Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-201 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, Tort Law — General Release Forms — The Free Ride for Joint Tortfeasors Is Over, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 791.

Case Notes

Appeal.

Where only one of two joint tortfeasors appealed from a judgment against them and obtained a reversal, the jury on the second trial was not limited in its judgment against the tortfeasor to the amount of the judgment in the first trial against the tortfeasor who did not appeal, but plaintiff's first satisfaction must be credited to any subsequent satisfaction he seeks. Woodward v. Blythe, 249 Ark. 793, 462 S.W.2d 205 (Ark. 1971).

Common Liability.

It is not necessary that the parties act in concert in order to be liable as joint tortfeasors. Applegate v. Riggall, 229 Ark. 773, 318 S.W.2d 596 (1958).

In view of this section it is clear that before there can be any contribution it must appear that at least originally the person seeking contribution and the person from whom contribution is sought must have been under a common legal liability to the injured party. Cox v. Maddux, 255 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Ark. 1966), rev'd, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967).

Defendant's argument was flawed where action was for breach of contract since subchapter applies only to persons liable for torts, and defendant did not show that person seeking contribution and person from whom contribution was sought were under a common legal liability to injured party. Roberts & Co. v. Sergio, 22 Ark. App. 58, 733 S.W.2d 420 (1987).

Even if the parties' tortious acts are temporally separate, if they caused the same injury or loss, the parties are jointly liable. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ernst & Young v. Reves, 502 U.S. 1092, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992), aff'd, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).

To the extent that the holding in St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761, conflicts with the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., it has been effectively overruled by Acts 2013, No. 1116. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Joint Tortfeasors.

Arkansas law permits a plaintiff to seek contribution from defendant as a “joint tortfeasor”, and plaintiff's contribution action was not defeated merely because the tort liability shared by the two insurers arose by virtue of principles of vicarious liability. Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1999).

Summary judgment was improperly granted in a contribution case arising from the distribution of an estate and a trust as a beneficiary could have been a joint tortfeasor based on an allegation of civil conspiracy. Heinemann v. Hallum, 365 Ark. 600, 232 S.W.3d 420 (2006).

In a second trial, the judge was correct in refusing to credit $60,000 paid by an insurance company in the first trial because the other defendant, an insurance brokerage acting as the agent for the company, and the company were not joint tortfeasors; the jury only found the agent liable for deceit and the appellate court could not tell whether the damages awarded against the insurance company and the damages awarded against the agent compensated the policy purchaser for the “same injury to person or property.” Aon Risk Servs. v. Mickles, 96 Ark. App. 369, 242 S.W.3d 286 (2006).

Hospital did not have a right of contribution under the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) because the hospital and the rehabilitation center were not joint tortfeasors under the UCATA, as there was only several liability following the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761 (2013), superseded by statute as stated in, J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

In employee's products liability action against the manufacturer of the product that injured him while he was working, the circuit court properly precluded the manufacturer's attempt to allocate fault to the nonparty employer in its amended answer; because the employer was clothed with immunity from liability in tort under the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers' compensation statutes, the employer could not have joint or several “liability” in tort and therefore did not meet the definition of “joint tortfeasor” in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., or fall within the confines of that act. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56 (2020).

Judgment-Proof Defendant.

The law does not presume that full recovery can be defeated because one or more of the defendants may be execution proof. Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935 (1948).

Principal-Agent Relationship.

While indemnity is commonly granted where liability has been imposed on a person not because of any fault on his part but solely because of his relationship to the one at fault, this doctrine did not apply to a railroad's indemnity claim against a truck driver since there was no employer-employee or other agency type relationship between the railroad and the driver on which to base imputation of liability. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Star City Gravel Co., 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

Proper Joint Tortfeasors.

If purchaser of chemical distributes it by plane over its crop, and crop of plaintiff is damaged, and plaintiff files suit against the purchaser of the chemical for damages, nonresident chemical corporation who sold it was a proper joint defendant as use of chemical was inherently dangerous to other crops. Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).

Where husband while driving wife's car to work collided with unlighted trailer of defendants which was being pulled by a tractor, relative to the damage done to wife's car, husband and defendants were joint tortfeasors. Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W.2d 169 (1961).

Where court concluded that the accounting firm and all of the settling defendants were joint tortfeasors, it was correct to credit the verdict against the firm with the settlement proceeds. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ernst & Young v. Reves, 502 U.S. 1092, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992), aff'd, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).

Retroactive Applicability.

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because Act 1116 created new, substantive rights, so Act 1116 could not constitutionally be retroactively applied. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Acts 2013, No. 1116 could not constitutionally be applied retroactively because, inter alia, Act 1116 created a new, substantive right to allocation of fault by adding the term “several liability,” which meant each person or entity was liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Time for Determination of Liability.

The question of the joint or common liability of the joint tortfeasors is determined as of the time the cause of action accrues and not at the time when the right to recover contribution is asserted, but where the jury, by its verdict, obviously found that defendant was neither jointly nor severally liable for the injury to the plaintiff, there simply was no way under the statutory definition that the defendant could be considered as a joint tortfeasor. Scalf v. Payne, 266 Ark. 231, 583 S.W.2d 51 (1979).

Cited: Arhart v. Micro Switch Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1986); Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Cole, 329 Ark. 209, 947 S.W.2d 362 (1997); Hurst v. Dixon, 357 Ark. 439, 182 S.W.3d 102 (2004).