Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in Arkansas, 11 Ark. L. Rev. 352.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

Fifteenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 427.

Case Notes

Note. Prior to the 1976 amendment, appeals from commission orders were made to the circuit court. The 1976 amendment provided for appeals directly to the Supreme Court. Since the 1979 amendments, appeals have been made to the Court of Appeals. These changes should be kept in mind with respect to the following notes.

Constitutionality.

Former provision for automatic affirmance of the award of the Workers' Compensation Commission upon failure of the circuit court to reverse, modify, or remand the award or to set it aside within 60 days was unconstitutional as a usurpation of a judicial function by the legislature. Sands v. Albert Pike Motor Hotel, 245 Ark. 755, 434 S.W.2d 288 (1968) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

Former provision allowing direct appeal of cases from the commission to the Supreme Court, was unconstitutional under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 4 which provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only. Ward School Bus Mfg., Inc. v. Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 547 S.W.2d 394 (1977) (decision prior to 1979 amendments).

By allowing the Workers' Compensation Commission to review the evidence or, if deemed advisable, hear the parties, their representatives, and witnesses, § 11-9-704(b)(6)(A) adequately protects a claimant's due process rights; thus, the commission does not err and violate a claimant's right to due process by substituting its own credibility determinations for that of the law judge. Stiger v. State Line Tire Serv., 72 Ark. App. 250, 35 S.W.3d 335 (2000).

In General.

Cause of action of claimant under this chapter was purely statutory precluding right to insist upon any judicial review except that which the legislature saw fit to provide. J.L. Williams & Sons v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943).

This chapter limits the setting aside of an award of the Workers' Compensation Commission to four instances and also provides that there shall not be a trial de novo on appeal. John Bishop Constr. Co. v. Orlicek, 224 Ark. 182, 272 S.W.2d 820 (1954).

The statute was intended to remain in force as an exception to the later and more general enactment of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rogers v. International Paper Co., 66 Ark. App. 34, 988 S.W.2d 23 (1999).

Construction.

The circuit court must abide by the rules set out by this section in the construction of this chapter. Fort Smith Couch & Bedding Co. v. Jones, 231 Ark. 790, 332 S.W.2d 817 (1960) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

The Arkansas Supreme Court did not intend that subsection (b) be superseded by ARAP 4. Sunbelt Couriers v. McCartney, 31 Ark. App. 8, 786 S.W.2d 121, aff'd, 303 Ark. 522, 798 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1990).

Applicability.

An Arkansas resident who entered into an employment contract with a corporation maintaining an office in Arkansas having control over the employment which was not at any fixed location came under this chapter, even though his injury occurred in another state in which all of his employment was performed. International Paper Co. v. Tidwell, 250 Ark. 623, 466 S.W.2d 488 (1971).

Administrative Law Judge Order.

Where the finding of an administrative law judge is supported by substantial evidence, the rule is well settled that the Court of Appeals will affirm such a finding on appeal. Saint Vincent Infirmary v. Carpenter, 268 Ark. 951, 597 S.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1980).

The duty of the Workers' Compensation Commission is to make a finding in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence and not on whether there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of the administrative law judge. Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982).

When a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is appealed to the Court of Appeals, no weight is given to the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge. Smart v. Biggs, 26 Ark. App. 141, 760 S.W.2d 882 (1988).

Evidence.

The Workers' Compensation Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence as it does any other evidence, and if the evidence is conflicting, the resolution of the conflict is a question of fact for the Commission. Beeson v. Landcoast, 43 Ark. App. 132, 862 S.W.2d 846 (1993).

Employer's argument that the Workers' Compensation Commission relied on outside materials was rejected where the majority opinion affirmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion, which made no reference to nor gave any consideration to online sources. Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Corr. v. Barclay, 2017 Ark. App. 214, 518 S.W.3d 138 (2017).

Failure to Appeal.

Right of appeal from final award is not lost by failure to appeal from temporary and provisional award. Caddo Quicksilver Corp. v. Barber, 204 Ark. 985, 166 S.W.2d 1 (1942).

The court without reservation could accept the evidence that a letter was properly addressed and stamped to the Workers' Compensation Commission and duplicate letters or copies of the original mailed to other parties; while this evidence of itself raised a presumption factually that the letter evincing a desire to appeal from award made by the referee was received, this presumption disappeared and was dissolved when the receipt of the letter was denied by the addressee, Workers' Compensation Commission. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Martin, 229 Ark. 1065, 320 S.W.2d 266 (1959).

Employee who did not appeal from order of full commission could not maintain action for damages in separate proceeding at law arising from alleged civil conspiracy to defraud him by intentional submission of false and misleading medical reports by defendants as evidence in proceeding before Workers' Compensation Commission. Ragsdale v. Watson, 201 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Ark. 1962).

