may be paid notwithstanding the fact that compensation was received for specific loss under § 11-9-521. McNeely v. Clem Mill & Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966); Meadowlake Nursing Home v. Sullivan, 253 Ark. 403, 486 S.W.2d 82 (1972); Cooper Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Worth, 256 Ark. 394, 508 S.W.2d 59 (1974); Johnson Constr. Co. v. Noble, 257 Ark. 957, 521 S.W.2d 63 (1975); Henderson State Univ. v. Haynie, 269 Ark. 721, 600 S.W.2d 454 (1980); Bemberg Iron Work v. Martin, 12 Ark. App. 128, 671 S.W.2d 768 (1984); Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985).

Claimant not entitled to maximum weekly compensation benefits in absence of no substantial evidence as to weekly pay or that his earning capacity was decreased beyond the partial disability compensation awarded him. Blann v. Harvill-Byrd Elec. Co., 249 Ark. 456, 459 S.W.2d 567 (1970).

If claimant is totally incapacitated to earn in the same or any other employment the wages he was receiving at the time of his injury, then he is entitled to receive weekly benefits during the continuance of such total disability. Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark. App. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102 (1980).

Claimant entitled to compensation for total disability until the disability ended. Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark. App. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102 (1980).

Where the claimant sustained a hip injury attributable to his broken leg, his problem was not between the hip and the knee, and the hip injury was an injury to the body as a whole. Milburn v. Concrete Fabricators, Inc., 18 Ark. App. 23, 709 S.W.2d 822 (1986).

The word “disability” means loss of earning capacity due to a work-related injury; “impairment” means loss of earning capacity due to a nonwork-related condition; “handicapped” means a physical disability that limits the capacity to work; and “anatomical impairment” means the anatomical loss as reflected by the common usage of medical impairment ratings. Second Injury Fund v. Yarbrough, 19 Ark. App. 354, 721 S.W.2d 686 (1986).

Commission may properly take a claimant's refusal to pursue rehabilitation into account in determining his degree of disability where that refusal hinders the commission's attempts to assess the extent of disability. Where the commission did not consider the claimant's failure to request rehabilitation analysis to be an impediment to its determination of permanent total disability, which it found based upon his physical injury, his age, his second-grade education, and his unskilled manual labor experience, the commission was not required to consider claimant's failure to request rehabilitation in determining the degree of his disability. Second Injury Fund v. Robison, 22 Ark. App. 157, 737 S.W.2d 162 (1987).

Where an employee's disability had been worsened by her diabetes and obesity, which in turn had been exacerbated by the failure to follow diets prescribed for her, there was no evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusions that the employee's disability would be less than total were it not for the flare up of her diabetic condition, and no substantial basis for the commission's conclusion that she failed to prove entitlement. Weller v. Darling Store Fixtures, 38 Ark. App. 95, 828 S.W.2d 858 (1992).

Temporary total disability healing period ends when the employee is as far restored as the permanent nature of the injury will permit; if the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and if nothing in the way of treatment will improve that condition, the healing period has ended. Searcy Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren, 92 Ark. App. 65, 211 S.W.3d 11 (2005).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's analysis of temporary total disability for a back injury was flawed as it was based on the fact that none of the procedures after October 29, 2003, were successful in treating the condition, rather than deciding the issue on the medical evidence that was presented, which showed that employee remained within his healing period and was being treated with the goal of improving his medical condition. Johnson v. Latex Constr. Co., 94 Ark. App. 431, 232 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

—Permanent.

Evidence held sufficient to support finding of total permanent disability. Peerless Coal Co. v. Gordon, 237 Ark. 152, 372 S.W.2d 240 (1963); Arkansas Best Freight Sys. v. Brooks, 244 Ark. 191, 424 S.W.2d 377 (1968); Meadowlake Nursing Home v. Sullivan, 253 Ark. 403, 486 S.W.2d 82 (1972); M.D. Thompson & Son Co. v. McCuan, 255 Ark. 762, 502 S.W.2d 93 (1973); Cooper Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Worth, 256 Ark. 394, 508 S.W.2d 59 (1974); Johnson Constr. Co. v. Noble, 257 Ark. 957, 521 S.W.2d 63 (1975); Aluminum Co. of America v. Wilson, 262 Ark. 602, 559 S.W.2d 710 (1978); Rooney v. Charles, 262 Ark. 695, 560 S.W.2d 797 (1978); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Birdsong, 267 Ark. 922, 593 S.W.2d 54 (1979); Henderson v. Winchester, 268 Ark. 710, 594 S.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1980); Henderson State Univ. v. Haynie, 269 Ark. 721, 600 S.W.2d 454 (1980); Benton Serv. Ctr. v. Pinegar, 269 Ark. 768, 601 S.W.2d 227 (1980); Halstead Indus. v. Jones, 270 Ark. 85, 603 S.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1980); Massey Ferguson, Inc. v. Flenoy, 270 Ark. 126, 603 S.W.2d 463 (1980); Second Injury Fund v. Robison, 22 Ark. App. 157, 737 S.W.2d 162 (1987).

