Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, A Brief Survey of Some Important 1991 and 1992 Insurance Law Decisions, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 85.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Reach of the Long-Arm After Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley: Still a “Vague and Tangled” Area of the Law?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 209.

Recent Developments, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1093.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Note, Davis v. St. John's Health System, Inc.: General Jurisdiction, The Door is Ajar, But How Far Will It Open? 56 Ark. L. Rev. 647 (2003).

Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments: Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporation Violates Due Process — Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater , 65 Ark. L. Rev. 163 (2012).

Robin E. Wright, Case Note: Conspiring to Create Jurisdiction: Gibbs v. PrimeLending and the Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction in Arkansas, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 723 (2012).

Recent Developments: Contract Faxed to Arkansas by Non-Resident Defendants Is Sufficient To Establish Personal Jurisdiction, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 601 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Kathy McCarroll, Note: Reassessing Personal Jurisdiction in Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 229 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former subdivision C.1.(e) does not violate Ark. Const., Art. 2, §§ 2, 3, or 8. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

In General.

The long-arm statute displaced the common law principle of the transitory cause of action as a rationale for asserting jurisdiction over corporate defendants and required that the cause of action arise out of prescribed conduct such as the transaction of business in Arkansas. To the extent that Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578, (1957), stands for the principle that service upon an agent appointed by a foreign corporation to receive process in this state confers personal jurisdiction in a transitory action regardless of the long-arm statute, it is overruled. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

Five-factor test previously used by the Supreme Court of Arkansas to assess specific personal jurisdiction is no longer applicable. Instead, the following criteria are necessary for specific personal jurisdiction: (1) the defendant must purposefully avail himself or herself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum state; and (3) the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Construction.

This section should be liberally construed. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974).

Although this section is to be liberally construed, there must still be some evidence upon which a prima facie showing of jurisdiction may be found to exist. Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Burden of Proof.

A nonresident defendant filing a motion to dismiss or quash on grounds that there are not sufficient contacts within the state to be personally in the state, has the burden of going forward and offering proof to sustain the allegations of the motion, and if the motion is denied, this does not mean that the plaintiff is relieved from establishing jurisdiction; it merely means that at that point in the proceedings a prima facie case of jurisdiction sufficient to take the cause to trial has been made. Hawes Firearm Co. v. Roberts, 263 Ark. 510, 565 S.W.2d 620 (1978).

Under Arkansas law, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that a nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with Arkansas to be sued in personam; however, the nonresident defendant filing a motion to dismiss or quash has the burden of going forward and offering proof to sustain the allegations of no jurisdiction. Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Challenging a Finding of Jurisdiction.

A writ of prohibition will not lie in a case where the personal jurisdiction turns upon whether the activities of the defendant were sufficient to satisfy the “minimum contacts” test applied under this section in order to allow the court to exercise the maximum jurisdiction allowable by due process, since the “minimum contacts” test is a question of fact, and in cases where jurisdiction depends upon the establishment of facts, the issue of jurisdiction must be decided by the trial court, subject to correction on appeal rather than by a writ of prohibition. Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp. v. Cole, 274 Ark. 121, 622 S.W.2d 192 (1981).

When a trial court has made a determination that a person's contacts with Arkansas are sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945), and former subdivision C.1.(a) of this section, the proper manner of challenging the decision is by appeal and not by a petition for a writ of prohibition. Fausett v. Host, 315 Ark. 527, 868 S.W.2d 472 (1994).

Contacts Found.

Circuit court did not err in denying a nonresident defendant's motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction where the protective order only prohibited the nonresident from contacting the resident plaintiff and did not impose any sort of affirmative duty on the nonresident. Beason v. Parks, 2015 Ark. App. 246, 459 S.W.3d 841 (2015).

Contacts Not Found.

Motion to dismiss was granted because although plaintiff argued that general personal jurisdiction was satisfied because auto parts manufactured by defendants were ultimately included in cars sold extensively in the state, this “stream of commerce” argument was not an adequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., No. 11-5130, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124189 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 26, 2011).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to appellee, a resident of Hawaii, in an action for defamation filed by appellant, an Arkansas resident, because the exchange of an email between appellee and a resident of Mississippi did not meet the minimum-contacts test; exercise of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Morris v. Christopher, 2013 Ark. App. 312 (2013).

In an action for defamation, false light, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and interference with business expectancy, arising from two postings made on logistics industry websites concerning an allegedly nonconforming shipment of frozen chicken, the court did not have general jurisdiction over defendants given the limited scope of defendants' contacts with Arkansas. Sioux Transp., Inc. v. XPO Logistics, No. 5:15-CV-05265, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2015).

In an action for defamation, false light, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and interference with business expectancy, defendants did not have sufficient contacts with Arkansas to confer specific jurisdiction on the court where (1) mail and telephone contacts alone were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, and (2) most of the performance relating to the parties' agreement occurred outside of Arkansas, on the road from Alabama to Michigan. Sioux Transp., Inc. v. XPO Logistics, No. 5:15-CV-05265, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2015).

