Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108 (2026)
Contempt
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Every court of record shall have power to punish, as for criminal contempt, persons guilty of the following acts and no others:
- Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the court's sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;
- Any breach of the peace, noise, or disturbance directly tending to interrupt its proceedings;
- Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it;
- Resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or process of the court; and
- The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness and when so sworn a similar refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.
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- Punishment for contempt is a Class C misdemeanor.
- A court shall always have power to imprison until its adjournment.
- When any person is committed to prison for the nonpayment of any such fine, he or she shall be discharged at the expiration of thirty (30) days.
- Contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily. In other cases, the party charged shall be notified of the accusation and shall have a reasonable time to make his or her defense.
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- Whenever any person is committed for a contempt under the provisions of this section, the substance of his or her offense shall be set forth in the order or warrant of commitment.
- Nothing in subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall be construed to extend to any proceedings against parties or officers, as for contempt, for the purpose of enforcing any civil right or remedy.
- A person punished for contempt under subsections (a)-(d) of this section shall, notwithstanding, be liable to an indictment for the contempt if the contempt is an indictable offense, but the court before which a conviction may be had on such an indictment shall, in forming its sentence, take into consideration the punishment previously inflicted.
History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 37-42; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1484-1489; Pope's Dig., §§ 1784-1789; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-901 — 34-906; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 410.
Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote (b)(1); inserted “or she” in (b)(3); and inserted “or her” in (c) and (d)(1).
Cross References. Contempts not committed in presence or hearing of courts, or in disobedience of process, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26.
Research References
Ark. L. Notes.
Becker, The Remedial Side of Contempt When Injunctions are Disregarded, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.
Brill, A Proposed Arkansas Contempt Statute, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 29.
Gitelman, The Zealous Advocate and Contempt of Court: Attorney Contempt in Arkansas and the Need for Change, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 39.
Ark. L. Rev.
Attorneys — Contempt — Language in a Motion as Direct Contempt, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 172.
Legal Liability for the Exercise of Free Speech, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 155.
Crabtree, Contempt Law in Arkansas, 51 Ark. L. Rev. 1.
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Survey — Constitutional Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.
U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
This section, which sets forth the powers of the court in punishing criminal contempt, is not a limitation on the power of the court to inflict punishment for disobedience of process, for, under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26, the legislature cannot abridge the power of the courts to punish for contempt in disobedience of their process; the constitution specially reserved this inherent power in the courts when delegating authority to the legislature to regulate punishments for contempts. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 295 Ark. 211, 748 S.W.2d 123 (1988).
Where a juvenile was deprived of his right to counsel during a contempt proceeding because the juvenile only had the services of an attorney ad litem and not a defense attorney, the juvenile's due process rights were violated and the court's orders were invalid. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004).
In General.
Contempt is divided into criminal contempt and civil contempt. In determining whether a particular action by a judge constitutes a finding of criminal or civil contempt, the focus is on the character of relief rather than the nature of the proceeding. Criminal contempt carries an unconditional penalty, and the contempt cannot be purged. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).
Arkansas law also distinguishes between direct and indirect contempt, the former being committed in the presence of the court. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).
Purpose.
The purpose of a criminal contempt proceeding is that it is brought to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its order. A civil contempt proceeding is instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the benefit of those parties. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).
Applicability.
Subsection (b) of this section does not apply to contempts committed by offering physical violence to judge at time when court is not in session. Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921).
Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of contempt against the attorney where the attorney frequently interrupted the judge and argued with him; however, the appellate court found that the justification for contempt would be served by reducing the attorney's jail sentence from 10 days to three days, with credit given for time served. McCullough v. State, 353 Ark. 362, 108 S.W.3d 582 (2003).
Contrary to the attorney's argument, the father, through his guardian ad litem, did not file a motion for contempt under subsection (c) of this section, but rather filed a motion to quash the deposition, which contained a request for sanctions under Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 11; the trial court did not enter a contempt order against the attorney, but he argued such on appeal and did not develop an argument regarding the Rule 11 sanctions, and because he failed to do so, the court refused to develop an argument for him and thus the court affirmed. McDermott v. Sharp, 371 Ark. 462, 267 S.W.3d 582 (2007).
A judge's power to punish for criminal contempt is not limited by this section. Morris v. State, 2017 Ark. 157, 518 S.W.3d 70 (2017).
