Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-101 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Debt Adjusting Statutes. 90 A.L.R.6th 1.

What Constitutes Plain, Speedy, and Efficient State Remedy Under Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341), Prohibiting Federal District Courts from Interfering with Assessment, Levy, or Collection of State Business Taxes. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.

Case Notes

In General.

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227, 996 S.W.2d 17 (1999).

Attorney’s Fees.

Section 23-79-209 required an insurer to pay an insured attorney's fees for defending the insurer's declaratory judgment action because, inter alia, by declaring the insurer was, in fact, obligated to defend the insured in three suits, the district court rendered judgment against the insurer. Hortica-Florists' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pittman Nursery Corp., 729 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2013).

Discretion of Court.

Declaratory judgment statutes are intended to supplement rather than supersede ordinary causes of action. Consequently, when another action between the same parties, in which all issues could be determined, is actually pending at the time of the commencement of an action for a declaratory judgment, the court abuses its discretion when it entertains jurisdiction. UHS of Ark., Inc. v. Charter Hosp. of Little Rock, Inc., 297 Ark. 8, 759 S.W.2d 204 (1988).

Federal Jurisdiction.

In an action to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and where the plaintiffs had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Arkansas courts under this section, § 14-90-501, § 14-90-804, and § 16-113-306, the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred federal jurisdiction. Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

Giving a broad construction to the Tax Injunction Act's (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, use of “tax,” access and hook-up fees for new installations of water and sewer services qualified as taxes for purposes of the TIA. Because homebuilders' action was to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and because the homebuilders had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the state courts via § 16-113-306 and this section, the TIA barred federal jurisdiction over the illegal exaction claims based on Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13 against a city, a utility, and a water and sewer commission, raised by the homebuilders. Northwest Ark. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Rogers, No. 07-5148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19772 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 3, 2008).

Because a declaratory judgment action to declare a will invalid was not cognizable under the general jurisdiction of Arkansas's circuit courts, the probate exception deprived the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate's request for a declaration that the will was void. Estate of Miller v. Miller, 51 F. Supp. 3d 861 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

Final Order.

Order denying the motion for declaratory judgment was not a final order. Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 322 Ark. 308, 908 S.W.2d 653 (1995).

Jurisdiction.

The mere fact that petitioner sought a declaratory judgment in addition to an injunction did not give the court jurisdiction to grant the injunction. Robinson v. Morgan, 228 Ark. 1091, 312 S.W.2d 329 (1958).

Where a jurisdictional question was not free from doubt and it was quite possible that the chancery court, if the petition for declaratory judgment were entertained, might decide the point one way while the justice of the peace court in which city had filed action, or the circuit court on appeal, might reach exactly the opposite conclusion, it would be manifestly desirable if such jurisdictional question be finally determined in the suit at law where it arose in the first instance. Cabot v. Morgan, 228 Ark. 1084, 312 S.W.2d 333 (1958).

Where in an action for declaratory judgment, the complaint did not show that there was either a justifiable controversy or subject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ross-Lawhon, 290 Ark. 578, 290 Ark. 578, 721 S.W.2d 658 (1986).

Arkansas's declaratory judgment act empowers a circuit court to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a will only by virtue of its probate jurisdiction. A declaratory judgment action to declare a will invalid is not cognizable under the general jurisdiction of Arkansas's circuit courts. Estate of Miller v. Miller, 51 F. Supp. 3d 861 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

Justiciable Controversy.

Declaratory Judgment Act does not require actual litigation as a prerequisite to asking for a declaratory judgment, but, as a general rule, litigation must be pending or threatened. Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 272 S.W.2d 438 (1954).

An attorney seeking fees for a worker's compensation suit to be based on a percentage of the medical payments made by an employer and his insurer, even though the full amount of payments was not yet known, could not obtain a declaratory judgment if he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Ragon v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).

The Declaratory Judgment Act is not intended to allow any question to be presented by any person; rather, a justiciable controversy must exist. Andres v. First Ark. Dev. Fin. Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97 (1959); Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Olive's Sporting Goods, Inc., 25 Ark. App. 81, 753 S.W.2d 284 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596 (1989).

