Ark. Code Ann. § 16-32-103 (2026)

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional. Richardson v. Williams, 327 Ark. 156, 936 S.W.2d 752 (1997).

Construction.

Acts 1969, No. 568 must be construed as mandatory for to construe it as directory only would tend to exclude from jury service those voters who registered after the last full selection of the jury wheel. Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973).

This section is so clear that it needs no construction or interpretation, even though it contains a typographical error; it is a well-thought-out statute, has a solid foundation in public policy, and is to be followed by the circuit judges and clerks. Bates v. State, 322 Ark. 738, 912 S.W.2d 417, 1995 Ark. LEXIS 738 (1995).

Discrimination.

Where there was a 14% disparity between the percentage of blacks on the jury venire and the percentage of registered black voters and the jury venire was chosen by the subjective judgment of white jury commissioners who could exercise untrammeled discretion subject only to the requirement that persons selected be of good moral character, of approved integrity, sound judgment and reasonable information, a prima facie case of discrimination was established. Sanford v. Hutto, 394 F. Supp. 1278 (1975), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. Ark. 1975) (decision under prior law).

No defendant has a right to have jurors selected in a manner to assure him of a jury from his own ethnic group or occupation. Turner v. State, 258 Ark. 425, 527 S.W.2d 580 (1975) (decision under prior law).

To the extent that persons not registered to vote did not constitute a distinct and identifiable group, use of voter registration lists in the overall composition of petit and grand juries did not discriminate against unregistered citizens. Murrah v. Arkansas, 532 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1976) (decision under prior law).

Evidence insufficient to show that the Arkansas system of selecting jurors at random from the current list of registered voters unlawfully underrepresented blacks and persons between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four. Sullivan v. State, 287 Ark. 6, 696 S.W.2d 709 (1985).

When the panel is drawn by chance, a showing that its racial make-up does not correspond to that of the county does not in itself make a prima facie case of racial discrimination; therefore, the defendant's motion for a continuance to enable him to show that the particular panel was not representative of the population was properly refused. Thomas v. State, 289 Ark. 72, 709 S.W.2d 83 (1986).

This process of selecting jurors has been upheld frequently and while jury selection may not be the result of discrimination against racial groups, each jury need not have on it persons representative of each distinctive group in the population from which it is chosen; thus a jury of 15% African-Americans in county where the African-American population is 23% did not show purposeful discrimination. MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Capital murder defendant's challenge to the use of voter-registration records to select the jury panel on the grounds that African-Americans and women would be under-represented was properly rejected; where the venire was chosen using the random selection process required by this section, there was no possibility of a systematic or purposeful exclusion of any group. State v. Fudge, 361 Ark. 412, 206 S.W.3d 850 (2005).

Multi-District County.

Where jury was drawn only from one district of multi-district county, the trial court properly refused to grant motion quashing the jury panel since Ark. Const., Art. 13, § 5, and this section both clearly contemplate that a jury may properly be drawn from only one district within a county having more than one district. Morgan v. State, 273 Ark. 252, 618 S.W.2d 161 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

The electoral subdistricts within the Tenth Judicial District are not judicial districts and that the venire in this case was properly drawn from Drew County as a whole. Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995), cert. denied, Caldwell v. Arkansas, 517 U.S. 1124, 116 S. Ct. 1361, 134 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1996).

Oath.

The trial court properly refused to quash the jury panel merely because a clerical employee who assisted in preparing the jury list had not taken the oath required by this section, since this section is not mandatory and no question about the integrity of the list had been shown. Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887, 1982 Ark. LEXIS 1606 (1982).

Sufficient Compliance.

Where the bailiff testified that he put the names in alphabetical order as a convenience to help him in locating the jurors and to help attorneys in matching the names with the jurors' information sheets, where the alphabetical listing was just as random and impartial as any other procedure, and where there was no hint that alphabetical order was chosen for a sinister purpose, in the absence of any showing whatever of possible prejudice, the trial judge was right in denying the motion to quash the panel. Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W.2d 717, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996, 101 S. Ct. 535, 66 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1980).

The fact that jurors were called for a particular term of court rather than for the calendar year in general did not offend the spirit of this section. Harrod v. State, 286 Ark. 277, 691 S.W.2d 172 (1985).

Jury selection satisfied requirements of this section. Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989).

The trial court erred by selecting the random numbers outside the presence of the circuit clerk and by not being present when the selection was made, but the error was harmless where there was no hint that the circuit judge did anything other than randomly select the numbers, and there was no hint that the circuit clerk did anything other than correctly apply the random numbers to the voter registration list. Bates v. State, 322 Ark. 738, 912 S.W.2d 417, 1995 Ark. LEXIS 738 (1995).

Violation.

In a civil tort proceeding, the plaintiff has an equal protection right to jury-selection procedures that produce juries from a representative cross-section of his community; however, in order to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement, he must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Richardson v. Williams, 327 Ark. 156, 936 S.W.2d 752 (1997).

Cited: Williams v. State, 254 Ark. 799, 496 S.W.2d 395 (1973); Robillard v. State, 263 Ark. 666, 566 S.W.2d 735 (1978); Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1986); Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 Ark. 551, 750 S.W.2d 406 (1988); Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 754 S.W.2d 518 (1988); Mitchell v. State, 299 Ark. 566, 776 S.W.2d 332 (1989); Wainwright v. Norris, 872 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 194, 925 S.W.2d 402 (1996); Britt v. State, 334 Ark. 142, 974 S.W.2d 436 (1998); Thompson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 275, 461 S.W.3d 368 (2015).