Ark. Code Ann. § 16-33-304 (2026)

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Death-qualification of the jury in capital cases has been and continues to be a constitutional procedure. Jurors who are unalterably opposed to capital punishment should not be permitted to participate in the determination of guilt or innocence in capital cases and their exclusion is proper, for either of two reasons; first, because conviction proneness is neither inherently wrong nor destructive of the juror's impartiality, and second, because a jury system that has served its purpose admirably throughout the nation's history ought not to be twisted out of shape for the benefit of those persons least entitled to special favors. It has always been the law in Arkansas, except when the punishment is mandatory, that the same jurors who have the responsibility for determining guilt or innocence must also shoulder the burden of fixing the punishment; that is as it should be, for the two questions are necessarily interwoven. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983), cert. denied, Rector v. Arkansas, 466 U.S. 988, 104 S. Ct. 2370, 80 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1984).

Construction.

This section is construed liberally toward insuring the constitutional right of a defendant to a trial by an impartial jury secured by Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

Implied bias arises by implication of law and is liberally construed in criminal cases. Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984), cert. denied, Linell v. Arkansas, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1778 (1985).

Actual Bias.

It is within discretion of trial court to determine whether a juror has actual bias, and a judgment will not be reversed unless the court abuses that discretion. Henslee v. State, 251 Ark. 125, 471 S.W.2d 352 (1971).

When actual bias is in question, the qualification of a juror is within the sound discretion of the trial judge because he is in a better position to weigh the demeanor of the prospective juror's response to the questions on voir dire; jurors are assumed to be unbiased and the burden of demonstrating actual bias is on the appellant. Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984), cert. denied, Linell v. Arkansas, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1778 (1985).

A prospective juror does not have to admit his bias before the trial court may excuse him. Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984).

Jurors are presumed unbiased and the burden of proving actual bias is on the party challenging the juror. Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984); Blann v. State, 15 Ark. App. 364, 695 S.W.2d 382 (1985).

It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to qualify a juror who indicated a number of times during the questioning that she was biased, where the defendant used all his peremptory challenges and demonstrated that he would have excused another juror if he'd had another peremptory challenge, thereby properly preserving his record. Bovee v. State, 19 Ark. App. 268, 720 S.W.2d 322 (1986).

—Failure to Disclose.

If a prejudiced juror does sit in the case, it is not grounds for a new trial unless it appears that he imposed himself upon the panel by concealment or prevarication. Colbert v. State, 156 Ark. 98, 245 S.W. 801 (1922).

Where a juror heard the testimony of the prosecuting witness at the examining trial and pronounced it the truth, but failed to disclose that fact on voir dire, he was disqualified as a juror notwithstanding that he testified that he entered the jury box without prejudice nor did it matter that the evidence established the defendant's guilt. Lane v. State, 168 Ark. 528, 270 S.W. 974 (1925).

—Preconceived Opinion.

When a juror admits that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, the law regards him as an unfit person to compose part of such impartial jury as the bill of rights secures to the accused, but the disqualification is removed if he is able to state that such opinion is founded upon rumor in its proper sense and is not such as to bias or prejudice his mind. Meyer v. State, 19 Ark. 156 (1857).

When a juror states upon his voir dire that he has formed and expressed an opinion of the prisoner's guilt, but has no prejudice against him, and is accepted by the prisoner without examination as to his feelings and statements, the prisoner cannot afterward urge after-discovered statements of the juror showing strong bias and belief of his guilt, as a ground for a new trial. Werner v. State, 44 Ark. 122 (1884).

Persons offered as jurors who state upon their voir dire that they have formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused which it would take evidence to remove, are incompetent and should be rejected, notwithstanding that they further state that they can give the accused a fair and impartial trial. Polk v. State, 45 Ark. 165 (1885). See Caldwell v. State, 69 Ark. 322, 63 S.W. 59 (1901).

Evidence sufficient to find juror competent. Sneed v. State, 47 Ark. 180, 1 S.W. 68 (1886); Gibson v. State, 135 Ark. 520, 205 S.W. 898 (1918); Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982), cert. denied, Hill v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S. Ct. 180 (1982).

A preconceived opinion about the merits of the case renders a juror prima facie incompetent. Taylor v. State, 72 Ark. 613, 82 S.W. 495 (1904); Bealmear v. State, 104 Ark. 616, 150 S.W. 129 (1912); Davidson v. State, 109 Ark. 450, 160 S.W. 385 (1913); McGough v. State, 113 Ark. 301, 167 S.W. 857 (1914), overruled, Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959); Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914).