Finality.

An order retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the end of healing period and the extent of permanent disability was final for the purposes of review on a petition filed after the expiration of 30 days. Luker v. Reynolds Metals Co., 244 Ark. 1088, 428 S.W.2d 45 (1968).

The commission order setting aside a judgment for the claimants and opening up the record for the taking of additional evidence, was not a final order which was appealable. Cooper Indus. Prods. v. Meadows, 269 Ark. 966, 601 S.W.2d 275 (1980).

This section does not state the award becomes final only after 30 days, but rather that it shall become final unless some action is taken by either or both parties to the dispute to prevent the order from becoming final. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't v. Godwin, 270 Ark. 743, 606 S.W.2d 127 (1980); White v. Air Sys., Inc., 33 Ark. App. 56, 800 S.W.2d 726 (1990).

Opinion of administrative law judge, which was filed and from which no appeal was taken within the 30-day requirement, became a final order or award, and “amended opinion” filed two months later did not amend the first opinion. Colson Co. v. Fields, 20 Ark. App. 187, 726 S.W.2d 296 (1987).

An order of the Worker Compensation Commission is ordinarily reviewable only at the point where it awards or denies compensation. Mid-State Constr. v. Sealy, 26 Ark. App. 186, 761 S.W.2d 951 (1988); TEC v. Falkner, 38 Ark. App. 13, 827 S.W.2d 661 (1992).

Worker's Compensation Commission's jurisdictional finding was purely an incidental issue and was not appealable. Mid-State Constr. v. Sealy, 26 Ark. App. 186, 761 S.W.2d 951 (1988).

Court order remanding case for administrative law judge to determine claimant's appropriate wage rate and periods of temporary total disability, and to make an award in accordance with those determinations, is not a final order and is not appealable. American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 801 S.W.2d 55 (1991).

In order for the court to review a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, the order from which the parties appeal must be final; thus, where a claim that is remanded to the law judge by the commission for the taking of additional evidence and one that does not award compensation for monetary benefits must be dismissed by the court for lack of a final order. Humphrey v. Faulkner Nursing Ctr., 61 Ark. App. 48, 964 S.W.2d 224 (1998).

Worker's appeal from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because the Commission had not yet entered a final order in the worker's case; although the Commission had rejected the worker's claim that she had suffered additional compensable injuries, it had not resolved her claims for additional medical treatment and for temporary total disability benefits in connection with the compensable injuries that she suffered to her left ankle and foot. Erwin v. Riverside Furniture Corp., 97 Ark. App. 42, 244 S.W.3d 14 (2006).

—Modification of Order.

Due process of law dictates that an employee who has been denied benefits should be afforded the same opportunity to have his claim reconsidered where he has discovered subsequently to the denial of benefits that his was a meritorious claim. Walker v. J & J Pest Control, 270 Ark. 941, 606 S.W.2d 597 (1980).

Although this chapter does not provide for rehearing or reconsideration procedures, the commission does have the authority under § 11-9-713 to modify a final award, but only upon a showing of a change in physical condition or proof of an assignment of an erroneous wage rate. Cooper Indus. Prods. v. Meadows, 5 Ark. App. 205, 634 S.W.2d 400 (1982).

Where an administrative law judge filed an opinion denying claimant additional benefits and claimant did not file a timely appeal from that order, a subsequent attempt by the administrative law judge to amend his original order and award benefits to the claimant based on a doctor's clarification of the claimant's disability was improper, because the order denying benefits became final when no appeal was sought within 30 days. Cooper Indus. Prods. v. Meadows, 5 Ark. App. 205, 634 S.W.2d 400 (1982).

The doctrine of res judicata, forbidding the reopening of matters once judicially determined by competent authority, applies to the decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission; having once determined that the claimant only suffered a 55% permanent disability to the body as a whole, the commission cannot 12 years later say that the claimant was totally disabled at that earlier time. Tuberville v. International Paper Co., 18 Ark. App. 210, 711 S.W.2d 840 (1986).

Interest.

Where award was not made until one and one half years after death, claimants could not request Supreme Court to allow interest from date of death because of the delay where no interest was allowed in award, the circuit court affirmed the award with interest from date of final award and no appeal was prosecuted on the question of interest. Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d 573 (1947) (decision under prior law).

A claim for what is believed the full amount of interest is not limited by this section, where a timely protest is made after claimants learn from insurer's tender of payment that the full amount of interest was not being offered. Clemons v. Bearden Lumber Co., 240 Ark. 571, 401 S.W.2d 16 (1966).