When the circuit court found an attorney in contempt for failing to appear on time for a first-degree murder trial and fined him $4,000, the circuit court was acting under its inherent power and was not constrained by the $500 limit that the Legislature has authorized for a Class C misdemeanor; however, as the purpose of the contempt punishment would be accomplished by a lesser fine, the appellate court reduced the fine to $2,000. Morris v. State, 2017 Ark. 157, 518 S.W.3d 70 (2017).
Actions Constituting Contempt.
Interfering with property in custody of law with or without consent of the attaching officer is contempt. Atkins v. Swope, 38 Ark. 528 (1881).
Preventing a party from attending court is contempt. Turk v. State, 123 Ark. 341, 185 S.W. 472 (1916).
—Disobeying Order.
Court may refuse to hear a party in contempt for disobeying its order. Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177 (1885).
It is a contempt of the Supreme Court for a clerk to contumaciously disobey an order to furnish a transcript of the record in a case when commanded by writ of error, mandamus, or other legal method. Barstow v. Pine Bluff, M. & N.O.R.R., 54 Ark. 551, 16 S.W. 574 (1891).
When a receiver has been appointed and has taken possession of property under his appointment, it is a contempt to attempt to deprive him of that possession by force or by judicial proceedings without the permission of the court that made the appointment. Walker v. Geo. Taylor Comm'n Co., 56 Ark. 1, 18 S.W. 1056 (1892).
Party held guilty of contempt for willful disobedience of court's order. Hervey v. Hervey, 186 Ark. 179, 52 S.W.2d 963 (1932); Hall v. State, 237 Ark. 293, 372 S.W.2d 603 (1963).
Where the failure or refusal to abide by an order of the court is the issue, the appellate court does not look behind the order to determine whether the order is valid. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
Attorney's actions in disobeying the court's order fell within the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26 and the court was not bound by the limitations set out in this section. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
Attorney jailed five days for criminal contempt for his willful and continued disobedience of the Supreme Court's per curiam orders directing him to file the abstract and brief in a criminal appeal. Pipkin v. State, 320 Ark. 159, 896 S.W.2d 432 (1995).
Attorneys, found in contempt for failing to comply with directives, demonstrated not only mismanagement of their client's affairs, but also an inability to fulfill their obligations to the Supreme Court in failing to file a brief, even after extensions of time were granted to do so. Stone v. State, 321 Ark. 501, 902 S.W.2d 231 (1995).
Actions in violating orders enjoining parties' massive Christmas light displays fell within the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt. Osborne v. Power, 322 Ark. 229, 908 S.W.2d 340 (1995).
The court denied a petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether a citation for contempt was appropriate where a circuit court held two prosecuting attorneys in contempt and incarcerated them after they refused to proceed with the jury trial in a criminal case in contravention of the scheduling order. Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).
In a criminal contempt case under subdivision (a)(3) of this section, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that defendant willfully violated the court's orders requiring her to make restitution payments because defendant testified that she received a monthly disability check in the amount of $633 but did not use the money to make restitution payments. Summers v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 247 (2012).
In a case in which an attorney appealed a circuit court's order finding him in contempt and fining him $100, he unsuccessfully argued that he did not interrupt the court but that the rhythms of the colloquy reflected the normal ebb and flow of a sometimes tense discussion. He had repeatedly interrupted the judge despite numerous warnings not to interrupt, and both the transcript and the audio recording of the hearing showed that the circuit's court's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Benca v. Benton County Circuit Court, 2013 Ark. 448 (2013).
Attorney was properly held in contempt because the attorney admittedly asked witnesses about issues into which an order barred the attorney from inquiring. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).
Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's decision finding a county supervisor in contempt where a caseworker testified that the supervisor told her to release the emergency hold, the circuit court found the caseworker credible, and the emergency-hold order was clear that the child was to be taken into Department of Human Services custody. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hellyer, 2017 Ark. App. 294, 521 S.W.3d 158 (2017).
Circuit court did not err in holding father in contempt for violating the terms of the paternity order to provide health insurance for the child. Williams v. Lofton, 2018 Ark. App. 606, 569 S.W.3d 872 (2018).
—Disobeying Process.
Where a party having actual notice of the issuance of a writ of injunction against him evades the service of the writ and violates the injunction, he is guilty of contempt, if the court had jurisdiction to make the order. Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742 (1909).
