Ark. Code Ann. § 16-110-101 (2026)

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; expressly overruling Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

The lack of prompt notice to the debtor of a prejudgment attachment and of possible state or federal exemptions and the lack of a prompt hearing at which the debtor can claim exemptions leaves the prejudgment attachment provisions inadequate to prevent an erroneous deprivation of property in violation of due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Claims Arising Upon Contract.

This section has reference only to debts or demands due. Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark. 166 (1877).

An attachment may issue against a nonresident for refusal to perform a contract although the damages claimed are unliquidated. Messinger v. Dunham, 62 Ark. 326, 35 S.W. 435 (1896).

A nonresident purchasing a tenant's crop knowing of a lien for rent is liable to the landlord on an implied contract. Judge v. Curtis, 72 Ark. 132, 78 S.W. 746 (1904).

A general attachment levied on the property of a nonresident defendant for a violation of the state anti-trust laws by the attorney general to recover a penalty was invalid as a claim was not a debt arising upon a contract. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Ehle, 112 Ark. 385, 166 S.W. 535 (1914).

—Foreign Corporations.

Where the writ of attachment is filed against a foreign corporation, this is in itself a sufficient ground for the attachment; when that ground is asserted, there is no statutory requirement that a fraudulent intent be shown. Sun Marine Terminals v. Tosco Corp., 287 Ark. 233, 697 S.W.2d 901 (1985).

—Nonresidents.

Residence in the attachment laws generally implies an established abode fixed permanently for a time, for business or other purposes, although there may be an intent existing all the while to return at some time to the true domicile; an actual resident of this state, having a domicile in another, cannot be attached in this state as a nonresident. Krone v. Cooper, 43 Ark. 547 (1884).

When the debtor and creditor were domiciled in different states and the creditor proceeded by attachment in the courts of his domicile against the property of his debtor, there was no cause for interference by the courts of the debtor's domicile even though the creditor was found within their jurisdiction. Griffith v. Langsdale, 53 Ark. 71, 13 S.W. 733 (1890).

In proceedings by attachment against the property of a nonresident, this section must be strictly followed. Bush v. Visant, 40 Ark. 124 (1882); McClelland v. Linton, 121 Ark. 79, 180 S.W. 482 (1915).

Where the defendant lived in a hotel in the state for over a year in the same town where he carried on a real estate business and was absent from the state only for short periods on business, he was a “resident” of the state within the meaning of this section, though his domicile was in another state, and attachment against his property could not be obtained on the ground that he was a nonresident. Jarrell v. Leeper, 178 Ark. 6, 9 S.W.2d 778 (1928).

Where the defendants, after building a home in Arkansas, moved to Dallas and the husband was employed in California at the time of the trial, they were nonresidents within the meaning of this section as the words “residence” and “domicile” are not synonymous. Stephens v. AAA Lumber Co., 238 Ark. 842, 384 S.W.2d 943 (1964).

Determination of Grounds.

The better practice is for the trial court to determine the existence of the ground of attachment rather than to submit that issue to the jury; however, it is not reversible error. Ward v. Nu-Wa Laundry Cleaners, Inc., 205 Ark. 713, 170 S.W.2d 381 (1943).

Defendant who requested and secured two instructions on attachment issue could not predicate reversible error on submission of that issue to the jury. Ward v. Nu-Wa Laundry Cleaners, Inc., 205 Ark. 713, 170 S.W.2d 381 (1943).

It is proper for trial court to decide as to existence of alleged grounds for attachment rather than to submit such issue to the jury. Marvin v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 204, 281 S.W.2d 926 (1955).

Where evidence does not sustain allegations as to grounds for attachment, trial court is correct in finding that attachment is wrongfully issued. Marvin v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 204, 281 S.W.2d 926 (1955).

Disposal of Property.

An assignment for the benefit of creditors executed otherwise than required by statute is ground for attachment. Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30, 11 S.W. 960 (1889); Box v. Goodbar, 54 Ark. 6, 14 S.W. 925 (1890).