Judicial Review.

Where the Workers' Compensation Commission made no findings as to whether the claimant sustained a compensable injury, or when the healing period ended if there was a compensable injury, or whether she was disabled at the time of the hearing, and if so, what was the cause of disability, the Court of Appeals was unable to tell from the record upon what factual basis the claim was denied and whether the commission erred in its application of the law; therefore, reversal and remand was appropriate. Wright v. American Transp., 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986).

In considering an appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission on the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court of Appeals reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the commission's findings; and the court must uphold the commission's findings if there is any substantial evidence to support them, even if the preponderance of the evidence would indicate a different result. Tahutini v. Tastybird Foods, 18 Ark. App. 82, 711 S.W.2d 173 (1986); Smart v. Biggs, 26 Ark. App. 141, 760 S.W.2d 882 (1988); Bates v. Frost Logging Co., 38 Ark. App. 36, 827 S.W.2d 664 (1992).

In order to reverse a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, the Court of Appeals must be convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the commission; the question is not whether the evidence would support findings contrary to those made by the commission, but whether the evidence supports the findings made by the commission. Franklin Collier Farms v. Chapple, 18 Ark. App. 200, 712 S.W.2d 334 (1986); Public Employee Claims Div. v. Tiner, 37 Ark. App. 23, 822 S.W.2d 400 (1992).

The findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission must be upheld unless there is no substantial evidence to support them. Price v. Little Rock Packaging Co., 42 Ark. App. 238, 856 S.W.2d 317 (1993).

The appellate court will not reverse a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission unless convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Price v. Little Rock Packaging Co., 42 Ark. App. 238, 856 S.W.2d 317 (1993).

When reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission on appeal, the appellate court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Beeson v. Landcoast, 43 Ark. App. 132, 862 S.W.2d 846 (1993).

On appellate review, the duty of the court is to review questions of law only. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

The substantial evidence test applicable for judicial review of a commission decision means that the commission should not be reversed unless it is clear that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same result if presented with the same facts; the substantial evidence standard of appellate review means that the appellate court must affirm the commission if fair-minded people could have reached the same result after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the result that the commission reached. Hubley v. Best Western-Governor's Inn, 52 Ark. App. 226, 916 S.W.2d 143 (1996), superseded by statute as stated in, Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998). But see Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 341 Ark. 527, 20 S.W.3d 280 (2000).

Employer's delay in paying the filing fee for an appeal did not extend or delay the deadline for lodging the record with the appellate court as nothing in either § 11-9-711(b)(1)(C) or Ark. Workers' Comp. Comm'n R. 18 indicated that the Workers' Compensation Commission would not consider a notice of appeal to have been filed until the filing fee had been paid. Waste Mgmt. v. Estridge, 210 S.W.3d 869 (2005).

—Filing of Record.

The record on appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission should be filed in the Court of Appeals within 90 days from the filing of the notice of appeal as is required in other civil actions. Davis v. C & M Tractor Co., 2 Ark. App. 150, 617 S.W.2d 382 (1981).

Denial of employer's motion for rule on the clerk to accept an untimely record was affirmed as Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 5 required the records to be filed within 90 days of the notice of appeal being filed and the employer tendered the record outside of the ninety-day time period; employer's claim that the time for filing the record did not begin to run until it paid its $15.00 processing fee under subdivision (b)(1)(C) of this rule was in error. Waste Mgmt. v. Estridge, 210 S.W.3d 869 (2005).

—Findings of Fact.

There is no requirement in the Workers' Compensation Act that the court, on review of the commission's decisions, make detailed findings of fact or state specific conclusions of law. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979).

While it is the function of the Workers' Compensation Commission, and not the appellate courts, to act as fact finder in workers' compensation cases, it is the duty of the appellate court to reverse the Commission's decision when convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 113, 846 S.W.2d 188 (1993).

When the commission denies compensation, it is required to make findings sufficient to justify that denial, containing all the specific facts relevant to the contested issue so the reviewing court may determine whether the commission has resolved these issues in conformity with the law. Shelton v. Freeland Pulpwood, 53 Ark. App. 16, 918 S.W.2d 206 (1996).

Where the commission adopted the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge as its own and where that opinion was almost exclusively a recitation of testimony, rather than findings based on that testimony, the commission failed to make specific findings of the fact on which it relied to support its decision. Shelton v. Freeland Pulpwood, 53 Ark. App. 16, 918 S.W.2d 206 (1996).

—Remand.

Where court had remanded case to commission to obtain additional evidence since it felt that there was insufficient evidence to allow claim but that the evidence was not sufficient to justify denial of claim, it was proper for court to remand the case a second time for a complete investigation as to whether or not claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and whether or not he suffered from an occupational disease. Ward Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Reather, 234 Ark. 151, 350 S.W.2d 691 (1961).