One who, even without force or intimidation or direct refusal to obey process, hinders or prevents the prompt service thereof by deception or artifice is guilty of contempt of court. Bryan v. State, 99 Ark. 163, 137 S.W. 561 (1911).
Petitioner held guilty of contempt for failure to respond to subpoena. Morrow v. Roberts, 250 Ark. 822, 467 S.W.2d 393 (1971).
Process, in the sense of this section, is a comprehensive term which includes all writs, rules, orders, executions, warrants, or mandates issued during the progress of an action, even those used to carry a judgment into effect, including a commitment to prison for a criminal offense or for contempt. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).
The portion of a commitment order of the court concerning custody of defendant constituted process of the court. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).
This section is not a limitation on the power of the courts to impose punishment for disobedience of process, because under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26 the legislature cannot abridge the power of the courts to punish for contempt in disobedience of their process. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 810 S.W.2d 331 (1991).
Refusal to comply with a court order was “disobedience of process” even though the order was not in writing. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's finding that appellant willfully disobeyed or resisted the process or order of the court; when confronted with registration and lien information, appellant denied ownership of the vehicles, and he took steps to avoid execution of a writ to the sheriff to take possession of the vehicles. Burrow v. J.T. White Hardware & Lumber Co., 2018 Ark. App. 212, 547 S.W.3d 500 (2018).
—Failure to Answer Question.
A witness adjudged in contempt for failure to answer, after stating that to answer would criminate himself, was denied an appeal. Cossart v. State, 14 Ark. 538 (1854).
The fact that the questions asked a witness are irrelevant or improper furnishes no reason for impeaching the commitment for contempt. Ex parte Butt, 78 Ark. 262, 93 S.W. 992 (1906).
—Intoxication.
Defendant who appeared in court intoxicated was guilty of contempt even if defendant intended no disrespect. Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 S.W.2d 100 (1996).
—Publications.
Any citizen has the right to comment upon proceedings and decisions of the court, to discuss their correctness and the fitness or unfitness of the judges, but he has no right to degrade the court by libelous publications which are an abuse of the liberty of the press. State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
Distribution of pamphlet tended to interfere with the orderly conduct of the judiciary by creating a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, and provided basis for contempt conviction. Tupy v. State, 234 Ark. 821, 354 S.W.2d 728 (1962).
—Statements.
It was a contempt of court for an attorney to assert in open court that he had heard the court was corrupt. Davies v. State, 73 Ark. 358, 84 S.W. 633 (1903).
Mere spoken words to a lawyer out of the presence of the court, which make no threat or attempt to interfere in any proceeding, do not amount to criminal contempt. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).
Attorney's argument that the chancellor was biased and had already made her mind up about the case, that she had allowed a worst case scenario to take place, and that she would not even listen to him, was disrespectful and tended to impair the respect due the court's authority. Thus, it was contumacious. Hodges v. Gray, 321 Ark. 7, 901 S.W.2d 1 (1995).
Actions Not Constituting Contempt.
Filing repeated motions which are thought to be for the purpose of vexation or delay does not constitute contempt. Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S.W. 143 (1908).
Evidence insufficient to establish contempt. Ex parte Winn, 105 Ark. 190, 150 S.W. 399 (1912).
Motion asking judge to recuse himself which contained allegations of criminal misconduct was not contemptuous and was not sufficient to form the basis of a conviction for criminal contempt. Clark v. State, 291 Ark. 405, 725 S.W.2d 550 (1987).
Trial court had not issued an order commanding defense attorney from raising issue of informant's prior arrest and misdemeanor convictions for the purpose of showing informant's motive, plan or intent and could not find him in contempt for doing so. McCullough v. Lessenberry, 300 Ark. 426, 780 S.W.2d 9 (1989).
Attorney was wrongly held in contempt because an order barring the attorney's inquiry into witnesses' juvenile probation or juvenile offenses did not bar the attorney's inquiry into the witnesses' states of mind at the time of an occurrence. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).
Trial court erred in holding a former husband in contempt because he did not willfully disobey the requirements of a final order since it was not definite in its commands regarding the notice to be given and did not clearly express what duties it imposed; the express terms of the order requiring notice of a proposed sale for purposes of the other party's right of first refusal did not require the seller to give “market information” about a mere offer that was presented. Elder v. Elder, 2018 Ark. App. 276, 549 S.W.3d 919 (2018).