Opinion based upon hearsay or mere rumor or formed from reading newspapers does not disqualify, if the juror can try the case on the evidence only. Sullins v. State, 79 Ark. 127, 95 S.W. 159 (1906); Daughtry v. State, 80 Ark. 13, 96 S.W. 748 (1906); Decker v. State, 85 Ark. 64, 107 S.W. 182 (1908); McElvain v. State, 101 Ark. 443, 142 S.W. 840 (1911).

An opinion formed from talking with witnesses and stating that defendant should be lynched disqualifies. Collins v. State, 102 Ark. 180, 143 S.W. 1075 (1912).

Evidence sufficient to find juror incompetent. Snyder v. State, 151 Ark. 601, 237 S.W. 87 (1922).

Discharge of Sworn Juror.

After the jury was sworn, the court, on discovering that one of the jurors was on the bond of the defendant, discharged the juror; the defendant was not entitled to a release on the ground that he had been in jeopardy. Harris v. State, 177 Ark. 186, 6 S.W.2d 34 (1928).

Where, following selection and swearing in of jury, it was brought to the court's attention that one of the jurors was related to the defendant in the case and the court thereupon discharged the juror, the conclusion drawn by appellant that he had been placed in jeopardy was not tenable nor did the trial court commit reversible error in discharging a juror related to defendant within the prohibited degree. McDaniel v. State, 228 Ark. 1122, 313 S.W.2d 77 (1958).

Where there was no sound reason for discharging the jury and there was certainly no overruling necessity, the effect of declaring a mistrial, in view of the fact that defendant was perfectly willing to have relative of officer retained as juror, was to put the accused in jeopardy and his motion to be discharged because of a former jeopardy should have been granted. Jones v. State, 230 Ark. 18, 320 S.W.2d 645 (1959).

Discrimination.

Prima facie case of purposeful discrimination may be made by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, demonstrating total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires, or showing a pattern of strikes, or questions and statements, by a prosecuting attorney during voir dire. Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 733 S.W.2d 728 (1987), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998)(But see, Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990)) See also MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

The standard of review for reversal of a trial court's evaluation of the sufficiency of the state's racially neutral explanation of alleged discrimination must test whether the court's findings are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. In every instance, however, the court shall state, in response to the defendant's objections, its ruling as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the racially neutral explanation provided by the state. Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Upon a showing by a defendant of circumstances which raise an inference that the prosecutor exercised one or more of his peremptory challenges to exclude venire persons from the jury on account of race, the burden then shifts to the state to establish that the peremptory strike(s) were for racially neutral reasons. The trial court shall then determine from all relevant circumstances the sufficiency of the racially neutral explanation. Only if the state's explanation appears insufficient, must the trial court then conduct a sensitive inquiry into the basis for each of the challenges by the state. Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Exhaustion of Peremptory Challenges.

When defendant's peremptory challenges are exhausted, it is error to hold a biased juror competent. Snyder v. State, 151 Ark. 601, 237 S.W. 87 (1922).

When a defendant has used all his peremptory challenges before a prospective juror is called, he may only challenge that juror for cause and not peremptorily, and it is reversible error to thereafter hold a biased juror competent. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

A defendant may challenge any error of the trial court in refusing to strike a juror for cause if the record shows that, as a result of refusal to strike, defendant was forced to exercise peremptory challenge and a subsequent juror he objected to was forced upon him because he had exhausted his peremptory challenges. For that rule to be applicable, however, the defendant must not only show that the trial judge abused his discretion in not excusing the first juror for cause, but must also demonstrate from the record that he would have excused the subsequent juror had he been able to peremptorily challenge him. Miller v. State, 8 Ark. App. 165, 649 S.W.2d 407, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 806 (1983).

Failure to Challenge Juror.

Inmate's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge a juror for cause, and therefore the inmate's motion for relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 was properly denied, because counsel testified that he did not believe he could prevail on such a challenge. While the juror seemed to favor the death penalty, she also replied affirmatively that she could consider the full range of punishment, that she would consider mitigating circumstances and weigh them against aggravating circumstances, and that she would have to listen to the evidence to make a decision. Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007).

Former Police Officer.