Court had no authority to determine the amount of the award and should remand the cause to the commission for the determination of the proper award. W.C. Burrow Constr. Co. v. Langley, 238 Ark. 992, 386 S.W.2d 484 (1965) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

Where the administrative law judge summarized the testimony of the witnesses and did not make findings of fact based on that testimony, the court of appeals could not ascertain whether the commission correctly applied the law in denying benefits and therefore remanded the case for the commission to make specific findings of fact upon which it relied in making its decision. Hardin v. Southern Compress Co., 34 Ark. App. 208, 810 S.W.2d 501 (1991).

Where employee's right to a one-time change of physician under § 11-9-514(a)(3)(A)(ii) was mandatory, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of that right and its finding that the employer had fulfilled the obligation of providing adequate medical treatment, diagnostic testing, and consultation with specialists, under the provisions of § 11-9-508 was not supported by substantial evidence. Collins v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 77 Ark. App. 303, 75 S.W.3d 204 (2002).

—Scope.

Court must give to findings of fact by the commission the same force and effect as a jury's verdict when supported by substantial evidence. Lundell v. Walker, 204 Ark. 871, 165 S.W.2d 600 (1942); J.L. Williams & Sons v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943); Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429 (1944), overruled in part, Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1964); Johnson v. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co., 206 Ark. 1016, 178 S.W.2d 249 (1944); Kloss v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 207 Ark. 115, 179 S.W.2d 172 (1944); Fordyce Lumber Co. v. Shelton, 206 Ark. 1134, 179 S.W.2d 464 (1944); Barrentine v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 207 Ark. 527, 181 S.W.2d 485 (1944), overruled in part, Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1964); E.H. Noel Coal Co. v. Grilc, 215 Ark. 430, 221 S.W.2d 49 (1949) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Pearson v. Faulkner Radio Serv. Co., 220 Ark. 368, 247 S.W.2d 964 (1952); American Cas. Co. v. Jones, 224 Ark. 731, 276 S.W.2d 41 (1955); Hollifield v. Bird & Son, 227 Ark. 703, 301 S.W.2d 27 (1957); Fagan Elec. Co. v. Green, 228 Ark. 477, 308 S.W.2d 810 (1958); South Ark. Feed Mills, Inc. v. Roberts, 234 Ark. 1035, 356 S.W.2d 645 (1962); Arkansas Coal Co. v. Steele, 237 Ark. 727, 375 S.W.2d 673 (1964); Wilson & Co. v. Christman, 244 Ark. 132, 424 S.W.2d 863 (1968); Pearson v. Lake Lawrence Pulpwood Co., 247 Ark. 776, 447 S.W.2d 661 (1969); Treadway v. Riceland Foods, 268 Ark. 658, 594 S.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1980); Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark. App. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102 (1980); Smart v. Biggs, 26 Ark. App. 141, 760 S.W.2d 882 (1988).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain commission's findings. J.L. Williams & Sons v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943); Baker v. Silaz, 205 Ark. 1069, 172 S.W.2d 419 (1943); Harris Motor Co. v. Pitts, 212 Ark. 145, 205 S.W.2d 21 (1947); Burdine v. Partee Flooring Mill, 218 Ark. 60, 234 S.W.2d 193 (1950) (preceding decisions under prior law); Independent Stave Co. v. Fulton, 251 Ark. 1086, 476 S.W.2d 792 (1972); Ethridge v. Alexander Brown & Associates, 258 Ark. 444, 527 S.W.2d 591 (1975); Hawthorne v. Davis, 268 Ark. 131, 594 S.W.2d 844 (1980); Smart v. Biggs, 26 Ark. App. 141, 760 S.W.2d 882 (1988); Public Employee Claims Div. v. Tiner, 37 Ark. App. 23, 822 S.W.2d 400 (1992).

Court may not try de novo cases heard by the commission. Solid Steel Scissors Co. v. Kennedy, 205 Ark. 958, 171 S.W.2d 929 (1943) (decision under prior law); Oak Lawn Farms v. Payne, 251 Ark. 674, 474 S.W.2d 408 (1971); Green v. Jacuzzi Bros., 269 Ark. 733, 600 S.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1980).