Circuit court did not err in determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over appellee; she prepared only one Arkansas tax return for appellant, he did not claim that the form was improperly prepared, and as neither party was an Arkansas resident, there was no interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents, and there was nothing about the sole act of preparing and signing one tax return that would have caused appellee to reasonably anticipate being brought into an Arkansas court. Reveley v. Roth, 2016 Ark. App. 248, 491 S.W.3d 490 (2016).

Contracts.

Contractual relationships held sufficient to establish jurisdiction over nonresident. Waukesha Bldg. Corp. v. Jameson, 246 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Dreyfus Co. v. Royster Co., 487 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); McMahen v. Paramount Holdings, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Rice v. SD Leasing, Inc., 14 Ark. App. 180, 686 S.W.2d 450 (1985); Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Negotiations within the state leading up to the execution of the contract constituted such minimal contacts as were sufficient to give a court in Arkansas jurisdiction over a suit on such contract. Thompson v. Ecological Science Corp., 421 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1970); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Ark. 1973).

Contractual relationship held insufficient to establish jurisdiction over nonresident. Arkansas Poultry Coop. v. Red Barn Sys., 468 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1972); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992).

Evidence did not establish a contract to supply services or things in Arkansas which would bring nonresident under Arkansas jurisdiction. Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

Agreement that lease would be governed by and construed under the laws of Arkansas did not give an Arkansas court personal jurisdiction in and of itself, but did provide another contact with this state which went to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982).

A single contract can provide the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if there is a substantial connection between the contract and the forum state. SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983).

In an Arkansas resident's breach of contract suit alleging an agreement that the Arkansas resident would pursue a wrongful death action in Arkansas on a Virginia resident's behalf in return for fifty percent of the Virginia resident's award, an Arkansas trial court had personal jurisdiction over the Virginia resident under subdivision B. of this section because the Virginia resident had purposefully availed herself of the process and protection of the Arkansas courts to procure a large sum of money, and should have reasonably anticipated being required to appear in an Arkansas court if a dispute arose regarding an agreement, performed in Arkansas, that was an integral part in her procurement of that money. Roberts v. Bendos, 102 Ark. App. 358, 285 S.W.3d 687 (2008), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 626 (Aug. 20, 2008).

Where a Bermuda corporation and its principal negotiated a contract in Arkansas with an Arkansas corporation to ship Arkansas poultry to Bermuda, the Arkansas court's exercise of personal jurisdiction under subdivisions A. and B. of this section over the Bermuda corporation and its principal in an action on the contract did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process. Twin Springs Group, Inc. v. Karibuni, Ltd., 2009 Ark. App. 649, 344 S.W.3d 100 (2009).

Questions of fact remained as to whether an Arizona shipping company and transportation brokerage and their presidents were subject to personal jurisdiction in Arkansas by virtue of their contracting with and allegedly defrauding an Arkansas trucking company for the transportation of food from Arizona to the East Coast. Hotfoot Logistics v. Shipping Point Mktg., 2013 Ark. 130, 426 S.W.3d 448 (2013), overruled in part, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Due Process.

The purpose of this section is to permit courts to exercise maximum in personam jurisdiction allowable by due process. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Gould v. P. T. Krakatau Steel, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S. Ct. 304, 121 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1992); Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of a defendant's activities in a state do not resolve the question of the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction, for whether due process is satisfied depends upon the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978); Gould v. Empire Steel Trading Co., 765 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Ark. 1991), aff'd, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992).

The use of arteries of interstate mail, telephone, railway, and banking facilities is insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy due process in asserting long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982).

Whether a trial court has in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants must be decided on the facts of each case. To make this determination, the court must decide whether the defendants' actions satisfy the “transacting business” requirement within the meaning of this section and whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is consistent with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); Capps v. Roll Serv., Inc., 31 Ark. App. 48, 787 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Factors to be considered in determining whether due process requirements have been satisfied when personal jurisdiction has been exercised over nonresident defendants are: (1) The nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of contacts with the forum state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience to the parties. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Capps v. Roll Serv., Inc., 31 Ark. App. 48, 787 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

This section extends this state's jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.Dudley v. Dittmer, 795 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1986); Byer v. Gordos Ark., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

The inquiry as to the existence of in personam “long-arm” jurisdiction requires a two-part analysis. The court must first determine whether the facts presented satisfy the requirements of the state “long-arm” statute. After that is determined, and only if that is determined affirmatively, the court must then determine whether the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order for state courts to maintain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident person under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party must satisfy two prongs: (1) the party must show that the nonresident has had sufficient minimum contacts with this state; and (2) the party must show that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Trial court erred in dismissing the Arkansas concrete company's action against the Kansas paint company because, even though the paint company had few ordinary business contacts with Arkansas, the paint company had filed a materialmen's lien against the concrete company's Arkansas real estate, which was sufficient contact to subject it to the jurisdiction of Arkansas courts; further, the lien filing also showed that the paint company had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arkansas. Concrete Wallsystems of Ark., Inc. v. Master Paint Indus. Coating Corp., 95 Ark. App. 21, 233 S.W.3d 157 (2006).