Where the pleading contained an allegation that (1) the value of the security was diminishing and that the debtor was in the process of selling or disposing of the collateral, (2) that the collateral was in danger of being sold, concealed, or moved from the premises in derogation of the rights and interest of the secured party without the proceeds being applied to the debt and contrary to the terms of the security agreement, and (3) where it was further alleged that, if the property were not attached, it would greatly diminish, the allegations made by the secured party stated a ground for attachment. Hackworth v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Ark. 668, 580 S.W.2d 465 (1979).

—About to Sell, Etc.

Where the plaintiff alleges only that the defendant is about to sell or convey his property with fraudulent intent, an instruction that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had, at the date of issuing the attachment, sold or disposed of his property with such fraudulent intent is erroneous since it is sufficient to prove that he was about to do so. Waples-Platter Co. v. Low, 54 F. 93 (8th Cir. 1893).

—Cheat, Hinder, or Delay.

A pledge of choses in action to a trustee for the benefit of certain creditors does not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors since an equitable estate remains in the pledgor; nor does it hinder or delay unsecured creditors since they may reach the pledgor's equitable estate under process. Goodbar v. Locke, 56 Ark. 314, 19 S.W. 924 (1892).

Evidence in action on note executed by husband and wife operating separate drug stores, for merchandise furnished to wife's store, was held to justify issuance of attachment on ground of husband's insolvency and removal of merchandise from wife's store to husband's store, together with failure to pay creditors. Archer Drug Co. v. Kimpel, 202 Ark. 27, 150 S.W.2d 605 (1941).

Property of debtor residing in another county could not be attached based on affidavit that debtor was intending to hinder or delay his creditors. Mahan v. Parks, 220 Ark. 514, 248 S.W.2d 880 (1952).

—Fraudulent Intent.

Fraudulent intent may be inferred when the debtor, while seeking an extension of time for payment, asserts that his assets are in excess of liabilities and at the same time threatens that, if the extension is not granted, a disposition of property would be made so that the creditor would realize nothing. Hanks v. Andrews, 53 Ark. 327, 13 S.W. 1102 (1890).

Proof that a few hours after the levy the debtor made a fraudulent disposition of property was not conclusive evidence that a fraudulent disposition was contemplated at the time the attachment was issued. Blass v. Lee, 55 Ark. 329, 18 S.W. 186 (1892).

The preference in an assignment of a creditor, in excess of his debt, with the intent to subsequently direct the payment of the excess to another creditor, is a fraud which vitiates the assignment and sustains the attachment. Waples-Platter Co. v. Low, 54 F. 93 (8th Cir. 1893).

Evidence that a merchant in failing circumstances sold his entire stock to one creditor to cancel debt and for additional cash, and thereafter collected outstanding claims but made only small payments to creditors, justified attachment on ground of fraudulent intent to hinder creditors. Shibley & Wood Grocery Co. v. Ferguson, 60 Ark. 160, 29 S.W. 275 (1895).

It was error to refuse evidence of attempted fraudulent disposition although such attempt was subsequent to the attachment. Milwaukee Harvester Co. v. Tymich, 68 Ark. 225, 58 S.W. 252 (1900).

In making a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, a secret reservation of an interest will constitute grounds for attachment for making a fraudulent disposition of property. Winter v. Kirby, 68 Ark. 471, 60 S.W. 34 (1900).

Disposing of property to pay debts and applying the proceeds thereto is not fraudulent. Blakemore v. Eagle, 73 Ark. 477, 84 S.W. 637 (1905).

When a sale is made by an insolvent debtor and proceeds are withheld from creditors, there is the inference that the sale was made with fraudulent intent to cheat creditors. Farris v. Gross, 75 Ark. 391, 87 S.W. 633 (1905).

The sale of property by an insolvent debtor in the usual course of business or for the purpose of paying debts does not constitute grounds for attachment; but where it can be shown that such sale was made for the fraudulent purpose of converting the property into money, so as to place it beyond the reach of creditors by execution or other process, a ground for attachment is made. Ark. Nat'l Bank v. Stuckey, 121 Ark. 302, 181 S.W. 913 (1915).