On appeal, evidence will be reviewed in the light most favorable to the commission's findings. Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429 (1944), overruled in part, Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1964); American Cas. Co. v. Jones, 224 Ark. 731, 276 S.W.2d 41 (1955); J.P. Price Lumber Co. v. Adams, 258 Ark. 630, 527 S.W.2d 932 (1975); Hawthorne v. Davis, 268 Ark. 131, 594 S.W.2d 844 (1980); Kemper Ins. Co. v. Buchheit, 271 Ark. 458, 609 S.W.2d 660 (1980); West v. Smith, 225 Ark. 365, 282 S.W.2d 597 (1955); Fagan Elec. Co. v. Green, 228 Ark. 477, 308 S.W.2d 810 (1958); Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979); Allen Canning Co. v. McReynolds, 5 Ark. App. 78, 632 S.W.2d 450 (1982); Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982); Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 264, 635 S.W.2d 286 (1982); Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 12 Ark. App. 66, 670 S.W.2d 815 (1984); Osage Oil Co. v. Rogers, 15 Ark. App. 319, 692 S.W.2d 786 (1985). But see Mid-State Constr. Co. v. Second Injury Fund, 295 Ark. 1, 746 S.W.2d 539 (1988); Southland Corp. v. Magers, 15 Ark. App. 360, 695 S.W.2d 380 (1985); Barnard v. B & M Constr., 52 Ark. App. 61, 915 S.W.2d 296 (1996).

Findings of the commission will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. West v. Smith, 225 Ark. 365, 282 S.W.2d 597 (1955); Hixson Coal Co. v. Furstenberg, 225 Ark. 568, 284 S.W.2d 120 (1955); Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956); Johnson Auto Co. v. Kelley, 228 Ark. 364, 307 S.W.2d 867 (1957); White v. First Electric Co-op. Corp., 230 Ark. 925, 327 S.W.2d 720 (1959); Harper v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co., 233 Ark. 398, 344 S.W.2d 856 (1961); Jolly v. J.M. Hampton & Sons Lumber Co., 234 Ark. 574, 353 S.W.2d 338 (1962); J.P. Price Lumber Co. v. Adams, 258 Ark. 630, 527 S.W.2d 932 (1975); Hawthorne v. Davis, 268 Ark. 131, 594 S.W.2d 844 (1980); Treadway v. Riceland Foods, 268 Ark. 658, 594 S.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1980); Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 264, 635 S.W.2d 286 (1982); Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 12 Ark. App. 66, 670 S.W.2d 815 (1984); Young v. Heekin Canning Co., 13 Ark. App. 199, 681 S.W.2d 419 (1985).

Evidence insufficient to sustain commission's findings. Hall v. Pittman Constr. Co., 235 Ark. 104, 357 S.W.2d 263 (1962); Dena Constr. Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791, 575 S.W.2d 155 (1979).

In reviewing the findings of fact of the commission on appeal, the court is limited to the sole determination of whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429 (1944), overruled in part, Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1964) (decision under prior law); Tiner v. Baldwin, 235 Ark. 1010, 363 S.W.2d 532 (1963); Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979); Dedmon v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 3 Ark. App. 108, 623 S.W.2d 207 (1981).

The decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission on fact questions carries the same force and effect as a jury verdict, and even though the evidence would support another conclusion, or if the preponderance of the evidence would indicate a different result, the court will still affirm the commission if reasonable minds could reach the conclusion reached by the commission. King v. Farmers Liquid Fertilizer, 267 Ark. 798, 590 S.W.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1979).

The Court of Appeals does not interfere with the actions of the commission unless it finds that the commission has acted without or in excess of its authority, or that its order is not supported by substantial evidence. Allen Canning Co. v. McReynolds, 5 Ark. App. 78, 632 S.W.2d 450 (1982).

On appeal the Court of Appeals reviews the record only to determine if the commission's findings are supported by such substantial, relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support their conclusion. Morrow v. Mulberry Lumber Co., 5 Ark. App. 260, 635 S.W.2d 283 (1982); Stephens v. St. Vincent Infirmary, 15 Ark. App. 209, 691 S.W.2d 190 (1985); Snow v. Alcoa, 15 Ark. App. 205, 691 S.W.2d 194 (1985).

The question presented to the Court of Appeals on reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is not whether the evidence would support findings contrary to those made by the commission, but whether the evidence supports the findings made by the commission; even if the decision of the commission is against the preponderance of the evidence, the Court of Appeals will not reverse where its decision is supported by substantial evidence. Snow v. Alcoa, 15 Ark. App. 205, 691 S.W.2d 194 (1985); Osage Oil Co. v. Rogers, 15 Ark. App. 319, 692 S.W.2d 786 (1985). But see Mid-State Constr. Co. v. Second Injury Fund, 295 Ark. 1, 746 S.W.2d 539 (1988); Southland Corp. v. Magers, 15 Ark. App. 360, 695 S.W.2d 380 (1985).

