Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-202 (2026)
Applicability
This subchapter applies to all causes of action for medical injury accruing after April 2, 1979, and, as to such causes of action, shall supersede any inconsistent provision of law.
History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2620n.
Case Notes
In General.
This subchapter is only applicable to professional services. Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270 (1982).
Medical Injury.
Section 16-114-201(3) defines “medical injury” sufficiently broadly; claims based on allegations of a failure to provide needed medical care and attention or the timely diagnosis of medical problems come within the ambit of this subchapter and are dependent upon expert testimony as outlined in § 16-114-206(a). Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).
Husband's claims against a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a clinic fell within the purview of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act as the claims involved the failure to properly diagnose, assess, and manage his wife's care and treatment. Dodd v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 90 Ark. App. 191, 204 S.W.3d 579 (2005).
Summary judgment was properly awarded to a hospital in an action by appellants for negligent credentialing of a surgeon because the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing as a “medical injury”; credentialing decisions did not involve a professional service, a doctor's treatment or order, or a matter of medical science related to specific patient care. Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 2012 Ark. 55, 386 S.W.3d 462 (2012).
Negligence.
The trial court erred in treating a medical malpractice claim as an ordinary negligence claim, and in permitting the issues raised by the medical malpractice claim to rest on lay testimony. Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).
Res Ipsa Loquitur.
In action under this subchapter, the trial court properly refused the proffered instruction on res ipsa loquitur where all of the essential elements were not present. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996), overruled in part, Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2006).
Statute of Limitations.
This subchapter's two-year statute superseded the Products Liability three-year statute of limitations to govern plaintiff's product-liability claims brought against a drug company for medical injury as a result of taking the diet drug popularly known as Fen/Phen. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
Wrongful Death.
The limitations period provided under this subchapter conflicts with the limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102; pursuant to this subchapter, § 16-62-102's statute of limitations, as an inconsistent provision of law, is superseded by § 16-114-203's statute of limitations where the two conflict. Hertlein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 323 Ark. 283, 914 S.W.2d 303 (1996).
Cited: HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Howard v. Northwest Ark. Surgical Clinic, 324 Ark. 375, 921 S.W.2d 596 (1996).