Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101 (2026)

Jurisdiction over utilities — Appeal — Definition

✓ current as of May 2026

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As used in this section, “public utility” means any electric, gas, sewer, water, or telephone company or utility, and any company or utility providing similar services, except a company excluded from the definition of “public utility” under § 23-1-101(9)(B)(ii), a consolidated utility district under the General Consolidated Public Utility System Improvement District Law, § 14-217-101 et seq., and a water or light commission under § 14-201-101 et seq.
1. Acting by ordinance or resolution of its council, board of directors, or commission, every city and town shall have jurisdiction to:
  1. 1. Except as provided in § 23-4-201, determine the terms and conditions upon which the public utility may be permitted to occupy the streets, highways, or other public places within the municipality, including without limitation:
      1. The rates, quality, and character of each kind of product or service to be furnished or rendered by a public utility; and
      2. A reasonable franchise fee.
    2. The ordinance or resolution shall be deemed prima facie reasonable.
    3. A franchise fee for a public utility, including a telephone company providing services other than basic local exchange service, shall not exceed the higher of the amount in effect on January 1, 1997, or four and twenty-five-hundredths percent (4.25%) of revenue collected by the public utility from its customers in the city or town for rates and fees charged by the public utility, unless agreed to by the affected utility or approved by the voters of the municipality;
  2. Require a telephone company providing basic local exchange service to pay a reasonable franchise fee not to exceed the higher of the amount of the telephone company's franchise fee on January 1, 1997, or a fee equal to four and one-quarter percent (4.25%) of the revenues received by the telephone company from providing basic local exchange services, unless:
    1. A higher rate or franchise fee is approved by the voters of the municipality; or
    2. The telephone company agrees to pay a higher percentage on services offered in addition to basic local exchange services;
  3. Require of any public utility such additions and extensions to its physical plant within the municipality as shall be reasonable and necessary in the interest of the public and to designate the location and nature of all such additions and extensions, the time within which they must be completed, and all conditions under which they must be constructed; and
  4. Provide a penalty for noncompliance with the provisions of any ordinance or resolution adopted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
2. Nothing in this section shall limit the authority of the public utility to collect from its customers residing in each municipality an amount that equals the franchise fee assessed by the municipality on the public utility.
3. If franchise fees assessed for basic local exchange services are based on revenues, the revenues shall consist of revenues from basic local service, excluding, among other things, extension, terminal equipment, toll, access, yellow pages, and other miscellaneous equipment revenues.
4. 1. No cause of action that challenges the right of a municipality to assess a franchise fee against a public utility for permission to occupy the streets, highways, or other public places within the municipality shall result in the award of money damages.
  2. However, consistent with the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Article 16, § 13, any cause of action for illegal exaction found to be meritorious may result in the granting of injunctive relief.
1. Any public utility affected by any such ordinance or resolution or any other party authorized to complain to the Arkansas Public Service Commission under § 23-3-119 may appeal the action of the council or commission by filing within twenty (20) days of receipt of notice of the ordinance or resolution by the utility's registered agent for service of process of the final action a written complaint with the commission setting out how the ordinance or resolution is unjust, unreasonable, or unlawful, whereupon the commission shall proceed with an investigation, hearing, or determination of the matters complained of, with the same procedure that it would dispose of any other complaint made to it, and with like effect.
2. Such appeal shall not suspend the enforcement of any provisions of the ordinance or resolution unless the commission, after a hearing and upon notice and for good cause shown, orders the suspension conditioned upon the filing of a bond with the commission as provided for in § 23-4-408.
3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit or restrict the jurisdiction or the powers of the commission as in other sections granted.
4. In the event the municipal boundaries of a city or town are altered or amended by annexation or otherwise, the city or town shall notify the utility's registered agent for service of process of the alteration or amendment, and the utility shall not be liable for any additional franchise fees for the right to furnish utility service or occupy the streets, highways, or public places in newly added or annexed areas unless the notice shall have been given.
In all matters of which by this act the commission and cities and towns are each given original jurisdiction, such jurisdiction shall be concurrent. Cities and towns shall take no action with respect to any matter under investigation by the commission until the matter has finally been disposed of by the commission. The commission shall take no action with respect to any matter which is the subject of an ordinance or resolution pending before the council or commission of any city or town until the matter has finally been disposed of.
Nothing in this act shall deprive or be construed as depriving any municipality of the benefits or rights accrued or accruing to it under any franchise or contract to which it may be a party, and neither the commission nor any court exercising jurisdiction under this act shall deprive the municipality of any such benefit or right.
1. No city or town may impose additional franchise fees upon any provider of regulated broadband services under the Broadband Over Power Lines Enabling Act, § 23-18-801 et seq.
2. A city or town may impose franchise fees upon any provider of nonregulated broadband services under the Broadband Over Power Lines Enabling Act, § 23-18-801 et seq., at the same rates that the city or town charges other providers of broadband network services.