Nonresident sellers' presence in Arkansas for several days during which they consummated a large sales transaction that became the subject of litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas was a sufficient contact to give the sellers a reasonable anticipation of being haled into court in Arkansas, and thus subjected them to personal jurisdiction under the Arkansas long-arm statute under this section. Bogle v. Jackson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86776 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 13, 2007).

Japanese traction machine manufacturer's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) dismissal motion was denied because it had sufficient contacts with the Eastern District of Arkansas to warrant the court's exercising personal jurisdiction over it: (1) the Arkansas long-arm statute authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the fullest extent allowed by the U.S. Const., Amend. XIVDue Process Clause; (2) due process required that the manufacturer have minimum contacts with Arkansas, such that the maintenance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; and (3) the manufacturer had sufficient contacts to render it subject to the court's jurisdiction in a products liability suit brought in the Eastern District of Arkansas because it did more than simply place its machine in the stream of commerce, it authorized a U.S. distributor to be the exclusive distributor of its products in the U.S., it provided a user manual in English with its machines, it placed no limitation on where the machines could be sold, it visited the distributor in the U.S. to discuss the sale of its products, and it was aware that its products were being sold throughout the U.S., including in Arkansas. Piggee v. Patterson Med. Prods., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50785 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 29, 2008).

In a suit for fraud, unauthorized practice of law, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy, personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporate officers of related insurance marketing entities was established under subdivision B. of this section because the officers held Arkansas insurance licenses and the corporations they led solicited business in Arkansas. Birts v. Vermillion, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87205 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 23, 2009).

In a suit for fraud, unauthorized practice of law, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy, personal jurisdiction over out-of-state residents who were not employed by, or lacked ownership interests in, related insurance marketing entities was not established under subdivision B. of this section because minimum contacts were lacking. Birts v. Vermillion, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87205 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 23, 2009).

Based upon the allegations in the complaint and the employee's affidavit that his only contacts with Arkansas were by telephone and correspondence, the employee's contacts with Arkansas were insufficient to establish minimum contacts so as to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND v. Elender Escrow, Inc., No. 4:11CV00123 JMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134690 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2011).

Co-conspirators' contacts with Arkansas were insufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction over them or conspiracy jurisdiction over their co-conspirators. Conspiracy jurisdiction only applied when at least one of the conspirators had minimum contacts with Arkansas in furtherance of the conspiracy and such contacts had not been pled. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND v. Elender Escrow, Inc., No. 4:11CV00123 JMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134690 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2011).

Personal jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory did not violate due process. As such, the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate this section, Arkansas's long arm statute. Gibbs v. Primelending, 2011 Ark. 255, 381 S.W.3d 829 (2011).

Court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtors, because the complaint arose out of and was directly related to the 2003 judgments, which were entered in Arkansas and remain unsatisfied; the debtors entered into or guaranteed several loan contracts with an Arkansas bank and pledged Arkansas real estate as collateral, and the debtors defaulted on the loans and an Arkansas court entered judgments against them. Hauser v. Sims, 2012 Ark. App. 295, 423 S.W.3d 104 (2012).

Circuit court erred in finding that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over a Virginia attorney and his law firm sued for conversion, because they lacked sufficient “minimum contacts” with Arkansas, where the attorney acted as counsel for an out-of-state escrow agent, and the earnest money in question had been wired to the attorney by a Georgia company in connection with a purchase agreement between the Georgia company, as purchaser, and the Arkansas plaintiff, as seller. The Arkansas plaintiff was not a party to the escrow agreement between the Georgia company and the escrow agent, and the Court of Appeals could not say that the attorney “purposefully availed” himself of the benefits and protection of the laws of Arkansas. Goodwin v. Magness Oil Co., 2018 Ark. App. 303, 552 S.W.3d 26 (2018).

—Contacts Found.

Nonresident held to have had sufficient contacts with state to bring it within state's jurisdiction without denying due process. Davis v. Triumph Corp., 258 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Lauck v. E.C.K. Chivers & Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Dixie Sound & Communications, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985).

Although Honda R & D makes no direct revenue from Arkansas, the Honda Corporate family does, and Honda R & D enjoys the revenues received by the Honda family. Therefore, plaintiff submitted sufficient information to conclude that defendant Honda R & D derives substantial revenue from the State of Arkansas, and that exercising jurisdiction over Honda R & D satisfies due process. Hawes v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Ark. 1990).

The fact that the corporation was neither present nor doing business in Arkansas and merely owned a subsidiary in Arkansas did not sufficiently connect the corporation to Arkansas to bring it within the state's personal jurisdiction under Arkansas's long-arm statute. Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 2003).

Court of appeals reversed the dismissal of a product liability suit for lack of jurisdiction over a French manufacturer where the manufacturer actively distributed and sold aircraft in the forum and operated a closely related business in the forum, which activities were sufficient to enforce long-arm jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Anderson v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6948 (8th Cir. Apr. 9, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1015, 125 S. Ct. 606, 160 L. Ed. 2d 484 (2004).

An insurance policy's territory-of-coverage clause, insuring a manufacturer against property damage from occurrences in the United States, established defendant insurer's sufficient contact to Arkansas to satisfy due process under subdivision B. of this section and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in plaintiff Arkansas farmer's indemnity suit against the insured. Ferrell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005).