Actions Outside Court's Presence.
In contempts not committed in the court's presence, the court may initiate the proceeding to punish the contemnor by a statement or order spread upon the record, but notice thereof should be given to the defendant and a reasonable time afforded him to make his defense. Lee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S.W. 909 (1912).
There must be an accusation in court and notice to accused when contempt is committed outside presence of the court. Ex parte Coulter, 160 Ark. 550, 255 S.W. 15 (1923).
Contempt, as defined in this section, also includes breach of the peace in matters occurring outside the courtroom which tend to interrupt its proceedings; of course, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court is considered contumacious conduct. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).
This section merely requires, where the contempt is not committed in the court's presence, that the party charged be notified and have reasonable time to make this defense. Nelson v. Nelson, 20 Ark. App. 85, 723 S.W.2d 849 (1987).
Persons accused of criminal attempt committed outside the court's view must be first notified by a writing, sufficiently definite to inform them to a reasonable degree of certainty of the charge against them, and then be afforded a reasonable time and opportunity to prepare and defend themselves against the charge. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shipman, 25 Ark. App. 247, 756 S.W.2d 930 (1988).
An attorney's conduct in failing to appear occurs outside of presence of court and thus is indirect contempt which may not be summarily punished. Allison v. Dufresne, 340 Ark. 583, 12 S.W.3d 216 (2000).
Appeal.
All criminal contempt cases are to be reviewed by appeal instead of certiorari. Frolic Footwear, Inc. v. State, 284 Ark. 487, 683 S.W.2d 611 (1985).
The proper procedure for the review of a citation holding a party's attorney in criminal contempt is for the attorney, not the party, to appeal the conviction. Marsh v. Hoff, 15 Ark. App. 272, 692 S.W.2d 270 (1985).
In an appeal of a case of criminal contempt, the appellate court will view the record in the light most favorable to the decision of the trial judge and sustain that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
The Arkansas Supreme Court has jurisdiction of appeals in cases involving the discipline of attorneys-at-law, including contempt citations, pursuant to S. Ct. & Ct. App. Rule 1-2(a)(5). Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 171, 889 S.W.2d 769 (1994).
A writ of prohibition is not an appropriate vehicle for requesting that a contempt citation be reviewed and set aside. Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 171, 889 S.W.2d 769 (1994).
Attorney's Fees.
Evidence that appellant actively and knowingly interfered with the process of court was of sufficient force and character for the circuit court to have held appellant in criminal contempt. Because the evidence supported the circuit court's finding of criminal contempt, which is subject to a higher standard of review than a finding of civil contempt, the circuit court did not err when it awarded attorney's fees, which are in the nature of civil contempt. Burrow v. J.T. White Hardware & Lumber Co., 2018 Ark. App. 212, 547 S.W.3d 500 (2018).
Authority of Court.
The right to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. Neel v. State, 9 Ark. 259 (1849); Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).
This section is merely declaratory of what the law was before its passage; the prohibiting clause is entitled to respect as an opinion of the legislature but is not binding upon the courts. State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
Courts may go beyond the powers given by statute to enforce their constitutional powers when acts in contempt invade them. Lee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S.W. 909 (1912).
Subsection (b) of this section is not a limitation on power of courts to punish for contempt for disobedience of process. Spight v. State, 155 Ark. 26, 243 S.W. 860 (1922).
Order of chancery court appointing committee to investigate a law firm on charges of contempt and alleged violation of Code of Professional Ethics exceeded jurisdiction of court. Davis v. Merritt, 252 Ark. 659, 480 S.W.2d 924 (1972).
The fact that the actions on which the charge is based may constitute a criminal offense does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to punish the offender for contempt. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).
Power to punish for contempt includes the right to inflict reasonable and appropriate punishment upon an offender against the authority and dignity of the court. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).
Inherent power to punish for contempt resides in all courts, and such power cannot be removed by enactment of laws to the contrary. Smith v. Smith, 28 Ark. App. 56, 770 S.W.2d 205 (1989).
The standard regarding the inherent power of the court to sentence someone for contempt under this section is included in Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
Subdivision (a)(3) of this section is not a limitation on the power of the court to impose punishment for disobedience of process. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
Although § 16-10-106 provides that all courts shall have the power to issue process which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, it does not provide the trial court with carte blanche authority to issue orders of body attachment, detention, and custody, while ignoring portions of statutory provisions relating to contempt proceedings, such as subsection (c) of this section, and without affording procedural protections of due process of law to the parties being placed in arrest and custody. Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 888 S.W.2d 642 (1994).
