Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-713 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Only Those Who Die Young Fail to Grow Old; International Paper Co. v. Tuberville: The Natural Aging Process and Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 243.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Due process of law dictates that an employee who has been denied benefits should be afforded the same opportunity to have his claim reconsidered where he has discovered subsequently to the denial of benefits that his was a meritorious claim. Walker v. J & J Pest Control, 270 Ark. 941, 606 S.W.2d 597 (1980).

Construction.

Where there was doubt as to whether employee's claim for additional compensation after receipt of compensation was governed by the six-month period provided by this section for modification of an award or by § 11-9-702(b) permitting a claim for additional compensation within one year from date of last payment of compensation, the act would be construed in favor of the longer period provided by § 11-9-702. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).

There is only one consistent, harmonious construction to be placed on the relationship between § 11-9-702(b) and this section in an effort to make them both effective, viz., where a claimant seeks additional benefits after a final award, this section governs as to the grounds required and § 11-9-702(b) governs the period of limitation for all claims for additional benefits whether or not there has been a final award. Southern Wooden Box Co. v. Smith, 5 Ark. App. 14, 631 S.W.2d 620 (1982).

Although subdivision (a)(1) of this section grants the commission the authority to modify a final award subsequent to the expiration of the time for appeal, under subdivision (a)(2) the commission may only do so upon a showing of a change in physical condition or proof of an assignment of an erroneous wage rate. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Brewer, 52 Ark. App. 214, 916 S.W.2d 773 (1996).

Applicability.

Commission was correct in refusing to allow claimant to reopen her claim where petition was not filed within the time to appeal and where petition followed an opinion by an administrative law judge that claimant failed to show entitlement to additional benefits since this section applies only to cases where a previous order or award of compensation has been made. Smith v. Servomation, 8 Ark. App. 274, 651 S.W.2d 118 (1983).

Employer could not contend that it was entitled to a modification of the law judge's decision pursuant to this section where the employer had never alleged that such a change had occurred after the law judge's decision. Lloyd v. Potlatch Corp., 19 Ark. App. 335, 721 S.W.2d 670 (1986).

Authority.

Rules 13 and 23 of the commission's rules authorize reasonableness on the part of the commission in a variety of circumstances dealing with the prosecution of claims for benefits, in order that the ends of justice may be served; hence, a liberal construction of the commission's rules lends support to the argument that the commission does have authority to entertain a petition for rehearing when based on reasonable grounds. Walker v. J & J Pest Control, 270 Ark. 941, 606 S.W.2d 597 (1980).

Although this chapter does not provide for rehearing or reconsideration procedures, the commission does have the authority under this section to modify a final award, but only upon a showing of a change in physical condition or proof of an assignment of an erroneous wage rate. Cooper Indus. Prods. v. Meadows, 5 Ark. App. 205, 634 S.W.2d 400 (1982).

Evidence.

Substantial evidence held to support commission's conclusion that claimant's condition had not changed. Marrable v. Southern LP Gas, Inc., 25 Ark. App. 1, 751 S.W.2d 15 (1988).

Grounds.

Where there was competent testimony that there were material changes in condition, decision of commission refusing to open award would be affirmed. Bookout v. Reynolds Mining Co., 213 Ark. 198, 209 S.W.2d 881 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Where there is competent testimony that claimant's condition has not changed, there is substantial evidence to sustain the commission's finding that claimant did not sustain a worsening of his condition which would entitle him to additional benefits. White v. First Electric Co-op. Corp., 230 Ark. 925, 327 S.W.2d 720 (1959).

Where natural consequences of injury caused additional problems years later, an increase in compensation benefits would be granted unless the additional problems were a result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct. Home Ins. Co. v. Logan, 255 Ark. 1036, 505 S.W.2d 25 (1974).

Where the claimant filed a petition for rehearing of the denial of disability benefits on the ground that there was newly discovered evidence, but it appeared that all of the evidence which he claimed was newly discovered was actually within his knowledge before the case was originally submitted to and decided by the commission, the motion for a rehearing was properly denied. Walker v. J & J Pest Control, 6 Ark. App. 171, 639 S.W.2d 748 (1982).

A claimant is not entitled under Arkansas law to obtain additional benefits after a final award without a showing that he has experienced a change in physical condition; a change in economic conditions is not a sufficient ground for reopening an award. Southern Wooden Box Co. v. Smith, 5 Ark. App. 14, 631 S.W.2d 620 (1982).

