Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-707 (2026)

Case Notes

Construction.

In determining whether a disputed claim under the former Workers' Compensation Law should be allowed, the terms of that law were given a liberal interpretation in favor of the claimant. Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 S.W.2d 31 (1947) (decision under prior law).

Applicability.

The provisions contained in former Workers' Compensation Law that there was presumption that a claim came within the provisions of that law was omitted by current Workers' Compensation Law and there now is no such presumption. John Bishop Constr. Co. v. Orlicek, 224 Ark. 182, 272 S.W.2d 820 (1954).

Evidence.

Evidence sufficient to support finding by the commission that injuries which caused employee's death were sustained in the course of his employment and to justify compensation award in view of presumption created by this section. Garrison Furn. Co. v. Butler, 206 Ark. 702, 177 S.W.2d 738 (1944) (decision under prior law).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that employer was not estopped to assert the defense of intoxication was supported by substantial evidence. Blevins v. Safeway Stores, 25 Ark. App. 297, 757 S.W.2d 569 (1988).

Intoxication.

In compensation proceeding, the burden was on the employer to show that employee's death resulted solely from his intoxicated condition. Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark. 257, 180 S.W.2d 113 (1944); Cox Bros. Lumber Co. v. Jones, 220 Ark. 431, 248 S.W.2d 91 (1952) (preceding cases decided under prior law).

Employer held liable for compensation as result of watchman being hit by train even though watchman had been drinking, if reason for watchman being hit by train was entirely speculative. Cox Bros. Lumber Co. v. Jones, 220 Ark. 431, 248 S.W.2d 91 (1952) (decision under prior law).

Presumption against intoxication as cause of injury was overcome where there was testimony as to the deceased's blood-alcohol level and no proof of another cause of the automobile accident. Goza v. Central Ark. Dev. Council, Inc., 254 Ark. 694, 496 S.W.2d 388 (1973).

Prior to 1993, there was a prima facie presumption under former subdivision (4) of this section that an injury did not result from intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; now however, under § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (now § 11-9-102(4)), the presence of an intoxicant creates a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of the intoxicant. Weaver v. Whitaker Furn. Co., 55 Ark. App. 400, 935 S.W.2d 584 (1996).

Until 1993, a prima facie presumption existed that an injury did not result from intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; Acts 1993, No. 796 changed that presumption by deleting former subdivision (4) of this section and amending § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (now § 11-9-102(4)). Brown v. Alabama Elec. Co., 60 Ark. App. 138, 959 S.W.2d 753 (1998), review denied, 334 Ark. 35, 970 S.W.2d 807 (1998).

Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction of the commission over the employer also gave it jurisdiction over the insurance carrier. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tuggle, 270 Ark. 106, 603 S.W.2d 452 (1980).

The Workers' Compensation Commission had jurisdiction to decide whether there was a workers' compensation policy in force at the time of the injury of farmworker and weather such worker was an employee. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tuggle, 270 Ark. 106, 603 S.W.2d 452 (1980).

Where employee asserted a cause of action in circuit court based in part on this chapter and in part on the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., the circuit court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction. Malone v. Trans-States Lines, 325 Ark. 383, 926 S.W.2d 659 (1996).

Evidence held sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of jurisdiction where (1) the claimant truck driver testified that she resided in Alabama, that she was hired in Georgia, and that her employer was located in Texas, and (2) the employer stipulated that it did not have an office or employees in Arkansas and the claimant did not disagree with that stipulation. Baker v. Frozen Food Express Transp., 63 Ark. App. 100, 974 S.W.2d 487 (1998), substituted opinion, 981 S.W.2d 101 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998).

The presumption of jurisdiction was rebutted where the injured truck driver's sole connection with Arkansas was that the accident occurred in Arkansas and the employer's sole connections were the existence of a designated fuel stop and an unsupervised drop yard in Arkansas; the employment relationship was entered into in Georgia, the driver was paid from Texas, the driver carried out her duties throughout the United States and Canada, and she was a resident of Alabama. Baker v. Frozen Food Express Transp., 336 Ark. 451, 987 S.W.2d 658 (1999).

Question of Fact a Law.

The statutory presumption that an injury is not occasioned by the willful intention of the employee in subsection (3) is a rebuttable one, however the issue of whether it was overcome by the evidence is a question of fact for the Workers' Compensation Commission to determine. Eagle Safe Corp. v. Egan, 39 Ark. App. 79, 842 S.W.2d 438 (1992).

Suicide.

Where employee of sand and gravel plant was killed during working hours on company property and his body was found at a place where he might properly have been in the performance of acts which, though personal, were incidental to the employment, there was a prima facie presumption against suicide. Williams v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 227 Ark. 340, 298 S.W.2d 323 (1957).

Cited: Country Pride v. Holly, 3 Ark. App. 216, 624 S.W.2d 443 (1981); Baker v. Frozen Food Express Transp., 63 Ark. App. 100, 974 S.W.2d 487 (1998).