Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-102 (2026)

Case Notes

In General.

While this section recognizes a party's right to a declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy is required. Mastin v. Mastin, 316 Ark. 327, 871 S.W.2d 585 (1994).

All four elements for declaratory relief were met and the action was improperly dismissed for the customer's failure to join her daughter where the customer sought a determination of her obligation for unauthorized charges by the daughter on a charge account, as: (1) there was a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy existed between two parties having adverse interests; (3) the customer claimed the customer did not owe for the charges; and (4) the issue was ripe for adjudication because the store continued to pursue recovery of the debt from the customer. Wilmans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Ark. 668, 144 S.W.3d 245 (2004).

In a city's challenge to the county assessor's allocation of millage rates, the matter was appropriate for declaratory judgment as it involved questions that directly affected an existing bond issue and presented a justiciable issue for the trial court to decide. City of Fayetteville v. Wash. County, 369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to the State of Arkansas and a prosecuting attorney on petitioner's complaint for a declaratory judgment that a statute was unconstitutional because petitioner was not in custody; because petitioner was on probation, and therefore not in custody, petitioner was not entitled to any postconviction relief. Neely v. McCastlain, 2009 Ark. 189, 306 S.W.3d 424 (2009).

Circuit court properly dismissed a physician's complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Arkansas State Medical Board where the statutes and regulations he sought to challenge did not completely bar any class of physicians from a certain act, and he failed to pursue the administrative remedy afforded him. Ahmad v. Beck, 2016 Ark. 30, 480 S.W.3d 166 (2016).

Beneficiaries of a state Medicaid program were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing their declaratory judgment action in the circuit court because any irreparable harm to the beneficiaries warranted application of the futility exception; also, § 25-15-207(d) provided the beneficiaries the statutory scheme for seeking a declaratory judgment in lieu of pursuing the exhaustion of remedies. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 2017 Ark. 308, 530 S.W.3d 336 (2017).

Applicability.

Petition for declaratory relief was denied as the individual's petition sought a declaration that her son, who witnessed his sister's death following an accident with the driver, could bring a claim for emotional damages; the Declaratory Judgment Act was not appropriate simply to determine whether a cause of action existed. Hardy v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 95 Ark. App. 48, 233 S.W.3d 165 (2006).

In an action arising out of a state-chartered bank's practices regarding the order in which debit card transactions were posted to maximize overdraft fees, customers were entitled to seek declaratory relief that the contracts at issue, or portions thereof, were unconscionable, as well as supplemental relief in the form of monetary damages. Hanjy v. Arvest Bank, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (E.D. Ark. 2015).

Affected by Statutes.

Insurance company has a right to use the declaratory judgment proceeding to have determined its duty to pay or defend where it questions whether the policy covers the situation out of which the injury arose. Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688 (1960).

Under this section, an independent candidate for office could have had a judicial determination of the constitutionality of a statute before paying the filing fee provided therein, and having failed to do so and paid the fee voluntarily, he could not raise the question after his defeat in the general election by an action for refund of the fee. County of Searcy v. Stephenson, 244 Ark. 54, 424 S.W.2d 369 (1968).

Mandamus was not the proper remedy where a petitioner was seeking an order for the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to rescind and void all permits issued to private clubs pursuant to statute for the dispensing of alcoholic beverages, because the constitutionality of the statute could be determined in a proceeding for declaratory judgment and because the petitioner was attempting to enforce an alleged duty which was not a plain ministerial duty for which a writ of mandamus could issue. Kemp-Bradford VFW Post 4764 v. Wood, 262 Ark. 168, 554 S.W.2d 344 (1977).

Defendant, who was convicted in a municipal court and filed suit for declaratory judgment that the legislation creating the court was unconstitutional and that his conviction was void had standing to bring the action as a person whose rights were affected by the legislation. Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985).

Section 25-15-212 unconstitutionally deprives inmates of review of constitutional questions, because judicial review of all other administrative questions may be granted, or withheld, according to the Legislature's discretion. Clinton v. Bonds, 306 Ark. 554, 816 S.W.2d 169 (1991).

A municipal corporation had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute which permitted a landowner or group of landowners to have their land detached from a municipality and annexed to another municipality in order to obtain additional municipal services where that was once a part of its borders has now been annexed by a neighboring city pursuant to the statute. City of Cave Springs v. City of Rogers, 343 Ark. 652, 37 S.W.3d 607 (2001).

There was no requirement that appellants had to raise to the Arkansas State Medical Board their facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 17-95-102, which requires physicians to receive prior approval from the board in order to dispense legend drugs, or that the physician had to apply for a permit before bringing the declaratory action in circuit court. Appellants did not bring their case under the Administrative Procedure Act, but instead filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief; and an exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary to bring an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act where appellants had no pending claims before an agency and raised a facial constitutional challenge to the statute. Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, 456 S.W.3d 744 (2015).

Insurance Contracts.

Insurance contracts come within the purview of the declaratory judgment statute. Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688 (1960).

There is no law authorizing a declaratory judgment to be sought by a third party; the insured is the only one that can seek such a judgment. Nall v. Scott, 233 Ark. 21, 342 S.W.2d 418 (1961).

A declaratory judgment action rendered against the insured in favor of the insurer while the plaintiff injured party has an action pending against the insured is not res judicata when the plaintiff exhausts his remedies against the insured and sues the insurance company where the plaintiff was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 236 Ark. 268, 365 S.W.2d 454 (1963).

Where there exists a justiciable controversy in which an insurance policyholder is vitally concerned with the number of “occurrences” and amount of his aggregate coverage, a declaratory judgment action is proper. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Olive's Sporting Goods, Inc., 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596 (1989).