Putative father's contacts with Arkansas were sufficient to meet due process requirements under § 9-17-201(8), this section, and U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, based on his agreement to submit to a paternity test in Arkansas and given the fact that he drove to Arkansas for the test that was administered in Arkansas. Moreover, the father could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Arkansas because a person submitting to a paternity test could foresee the possibility that a paternity suit and support action could have been brought there, and finally, the exercise of jurisdiction over the father did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice when the burden of litigating the action was in no way unreasonable and the state had an interest in protecting its minor children and ensuring the payment of child support. Payne v. France, 373 Ark. 175, 282 S.W.3d 760 (2008), overruled, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to a shipper and its officers because the contacts between a broker and the shipper were sufficient and the shipper and the officers should not have been surprised to be haled into court in Arkansas because the broker was an Arkansas corporation, the parties entered into a legally binding contract through the bill of lading, and the broker's breach-of-contract cause of action arose directly from the contacts between the shipper and the broker. Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., 2014 Ark. 460, 447 S.W.3d 592 (2014).

In an action alleging fraud and other claims related to an investment agreement, the federal district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's action for lack of personal jurisdiction because defendants, a California resident and his California-based business, had sufficient contacts with Arkansas to establish personal jurisdiction; the facts suggested that the individual defendant's contacts with Arkansas were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated, but rather were central to an alleged scheme to purposely avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arkansas, and the individual defendant's actions in and affecting Arkansas were central to plaintiffs' allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and supported a finding of specific jurisdiction. Whaley v. Esebag, 946 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2020).

In a suit to recover legal fees, there was personal jurisdiction consistent with due process because the guarantor's contacts were such that he should have anticipated being haled into court in Arkansas since he negotiated the legal services contract, made hundreds of calls and emails to the Arkansas law firm, and visited the state regarding the litigation. Henry Law Firm v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, 949 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2020).

—Contacts Not Found.

Contacts of nonresident with state held to be insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Frank v. Steel, 253 Ark. 338, 485 S.W.2d 737 (1972); Carter Oil Co. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Eagle Material Handling of Ark., Inc. v. Acme Dock Specialists, Inc., 273 Ark. 362, 616 S.W.2d 716 (1981); Marchant v. Peeples, 274 Ark. 233, 623 S.W.2d 523 (1981); Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Gould v. P. T. Krakatau Steel, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S. Ct. 304, 121 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1992).

Where a resident of another state has no contacts with Arkansas and engages in no activities that would establish a “presence” in Arkansas to render him amenable to suit, he is not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this state. Carter v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 58, 648 S.W.2d 472 (1983).

There were insufficient contacts between the nonresident guarantors and Arkansas to subject the guarantors to the jurisdiction of the Arkansas courts, for the mere fact that the individual defendants guaranteed an obligation to an Arkansas corporation did not subject the guarantors to jurisdiction in Arkansas. Nor did the guarantors' status as shareholders in the debtor corporation, or the more remote connection between some of the guarantors and California corporation, establish the minimum contacts between the guarantors and Arkansas necessary to satisfy due process. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n v. Alchemy Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1986).

Where company's single act was to guarantee a debt between an Arkansas company and a nonresident corporation, and the record was devoid of evidence of even mail or telephone transactions to bring the company within this state's jurisdiction, such contacts were insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction. Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992).

In an action to collect on student loan notes, where defendant was a Tennessee resident, never resided or engaged in business in Arkansas, signed student guarantee notes in Tennessee, and his children, for whose benefit the notes were executed, went to school in Tennessee, and where defendant's only contacts with Arkansas were that the guaranteed loan was made by an Arkansas bank and the guarantor was an Arkansas corporation, the connection was too tenuous to support a finding of personal jurisdiction. Glenn v. Student Loan Guarantee Found., 53 Ark. App. 132, 920 S.W.2d 500 (1996).

A nonresident manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of this state simply because its product is shipped there; there must be some showing that the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in this state or in some manner directed its activities at the forum state. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Personal jurisdiction not shown where the only contact that defendant had with Arkansas prior to the plaintiff's claim was the filing of an Oklahoma judgment against an Arkansas resident and the issuance of a writ of execution based on that judgment; such brief encounters with the state for the purpose of enforcing a judgment are not the type of continuous, systematic, and substantial contacts envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court to satisfy due process considerations. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

General personal jurisdiction not shown where corporation was not registered in Arkansas, had no employees here, had no agent for service in Arkansas, and had never initiated contact with people in Arkansas, and where the only contact that the corporation had had with this state had been sales to Arkansas residents, set in motion by Arkansas residents and merchandise delivered to Arkansas residents by mail or UPS. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

A federal court in Arkansas did not have personal jurisdiction over a Kentucky bank whose only contact with Arkansas was to issue a cashier's check payable to an Arkansas bank and then, it was alleged, wrongfully dishonor the check. First Nat'l Bank of Lewisville v. First Nat'l Bank of Clinton, 258 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2001).