Where the denial of relief is based on the claimant's failure to prove entitlement by the preponderance of the evidence, the substantial evidence standard of review requires the court to affirm if the Commission's opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Day v. Central Day Care, Inc., 38 Ark. App. 241, 833 S.W.2d 783 (1992); Barnard v. B & M Constr., 52 Ark. App. 61, 915 S.W.2d 296 (1996).

Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; the issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from that reached by the commission, or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding, but rather if reasonable minds could reach the result shown by the commission's decision, we must affirm the decision. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

Workers' Compensation Commission exceeded its authority in concluding that a firefighter had not sustained a brain injury or dysphasia where only the degree of impairment, not the existence of an injury, was in dispute. Bowmaster v. City of Jacksonville, 2016 Ark. App. 572, 507 S.W.3d 526 (2016).

— —Questions of Law or Fact.

Scintilla of evidence rule does not apply to a review of compensation award, and in such cases it is a question of law whether there is substantial evidence to warrant finding, but the question of the weight of the evidence is a question of fact and not of law. J.L. Williams & Sons v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Conflicting testimony presents a fact question for the commission's determination and when supported by substantial testimony is to be viewed on appeal in favor of the finding. Grimsley v. Manufacturers Furn. Co., 224 Ark. 769, 276 S.W.2d 64 (1955); Hollifield v. Bird & Son, 227 Ark. 703, 301 S.W.2d 27 (1957); McKamie v. Kern-Trimble Drilling Co., 229 Ark. 86, 313 S.W.2d 378 (1958); Kivett v. Redmond Co., 234 Ark. 855, 355 S.W.2d 172 (1962).

Sufficiency of evidence to support commission's findings of fact is a question of law. West v. Smith, 225 Ark. 365, 282 S.W.2d 597 (1955); Hixson Coal Co. v. Furstenberg, 225 Ark. 568, 284 S.W.2d 120 (1955); Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956); Johnson Auto Co. v. Kelley, 228 Ark. 364, 307 S.W.2d 867 (1957); Cummings v. United Motor Exch., Inc., 236 Ark. 735, 368 S.W.2d 82 (1963).

When there is doubt remaining as to a factual issue, and the doubt has been caused by conflicting or equivocal testimony, for the reviewing court to hold that the resolution of that doubt by the commission must always favor the claimant is to rob the commission of its fact-finding function which is definitively prescribed by the statute. Johnson v. Valmac Indus., 269 Ark. 626, 599 S.W.2d 440 (1980).

The commission has the right to find the facts, but that right carries with it the duty to make and set out the crucial findings of fact and the supporting evidence. McCoy v. Buckeye Cotton Oil, 271 Ark. 638, 609 S.W.2d 670 (1980), rev'd, 272 Ark. 272, 613 S.W.2d 590 (1981).

— —Weight and Credibility of Evidence.

The court on appeal from a finding of fact made on sufficient competent evidence by the commission has not the legal right to set aside the finding merely because, in its opinion, it is contrary to the weight of the testimony. J.L. Williams & Sons v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943) (decision under prior law).

The credibility of witnesses is a matter which lies within the exclusive province of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Kivett v. Redmond Co., 234 Ark. 855, 355 S.W.2d 172 (1962); May v. Crompton-Arkansas Mills, Inc., 253 Ark. 1080, 490 S.W.2d 794 (1973); Morrow v. Mulberry Lumber Co., 5 Ark. App. 260, 635 S.W.2d 283 (1982); Southland Corp. v. Magers, 15 Ark. App. 360, 695 S.W.2d 380 (1985).

The weight to be accorded the testimony of the claimant and the inferences to be drawn from it were to be considered by the commission and were not for de novo determination by the courts. Oak Lawn Farms v. Payne, 251 Ark. 674, 474 S.W.2d 408 (1971).

It is not the appellate court's function to weigh the credibility of conflicting witnesses on appeal. Dena Constr. Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791, 575 S.W.2d 155 (1979).

There is no distinction between medical testimony and other evidence insofar as the resolution of doubts is concerned in Workmen's Compensation proceedings. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979); Public Employee Claims Div. v. Tiner, 37 Ark. App. 23, 822 S.W.2d 400 (1992).

Questions of credibility and the weight to be given the evidence are exclusively within the province of the Workers' Compensation Commission; the reviewing court may not displace the commission's choice between two fairly conflicting views even though, if it were reviewing the matter de novo, the court might have made a different decision. Roberts-McNutt, Inc. v. Williams, 15 Ark. App. 240, 691 S.W.2d 887 (1985), aff'd, 288 Ark. 587, 708 S.W.2d 87 (Ark. 1986).