Whether or not defendant's behavior falls into one of the five categories in subsection (a) of this section, a court has inherent power to punish contemptuous behavior committed in its presence, without regard to the restrictions imposed by subsection (a); summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 S.W.2d 100 (1996).
Attorney was wrongly held in contempt as to certain citations because the citations were issued one and four days after the alleged contempt, so subsection (c) of this section required notice and a chance to defend, which were absent. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).
Court Orders.
Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, that order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him, and the command must be expressed rather than implied. McCullough v. Lessenberry, 300 Ark. 426, 780 S.W.2d 9 (1989).
When an attorney was held in contempt for inquiring into areas which the attorney was barred from asking about, the attorney could not claim, on appeal, that the attorney's cross-examination was unconstitutionally limited because the attorney was required to follow the order, whether or not the order was erroneous. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).
Issuing a contempt order on Sunday did not invalidate the order because a verdict was received at the same time. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).
Direct Contempt.
Summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).
In a matter involving direct contempt, the circuit court's decision to hold an attorney for the Department of Human Services (DHS) and a DHS caseworker in contempt was supported by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, when the attorney directed the caseworker to leave court to prevent the other parties and the court from presenting or considering evidence in a dependency-neglect hearing concerning change of custody. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).
Because the conduct in question occurred in the presence of the circuit court judge, the contempt was direct; thus, the circuit court's decision was not subject to the restrictions outlined in subsection (a) of this section, and the circuit court was within its power to punish the alleged contempt summarily. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the circuit court's decision, substantial evidence supported holding an attorney in contempt and imposing a fine; when the circuit court told the attorney the court would not proceed with a guardianship hearing without a written medical report, the attorney questioned the judge's integrity in open court, persisted with that theory after the court explained the court's reasoning, interrupted the court at least three times, and was unwilling to reconsider the accusation after being given an opportunity, displaying a lack of regard for the court's integrity and demonstrating disrespect. Streit v. State (In re Bevill), 2019 Ark. 218, 576 S.W.3d 27 (2019).
Due Process.
The Due Process Clause, as applied in criminal proceedings, requires that an alleged contemnor be notified that a charge of contempt is pending against him and be informed of the specific nature of that charge, and where notice of the charge and the nature thereof are not given, the judgment of conviction for contempt must be reversed. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).
Appellant was not denied due process in contempt proceedings where he was afforded the rights required under this section, appellant acknowledged receipt of the motions which explained how he failed to comply with the order requiring him to provide certain financial information, he was given notice of the contempt hearing, and he was given the opportunity to present a defense at that hearing. Stilley v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist., 367 Ark. 193, 238 S.W.3d 902 (2006).
Circuit court erred in holding an attorney in contempt for obtaining its signature on an amended judgment and commitment order by misrepresenting the state's approval and consent because a letter the circuit court addressed to the attorney provided adequate notice that a hearing would occur, but it did not give the attorney adequate notice that criminal contempt charges were pending against her; both Arkansas law and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were clear that the attorney was entitled to notice not only that the circuit court was investigating the possibility of her misrepresentation but also that it was considering holding her in criminal contempt for alleged misrepresentation. Bloodman v. State, 2010 Ark. 169, 370 S.W.3d 174 (2010).
Circuit court did not err in finding a witness in criminal contempt because he did not inform counsel for a legislative audit committee that he had a conflict, but merely left a voicemail that he was not going to appear at the hearing, his reasons for failing to answer a subpoena did not amount to good cause, the petition and order to show cause sufficiently provided the witness with notice that he was accused of criminal contempt, and he did not preserve his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. Valley v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 112, 431 S.W.3d 916 (2014).
Holding an attorney in contempt did not violate the attorney's rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard because the attorney willfully violated a court order in the court's presence, so the attorney could be summarily punished. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).
Wife was afforded due process in a contempt proceeding where case law, subsection (c) of this section, and constitutional law required only that she be notified of the accusation and given a reasonable time to make her defense, and the order to show cause clearly gave notice that her failure to abide by the divorce decree regarding spending her daughter's funds subjected her to the possibility of being held in contempt and provided nearly two months' preparation time. Coleman v. Coleman, 2016 Ark. App. 324, 497 S.W.3d 688 (2016).