Summary judgment was properly granted in a declaratory judgment action as it related to an intentional act exclusion in a homeowner's policy because a negligence lawsuit brought by an injured party was based upon injuries caused by the unexpected result of an insured's intentional act of shooting a gun. However, there was ambiguity in the language of a general liability exclusion; therefore, summary judgment was precluded because it was susceptible to more than one reasonable construction. Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 104 Ark. App. 301, 292 S.W.3d 311 (2009).

Justiciable Controversy.

Declaratory relief was proper in appellants' action to have the Arkansas Check-Cashers Act declared unconstitutional because a justiciable controversy was present between appellants and the Arkansas State Board of Collection Agencies as to the implementation, application, and effect of the Act. McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 375 Ark. 52, 289 S.W.3d 18 (2008).

Circuit court did not err in denying declaratory relief to a tobacco products manufacturer where it sought declaratory relief on events only hypothetical in nature and, therefore, the manufacturer lacked standing because no justiciable controversy existed. McLane Southern, Inc. v. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd., 2010 Ark. 498, 375 S.W.3d 628 (2010).

Doctor who had allowed his Arkansas medical license to lapse did not have standing to obtain a judgment declaring that § 17-95-409(b) did not apply to contracts under the Community Match Loan and Scholarship Program, established under § 6-81-715 et seq., because the Declaratory Judgment Statute, § 16-111-101 et seq., was applicable only where there was a present actual controversy. Nelson v. Ark. Rural Med. Practice Loan & Scholarship Bd., 2011 Ark. 491, 385 S.W.3d 762 (2011).

Because the operator failed to present a justiciable controversy under this section, the declaratory judgment in its favor was not proper; the requested declaratory relief regarding any alleged due-process violations, which were based upon the lack of a hearing, was moot, and the circuit court erred in granting the operator's motion for summary judgment. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Civitan Ctr., Inc., 2012 Ark. 40, 386 S.W.3d 432 (2012).

Court did not err in concluding that the business was not entitled to declaratory relief, because there was no existing legal controversy, when the business sought a declaration that its conduct (sweepstakes promotion) was legal and not subject to prosecution, and it was apparent the business was seeking an advisory opinion rather than the resolution of an actual controversy; courts do not sit for the purpose of determining speculative and abstract questions of law or laying down rules for future conduct. Cancun Cyber Cafe & Bus. Ctr., Inc. v. City of N. Little Rock, 2012 Ark. 154 (2012).

Circuit court's determination that §§ 25-19-104 and 25-19-106 were unconstitutional was improper because declaratory relief was inappropriate under this section as appellees did not yet have a case or controversy ready for decision by the courts. Appellees received a legal opinion on the effects of certain provisions of the state's Freedom of Information Act rather than resolution of an actual controversy. McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith, 2012 Ark. 452, 425 S.W.3d 671 (2012).

Circuit court erred in denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment in the hospitals' action to declare the Arkansas Peer Review Fairness Act, § 20-9-1301 et seq., unconstitutional because the court did not elaborate on its ruling that the Act was not unconstitutional and a justiciable controversy had not been presented for review where the hospitals did not state they were violating the Act, did not allege a threat of imminent enforcement under the Act, and did not present a sufficient factual record to show an actual, present controversy, which was a necessary element of a declaratory-judgment suit. Baptist Health Sys. v. Rutledge, 2016 Ark. 121, 488 S.W.3d 507 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in denying resident's petition for declaratory judgment because no justiciable controversy existed; the allocation of the cost of the improvements to the water system was sufficiently detailed in the 2005 receivership order, the order had been entered and affirmed, and the city had no control over the receivership or the handling or financing of the projects undertaken pursuant to its authority. Williams v. City of Sherwood, 2019 Ark. App. 487, 586 S.W.3d 711 (2019).

Municipal Annexation.

A city in which property was originally located had standing to argue that another city which annexed the property did not meet the requirements of the annexation statute, § 14-40-2002, as the issue of whether the property remained a part of the first city depended upon whether the second city met its obligations under the annexation statute. City of Lowell v. City of Rogers, 345 Ark. 33, 43 S.W.3d 742 (2001).

Municipal Ordinances.

Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was improperly granted because a complaint filed by a lessor and a lessee sufficiently alleged that their rights or other legal relations were affected by Avoca, Ark., Ordinance No. 69 where a town was making demands regarding the removal of billboards; therefore, the lessor and the lessee were entitled to declaratory relief under this section. They were arguing that the town lacked power to regulate the billboards at issue. Statewide Outdoor Adver., LLC v. Town of Avoca, 104 Ark. App. 10, 289 S.W.3d 111 (2008).

Rights of Third Parties.

In a property owner's suit to decide which of two public entities had the right to set a sewer connection fee, the owner had standing to seek a declaratory judgment because: (1) the owner was a beneficiary of a contract between the entities, and (2) under this section, any person (even a non-beneficiary) whose legal relations were affected by a contract could obtain a declaration of legal relations under the contract. McAlmont Suburban Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 242 v. McCain-Hwy. 161, LLC, 99 Ark. App. 431, 262 S.W.3d 185 (2007).

Cited: Roberts v. Watts, 263 Ark. 822, 568 S.W.2d 1 (1978); Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Kildow, 9 Ark. App. 86, 654 S.W.2d 600 (1983); City of Jacksonville v. Martin, 286 Ark. 288, 692 S.W.2d 226 (1985); Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992); Stilley v. James, 345 Ark. 362, 48 S.W.3d 521 (2001); Stilley v. James, 347 Ark. 74, 60 S.W.3d 410 (2001); Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002); Weaver v. Collins, 2010 Ark. App. 707, 379 S.W.3d 582 (2010).