Question of credibility and the weight and sufficiency of the evidence are matters for determination by the commission, which is better equipped, by specialization and experience, to analyze and translate evidence into findings of fact than is the Court of Appeals. Osage Oil Co. v. Rogers, 15 Ark. App. 319, 692 S.W.2d 786 (1985). But see Mid-State Constr. Co. v. Second Injury Fund, 295 Ark. 1, 746 S.W.2d 539 (1988).

Weight and sufficiency of evidence are matters for determination by the commission. College Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988).

The reviewing court may not set aside the commission's decision unless it cannot conscientiously find from a review of the entire record that the evidence supporting the decision is substantial. College Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988).

On appeal, the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the commission and give the testimony its strongest probative value in favor of the order of the commission. The issue on appeal is not whether the evidence would have supported a finding contrary to the one made; the question is solely whether the evidence supports the finding made by the commission, and the decision must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. College Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988).

Substantial evidence has been defined as more than a mere scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is of such force and character that it would with reasonable and material certainty and precision compel a conclusion one way or another. College Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988).

It is well settled that the commission must weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and appellate courts are not at liberty to judge the witnesses' credibility on review. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 25 Ark. App. 237, 756 S.W.2d 923 (1988), superseded, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989).

An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the commission, and the standard of review is whether the commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 25 Ark. App. 237, 756 S.W.2d 923 (1988), superseded, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989); Welch's Laundry & Cleaners v. Clark, 38 Ark. App. 223, 832 S.W.2d 283 (1992).

An appellate court will reverse a decision of the commission where convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have arrived at the conclusion reached by the commission. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 25 Ark. App. 237, 756 S.W.2d 923 (1988), superseded, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989).

Jurisdiction.

Rule 1-2 of the Rules of the Sup. Court and the Court of Appeals cannot possibly deprive the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction of an appeal from the Workmen's Compensation Commission, as the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals from the Workmen's Compensation Commission is not a part of the appellate jurisdiction of that court assigned to it by the Supreme Court pursuant to Const., Amend. 58, but original jurisdiction conferred upon that court by this section. Houston Contracting Co. v. Young, 271 Ark. 455, 609 S.W.2d 895 (1980).

Appellate court had jurisdiction to address the merits of a workers' compensation case where the court of appeals was merely substituted for the circuit court as the first court to review an administrative order. Magnet Cove Sch. Dist. v. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. 11, 97 S.W.3d 909 (2003).

Arkansas Supreme Court denied the employer's motion to dismiss an estate's wrongful-death and survival action on the ground that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because the estate did not appeal to the full commission the administrative law judge's jurisdictional statement, based on the parties' stipulation, that the “Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of this claim”; the administrative law judge's decision became final under this section once it was not appealed. Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc., 2016 Ark. 453, 506 S.W.3d 230 (2016).

Res Judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to final orders or adjudications, and the filing of a petition for review with the full commission within 30 days prevents the order of the administrative law judge from becoming final. Wilson v. Cargill, Inc., 45 Ark. App. 174, 873 S.W.2d 171 (1994).

Where employer and its insurance carrier appellants did not appeal award within 30 days, the appellate court would not review the challenge to the award of benefits because that decision by the commission was res judicata. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

Timeliness of Appeal.

Rule of commission allowing 14 days from effective date of award in which to file a notice of appeal was ineffective as in direct conflict with the provision of former Workers' Compensation law. Commercial Std. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 203 Ark. 768, 158 S.W.2d 676 (1942).

The General Assembly has not enacted a law which would authorize the statutory appeal time to be extended, and unless the General Assembly provides such a remedy or procedure, neither administrative law judges nor the commission have the power to waive or otherwise extend the appeal time. Cooper Indus. Prods. v. Meadows, 5 Ark. App. 205, 634 S.W.2d 400 (1982).

Where there was evidence that the notice of claim had been mailed to the employer at an address at which he received his mail, and there was evidence from two witnesses that they saw a letter from the Workers' Compensation Commission, with a “green card” attached, on the employer's desk prior to that hearing, it was reasonable to conclude that the order the employer was appealing had been mailed and was received more than 30 days before the notice of appeal and petition were filed; therefore, the appeal was not timely. Martin v. Young, 17 Ark. App. 128, 705 S.W.2d 445 (1986).

The Workers' Compensation Commission erred in reversing the law judge's decision where the law judge's decision had not been timely appealed to the commission. Lloyd v. Potlatch Corp., 19 Ark. App. 335, 721 S.W.2d 670 (1986).

The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and should be raised by the court even if the parties do not raise it. Lloyd v. Potlatch Corp., 19 Ark. App. 335, 721 S.W.2d 670 (1986).

The filing of a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing, does not extend the time to file the notice of appeal. Hill v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 24 Ark. App. 116, 748 S.W.2d 356 (1988).