In a personal injury action brought by a man and his wife where the man was injured when an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) turned over on him there were insufficient contacts with Arkansas for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction; although there were a series of transaction involving the ATV, the injured party and his wife were residents of Louisiana, where they had purchased the ATV, and they brought the ATV to Arkansas for recreational purposes. Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 366 Ark. 238, 234 S.W.3d 838 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Eastern District of Arkansas district court properly concluded that it could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation because doing so would not comport with due process: (1) an Arkansas widow filed a wrongful death suit against the corporation after her husband was killed in Tennessee, while unloading electrodes that the corporation had manufactured in Japan; (2) the Arkansas long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction on the district court to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause; (3) due process required minimum contacts with the forum state and a finding that maintenance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; (4) the corporation's only contacts with Arkansas were the annual visits made by its representatives to an Arkansas customer; (5) the widow's wrongful death claims did not arise from those contacts; (5) the corporation was not directly involved in the packing, shipping, or unloading of the electrodes, which activities were related to the worker's death; and (6) the inconvenience to the parties and the witnesses was also a factor weighing against the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation because essentially all of the witnesses and documents concerning the packaging, shipping, and unloading of the electrodes were located in Japan and/or outside of Arkansas. Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., 528 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2008).

Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because defendant's only contact with Arkansas was the filing of a Utah judgment against plaintiff in the state, and it went too far to suggest that defendant's registration of the Utah judgment against plaintiff was sufficient alone to satisfy the Arkansas long-arm statute and Fourteenth Amendment due process considerations. Barnett v. Centennial Bank, Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11256 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 4, 2008).

District court did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants, an Iowa citizen and limited liability company, because the only contact with Arkansas was a single meeting by the parties in Arkansas; because defendants' trip to Arkansas (and their failure to obtain permission to use plaintiff's mark) did not cause or otherwise precipitate the alleged infringement, and nothing in the record showed any other connection to Arkansas, the contact with Arkansas was insufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause. Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2011).

—Question of Fact.

In order for a valid judgment to be rendered against a nonresident not served within the forum state, due process requires that certain minimum contacts exist between the nonresident and the state, such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; the contacts with the forum state must be such that the nonresident defendant should reasonably anticipate being “haled” into an Arkansas court. A single contract can provide the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if there is a substantial connection between the contract and the forum state; whether the “minimum contacts” requirement has been satisfied is a question of fact. Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988).

The existence of a state-created corporate form did not operate as a limitation on personal jurisdiction; it is necessary to utilize a case-by-case examination of the individual's contact with the forum. Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has established a five-factor test for determining the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with the forum state so as to result in personal jurisdiction: (1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Effect of Amendments.

The 1994 version of this section provided certain listed bases for personal jurisdictions; after its 1995 amendment, this section, in subdivision B., embraced all actions consitutionally permitted. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Enduring Relationship.

Subdivision B. of this section was not applicable where there was no showing that the defendant ever was domiciled in the state. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 257 Ark. 137, 514 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

Federal Law.

Federal court properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant, a bail bondsman, who submitted to state court an affidavit of intention to surrender accused requesting plaintiff's arrest, that lead to plaintiff's arrest and his suit for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997).

Where none of the jurisdictional factors prescribed by 10 U.S.C. § 1408 were satisfied, and the federal statute preempted the application of the “minimum contacts” provisions of this section, the chancellor lacked personal jurisdiction to divide party's military pension. Pender v. Pender, 57 Ark. App. 305, 945 S.W.2d 395 (1997).

Foreign Company.

An Arkansas court has authority, under this section and the due process clause, U.S. Const. Amend. 14, to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company in a suit by the insured to recover under the insurance policy's uninsured motorist clause for damages arising out of an accident in Arkansas with an uninsured Arkansas motorist. Szalay v. Handcock, 307 Ark. 232, 819 S.W.2d 232 (1991).

Business owner met his burden of prima facie showing that the district court could exercise general personal jurisdiction over an international company under the Arkansas long-arm statute, subdivision B. of this section, because the owner presented evidence showing that the international company had purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business activities within Arkansas, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the state's laws: (1) the international company owned a security company that had promised to provide monitoring, alarm, and security services for the owner's Arkansas business; (2) statements on the international company's website and a prior lawsuit brought against the international company by the Securities and Exchange Commission provided proof that the international company manipulated and controlled the security company and that it received income from the security company's sale of security systems and services in the State of Arkansas; (3) the international company's contacts with Arkansas, through the security company, were the type of continuous and systematic contacts that established general jurisdiction even if the owner's claims did not specifically arise out of business activities directed at Arkansas; and (4) it would not violate the U.S. Const., Amend. XIVDue Process Clause to exercise jurisdiction over the international company because it could hardly be inconvenient for the international company to defend itself in a state where it was otherwise proud to conduct business. Duffer v. TYCO Int'l Ltd., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74476 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 26, 2008).

Arkansas did not have general jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer pursuant to subdivision (B) of this section in a wrongful-death suit arising from a tractor accident because the manufacturer was not itself doing business in Arkansas and did not dominate and control its American subsidiary, which sold tractors in Arkansas through authorized dealers, such that personal jurisdiction could be predicated on an alter ego relationship. Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439 (2012).

Forum Convenience.