Evidence held insufficient to support finding of total permanent disability. Aluminum Co. of America v. McClendon, 259 Ark. 675, 535 S.W.2d 832 (1976); King v. Farmers Liquid Fertilizer, 267 Ark. 798, 590 S.W.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1979); Hassen v. Wickes Lumber Co., 270 Ark. 922, 606 S.W.2d 611 (1980); Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995).

The question of permanent total disability is an issue of fact and all relevant evidence bearing upon the issue should be considered by the commission. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Birdsong, 267 Ark. 922, 593 S.W.2d 54 (1979).

Opinion of treating physician in workers' compensation proceeding was not objectable because it went beyond functional impairment nor because it embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the commission. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Birdsong, 267 Ark. 922, 593 S.W.2d 54 (1979).

Evidence supported finding that claimant was not permanently totally disabled. Smelser v. S.H. & J. Drilling Corp., 267 Ark. 996, 593 S.W.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1980).

Although the commission's knowledge and experience is not evidence, once it has before it firm medical evidence of physical impairment and functional limitations, it has the advantage of its own superior knowledge of industrial demands, limitations and requirements and can apply its knowledge and experience in weighing the medical evidence of functional limitations together with other evidence of the manner in which the functional disability will affect the ability of an injured employee to obtain or hold a job, and thereby arrive at a reasonably accurate conclusion as to the extent of permanent partial disability as related to the body as a whole. Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982).

The Workers' Compensation Commission is required to consider factors other than mere physical disability in making an award of permanent total disability. Thus, where the physicians assessed the claimant's physical impairment at only 5-10% disability, but the commission found 30% disability, the commission must have considered the claimant's age, education, and training, and since its determination was supported by the evidence, the commission did not err in finding that the claimant was not totally disabled. Johnson v. Research-Cottrell, 15 Ark. App. 48, 689 S.W.2d 8 (1985).

There was sufficient evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's award of permanent disability benefits of 70% to the body as a whole, where the medical expert concurred that the employee could return to work but also agreed that he should curtail activities involving lifting, bending, and twisting his back, and his employment potential lay in work settings that would not require sustained physical exertion that might expose his back to new injury. Del Monte Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Harmon, 19 Ark. App. 51, 716 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

Where employee's present tears identified in his disc were the product of aging, which was predicated upon a natural consequence growing from a compensable injury, the employee was still permanently and totally disabled. Jim Walter Homes v. Beard, 82 Ark. App. 607, 120 S.W.3d 160 (2003).

No substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusion that an employee, who suffered a fifty-percent impairment to his left lower extremity and a scheduled compensable injury to his right leg, was not permanently and totally disabled under § 11-9-519(b) when the Commission relied on a vocational rehabilitation counselor's report about available jobs but the counselor testified that her assessment of available jobs was produced before the psychological and psychiatric reports were made. The Commission ignored the psychological and psychiatric reports, which corroborated the employee's testimony that he was functionally illiterate and which assessed further limitations on his ability to work. McDonald v. Batesville Poultry Equip., 90 Ark. App. 435, 206 S.W.3d 908 (2005).

Court affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission that appellee met his burden of proving entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits under subdivision (e)(1) of this section because substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that appellee was permanently and totally disabled. Appellee clearly could not perform the strenuous kinds of jobs he held prior to his injury, and the Commission accepted his testimony that he was unable to perform sedentary work. American Eagle Airlines & Specialty Risk Servs. v. Berndt, 2013 Ark. App. 230 (2013).