Where aging process exacerbated original compensable injury, claimant was entitled to modification of award. Tuberville v. International Paper Co., 28 Ark. App. 196, 771 S.W.2d 805 (1989), aff'd, 302 Ark. 22, 786 S.W.2d 830 (Ark. 1990).

Where claimant did not argue in his motion to vacate filed with the commission that his physical condition had changed since the order was entered or that there was an assignment of an erroneous wage rate, but argued instead that claimant experienced a change in physical condition prior to the entry of the award but subsequent to the change in workers' compensation carriers, such argument was clearly outside the scope of this section. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Brewer, 52 Ark. App. 214, 916 S.W.2d 773 (1996).

Although the claimant and the employer stipulated to the compensation rates at the November 21, 2013, hearing, the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund was not yet joined as a party at that time, and therefore the Trust Fund was not bound by that stipulation. Thus, when the Trust Fund provided evidence to the Workers' Compensation Commission that the November 2013 rates were not supported by the claimant's wage records, it was not inappropriate for the Commission to modify the claimant's disability-wage rate in accordance with statutory authority. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shields, 2018 Ark. App. 247, 548 S.W.3d 208 (2018).

Issues for Review.

Where commission's finding that no causal connection existed between death of employee and his original illness or injury was supported by substantial evidence, the finding was in effect a finding that no permanent disability was occasioned by the first illness and contention on appeal from denial of death benefits that claim for permanent partial disability was based on modification of prior award was not required to be discussed. Chambers v. Bigelow-Liptak Corp., 235 Ark. 1039, 363 S.W.2d 908 (1963).

In a workers' compensation matter, an order modifying a previous award of wage loss based upon permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of this section was modified where the accrual of benefits began at the time the first order in the case addressing the modification was entered, August 15, 2003, which was the order entered by the ALJ. O'Hara v. J. Christy Constr. Co., 101 Ark. App. 212, 272 S.W.3d 842 (2008), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, 272 S.W.3d 842 (2008), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 324 (Apr. 16, 2008).

Res Judicata.

Where the question of interstate commerce was heard and determined in a Workman's Compensation claim case, the same question could not be raised again in a claim for death benefits arising out of the same injury. Bell v. Batesville White Lime Co., 217 Ark. 379, 230 S.W.2d 643 (1950) (decision under prior law).

If an employee dies as a result of the disability for which he has been awarded compensation, the cause of the disability is res judicata. Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 225 Ark. 199, 280 S.W.2d 719 (1955).

The doctrine of res judicata, forbidding the reopening of matters once judicially determined by competent authority, applies to the decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission; having once determined that the claimant only suffered 55% permanent disability to the body as a whole, the commission cannot 12 years later say that the claimant was totally disabled at that earlier time. Tuberville v. International Paper Co., 18 Ark. App. 210, 711 S.W.2d 840 (1986).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred when it held that claimant's claim for additional wage-loss disability benefits or permanent and total disability, over and above a March 1997 award of 20 percent wage-loss disability, was barred by res judicata because claimant's more recent claim was based on changes in his condition post-1997, and the Commission erred as a matter of law when it required objective findings to support a change in physical condition relative to his wage-loss claim. O'Hara v. J. Christy Constr. Co., 94 Ark. App. 143, 227 S.W.3d 443 (2006).

Standard of Review.

The question presented to the appellate court reviewing the Commission's decision is not whether the evidence would support findings contrary to those made by the Commission, but whether the evidence supports the findings made by the Commission; even if the Commission's decision is against the preponderance of the evidence, the court will not reverse where its decision is supported by substantial evidence. International Paper Co. v. Tuberville, 302 Ark. 22, 786 S.W.2d 830 (Ark. 1990).

Stipulations.

Employer and insurer were properly denied an overpayment credit because, when stipulating to a compensation rate, the employer and insurer should have known a worker's employment and wage history; thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the request of the employer and insurer to withdraw the stipulation. Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Jackson, 2019 Ark. App. 124, 571 S.W.3d 539 (2019).

Timeliness.

Where an administrative law judge filed an opinion denying claimant additional benefits and the claimant did not file a timely appeal from that order, a subsequent attempt by the administrative law judge to amend his original order and award benefits to the claimant based on a doctor's clarification of the claimant's disability was improper, because the order denying benefits became final when no appeal was sought within 30 days. Cooper Indus. Prods. v. Meadows, 5 Ark. App. 205, 634 S.W.2d 400 (1982).

Cited: Cook v. Brown, 246 Ark. 11, 436 S.W.2d 482 (1969); Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).