History. Acts 1935, No. 324, § 15; Pope's Dig., § 2078; A.S.A. 1947, § 73-208; Acts 1993, No. 403, § 7; 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 6, §§ 3, 6; 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 7, §§ 3, 6; 1997, No. 182, § 1; 1999, No. 576, § 1; 2007, No. 477, § 1; 2007, No. 739, § 2; 2009, No. 163, § 4; 2019, No. 241, §§ 1, 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. A comma following “1997” could not be inserted in subdivision (a)(1)(A) pursuant to § 1-2-303.

Publisher's Notes. Identical Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.) Nos. 6 and 7, § 1, provided:

“LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS.

(a) In the State of Arkansas, municipalities are granted jurisdiction and authority over the use and control of the public rights-of-way within the corporate limits of the municipality, to the extent that such jurisdiction does not conflict with state or federal statutes or regulations.

“(b) This historic authority has included the right to assess franchise fees for the privilege of the use of such rights-of-way and of providing utility service to the public.

“(c) On numerous occasions, the courts of the State of Arkansas have referred to this right to assess franchise fees against public utilities. For example, in Hot Springs Electric Light Co. v. Hot Springs, 70 Ark. 300 (1902), the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly stated that cities may assess a franchise fee as a condition for the use of public rights-of-way.”

Identical Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.) Nos. 6 and 7, § 2, provided:

“STATEMENT OF POLICY. It is, and historically has been, the policy of the State of Arkansas to permit municipalities, as one means of raising revenues, to assess municipal franchise fees against public utilities for the privilege of providing utility services to the public and of using public rights-of-way, including streets, highways, or other public places of any kind whatsoever within municipal boundaries and such franchise fees have not been considered to be within the scope of A.C.A. § 26-73-103 so as to require a vote of the electorate.

“It is also the policy of the State that nothing in this Act shall amend or adversely impact the terms and provisions of an existing franchise agreement between a municipality and a public utility entered into pursuant to A.C.A. § 14-54-704, A.C.A.§ 14-200-101, or any other enabling legislation relating to franchise fees in effect at the time of the agreement.”

Amendments. The 1993 amendment, in (a)(1), added “Except as provided in § 23-4-201” at the beginning, and inserted “and rates for,” after “each kind of.”

The 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 6 and 7 redesignated former (a)(1)-(a)(3) as (a)(1)(A)-(a)(1)(C), respectively; inserted “board of directors” in the introductory language of (a); in (a)(1)(A), inserted “including a reasonable franchise fee” and added the proviso; and added (a)(1)(D), (a)(1)(E), and present (a)(2).

The 1997 amendment rewrote (a)(1)(A).

The 2009 amendment substituted “4.25%” for “4¼%” in (b)(1)(A)(iii) and (b)(1)(B).

The 2019 amendment, in (a), inserted “or utility” twice, and inserted “water” following “sewer”; and in (b)(1)(A)(iii), inserted “public”, substituted “twenty-five hundredths percent” for “one-quarter percent”, and inserted “of revenue collected by the public utility from its customers in the city or town for rates and fees charged by the public utility”.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1935, No. 324, codified as §§ 14-200-101, 14-200-103 — 14-200-108, 14-200-111, 23-1-101, 23-1-102, 23-1-104, 23-1-112, 23-2-301, 23-2-303 — 23-2-308, 23-2-310, 23-2-312, 23-2-314 — 23-2-316, 23-2-402, 23-2-405, 23-2-408, 23-2-410 — 23-2-412, 23-2-414 — 23-2-418, 23-2-421, 23-2-426, 23-2-428, 23-2-429, 23-3-112 — 23-3-115, 23-3-118, 23-3-119, 23-3-201 — 23-3-206, 23-4-102, 23-4-103, 23-4-105 — 23-4-109, 23-4-402 — 23-4-405, 23-4-620 — 23-4-634, and 23-18-101.

Cross References. Rate-making authority, § 23-4-201.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Halbert, Municipal Law—Utility Franchise Fees—True Nature of Levy Immaterial When City Possesses Statutory Authority. City of Little Rock v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 318 Ark. 616, 888 S.W.2d 290 (1994), 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 259.

Case Notes

In General.

The Railroad (now Public Service) Commission had no authority to grant a certificate of convenience and necessity to a company distributing electricity in a city under franchise from it. De Queen Light & Power Co. v. Curtis, 157 Ark. 238, 248 S.W. 5 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Order of Department of Public Utilities (now Public Service Commission) setting aside rule made by city ordinance regulating character of service to be furnished by telephone companies to users of its service and restoring company's rule pertaining to such service was not judicial but legislative and within the power of the department (now commission) to make it. City of Fort Smith v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 195 Ark. 513, 113 S.W.2d 100 (1938).

Applicability.

