Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-601 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Labor Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 493.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Even though the Workers' Compensation Commission may not have authority to declare challenged statutes unconstitutional, such issues should first be raised at the administrative law judge or commission level. Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982).

Appellant's constitutional challenge to the silicosis limitations statute failed for lack of proof that an arbitrary classification was involved or the statute was unsupported by a legitimate governmental interest. Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 25 Ark. App. 66, 752 S.W.2d 288 (1988), rehearing denied, 25 Ark. App. 66, 754 S.W.2d 850 (1988), review denied, 297 Ark. 24, 759 S.W.2d 792 (Ark. 1988).

In General.

Occupational diseases are generally gradual rather than sudden in onset. Hancock v. Modern Indus. Laundry, 46 Ark. App. 186, 878 S.W.2d 416 (1994).

Construction.

A proper interpretation of subdivision (e)(2) requires that it be read in conjunction with this chapter as a whole, and particularly those sections dealing with the same subject matter. Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984); Hyman v. Farmland Feed Mill, 24 Ark. App. 63, 748 S.W.2d 151 (1988).

Apportionment.

Subdivision (c)(1) of this section contemplates two situations wherein apportionment is appropriate; the first situation arises when an occupational disease is aggravated by any other noncompensable disease or infirmity, and the second situation arises when a noncompensable disability or death is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational disease. Jenkins v. Halstead Indus., 17 Ark. App. 197, 706 S.W.2d 191 (1986).

There is no requirement in subdivision (c)(1) of this section for the noncompensable disease or infirmity to be independently producing disability before and after the development of the occupational disease in order for it to be apportionable. Jenkins v. Halstead Indus., 17 Ark. App. 197, 706 S.W.2d 191 (1986).

Where there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the occupational disease was aggravated by another disease or infirmity, not itself compensable, and that apportionment was proper, the commission did not err in finding that 92% of the claimant's disability was attributable to smoking, and 8% of his disability was attributable to his occupation. Jenkins v. Halstead Indus., 17 Ark. App. 197, 706 S.W.2d 191 (1986).

Workers' compensation commission erred in holding two healthcare providers equally liable for benefits payable to a nurse who was disabled as a result of sensitivity to latex gloves worn while the nurse was employed by the providers; the appellate court remanded the matter to the commission to assign liability based on when the nurse was last injuriously exposed to latex considering the factor of when her disablement occurred and not merely when the symptoms of the problem manifested themselves. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr. Mgmt. Servs. v. Smith, 75 Ark. App. 246, 58 S.W.3d 858 (2001).

Causal Connection.

Fact that breathing of dust, which aggravated disease, continued over a period of years and damage was gradual and it could not be shown at what exact instant disability occurred was not ground for denying compensation. Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 S.W.2d 31 (1947) (decision under prior law).

The Workers' Compensation Commission is not required to rely upon inference that there is a causal connection between the injury and the disability where there is positive medical testimony to the contrary. The determination of whether the causal connection of the injury to the disability exists is a question of fact for the commission to determine. Carter v. Flintrol, Inc., 19 Ark. App. 317, 720 S.W.2d 337 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998).

Causal connection is generally a matter of inference, and possibilities may play a proper and important role in establishing that relationship. Hope Brick Works v. Welch, 33 Ark. App. 103, 802 S.W.2d 476 (1991).

In workers' compensation cases, medical opinions need not be expressed in terms of reasonable medical certainty in speaking of a causal connection when there is supplemental evidence supporting the causal connection. Hope Brick Works v. Welch, 33 Ark. App. 103, 802 S.W.2d 476 (1991).

Commission's finding of a causal connection between the claimant's silicosis and his employment was supported by substantial evidence. Hope Brick Works v. Welch, 33 Ark. App. 103, 802 S.W.2d 476 (1991).