Sale of property by an insolvent debtor for the fraudulent purpose of converting it into money to be placed beyond the reach of creditors constitutes a ground for attachment even if such sales be made in the usual course of business. Archer Drug Co. v. Kimpel, 202 Ark. 27, 150 S.W.2d 605 (1941).

Insufficient Grounds.

Attachment cannot be issued in suit to compel marshaling of assets. Buck v. Bransford, 58 Ark. 289, 24 S.W. 103 (1893).

Property, Etc., Subject to Attachment.

Where an attachment is sued out against two persons jointly, it may be sustained as against the property of one alone. Allen, West & Bush v. Clayton & Prewitt, 11 F. 73 (E.D. Ark. 1882).

The individual property of an innocent partner is not subject to attachment at the instance of a firm creditor for the fraud of a copartner. Worthley v. Goodbar, 53 Ark. 1, 13 S.W. 216 (1890).

Partnership property is not subject to attachment by a creditor of one of the partners until there has been executed a bond to his copartner by one or more sureties to the effect that he will pay to such copartner the damages he may sustain by the wrongful suing out of order. Noble v. Knobel Hoop Co., 85 Ark. 306, 107 S.W. 988 (1908).

Where materials are furnished to a contractor to be used in the construction of a building, the presumption is that they were furnished on the credit of the building and its owner; unless such presumption is rebutted by proof that they were furnished on the personal credit of the contractor, they will not be subject to attachment at the instance of the contractor's creditors. Pratt v. Nakdimen, 99 Ark. 293, 138 S.W. 974 (1911).

Estate of devisee is subject to attachment against him in same manner as other beneficial legal estates. Taylor v. Bacon, 102 Ark. 97, 142 S.W. 1128 (1912).

Trial court did not err in finding that funds in the hands of a garnishee obtained to pay a judgment debtor's attorney's fees were subject to garnishment by the judgment creditor; although the garnishee, the debtor's wife, maintained that those funds were in a constructive trust to pay the debtor's attorney, there was no proof that the money was assigned to the debtor's counsel for payment of attorney fees prior to the writ of garnishment being served. Hudson v. Cook, 82 Ark. App. 246, 105 S.W.3d 821 (2003).

Removing Property from State.

If a debtor is removing his property out of the state without leaving sufficient property to pay all his debts, a creditor may attach even though sufficient property is left to pay his debts; further, testimony of other debts is admissible to prove the insufficiency of the property to pay all debts. Holliday v. Cohen, 34 Ark. 707 (1879).

The removal by a debtor of a material portion of his property outside the state, not leaving sufficient property to pay his debts, is cause for attachment even if he has no intention to cheat, hinder, or delay his creditors. Durr v. Hervey, 44 Ark. 301 (1884).

The removal by a corporation of a material part of its property out of the state, not leaving enough to pay debts, is grounds for attachment. Simon v. Sevier County Co-op. Ass'n, 54 Ark. 58, 14 S.W. 1101 (1890).

A debtor who removed a material part of his property outside the state without leaving sufficient property to pay his debts, although the removed property was shipped in payment of a debt owed to the consignee and such shipment was not with fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder, and delay his creditors, was subject to attachment. Goodbar v. Bailey, 57 Ark. 611, 22 S.W. 568 (1893).

Under subdivision (1)(A)(vi) of this section, the word “property” does not mean all the debtor's property and, hence, there is not inconsistency is in alleging in the affidavit for attachment that the defendants have disposed of their property and that they are about to dispose of the property. Salmon v. Mills, 68 F. 180 (8th Cir. 1895).

True test in determining whether an attached debtor has left enough property in the state to pay debts is to ascertain whether at its fair market value it is sufficient. Nesbit v. Schwab Clothing Co., 62 Ark. 22, 34 S.W. 79 (1896); Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387, 38 S.W. 1114 (1897).

Where a farmer abandoned his crop and the landlord took possession of the crop and gathered and sold it, and at the same time attached his goods upon the grounds that he was about to remove his property from the state without leaving enough to pay his claim, the validity of the attachment depended on whether the market value of the crop at the time of the attachment was equal to the landlord's claim. Southern Orchard Planting Co. v. Turner, 87 Ark. 382, 112 S.W. 956 (1908).