County supervisor's due process claim was rejected as the motion for contempt provided the supervisor sufficient notice that she personally faced contempt charges, she and the Department of Human Services were represented at the contempt hearing, she testified at the hearing, and there was no requirement for a verified petition or affidavit. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hellyer, 2017 Ark. App. 294, 521 S.W.3d 158 (2017).
Erroneous Contempt Finding.
It was error to hold a father in indirect contempt for failure to pay child support because the Office of Child Support Enforcement presented no evidence of noncompliance, as counsel's unsworn statements that the father had not paid were not testimony or evidence required to prove indirect contempt occurring outside the court's presence, so there was no such evidence before the court. Williams v. State Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2015 Ark. App. 225, 459 S.W.3d 321 (2015).
Jurisdiction.
Trial court erred in finding the defendant in contempt of court at his third probation revocation hearing because it lost jurisdiction to do so after it executed his sentence at his second revocation hearing by accepting his guilty plea and ordering him to pay a balance of fines, fees, and court costs. Pike v. State, 344 Ark. 478, 40 S.W.3d 795 (2001), superseded by statute as stated in, Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229, 85 S.W.3d 914 (2002), superseded by statute as stated in, Mills v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 128 (Feb. 11, 2004), superseded by statute as stated in, Rudder v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Ark. App. LEXIS 466 (June 15, 2005).
Notice.
In action for contempt of court where accused was informed of the basis of the alleged contempt in the attachment, was further advised of facts constituting the charge at the outset of the hearing, and was given an opportunity to make his defense, which he presented, that procedure was in full compliance with this section. Hall v. State, 237 Ark. 293, 372 S.W.2d 603 (1963).
Contempt order held deficient and set aside where it failed to inform defendant with reasonable certainty of the facts constituting the offense. Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 252 Ark. 1078, 483 S.W.2d 189 (1972).
Notice held sufficient. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).
There is no statutory requirement that the accused be given notice prior to the issuance of an order to show cause. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978); Clark v. State, 287 Ark. 221, 697 S.W.2d 895 (1985).
Notice held waived. Clark v. State, 287 Ark. 221, 697 S.W.2d 895 (1985).
Where defendant, who had appeared for a hearing on a petition to revoke a suspended sentence, was then first made aware of a criminal contempt charge and the nature and degree of the offense charged, his conviction of criminal contempt was reversed. Sellers v. State, 50 Ark. App. 32, 901 S.W.2d 853 (1995).
The Department of Human Services received constitutionally adequate notice of a show cause order on contempt; although it did not receive written notice of the first scheduled hearing, it was served with notice of the second scheduled hearing. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R. P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).
Notice of a criminal contempt proceeding was adequate where (1) the contemnor was personally served with a show cause order for the first hearing, (2) although the order did not describe the offense or order that was violated, she was present at the hearing where the matter was discussed, and (3) she was informed by telephone of the date of the second hearing. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R. P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).
Defendant attorney had to be notified of the accusation of criminal contempt and be afforded a reasonable time to make his defense, and the finding that the petition for order to show cause was deposited with the U.S. Postal Service with first-class mail postage was not sufficient to provide defendant with notice that he was accused of criminal contempt for his failure to appear at a client's hearing; as the record failed to show constitutionally sufficient notice, the judgment was reversed. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).
Because a former husband's alleged contemptuous actions occurred outside the immediate view and presence of the trial court, the husband was entitled to notice of the accusation and a reasonable time to make his defense; the former wife's motion did not contain the term “contempt”, and the husband's responding to the wife's motion and appearing before the trial court to defend against it was not synonymous with being notified of and defending against a specific contempt charge. Elder v. Elder, 2018 Ark. App. 276, 549 S.W.3d 919 (2018).
Circuit court erred in finding the father in contempt for nonpayment of child support because he was entitled to notice of the contempt accusation and a reasonable time to defend it, which he did not receive, as the mother did not file a motion for contempt on the issue of the child-support arrearages. Wadley v. Wadley, 2019 Ark. App. 549, 590 S.W.3d 754 (2019).