Subdivision (a)(1) of this section empowers Arkansas municipalities to assess utility franchises operating within the municipalities, and telephone companies are not excluded. City of Little Rock v. AT&T Communications, 318 Ark. 616, 888 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

Appeals.

Whether a proceeding to review an order of a city commission was treated as an appeal or an independent proceeding to declare the statute void, the hearing before the circuit court was de novo, and the same facts were considered and like principles were applicable in either case in determining the rights of a street railway company to discontinue service on a portion of its line. Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 160 Ark. 1, 254 S.W. 481 (1923), aff'd, 267 U.S. 330, 45 S. Ct. 249 (1925) (decision under prior law).

A city ordinance requiring public utilities operating within the city to maintain business offices there and containing an emergency clause became final so as to permit a utility to appeal to the commission under subsection (b) immediately, and the utility was not required by subsection (c) to wait until the 30 days for filing a referendum petition under Ark. Const., Art. 7 had expired. City of DeWitt v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 Ark. 285, 451 S.W.2d 188 (1970).

Ordinance.

—Not Upheld.

An ordinance of the City of Little Rock that required a utility to pay a certain fee for the privilege of using the public streets was not valid: (1) because the city lacked the authority to enact the ordinance, since this section does not provide such authority and since § 23-17-101 bars such action by the city; and (2) because the levy of the ordinance is an unauthorized tax that has not been approved by the vote of the people as required by § 26-73-103. AT & T Communications v. City of Little Rock, 44 Ark. App. 30, 866 S.W.2d 414 (1993), rev'd, 318 Ark. 616, 888 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

—Presumption of Validity.

Under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, a city ordinance using time-unit methodology in establishing a franchise fee was by law presumptively reasonable. City of Little Rock v. AT&T Communications, 318 Ark. 616, 888 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

—Upheld.

City ordinance that required telephone company to pay certain fees for the privilege of using the city's public streets, and also levied a $.004 per minute charge on all long distance telephone calls that are billed to a city service address, was a franchise and fee ordinance and authorized by law. City of Little Rock v. AT&T Communications, 318 Ark. 616, 888 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

Police Power.

This section gives a city the right to impose valid police power regulations; however, it remains for the appellate court to determine whether the levy imposed by the city is a lawful exercise of that police power. AT & T Communications v. City of Little Rock, 44 Ark. App. 30, 866 S.W.2d 414 (1993), rev'd, 318 Ark. 616, 888 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

Rate-Making.

Since courts of equity lack concurrent jurisdiction with the Public Service Commission in setting utility rates, rates approved by the commission may be put into effect immediately without posting a bond, and notwithstanding any provision of a municipal franchise such a utility may have been granted. General Tel. Co. v. Lowe, 263 Ark. 727, 569 S.W.2d 71 (1978).

While this section grants municipalities the right to establish terms and conditions upon which public utilities may be permitted to operate within the borders of municipalities, § 23-4-201 clearly divests the cities and towns from having any jurisdiction to fix or determine rates and grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Public Service Commission in rate-making matters. City of Ft. Smith v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 278 Ark. 521, 648 S.W.2d 40 (1983).

Terms and Conditions.

Cities of second class may require water company to furnish meters at its expense. Wilson Water & Elec. Co. v. City of Arkadelphia, 95 Ark. 605, 129 S.W. 1091 (1910) (decision under prior law).

Every city or town has the authority to determine the terms and conditions under which a public utility can occupy the streets and public places within the municipality. Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. City of Rector, 164 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1947); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 271 Ark. 630, 609 S.W.2d 914 (1980).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 4 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: City of Little Rock v. At&t Commc'ns of Sw., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 290 (Ark. 1994).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

City of Little Rock v. At&t Commc'ns of Sw., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 290 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 70× “17 as its own. AT & T appealed from the Commission's decision to the court of appeals and set out the following points for reversal: (1) The ordinance is unlawful as a tax or fee, and in particular, is not authorized by Ark.”

AT&T Commc'ns of Sw., Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 866 S.W.2d 414 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 8× “For reversal, AT&T relies on three points: (l)(a) the City lacked the authority to enact the ordinance, specifically that Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101 (1987) does not provide such authority and that Ark.”

City of Gurdon, Arkansas v. At&t Corp., 2026 Ark. App. 346 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 8× “Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101 (b)(2) (Supp.”

Clark Cnty., Ark. v. At&t Corp., 2026 Ark. App. 348 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 6× “Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101 (b)(2) (Supp.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101(a) — 1 case

City of Little Rock v. At&t Commc'ns of Sw., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 290 (Ark. 1994). “17 as its own. AT & T appealed from the Commission's decision to the court of appeals and set out the following points for reversal: (1) The ordinance is unlawful as a tax or fee, and in particular, is not authorized by Ark.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101(a)(1) — 1 case

— Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101(b)(1) — 1 case

— Ark. Code Ann. § 14-200-101(b)(l) — 1 case

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