Denial of a claimant's claim for permanent-total-disability benefits was appropriate because substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the claimant's right hand was functional and that the claimant could participate in gainful employment. The Commission found that the claimant's unreliable effort and magnified symptoms during testing were entitled to significant weight. Walker v. Fresenius Med. Care Holding, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 322, 436 S.W.3d 164 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a surgical technician was not permanently and totally disabled was supported by substantial evidence given the similarity to another case in which an employee, who underwent a spinal fusion, used narcotic pain medication, and made little effort to look for work, was found not permanently and totally disabled, and the technician was more educated. Cooper v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 2017 Ark. App. 58, 510 S.W.3d 304 (2017).

Worker retired because of his work-related injuries and associated difficulties with the particular job, and he did not seek other work that he was capable of performing; the Commission's decision denying the worker's claim that he was permanently and totally disabled was upheld, and substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision that the worker sustained 50% wage-loss disability. Hubbard v. Riceland Foods, 2017 Ark. App. 135, 515 S.W.3d 171 (2017).

—Temporary.

Claimant held entitled to temporary total disability benefits. International Paper Co. v. McGoogan, 255 Ark. 1025, 504 S.W.2d 739 (1974); Conway Convalescent Ctr. v. Murphree, 266 Ark. 985, 588 S.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1979); Desoto, Inc. v. Parsons, 267 Ark. 665, 590 S.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1979); Pyles v. Triple F. Feeds of Texas, Inc., 270 Ark. 729, 606 S.W.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1980); Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Farrell, 16 Ark. App. 59, 696 S.W.2d 779 (1985); Chamber Door Indus., Inc. v. Graham, 59 Ark. App. 224, 956 S.W.2d 196 (1997).

Claimant was not entitled to additional compensation for temporary total disability. Wise v. Deltic Farm & Timber Co., 269 Ark. 881, 601 S.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1980).

Claimant held not entitled to temporary total disability benefits after healing period ended. Weeks v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 270 Ark. 151, 604 S.W.2d 566 (1980); Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984) (decided under prior law) Elk Roofing Co. v. Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987).

There was substantial evidence to support finding that claimant was not temporarily totally disabled. Green v. Jacuzzi Bros., 269 Ark. 733, 600 S.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1980).

If during the period while the body is healing, the employee is unable to perform remunerative labor with reasonable consistency and without pain and discomfort, his temporary disability is deemed total. Pyles v. Triple F. Feeds of Texas, Inc., 270 Ark. 729, 606 S.W.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1980).

Temporary disability is a separate and distinct disability from any permanent disability and may be compensated separately. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 271 Ark. 398, 609 S.W.2d 81 (1980), modified, Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1981).

Temporary total disability and the healing period in workers' compensation cases are not the same time periods in all cases since temporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which the employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages under subdivision (5) of § 11-9-102 and this section. Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1981).

Where the employee's claim was originally brought against both the employer and the Second Injury Fund for temporary total disability and medical benefits, the Second Injury Fund was dismissed as a party, and the employee filed his pro se notice of appeal as to the Second Injury Fund only, the appeal was properly dismissed because the employee failed to properly make the employer a party on appeal and the Second Injury Fund was no longer a party. Garland v. Windsor Door, 19 Ark. App. 284, 719 S.W.2d 714 (1986).

The Workers' Compensation Law does not authorize award of current total or limited total disability benefits after the end of the healing period. The concept of current total disability benefits seems to have been based on McNeely v. Clem Mill & Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966); to the extent that McNeely has been interpreted as holding that temporary benefits, regardless of how they are denominated, may be paid after the end of the healing period, that interpretation is erroneous. Arkansas Secretary of State v. Guffey, 291 Ark. 624, 727 S.W.2d 826 (1987).

Recurring symptoms may give rise to a subsequent healing period after the original one has ended. Where a second complication is found to be a natural and probable result of the first injury, the employer remains liable, and this liability includes liability for additional temporary benefits when the employee undergoes a second, distinct healing period. Elk Roofing Co. v. Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987).

In cases controlled by this section, temporary total disability is not based on the claimant's healing period, but is awarded where the claimant's injury-caused incapacity prevents him from earning the wages he was receiving at the time of the injury. County Mkt. v. Thornton, 27 Ark. App. 235, 770 S.W.2d 156 (1989), rehearing denied, County Market v. Thornton, 27 Ark. App. 235, 771 S.W.2d 793 (1989).

Claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits where he failed to prove a compensable, work-related injury. Johnson v. Hux, 28 Ark. App. 187, 772 S.W.2d 362 (1989).

Medical records clearly supported commission's findings that claimant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits for an injury to her back and legs in July 1991 that rendered her unable to return to work until November 1991. W.W.C. Bingo v. Zwierzynski, 53 Ark. App. 288, 921 S.W.2d 954 (1996).

If the underlying condition causing disability has become more stable and if nothing further in the way of treatment will improve that condition, the healing period for which an employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits is ended. Roberson v. Waste Mgt., 58 Ark. App. 11, 944 S.W.2d 858 (1997).

Evidence.

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding temporary total disability benefits to employee for a cervical spine injury after she had injured her back as the finding that employee's healing period had not ended was supported by substantial evidence. Searcy Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren, 92 Ark. App. 65, 211 S.W.3d 11 (2005).

Where appellant employee reported that he sustained a second back injury at work, two MRIs indicated that there were no new objective findings and the record contained competing opinions between physicians. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission chose to credit those which indicated that there were no objective findings of injury; the Commission's decision denying medical and temporary-total disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence. Lamb v. Norac Co., 2009 Ark. App. 730 (2009).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission had a substantial basis upon which to deny a claim for additional medical and temporary-total disability benefits because the workers' compensation benefits claimant underwent two MRIs, and there were new objective findings on the second MRI, according to the radiologist who reviewed both MRIs, and the doctor related claimant's need for treatment to the new injury; the Commission, reviewing the evidence de novo, found that no causal connection between the primary injury and the subsequent disability was shown, eliminating the need to address claimant's conduct. Griffith v. Medcath, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 777 (2009).

This section did not require for a permanent-total-disability (PTD) determination, that a workers' compensation claimant have an impairment rating established by the medical evidence because the statute's plain language contained no such requirement. Thus, the court overruled its decision in Wren v. Sanders Plumbing Supply, 83 Ark. App. 111, 117 S.W.3d 657 (2003), to the extent that the decision held that without an impairment rating, a claimant was not entitled to permanent disability benefits or wage-loss benefits. Rutherford v. Mid-Delta Cmty. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 317, 285 S.W.3d 248 (2008), review denied, Rutherford v. Mid-Delta Cmty. Servs., Inc., — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 507 (Jan. 30, 2009).

Denial of permanent-total disability benefits to the employee was appropriate pursuant to subdivisions (e)(1) and (2) of this section because all of her physicians had returned her to work full-duty with no restrictions and no medical provider indicated that she was unable to work. Greenfield v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 292 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported the denial of permanent total disability, as there was evidence of record that a claimant had transferrable work skills, motivation, and the ability to do some sedentary work. Hixon v. Baptist Health, 2010 Ark. App. 414, 375 S.W.3d 690 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in denying an employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits under subdivision (e)(1) of this section for carpal-tunnel syndrome because the Commission relied on both a functional capacity evaluation, which showed that the employee could do sedentary work, and the employee's college education; the employee could read, write, drive as needed, and perform limited household chores. Kirkendolph v. Department of Fin. & Admin., 2010 Ark. App. 786 (2010).