The trial court in a criminal prosecution did not commit prejudicial error by failing to excuse for cause a venireman, where the defendant peremptorily excused this venireman and the record reflected that no objectionable juror was forced upon the defendant without his having the privilege of exercising a peremptory challenge. Stephens v. State, 277 Ark. 113, 640 S.W.2d 94 (1982).

Illness.

It was not error to excuse a juror, after he had been accepted by both sides, where the juror stated that he was subject to spells and liable to be sick if confined with the jury. Caughron v. State, 99 Ark. 462, 139 S.W. 315 (1911).

Implied Bias.

The mere fact that a proposed juror ran a boat for the parties that searched for the body of the deceased does not disqualify him. Coats v. State, 101 Ark. 51, 141 S.W. 197 (1911).

Circumstances held not to warrant disqualification of juror. Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Jones v. State, 264 Ark. 935, 576 S.W.2d 198, 1979 Ark. LEXIS 1282 (1979); Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980); Moss v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1992).

Circumstances held to warrant disqualification of juror. Grigsby v. State, 260 Ark. 499, 542 S.W.2d 275 (1976); Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983); Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984).

The question of a juror's qualification lies within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge and defendant has the burden of showing the prospective juror's disqualification on grounds of implied bias. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

Where one juror said that her husband and son had been represented by the prosecuting attorney in a property matter, and another said the prosecutor had represented her adult daughter two years earlier, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the challenges for cause, for the jurors did not appear to be biased. Bliss v. State, 288 Ark. 546, 708 S.W.2d 74 (Ark. 1986).

Trial court has discretion to excuse a juror for implied bias, even if the bias does not clearly fall within one of the categories provided under subdivision (b)(2)(B), as it would be impossible for the statute to cover every conceivable circumstance touching on a juror's possible bias; therefore, where defendant was charged with evasion of use taxes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing for cause two prospective jurors who had been delinquent in paying personal property taxes even though subdivision (b)(2)(B) did not include that particular form of implied bias. Owens v. State, 354 Ark. 644, 128 S.W.3d 445 (2003).

Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to remove a juror and replace the juror with an alternate when midtrial, the juror informed the trial court that the juror belatedly realized that the juror attended church with the mother of one of the victims; the juror gave the trial court and counsel an opportunity to openly address the matter, defense counsel failed to ask any questions of the juror that would demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion, and no one questioned the juror about the meaning of the juror's statement that the juror did not want the case to “get thrown out or something” in the future, so the juror's response could not demonstrate prejudice. Childs v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 675 (2010).

—Capital Punishment.

It was not error, in a capital case, to permit the prosecuting attorney to challenge a juror peremptorily, after he had been accepted but before the jury was complete, where the juror informed the court that he had conscientious scruples against capital punishment. Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S.W. 773 (1904).

Where several veniremen on their voir dire stated that they would not return a verdict on circumstantial evidence and assess the death penalty, but would return a verdict on such evidence and assess life imprisonment, and the prosecuting attorney announced that he would waive the infliction of the death penalty, the selection of those veniremen as jurors was not prejudicial to the defendant. Rogers v. State, 136 Ark. 161, 206 S.W. 152 (1918).

It was proper for prosecutor to ask prospective juror if he had any scruples against death penalty, even though statute provided for either death penalty or life imprisonment. Needham v. State, 215 Ark. 935, 224 S.W.2d 785 (1949).

Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense attorney in prosecution for rape to ask a prospective juror if he would feel obligated to impose death penalty rather than life imprisonment upon finding of guilty, as there is no statutory recognition of implied bias in favor of capital punishment; hence, court had the right to exercise its discretion. Needham v. State, 215 Ark. 935, 224 S.W.2d 785 (1949).

Where qualification of jury on the death penalty was done in accordance with this section, there was no error. Baxter v. State, 225 Ark. 239, 281 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1955).

Since this section, which recognizes implied bias when a juror entertains such conscientious opinions as would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death, necessarily shifts the implied bias from the mere finding of guilt to the imposition of the death penalty because the legislature gave the jury the option of imposing life imprisonment in all capital cases, it was not error not to examine the veniremen to determine whether they could even find the defendant guilty. Miller v. State, 273 Ark. 508, 621 S.W.2d 482, 1981 Ark. LEXIS 1399 (1981).

The removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors who state that they cannot under any circumstances vote for the imposition of the death penalty does not violate a defendant's right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution to have his guilt or innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a representative cross section of the community. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).