There was no basis in the record for the Workers' Compensation Commission to find that the claimant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her occupational disease was caused by her employment where her physician testified that the claimant was exposed to substances that were on a warning label and that it “was very likely that these substances caused the trouble,” and he also responded affirmatively when asked whether he believed within a reasonable medical certainty that the claimant's exposure at work was at least 51 percent of the cause of her condition. Howell v. Scroll Techs., 343 Ark. 297, 35 S.W.3d 800 (2001).

Change of Carriers.

Where claimant applied for workers' compensation claiming permanent partial disability caused by an occupational disease, and the employer changed insurance carriers during the period in which he worked, full liability fastened upon the insurer which was on a risk at the time the employee ceased work, absolving any prior insurers regardless of the extremity of progression of the disease, short of cessation of work. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 232 Ark. 113, 334 S.W.2d 701 (1960).

Classification of Condition.

The commission's efforts to categorize a condition as an injury or occupational disease should be based not simply on how the medical profession may characterize a given condition, but rather primarily on factors germane to the purposes of workers' compensation law, which include the general remedial goals of the act, efficiency of future claim handling, the extent to which the classification being considered would encourage safer employment practices, and avoidance of unacceptably high costs to the system. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990).

In determining whether a condition is an injury or occupational disease, where the ambiguity of the statutory language permits alternative interpretations, the workers' compensation commission and courts should generally resolve the ambiguity in favor of claimants. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990).

In determining whether a condition is an injury or an occupational disease, the initial presumption should be that conditions on the pre-1976 schedule of compensable occupational diseases were still to be handled under former A.S.A § 81-1314 (see now §§ 11-9-601 — 11-9-603), although the commission is not required to do so since the schedule has been repealed. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990).

Where the evidence showed that the appellant's traumatic injury resulted from a single injurious exposure and was sudden in its onset, the commission erred in characterizing it as an occupational disease rather than an injury. Hancock v. Modern Indus. Laundry, 46 Ark. App. 186, 878 S.W.2d 416 (1994).

Where an employee acquired a serious infection through scratches obtained during the course of employment, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred by requiring the employee to prove that the infection was an occupational disease; the employee was only required to establish a causal link between the scratches and the infection in order to show a compensable accident injury under § 11-9-102(4)(a). Heptinstall v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 84 Ark. App. 215, 137 S.W.3d 421 (2003).

Evidence.

Worker fell within the odd-lot category, and commission's finding of permanent and total disability was supported by substantial evidence. Hyman v. Farmland Feed Mill, 24 Ark. App. 63, 748 S.W.2d 151 (1988).

Where only one of four experts testified that the claimant's symptoms were caused by exposure to toxic chemicals, the evidence was sufficient to support the Commission's determination that the claimant was not entitled to benefits for an occupational disease. Johnson v. Democrat Printing & Lithograph, 57 Ark. App. 274, 944 S.W.2d 138 (1997).

Exclusivity.

Circuit court properly dismissed an estate's wrongful-death and survival action against a decedent's employer on the ground that the claims fell within the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Law because the claims were within the coverage formula of the law, even though the decedent was ultimately denied recovery due to his asbestos claim being time-barred under the law. Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc., 2016 Ark. 453, 506 S.W.3d 230 (2016).

False Representation.

A false representation as to a physical condition in procuring employment will preclude the benefits of this chapter for an otherwise compensable injury if it is shown that the employee knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition, the employer relied upon the false representation, which reliance was a substantial factor in the employment, and there was a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Shippers Transp. v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365, 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979).

Injury.

Evidence must show that injury was cause of sickness which resulted in claimant's death before recovery can be had for wrongful death under this chapter. Springdale Monument Co. v. Allen, 216 Ark. 426, 226 S.W.2d 42 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Liability.

Employer's obligation was for the disability of the claimant which was caused by the occupational disease, not only the loss of the use of the lungs which was caused by claimant's occupational disease. Quality Serv. Railcar v. Williams, 36 Ark. App. 29, 820 S.W.2d 278 (1991).

Occupational Diseases.