Finding that the cashier was not permanently and totally disabled under subdivision (e)(1) of this section and was not entitled to an ultrasound recommended by her physician was appropriate because the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was permitted to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Regarding the ultrasound, it was within the province of the Commission to choose to attribute greater weight and credibility to the opinions of one doctor over another. Hruska v. Baxter Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2011 Ark. App. 599, 385 S.W.3d 925 (2011).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err under subdivision (e)(1) of this section in holding that an employee was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits for a spine injury; the employee had not made any effort to pursue vocational rehabilitation in order to go back to work, and the employee was still capable of participating in retail shopping and other daily activities. Efird v. Whelan Sec., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 548, 423 S.W.3d 643 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in denying an employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits under subsection (e) of this section related to a back injury; the case turned on the Commission's evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence regarding the primary issue, the employee's ability to earn meaningful wages. Moore v. Ark. State Highway Transp. Dep't, 2013 Ark. App. 752 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of the worker's claim for permanent total disability for a back injury and the finding that he sustained only a 10 percent wage loss turned on the Commission's assessment of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence, and the denial had a substantial basis, but the wage-loss issue was remanded in light of the reversal of the impairment rating; the Commission did not find that the worker was motivated to return to the workforce, and the Commission considered his age, education, work experience, and the nature of the injury. Thompson v. Mt. Home Good Samaritan Vill., 2014 Ark. App. 493, 442 S.W.3d 873 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly found that an employee failed to prove permanent total disability or entitlement to a greater amount of wage-loss benefits; while he was 57 years old, had not completed the 11th grade, and did not have skills transferable into the light category of work, his true functional capacity level was unknown. The employee gave unreliable effort in the examination and his statements to his doctors and a vocational rehabilitation counselor showed his lack of motivation to return to work, which impeded the Commission's ability to assess the full extent of the employee's current wage-earning capacity. Stauber v. City of North Little Rock, 2015 Ark. App. 54 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that a claimant failed to prove that the claimant was permanently and totally disabled; despite the treating physician's belief that the claimant was totally disabled, the claimant was very intelligent and had transferable and marketable skills that did not involve physically demanding activities and the record was devoid of any physical limitations being placed on the claimant by any of his treating surgeons. Nichols v. Micro Plastics, Inc., 2015 Ark. App. 134 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant was not permanently and totally disabled, but sustained wage-loss disability in the amount of 35% as a result of a shoulder injury because the claimant made no effort to find a job or return to the workforce and no treating physician opined that the claimant was unable to resume any gainful employment. Furthermore, the Commission did not find credible that the claimant was confined to the claimant's bedroom as a result of the injury. Schall v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 2017 Ark. App. 50, 510 S.W.3d 302 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying an employee permanent and total disability benefits where no physician had opined that the employee was permanently and totally disabled, he had returned to light-duty work, the employee was able to drive and care for himself, and there were potential jobs that were not physically demanding. Birtcher v. Mena Water Utils., 2017 Ark. App. 210, 518 S.W.3d 707 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion that the employee suffered compensable mental injuries and that the continued treatment of those injuries was reasonable and necessary was supported by substantial evidence; the employee's medical records noted a depressed mood immediately following his compensable injury. Ark. Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Dunlap, 2017 Ark. App. 637, 535 S.W.3d 674 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that an employee established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to benefits for permanent total disability was supported by substantial evidence because the medical opinions showed that the employee was either completely disabled or, at the very least, had no use of his right arm. Ark. Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Dunlap, 2017 Ark. App. 637, 535 S.W.3d 674 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that an employee was not permanently and totally disabled where the employee testified that he was able to drive, perform household chores, and cook for himself, the employee graduated from high school, and after considering his physical limitations, two vocational rehabilitation assessments identified potential jobs for him in the area. Woods v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 186, 547 S.W.3d 456 (2018).

Hernia.

Where an employee has had good results from a hernia operation and where his total disability results from his susceptibility to the recurrence of the hernia, he is not entitled to benefits for total disability, but is limited to the benefits provided by the hernia provision in § 11-9-523. Smith v. Riceland Food, 261 Ark. 10, 545 S.W.2d 604 (1977).

Partial Disability.

Partial disability decision by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was affirmed for a worker with extremely limited job prospects due to limited education, poor English-speaking ability, and medical restrictions. The worker could not claim permanent and total disability as long as she could earn wages in even a very limited capacity. Khampane v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 2011 Ark. App. 299 (2011).

Wage Earning Loss.

The wage-loss factor rather than the functional or anatomical loss is controlling in disability determinations which are to be made by the commission on the basis of medical evidence, age, education, experience and other matters reasonably expected to affect the claimant's earning power. Rooney v. Charles, 262 Ark. 695, 560 S.W.2d 797 (1978); City of Fayetteville v. Guess, 10 Ark. App. 313, 663 S.W.2d 946 (1984); Perry v. Mar-Bax Shirt Co., 16 Ark. App. 133, 698 S.W.2d 302 (1985).

A worker may be entitled to additional wage loss disability even though his wages remain the same or increase after the injury. City of Fayetteville v. Guess, 10 Ark. App. 313, 663 S.W.2d 946 (1984).

Claimant was within the odd-lot category of workers. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 113, 846 S.W.2d 188 (1993).