Suit for declaratory judgment as to constitutionality of statutes presents a justiciable controversy. Bennett v. NAACP, 236 Ark. 750, 370 S.W.2d 79 (1963); Coley v. Clinton, 479 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

A declaration of law in a separate and independent action when a justiciable controversy exists, in anticipation of future litigation, would be proper and the judgment appealable, but declaratory relief is not proper when the identical questions involved in the declaratory judgment proceeding are already at issue between the parties in a pending action. Boyett v. Boyett, 269 Ark. 36, 598 S.W.2d 86 (1980).

Proposed Amendments to State Constitution.

Voter demonstrating that a proposed constitutional amendment was unconstitutional was entitled to both declaratory and mandamus relief, as (1) declaratory relief is available whether or not other relief can be obtained; (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court has routinely ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to not count or certify any ballots cast for a proposed amendment that does not meet the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution or Arkansas law; and (3) a voter has a right to cast a ballot only on referred constitutional amendments that meet the standards set forth by the Arkansas Constitution. Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295, 558 S.W.3d 370 (2018).

Statute of Limitations.

In a declaratory judgment action, even if the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until there was notice that a first lease was being relied on, a complaint was time-barred due to a recordation of an assignment; the recording served as constructive notice from the time the instrument was filed for record, and the case was filed more than 5 years after an assignment was recorded. The circuit court did not err by treating the claim as raising contract enforcement issues and applying the relevant statutory period of limitations. McDougal v. Sabine River Land Co., 2015 Ark. App. 281, 461 S.W.3d 359 (2015).

Sufficiency of Complaints.

In declaratory judgment action wherein plaintiff sought judgment declaring her right to make such use of her lot as would prevent surface water from flowing across it from lands of defendants where some defendants stated they would hold her liable in damages if she interfered with the drainage of the water, chancellor did not abuse his discretion in dismissing the petition where it appeared that persons other than the named defendants might be damaged by her action and where it did not appear in detail just what action she proposed or what the probable damage to defendants and others might be. Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 272 S.W.2d 438 (1954).

The criteria for a declaratory judgment were met where, although neither complaint used the words “declaratory judgment,” the effect of the complaints was to request that the court “declare rights, status, and other legal relations.” Equity Gen. Agents, Inc. v. O'Neal, 15 Ark. App. 302, 692 S.W.2d 789 (1985).

Declaratory relief was not available where the plaintiff did not seek a declaration of his rights under the terms of an insurance contract, but, instead, alleged that a misrepresentation of the insurance contract terms was made in 1984 and that as a consequence of that misrepresentation, he wais entitled to have the contract of insurance reformed to conform with the representations made to him at that time. Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001).

In a putative class action against an air ambulance service, declaratory judgment claims as pleaded were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713; a judgment declaring that an air ambulance service had no claim for breach of contract, and no right to recover for services it actually provided under any equitable theory, because it did not disclose its pricing term before providing services, would be clearly preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act's express preemption provision. Ferrell v. Air EVAC EMS, Inc., 900 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2018).

Cited: White v. Thornbrough, 229 Ark. 96, 313 S.W.2d 384 (1958); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Downs, 230 Ark. 77, 320 S.W.2d 765 (1959); Watson v. Jones, 233 Ark. 203, 343 S.W.2d 415 (1961); Faubus v. Miles, 237 Ark. 957, 377 S.W.2d 601 (1964); American Television Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 253 Ark. 760, 489 S.W.2d 754 (1973); Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 254 Ark. 956, 497 S.W.2d 15 (1973); Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1980); Capehart-Creager Enters., Inc. v. O'Hara & Kendall Aviation, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Worthen v. Dillard, 275 Ark. 132, 628 S.W.2d 7 (1982); Stephenson v. Whittington, 6 Ark. App. 4, 636 S.W.2d 878 (1982); Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Kildow, 9 Ark. App. 86, 654 S.W.2d 600 (1983); Integon Life Ins. Co. v. Vandegrift, 11 Ark. App. 270, 669 S.W.2d 492 (1984); Murphy v. Epes, 283 Ark. 517, 678 S.W.2d 352 (1984); Webb v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 286 Ark. 399, 692 S.W.2d 233 (1985); Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992); Hardy v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 95 Ark. App. 48, 233 S.W.3d 165 (2006); Perroni v. Sachar, 2017 Ark. 59, 513 S.W.3d 239 (2017).