Although this section may affect venue because of its provisions relating to jurisdiction and service of process, the provision that the court in which the action is filed has broad powers under the principle of forum non conveniens demonstrates that the statute is basically a jurisdiction-giving statute rather that a venue-fixing one. Ozark Supply Co. v. Glass, 261 Ark. 750, 552 S.W.2d 1 (1977).

Considerations usually associated with forum convenience were pertinent to federal court's decision that Arkansas' exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporation would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978).

Court may raise the doctrine of forum non conveniens on its own. Country Pride Foods Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 279 Ark. 75, 648 S.W.2d 485 (1983).

The trial court's discretion in determining whether to dismiss an action due to an inconvenient forum must necessarily be based upon such factors as convenience to the parties in obtaining documents and witnesses, the expense involved in trying the case, questions of foreign law, trial docket, and other matters. Although the application of forum non conveniens lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion, the record must show the matters considered by the court in applying the doctrine. Country Pride Foods Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 279 Ark. 75, 648 S.W.2d 485 (1983).

Where contract was executed in Arkansas and most of the parties were residents of the state, the convenience of the parties was best served by the hearing of the case in Arkansas. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985).

There is no requirement that plaintiff's claim be dismissed because of a prior pending action in federal court, nor is there any requirement that the court exercise the forum non conveniens discretion given it by subsection E. Helm v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 301 Ark. 521, 785 S.W.2d 209, cert. denied, Helm v. Mid-America Industries, Inc., 498 U.S. 850, 111 S. Ct. 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1990).

The application of forum non conveniens lies within the sound discretion of the trial court; only if this discretion is abused will be reviewing court reverse. Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., Inc., 316 Ark. 630, 873 S.W.2d 537 (1994).

Because an insurer was the first party to file suit, and it chose to do so in the county in which it had its principal office, pursuant to § 16-55-213(a), a circuit judge erred by applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens under subdivision D. of this section, effectively overruling the insurer's choice of venue. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Gadbury-Swift, 2010 Ark. 6, 362 S.W.3d 291 (2010).

It was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss a wrongful death complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the trial court weighed the parties' interests and the complaint's procedural posture and concluded it was best for a related federal court complaint to proceed; thus, the court did not exercise its discretion thoughtlessly or without due consideration. Silkman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 2015 Ark. 422, 474 S.W.3d 74 (2015).

Internet Contacts.

Manufacturer's advertisement on the World Wide Web was insufficient contact with this state to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Matters Outside Pleadings.

Circuit court did not err in considering matters outside the pleadings in reaching its conclusions regarding personal jurisdiction. Reveley v. Roth, 2016 Ark. App. 248, 491 S.W.3d 490 (2016).

Circuit court may consider evidence outside the pleadings on a motion under Ark. R. Civ. P. (12)(b)(2) alleging lack of personal jurisdiction. If the circuit court considers evidence outside the pleadings, the Rule (12)(b)(2) motion is not converted to a summary judgment motion, and previous cases that have taken a contrary position are overruled, see, e.g., Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 366 Ark. 238 (2006); Payne v. France, 373 Ark. 175 (2008); and Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc., 2013 Ark. 130. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Principal and Agent.

Nonresident principal acting through agent in state held to be transacting business so as to subject principal to jurisdiction. Wichman v. Hughes, 248 Ark. 121, 450 S.W.2d 294 (1970); Nix v. Dunavant, 249 Ark. 641, 460 S.W.2d 762 (1970); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

Former subdivision C.1. of this section would only enable the court to exercise jurisdiction over the principal on whose behalf the agent acted, based upon the conduct of the agent as it falls within this section. This section does not similarly authorize exercise of jurisdiction over an agent based upon the conduct of his principal, since the actions of an agent acting for a disclosed principal bind only the principal and not the agent, subjecting only the principal to jurisdiction on the basis of contact with the forum. Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Real Property.

A court of the county where real estate was located had jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident owner under former subdivision C.1.(e) of this section in an action by a real estate broker against the nonresident owner to recover a commission for the sale of the real estate. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

A nonresident of Arkansas who contracted to buy Arkansas land is subject to the personal jurisdiction of an Arkansas court in a foreclosure suit on the land. Ratliff v. Thompson, 267 Ark. 349, 590 S.W.2d 291 (1979).

State courts had personal jurisdiction over persons who not only owned the property in the state that was the subject of foreclosure, but also lived on the property when they negotiated and consummated the defaulted loan, which was the basis of the suit. Horne v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 295 Ark. 182, 747 S.W.2d 580 (1988).

Special Appearance.

Special appearance in an Arkansas court to contest the jurisdiction of the court and move for continuance did not subject nonresident to “long arm” personal jurisdiction. Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981).

Tortious Injury.

Nonresident putative father was not subject to personal jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(c) of this section on ground that child was conceived in Arkansas, since sexual intercourse between consenting adults is not a “tortious act” so as to confer jurisdiction. Howard v. County Court, 272 Ark. 205, 613 S.W.2d 386 (1981).

In a suit against United States for damages for death of enlisted person due to sexual harassment by sergeant, former subdivision C.1.(c) of this section did not provide basis for jurisdiction over sergeant who had no contacts with Arkansas. Stubbs v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984).

