Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-303 (2026)
Compromise or settlement without attorney's consent — Effect
- Any agreement, contract, or arrangement between litigants or any conduct of the one seeking affirmative relief at the instance and procurement of his adversary which deprives the litigant of his asserted right against his adversary shall constitute a compromise or settlement of his cause of action within the meaning of this section.
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- In case a compromise or settlement is made by the parties litigant to the action after service of the notice by certified mail and before the filing of suit, or if made after suit is filed upon the action and such compromise or settlement is made without the consent of such attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor, the court of proper jurisdiction shall, upon motion, enter judgment for a reasonable fee or compensation against all of the parties to the compromise or settlement so made without the consent of the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor, and the amount of the fee or compensation shall not be necessarily limited to the amount, if any, of the compromise or settlement between the parties litigant.
- If the compromise or settlement is effected by an agent or agents of such party, the judgment shall be entered against the agent or agents as well as against those parties from whom the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor is entitled to judgment for the fee or compensation, and, if the compromise or settlement is made with the knowledge or advice of the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor of those parties from whom the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor is entitled to judgment for the fee or compensation, the court shall also enter judgment against such attorneys at law, solicitors, or counselors as well.
History. Acts 1989, No. 293, § 1.
Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of former provisions relating to lien of attorney, see Publisher's Notes to this subchapter.
Research References
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Survey—Miscellaneous, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 235.
Case Notes
Construction.
Former similar section was remedial in character and must be liberally construed. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (preceding decisions under prior law).
Applicability.
The attorney's lien statutes, §§ 16-22-301 — 16-22-304, do not apply to cases in which an attorney is terminated for cause. Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 890 S.W.2d 260 (1995).
Abandonment of Client.
Counsel's protest to client and advice against making what he thought was an improvident settlement did not constitute abandonment of his client or forfeiture of any right he may have had under contract with client. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Hurst, 198 Ark. 546, 129 S.W.2d 970 (1939) (decision under prior law).
Collection of Fee.
The right of the attorney to collect his fee from his client's adversary is dependent upon this section and he must bring his case in conformity therewith. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Geurin, 200 Ark. 755, 140 S.W.2d 691 (1940) (decision under prior law).
Where client settles claim without attorney's knowledge, attorney can recover fee by separate action in the court in which his client's action was instituted and is not limited to file a motion in the origianl suit. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).
Judgment for a reasonable fee may be against any of the parties litigant. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (decision under prior law).
Because it was “patently clear” that the attorney's Pulaski County suit over disputed contingency fees from a former client's settlement with the insurer had no chance of success and was a collateral attack, where the settlement was entered in Cleburne County, and the proper venue was in Cleburne County, and because the attorney attempted to manufacture venue by claiming unwarranted costs and expenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against the attorney under Ark. R. Civ. P. 11. Pomtree v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 353 Ark. 657, 121 S.W.3d 147 (2003).
—Lien.
Probate court had jurisdiction to enforce attorney's lien pending in that court for case tried before that court. Baxter Land Co. v. Gibson, 236 Ark. 664, 367 S.W.2d 741 (1963) (decision under prior law).
If a proceeding to collect attorney's fee is against the client, the amount of the fee is to be governed by their agreement and, to ensure payment of that fee, the attorney is entitled to a lien upon the client's cause of action which attaches to any settlement recovered by the client; however, when the attorney proceeds against the other party, this section contains no provision for a lien upon the cause of action which might attach to a settlement recovered by the other party and the attorney is entitled only to a reasonable fee or compensation. Jarboe v. Hicks, 281 Ark. 21, 660 S.W.2d 930 (1983); Cato v. Arkansas Mun. League Mun. Health Benefit Fund, 285 Ark. 419, 688 S.W.2d 720 (1985) (preceding decisions under prior law).
Where attorney filed suit for accounting and aided in preparing divorce suit, which was dismissed, and there was no showing that client received tangible assets in return for the dismissal of her claim, no useful purpose would be served by reopening suit for purposes of enforcing attorney's lien. Myers v. Muuss, 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W.2d 805 (1984) (decision under prior law).
Entitlement to Fee.
Defendant, by compromising and settling with client, recognizes the attorney's absolute right to recover a fee of some amount and the attorney is entitled to a recovery without having to prove that client could recover in the original case. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943) (decision under prior law).
When a client settles a claim without the attorney's consent, with or without a monetary consideration for the settlement, the attorney is nevertheless entitled to a reasonable fee. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).
Attorney who, when it developed at the trial that client's suit had been settled without his knowledge, entered a nonsuit, did not lose his right to an attorney's fee. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).
In suit by attorneys to recover fees where parties to a suit have compromised, attorneys need not show that suit would have been successful, if tried, or that client received any consideration for the compromise or settlement. Hamm v. Howard, 216 Ark. 326, 225 S.W.2d 333 (1949) (decision under prior law).
Attorney was entitled to fee for services rendered in suing debtor where debtor paid client directly, if client had agreed to pay attorney a reasonable cash fee for any services performed. Stevens v. Gilliam, 220 Ark. 867, 251 S.W.2d 241 (1952) (decision under prior law).
To be entitled to a fee under this section the attorney does not have to show that the suit would have been successful. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (decision under prior law).
An attorney discharged with or without cause can recover the reasonable value of his or her services to the date of discharge. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).
Motion to Fix Fee.
Proof of a compromise or settlement after suit is filed and without the attorney's consent constitutes, under this section, the only prerequisite to the proper filing by the attorney of a motion to have his fee fixed. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943) (decision under prior law).
Reasonableness of Fee.
This section provides for a fee on a quantum meruit basis and in determining what would be a reasonable fee, court takes into consideration the amount of time and labor involved, the skill and ability of the attorney, and the nature and extent of the litigation. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Hurst, 198 Ark. 546, 129 S.W.2d 970 (1939) (decision under prior law).
Fee is not necessarily limited to the amount of the settlement; other elements may be considered in determining a reasonable fee on a quantum meruit. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Geurin, 200 Ark. 755, 140 S.W.2d 691 (1940) (decision under prior law).
For discussion of reasonableness of fee in various contexts, see St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Poe, 201 Ark. 93, 143 S.W.2d 879 (1940); Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943); Holland v. Harley, 206 Ark. 244, 174 S.W.2d 567 (1943); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943); Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979) (decisions under prior law).
Among the pertinent considerations in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee, not specifically fixed by contract, are: (1) the attorney's judgment, learning, ability, skill, experience, professional standing and advice; (2) the relationship between the parties; (3) the amount or importance of the subject matter of the case; (4) the nature, extent and difficulty of services in research; (5) the preparation of pleadings; (6) the proceedings actually taken and the nature and extent of the litigation; (7) the time and labor devoted to the client's cause, the difficulties presented in the course of the litigation and the results obtained. In making these determinations, both the trial court's and the appellate court's experience and knowledge of the character of such services may be used as a guide. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).
Fee award held reasonable. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).
There is no requirement that the trial judge consider his own experience and knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a fee. Harper v. Shackleford, 41 Ark. App. 116, 850 S.W.2d 15 (1993).
Cited: Haskins Law Firm v. American Nat'l Property & Cas. Co., 304 Ark. 684, 804 S.W.2d 714 (1991).