Since Arkansas recognizes the death penalty, jurors in a capital murder case must be able to consider imposing a death sentence if they are to perform their function as jurors; the trial court correctly decided that those excused jurors could not perform their duties because they could not consider imposing a death sentence. Williams v. State, 288 Ark. 444, 705 S.W.2d 888 (1986).

A state may not carry out a sentence of death imposed by a jury which was selected by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed religious or conscientious scruples against its infliction; the most that can be demanded of a prospective juror is that he or she be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he or she not be irrevocably committed before the trial has begun to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge. Orndorff v. Lockhart, 707 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd in part, vac'd in part, 906 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. Ark. 1990).

—Employer and Employee.

Employees of victimized corporation were biased by implication and should not have been allowed to sit on jury where defendant was charged with arson of property which belonged to the corporation and defendant had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Byrd v. State, 251 Ark. 149, 471 S.W.2d 350 (1971).

—Landlord and Tenant.

Where a juror testified that she was not the landlord of either of the defendants and that she did not rent from either of them, there was no merit to the contention that the juror was disqualified as being landlord of one of the appellees. Crouch v. Richards, 212 Ark. 980, 208 S.W.2d 460 (1948).

—Maximum Penalty.

Where, on voir dire, after stating the minimum and maximum penalties for the crimes charged, the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors whether they would consider the maximum penalty, the trial court properly allowed the inquiry, because the jurors were really only asked whether they would consider all the penalties provided by law. Stephens v. State, 277 Ark. 113, 640 S.W.2d 94 (1982).

Where a prospective juror was irrevocably committed to voting against the possible maximum penalties, regardless of the facts and circumstances that might have ensued in the course of the trial, the trial court did not err in excusing the venireman for cause. Stephens v. State, 277 Ark. 113, 640 S.W.2d 94 (1982).

—Prior Service.

It was prejudicial error for the trial court to require the defendant to peremptorily challenge a venireman who served on the grand jury which indicted the defendant where, before the jury was completed, the defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges. Holman v. State, 115 Ark. 305, 171 S.W. 107 (1914).

Where some jurors in defendant's prosecution had previously sat on juries which convicted different defendants for the same offense based on the testimony of the same prosecuting witness who testified against defendant, this section did not apply, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify the jurors for cause on the grounds that the jurors had prejudged the credibility of the prosecuting witness. Holland v. State, 260 Ark. 617, 542 S.W.2d 761 (1976); Pickens v. State, 260 Ark. 633, 542 S.W.2d 764 (1976).

The plain language of subdivision (b)(2)(B)(iv) of this section permits persons accused of a crime the right to exclude all jurors who have served as jurors in the trial of a co-defendant; the right need not be extended to exclude potential jurors who had not actually served as a juror in a prior trial involving the same offense. McClendon v. State, 316 Ark. 688, 875 S.W.2d 55 (1994); Goins v. State, 319 Ark. 689, 890 S.W.2d 602 (1995).

—Relationship.

Juror was not disqualified by fact that his son had married a member of a family into which member of prosecuting witness' family had also married, since there was no relation of affinity between juror and prosecuting witness or any member of her family, and denial of new trial on ground of juror's failure to disclose the above relation was not abuse of discretion. Thornsberry v. State, 192 Ark. 435, 92 S.W.2d 203 (1936).

In prosecution for destroying school building by means of dynamite, juror, who was brother-in-law of fire chief whose city-owned car was dynamited on the same night as the school building, was not disqualified under this section because fire chief suffered no property damage and was not a witness during the trial. Lauderdale v. State, 233 Ark. 96, 343 S.W.2d 422 (1961).

A juror was properly excused by the court after being accepted by both prosecution and defense when it was learned that he was a cousin to a secretary of the prosecuting attorney, since the judge has the discretion to excuse a juror even where the issue of bias may be more implied than actual and even though the situation does not clearly fall within this section or § 16-31-102, since it would be impossible for the statutes to cover every conceivable circumstance touching on a juror's possible bias. Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 617 S.W.2d 6 (1981), cert. denied, Ruiz v. Arkansas, 454 U.S. 1093, 102 S. Ct. 659 (1981).