Circuit court's criminal contempt finding against former wife did not violate due process or this section because the former husband's contempt petition and the wife's response to it belied her argument that she was not informed of the alleged misconduct—not making timely child support payments—or of the possible consequences of it. Crowe v. Crowe, 2020 Ark. App. 37 (2020).
Penalty.
An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character whereas a conditional penalty is civil because it is specifically designed to compel the doing of some act. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).
Where a fine is unconditional and is to be paid to the court, the punishment is punitive in nature as it has no coercive or compensatory aspect, and the contempt proceeding is criminal in nature. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).
Where a circuit court judge held two prosecuting attorneys in contempt after they refused to proceed with the jury trial in a criminal case in contravention of the scheduling order and ordered them incarcerated, the court modified the contempt punishment to time already served in jail and assessed a $100 fine against each prosecutor. Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).
Punishment.
Imprisonment for contempt in disobeying an order to turn over specific funds found to be in defendant's hands is not an imprisonment for debt. Meeks v. State, 80 Ark. 579, 98 S.W. 378 (1906).
An order for the restitution of specific property or funds will be enforced by punishment for contempt only where the court has first found that such property or funds are in possession or under the control of the person ordered to make the restitution. Dodson v. Butler, 101 Ark. 416, 142 S.W. 503 (1912).
Punishment held excessive. Morrow v. Roberts, 250 Ark. 822, 467 S.W.2d 393 (1971).
Only contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the trial court may be summarily punished; in all other cases, the party charged with contempt shall be notified of the accusation and afforded a reasonable time to make a defense. Harvell v. Harvell, 36 Ark. App. 24, 820 S.W.2d 463 (1991).
A sentence of 90 days in jail was held excessive. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
It was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's mistrial motion when defendant's alibi witness was arrested in the jury's presence because the witness disobeyed a court order in the jury's presence; thus, the court was entitled to summarily punish the witness. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 573, 473 S.W.3d 583 (2015).
Imposing 20 days' incarceration on a wife who admittedly violated a divorce decree requiring her to notify the court before spending her daughter's funds was not an abuse of discretion where the wife admittedly and repeatedly violated a known court order over several years, and the court could have imposed up to 30 days' of incarceration under § 5-4-401(b)(3). Coleman v. Coleman, 2016 Ark. App. 324, 497 S.W.3d 688 (2016).
Circuit court's punishment of an unconditional penalty (eight hours of community service and a one-page paper) is treated by the law as criminal contempt. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).
Relation to Other Law.
Criminal contempt findings do not violate an automatic bankruptcy stay. Crowe v. Crowe, 2020 Ark. App. 37 (2020).
Right to Appeal.
Because defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor of criminal contempt, he had the right to appeal under § 16-91-101 and Rule 1(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure—Criminal. The mootness doctrine did not bar a direct appeal, despite the fact that he had already served his criminal contempt sentence. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).
Defendant was clearly convicted of a misdemeanor because this section, which he was found guilty of violating, states that punishment for contempt is a Class C misdemeanor. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).
A defendant's right to a direct appeal from his criminal conviction continues after his service of confinement. Thus, Swindle v. State, 373 Ark. 519, 285 S.W.3d 200 (2008), was clearly wrong to the extent that it conflicted with the Supreme Court's present holding that the mootness doctrine did not bar defendant's direct appeal of his criminal contempt conviction. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).
Right to Jury Trial.
Wife was not entitled to a jury trial after the circuit court found her in indirect criminal contempt because there was no dispute that the sentence imposed on the wife for the five counts was less than six months and that §§ 16-10-108 and 5-4-401 did not authorize a sentence in excess of six months, and, while the court did not provide a statutory cap as requested, there was nothing to indicate from the court's colloquy with the wife's counsel that the court contemplated imposing a sentence greater than six months. Damron v. Damron, 2019 Ark. App. 160, 574 S.W.3d 166 (2019).
Service of process.
Service in a criminal contempt proceeding was governed by this section, rather than ARCrP 6.3. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R. P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).
Time of Hearing.
Circuit court's order finding an attorney in contempt for violating an order was affirmed; although the attorney argued that the contempt hearing was held less than 20 days after the motion was filed, in violation of Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(c), this section sets no fixed time for a party's response to a charge of contempt and the attorney failed to identify any prejudice. Jackson v. Stratton, 2016 Ark. App. 6 (2016).
Cited: Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v. Riviere, 268 Ark. 532, 597 S.W.2d 596 (1980); Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992).