While nonresident driver committed a tortious injury in Arkansas which served as a basis for personal jurisdiction over him in action for personal injuries, that tortious act did not give rise to cause of action for failure to settle under driver's insurance policy, which failure was an act of insurer and not of driver; the trial court erred in holding that driver's conduct was sufficient to support personal jurisdiction under this section in that action. Franklin v. Griffith, 282 Ark. 271, 668 S.W.2d 518 (1984).

When personal jurisdiction is based solely upon the provisions that “only a cause of action or claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted” against a defendant, there must be a relationship between the defendant's connection with Arkansas and the injury complained of. Slocum v. Sandestin Beach Resort Hotel, 679 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

In order to exercise jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section, the tortious injury must occur in Arkansas, but the business activities of the defendant need not be related to the tortious injury. Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

A fair interpretation of the allegations made by plaintiff allowed the conclusion that her inability to find a job in Arkansas resulted from allegedly defamatory statements attributed to defendant; therefore, regarding the claim of defamation, the amended complaint stated a claim as to personal jurisdiction under this statute. Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state trucking company was not dependent on this section where, at trial, the proof was not in dispute as to the situs of the collision; thus, Arkansas acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant under § 16-58-120 because the plaintiff's cause of action arose directly from an act committed in this state by the agent of the defendant. Watkins Motor Lines v. Hedrick, 316 Ark. 683, 873 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

—Injury in State Caused by Action Outside State.

Under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section, an Arkansas court had jurisdiction over foreign corporations in action for tort and breach of warranty even though the corporations had no offices or agents within the state and their products entered the state only through being incorporated in the products of others sold within the state or through sale by manufacturer's agents and independent brokers. Pennsalt Chem. Corp. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 244 Ark. 638, 426 S.W.2d 417 (1968).

Nonresident corporation deriving substantial revenue from goods sold in Arkansas held subject to jurisdiction. International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 249 Ark. 298, 459 S.W.2d 62 (1970); Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Marshall Constr. Co. v. M. Berger Co., 533 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Ark. 1982).

Where nonresident manufacturer engaged in a persistent course of conduct or derived substantial revenue from use of its goods in Arkansas, there were sufficient substantial contacts with the state for this section to apply, and this result was not changed by the fact that the complaint sounded in warranty rather than negligence or strict liability since former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section applies both to actions for breach of warranty and to actions in tort. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chems. Co., 519 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Defendant's contacts with the state, which were the mailing of monthly payments to, and maintaining an escrow account at, the plaintiff bank within the state, were insufficient to render her subject to personal jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section. Union Nat'l Bank v. Thornton, 293 Ark. 385, 738 S.W.2d 103 (1987).

—Injury Outside State.

Arkansas courts held not to have jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where injury occurred in another state. Krone v. AMI, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Carter v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 58, 648 S.W.2d 472 (1983).

To confer jurisdiction on court under this section, the connection between defendant's activities in Arkansas and plaintiff's injuries in another state must be actual and not merely antecedent. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974).

Where nonresident manufacturer engaged in a persistent course of conduct or derived substantial revenue from use of its goods in Arkansas, there were sufficient substantial contacts with the state for this section to apply, and this result was not changed by the fact that the complaint sounded in warranty rather than negligence or strict liability since former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section applies both to actions for breach of warranty and to actions in tort. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chems. Co., 519 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Tortious acts in Arkansas held to confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where injury occurred in another state. Wright v. Newman, 539 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. Ark. 1982), vacated, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. Mo. 1984).

The failure to allege facts connecting the transaction of Arkansas business to the accident in a foreign state was fatal to the cause of action, where such allegations were required by the long-arm statute to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

In a premises liability case arising from an injury that occurred in defendant's Louisiana store, the contacts between the defendant company and the Arkansas plaintiff were sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over the company, which should not have been surprised to be haled into court in Arkansas because it sought to have Arkansas residents patronize its Louisiana store; and the company was located roughly 30 miles from the forum, so the argument regarding an inconvenient forum was weak. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, 2017 Ark. App. 44, 511 S.W.3d 883 (2017), vacated, remanded, 138 S. Ct. 237, 199 L. Ed. 2d 2 (U.S. 2017) (remanded for further consideration in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017)).

Circuit court properly dismissed a customer's premises liability suit against a Louisiana retail sporting-goods store that advertised and conducted promotional activities in Arkansas for lack of specific personal jurisdiction. A fundamental connection did not exist between the cause of action and Arkansas, as the cause of action did not arise from or relate to defendant's contact with Arkansas as required under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017). The customer's trip and fall undisputedly occurred in Louisiana, and any alleged negligence related to the incident in Louisiana did not arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with Arkansas. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Transacting Business.

Neither marriage nor living with a person constitutes transacting any business in the state on which personal jurisdiction can be exercised by the chancery court in a divorce action. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 257 Ark. 137, 514 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

Nonresident defendant held to have transacted business in state so as to confer jurisdiction on Arkansas courts. Shannon v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 259 Ark. 186, 531 S.W.2d 958 (1976); Stivers v. Pacific Bldg., Inc., 269 Ark. 294, 601 S.W.2d 822 (1980); Helm v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 301 Ark. 521, 785 S.W.2d 209, cert. denied, Helm v. Mid-America Industries, Inc., 498 U.S. 850, 111 S. Ct. 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1990); American Gen. Fire & Cas. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Nonresident defendant held not to have transacted business in state so as to subject itself to Arkansas jurisdiction. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978); Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Davis v. Kroger Co., 576 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D. Ark. 1983).