The trial court did not err when it denied the defendant's challenge of a juror for cause based on an alleged family relationship between the prosecutor's wife and the juror, where the evidence showed that the relationship between the juror and the deputy prosecuting attorney's wife was one merely of affinity, so distantly removed that the juror was not certain of its degree and could only guess that they were third cousins. Miller v. State, 8 Ark. App. 165, 649 S.W.2d 407, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 806 (1983).

The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial when, after the trial had commenced, a juror told the trial judge that he knew the prosecutrix where the juror stated that the prosecutrix had spoken to him during the lunch hour, that, after reflection, he had recalled meeting her three or four years earlier when he repaired a typewriter at the bank where she worked, that he had not seen her since that time, and that he could be a fair and impartial juror. Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986).

Juror Improperly Excused.

Because the trial court (a) failed to make a finding, from all relevant circumstances, as to the sufficiency of the state's gender-neutral explanation, and then (b) failed to conduct a sensitive inquiry into the basis for each of the challenges by the state, the evidence did not establish that the state's challenges were for valid reasons without any gender bias; therefore, the defendant's constitutional rights had not been protected and the trial court's error required a reversal and retrial. Cleveland v. State, 318 Ark. 738, 888 S.W.2d 629 (1994).

Juror Properly Excused.

Trial court did not abuse discretion in excusing venireperson, acquaintance of defendant's daughter, for cause. Henry v. State, 309 Ark. 1, 828 S.W.2d 346 (1992).

Preserving Issue.

Defendant objected to seating a juror during voir dire and requested that the trial court dismiss her for cause, such that the point was preserved for review; case law does not support the argument that a party must make an additional objection at the conclusion of voir dire. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Refusal to Strike.

Petitioner was not denied his right to an impartial jury by the trial court's refusal to strike for cause a venireman whose mother had already been empaneled as a juror. The Arkansas trial and appellate courts found that the juror manifested no bias. Moss v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1992).

Once it was revealed that the juror knew the robbery victim's father through a golfing club and business matters, the trial court appropriately inquired as to the juror's ability to be fair and unbiased, and also allowed defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney to ask the juror questions; because the juror could set aside the his knowledge of the parties, decide the case on the facts, and abide by the law as given by the court, there was no for-cause basis to exclude the juror under this section. Miller v. State, 81 Ark. App. 337, 101 S.W.3d 860 (2003).

Juror did not evidence any specific bias against defendant, nor did she express any opinion concerning defendant's guilt and defendant failed to overcome the presumption of impartiality accorded the juror, nor had defendant shown actual prejudice resulting from the trial court's refusal to strike her from the jury for cause. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Trial court did not err in refusing to strike a juror for actual bias; although the juror initially equivocated about whether he could presume the innocence of defendant, when questioned by the trial judge, he agreed that he could in fact make a presumption of innocence in the case. Gwathney v. State, 2009 Ark. 544, 381 S.W.3d 744 (2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to strike a juror for actual bias because the juror, when questioned by the trial judge, made clear that he could follow the law, put aside what he had seen about the case outside the courtroom, and judge the prosecution's case on its own merits. Gwathney v. State, 2009 Ark. 544, 381 S.W.3d 744 (2009).

Silence of Juror.

Defendant failed to raise an issue of actual or implied bias, where his sole contention was that he was effectively denied the right to challenge the juror, either for cause or peremptorily, because of the juror's silence in response to the question whether he knew the defendant. Sims v. State, 266 Ark. 922, 587 S.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1979).

Standard.

The proper standard to be used in releasing a juror is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath. Williams v. State, 288 Ark. 444, 705 S.W.2d 888 (1986).

Statement of Impartiality.

While a venireman is generally impartial when he states that he can put aside any preconceived opinions and give the accused the benefit of all doubts that the law requires, it is not an automatic cure-all for opinions, relationships or information that could disqualify one; some opinions and relationships cannot be overcome by a mere recitation by the prospective jurors that they will set aside objectionable factors. Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983).

Cited: Cotton v. State, 256 Ark. 527, 508 S.W.2d 738 (1974); Kirk v. State, 270 Ark. 983, 606 S.W.2d 755 (1980); Hulsey v. Sargent, 821 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1987); Noel v. State, 28 Ark. App. 158, 771 S.W.2d 325 (1989); Threlkeld v. Worsham, 30 Ark. App. 251, 785 S.W.2d 249 (1990); National Bank of Commerce v. Beavers, 304 Ark. 81, 802 S.W.2d 132 (1990).