Evidence sufficient to establish that claimant suffered from compensable occupational disease. Solid Steel Scissors Co. v. Kennedy, 205 Ark. 958, 171 S.W.2d 929 (1943); Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 671, 238 S.W.2d 640 (1951) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Heidelberger, 267 Ark. 971, 593 S.W.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1980); Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984).

Evidence insufficient to establish that claimant was suffering from occupational disease. Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951); Taylor v. McAdams, 270 Ark. 707, 606 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

Where the undisputed facts showed that ischial bursitis was caused by constant and repeated pressure on the parts affected, such condition was an occupational disease within the meaning of this section. Brown Shoe Co. v. Fooks, 228 Ark. 815, 310 S.W.2d 816 (1958).

Where it is shown that condition resulted from the position the employee had to maintain during the employment it could be an occupational disease and it is not necessary to show whether the same condition affected any coworkers. Brown Shoe Co. v. Fooks, 228 Ark. 815, 310 S.W.2d 816 (1958).

An occupational hazard is quite different from occupational diseases defined in this section. Neal v. Hanford Produce Co., 256 Ark. 1074, 511 S.W.2d 636 (1974).

Salmonella infection held to be occupational disease. Dega Poultry Co. v. Tanner, 259 Ark. 396, 533 S.W.2d 207 (1976).

In construing subdivision (e)(3), the fact that the general public may contract the disease is not controlling; the test of compensability is whether the nature of employment exposes the worker to a greater risk of that disease than the risk experienced by the general public or workers in other employments. Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984).

An occupation disease is characteristic of an occupation, process or employment where there is a recognizable link between the nature of the job performed and an increased risk in contracting the occupational disease in question. Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984).

Claimant's histoplasmosis was the type of infection which is compensable under this section. Osmose Wood Preserving v. Jones, 40 Ark. App. 190, 843 S.W.2d 875 (1992).

Because employee's development of sinus difficulties as a result of exposure to mold in the classroom was peculiar and characteristic of particular employment which exposed her to a greater risk of that disease, employee sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of her employment. Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Gourley, 50 Ark. App. 1, 899 S.W.2d 482 (1995).

Although the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission contained a thorough discussion of the existence of objective findings to support the existence of a compensable injury and on the causal relationship between the injury and work, the Commission's findings were lacking with regard to the substantive claim because the Commission made no findings on the issue of how the claim fit within the occupational disease construct under subdivision (g)(1)(A) of this section. Pharmerica v. Seratt, 103 Ark. App. 9, 285 S.W.3d 699 (2008).

Proof.

Employee had the burden of proving that disease was the result of treatment for an occupational back injury which was compensable. Tigue v. Caddo Minerals Co., 253 Ark. 1140, 491 S.W.2d 574 (1973).

In a claim for occupational disease, a claimant cannot prevail on a mere preponderance of the evidence. The causal connection between the occupation or employment and the occupational disease must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Arkansas Dep't of Cor. v. Chance, 271 Ark. 472, 609 S.W.2d 666 (1980).

The characterization of claimant's injury affects the burden of proof. If claimant's condition is an “injury,” she has the burden of proving that it arose out of and in the course of her employment by a preponderance of the evidence; but if her condition is an “occupational disease,” a causal connection between the employment and the disease must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990).

Employee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plantar fasciitis (heel spurs) was caused or aggravated by her employment. Jackson v. Poulan/Weed Eater, 46 Ark. App. 18, 876 S.W.2d 276 (1994).

Statute of Limitations.

The statute of limitations was tolled by the payment of compensation in the form of medical benefits not included in the disability payments credited by the insurance carriers to its group coverage. Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 257 Ark. 587, 518 S.W.2d 499 (1975).

Cited: Tri State Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 254 Ark. 944, 497 S.W.2d 39 (1973); Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 257 Ark. 587, 518 S.W.2d 499 (1975); Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 293 Ark. 499, 739 S.W.2d 161 (1987); Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 25 Ark. App. 66, 752 S.W.2d 288 (1988).