Where a Pennsylvania corporation began transacting business within this state, those transactions would not render the corporation subject to the in personam jurisdiction of an Arkansas court in a suit arising from activities which occurred prior to that time. Carter Oil Co. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

The purpose of the “transacting business” provision is to permit the trial court to exercise the maximum personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant allowable by due process, and the provision should be given a broad and liberal interpretation. Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992); Glenn v. Student Loan Guarantee Found., 53 Ark. App. 132, 920 S.W.2d 500 (1996).

The Arkansas legislature intended the term “transacting business” to be construed to expand jurisdiction to the modern constitutional limit. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

In an action by a local broker against the president of a commodities brokerage business for fraud and market manipulation under the Commodities Exchange Act, the district court properly asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant where the defendant telephoned and visited the local broker's office to trade on both customer accounts and personal accounts. Dudley v. Dittmer, 795 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1986).

Although the Arkansas legislature intended the term “transacting business” to be construed to expand the in personam jurisdiction of its courts over nonresident defendants to the maximum allowed by due process, the use of arteries of interstate mail and telephone is insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy due process. Slocum v. Sandestin Beach Resort Hotel, 679 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

Where the defendant has created continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by the benefits and protections of the forum's laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well. Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Where defendant's employee, pursuant to contract for jointly purchased aircraft engine, stopped in Marion, Arkansas while en route from Texas to Indiana on other business, and attempted delivery to plaintiff but left none of the engine because a dispute arose over identity of property agreed upon, defendant engaged in a purposeful act sufficiently substantial to subject it to long-arm jurisdiction in Arkansas. Papachristou v. Turbines Inc., 902 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1990).

Telephone and mail transactions of foreign company not qualified to do business in Arkansas do not, standing alone, satisfy the minimum contacts required by due process to bring company within Arkansas's jurisdiction. CDI Contractors v. Goff Steel Erectors, Inc., 301 Ark. 311, 783 S.W.2d 846 (1990).

Where nonresident defendant had no offices, agents, or property in Arkansas, was not licensed to conduct business in Arkansas and contended it did not, and at no time did any employee or representative of defendant come to Arkansas to deal with plaintiff, defendant's activities did not rise to the status of transacting any business in this state and did not have the minimum contacts required with the State of Arkansas for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dickson v. Hawker-Siddeley Power Eng'g, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1991).

In this action for action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the publisher for lack of personal jurisdiction was reversed and remanded where (1) the fact that defendant publisher contracted to receive monthly sales reports, especially if these reports were to display sales on a state by state basis, would permit an inference that the publisher had reasonable expectations and knowledge that its products were going to be offered in the Arkansas market; and (2) there was also evidence that the publisher was actively involved in marketing plans and promotions of books placed in stores. Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 939, 129 S. Ct. 223, 172 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2008).

In this action for action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against one corporate entity was affirmed where (1) the entity argued that it did not contract with the staff member, did not publish the novel, and was not party to the distribution agreement; and (2) plaintiff offered no credible evidence that the entity had any involvement in the publication or distribution of the novel and instead made merely conclusory allegations about the entity's alleged role. Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 939, 129 S. Ct. 223, 172 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2008).

Facts alleged in a company's breach of contract complaint provided a sufficient basis to subject defendant to specific personal jurisdiction in Arkansas under subsection B. of this section; defendant reached into Arkansas and initiated contact with the company in order to conduct business. Pritchett v. Evans, 2013 Ark. App. 679, 430 S.W.3d 223 (2013).

Cited: Rose's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Rex Financial Corp., 383 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Ark. 1974); William Penn Fraternal Ass'n v. Hickman, 256 Ark. 308, 506 S.W.2d 823 (1974); Turner v. McClain, 459 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Ark. 1978); United States v. Blackmon, 496 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Oden Optical Co. v. Optique Du Mond, Ltd., 268 Ark. 1105, 598 S.W.2d 456 (1980); Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982); Tucker Enters., Inc. v. Hartje, 278 Ark. 320, 650 S.W.2d 559 (1983); SD Leasing, Inc. v. RNF Corp., 278 Ark. 530, 647 S.W.2d 447 (1983); Weatherford v. State, 286 Ark. 376, 692 S.W.2d 605 (1985); Zolper v. AT&T Info. Sys., 289 Ark. 27, 709 S.W.2d 74 (1986); Keene v. National Medical Care, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1991); Carpetland of N.W. Ark., Inc. v. Howard, 304 Ark. 420, 803 S.W.2d 512 (1991); Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 327 Ark. 504, 938 S.W.2d 847 (1997);

Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Eagle Material Handling of Ark., Inc. v. Acme Dock Specialists, Inc., 273 Ark. 362, 616 S.W.2d 716 (1981); Marchant v. Peeples, 274 Ark. 233, 623 S.W.2d 523 (1981); Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992).