The commission has no authority to entertain a petition for rehearing after the expiration of the 30-day appeal period, and no authority to grant a motion to vacate. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Brewer, 52 Ark. App. 214, 916 S.W.2d 773 (1996).

No provision of the statute addresses any changes in the time for the notice of appeal where a post-award motion has been filed. Rogers v. International Paper Co., 66 Ark. App. 34, 988 S.W.2d 23 (1999).

Appeal from a decision in a workers' compensation case was dismissed as untimely where an attorney from Texas filed notices of appeal on behalf of an insurer since he failed to comply with Ark. R. Admis. Bar XIV until later. As such, the pleadings were rendered a nullity. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. Hickok, 370 Ark. 41, 257 S.W.3d 43 (2007).

Workers' Compensation Commission abused its discretion in dismissing as untimely a worker's pro se notice of appeal from an order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) denying permanent total disability for carpal tunnel injuries because the ALJ's order could not become final until 30 days after the worker received a copy where the worker's attorney was disbarred 26 days after receiving a copy and thus did not have a full 30 days to appeal. Kirkendolph v. DF&A Revenue Servs. Div., 2009 Ark. App. 629 (2009).

Cited: John Bishop Constr. Co. v. Orlicek, 224 Ark. 182, 272 S.W.2d 820 (1954); Cole v. Hendry Corp., 230 Ark. 100, 321 S.W.2d 377 (1959); Mason v. Lauck, 232 Ark. 891, 340 S.W.2d 575 (1960); Singer Co. v. Johnston, 243 Ark. 679, 421 S.W.2d 341 (1967); Herman Wilson Lumber Co. v. Hughes, 245 Ark. 168, 431 S.W.2d 487 (1968); Davis v. Stearns-Rogers Constr. Co., 248 Ark. 344, 451 S.W.2d 469 (1970); Missouri City Stone, Inc. v. Peters, 257 Ark. 917, 521 S.W.2d 58 (1975); American Can Co. v. Pettyjohn, 258 Ark. 98, 522 S.W.2d 358 (1975); Johnson v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 259 Ark. 724, 536 S.W.2d 121 (1976); Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978); Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979); Bibler Bros. v. Ingram, 266 Ark. 969, 587 S.W.2d 841 (1979); Richardson v. Rogers, 266 Ark. 980, 588 S.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1979); Conway Convalescent Ctr. v. Murphree, 266 Ark. 985, 588 S.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1979); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Heidelberger, 267 Ark. 971, 593 S.W.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1980); Salant & Salant, Inc. v. Williams, 267 Ark. 987, 593 S.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1980); Johnson v. Valmac Indus., 269 Ark. 626, 599 S.W.2d 440 (1980); Ozark Rustic Homes v. Albright, 269 Ark. 696, 600 S.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1980); Hassen v. Wickes Lumber Co., 270 Ark. 922, 606 S.W.2d 611 (1980); Foust v. Ward Sch. Bus Mfg. Co., 271 Ark. 411, 609 S.W.2d 88 (1980); Ashcraft v. Quimby, 2 Ark. App. 174, 617 S.W.2d 390 (1981); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cole, 3 Ark. App. 183, 623 S.W.2d 848 (1981); State Second Injury Fund v. Girtman, 16 Ark. App. 155, 698 S.W.2d 514 (1985); Huckaby v. Cargill, Inc., 20 Ark. App. 164, 725 S.W.2d 856 (1987); Webb v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 292 Ark. 349, 730 S.W.2d 222 (1987); Baldor Elec. Co. v. Jones, 29 Ark. App. 80, 777 S.W.2d 586 (1989); Baldwin v. Club Prods. Co., 302 Ark. 404, 790 S.W.2d 166 (1990); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990); Sunbelt Couriers v. McCartney, 303 Ark. 522, 798 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1990); Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enters., 33 Ark. App. 139, 803 S.W.2d 561 (1991); Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enterprises, 306 Ark. 641, 816 S.W.2d 876 (1991); Johnson v. American Pulpwood Co., 38 Ark. App. 6, 826 S.W.2d 827 (1992); Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 108, 842 S.W.2d 456 (1992); Tillman v. Baldwin & Shell Constr., 58 Ark. App. 177, 948 S.W.2d 118 (1997); Eckhardt v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 62 Ark. App. 224, 970 S.W.2d 316 (1998); Shepard v. ALCOA, 76 Ark. App. 292, 64 S.W.3d 786 (2002); Maupin v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, 90 Ark. App. 1, 203 S.W.3d 668 (2005); Plane Techs v. Keno, 103 Ark. App. 121, 286 S.W.3d 774 (2008).