Given that, in scheduled injury cases, the nature of the injury is fixed, the finding of permanent and total disability under such circumstances necessarily hinges on factors which bear on the claimant's age, education, experience, and other matters affecting wage loss. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 113, 846 S.W.2d 188 (1993).

Employers are on notice that an employee with a scheduled injury who claims to be permanently and totally disabled will necessarily be presenting proof of wage-loss factors such a mental capacity, education, training, or age, and that a sufficient showing by the claimant will require that the employer show that suitable work is available on a regular and continuous basis; therefore, employer who knew that employee was making a claim for total and permanent disability prior to a hearing was on notice that the odd-lot doctrine was at issue. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 113, 846 S.W.2d 188 (1993).

In determining benefits for a claimant who was employed by two employers in the capacity of a joint employee and who was only working one forty-hour work week, although employee was receiving a check from both employers for the same work week, the commission concluded that claimant was entitled to idemnity benefits based upon his combined wages. Cook v. Recovery Corp., 50 Ark. App. 49, 900 S.W.2d 212 (1995), aff'd, 322 Ark. 707, 911 S.W.2d 581 (1995).

Arkansas Court of Appeals, Division Four, holds that a claimant with a scheduled injury is not entitled to permanent partial disability benefits, and this applies whether the claimant is seeking benefits from an employer, an insurer, or the Arkansas Second Injury Fund. Therefore, a claimant, who lost four fingers in an accident, was unable to obtain wage-loss disability over and above the impairment rating to her hand based on a previous diagnosis of foot ulcers, even if the Fund was liable. Crelia v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 99 Ark. App. 73, 257 S.W.3d 115 (2007).

There was no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the Workers' Compensation Commission that an employee suffered only a 20 percent reduction in earning capacity because the evidence demonstrated that the employee sustained more than a 20 percent wage loss when comparing the wages paid for a press operator job and the subsequent light work the employer offered. Tucker v. Cooper Std. Auto., Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 7, 374 S.W.3d 44 (2010).

Workers' compensation claimant was properly awarded a 25% wage loss disability in excess of his permanent partial impairment given the fact-intensive inquiry; the Workers' Compensation Commission recognized that the claimant was middle-aged, had work experience primarily in the manual labor fields, but also noted that functional evaluations over the years showed his capacity to work in light duty with lifting restrictions. Cossey v. Pepsi Beverage Co., 2015 Ark. App. 265, 460 S.W.3d 814 (2015).

Cited: Lion Oil Co. v. Reeves, 221 Ark. 5, 254 S.W.2d 450 (1952); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961); Abbott v. C. H. Leavell & Co., 244 Ark. 544, 426 S.W.2d 166 (1968); C. Finkbeiner, Inc. v. Flowers, 251 Ark. 241, 471 S.W.2d 772 (1971); Bibler Bros. Lumber Co. v. Allen, 251 Ark. 593, 474 S.W.2d 116 (1971); Oak Lawn Farms v. Payne, 251 Ark. 674, 474 S.W.2d 408 (1971); Coleman's Bar-B-Que v. Fuller, 262 Ark. 645, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978); Browning's Restaurant v. Kuykendall, 263 Ark. 374, 565 S.W.2d 33 (1978); Randall, Burkart/Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Daniels, 266 Ark. 1060, 599 S.W.2d 392 (1979); Model Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Simmons, 268 Ark. 770, 596 S.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1980); Hammer v. Intermed N.W., 270 Ark. 262, 603 S.W.2d 913 (1980); Weeks v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 270 Ark. 151, 604 S.W.2d 566 (1980); Midwest Steel Co. v. Mulanax, 270 Ark. 914, 606 S.W.2d 606 (1980); Mountain Valley Superette, Inc. v. Bottorff, 4 Ark. App. 251, 629 S.W.2d 320 (1982); Vann v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Crain Burton Ford Co. v. Rogers, 12 Ark. App. 246, 674 S.W.2d 944 (1984); C.J. Horner Co. v. Stringfellow, 14 Ark. App. 138, 685 S.W.2d 533 (1985); Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Franklin Collier Farms v. Chapple, 18 Ark. App. 200, 712 S.W.2d 334 (1986); General Indus. v. Gibson, 22 Ark. App. 217, 738 S.W.2d 104 (1987); Brown v. Dow Chem. Co., 875 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1989); Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Hempstead County, 32 Ark. App. 36, 796 S.W.2d 351 (1990).