Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-207 (2026)
Third party practice — Amended complaints — Counterclaims and cross-complaints — Motion practice
- Before answering, a defendant seeking contribution in a tort action may move ex parte or, after answering, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable as a joint tortfeasor to him or her to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him or her. If the motion is granted and the summons and complaint are served, the person so served, hereinafter called the third party defendant, shall make his or her defense to the complaint of the plaintiff and to the third party complaint in the same manner as defenses are made by an original defendant to an original complaint. The third party defendant may assert any defenses which the third party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff may amend his or her pleadings to assert against the third party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third party defendant had he or she been joined originally as a defendant. The third party defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff as well as of his or her own liability to the plaintiff and to the third party plaintiff. A third party defendant may proceed under this section against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable as a joint tortfeasor to him or her or to the third party plaintiff for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third party defendant.
- When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff he or she may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this section would entitle a defendant to do so.
- A pleader may either (a) state as a cross-claim against a coparty any claim that the coparty is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant; or (b) move for judgment for contribution against any other joint judgment debtor, where in a single action a judgment has been entered against joint tortfeasors one (1) of whom has discharged the judgment by payment or has paid more than his or her pro rata share thereof. If relief can be obtained as provided in this subsection no independent action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for contribution.
- The court may render such judgments, one (1) or more in number, as may be suitable under the provisions of this subchapter.
- [Repealed.]
- In the event plaintiff or defendant fails to serve third parties in such time and manner as may be required for third parties to be brought in and for service on the same to have matured on the day set for the original proceedings between the original parties, such failure shall not delay prosecution of proceedings between the original parties or impair the original defendant's right of contribution.
History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1007; Acts 1993, No. 759, § 1; 2013, No. 1116, §§ 1, 7, 8.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the rights afforded to joint tortfeasors by this act apply with equal force after the modification of joint and several liability as provided in § 16-55-201, and that none of the rights granted to join tortfeasors by this act, including allocation of fault and credits for settlements entered into by other joint tortfeasors, shall be denied to joint tortfeasors.”
Amendments. The 2013 amendment repealed (5).
Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”
Research References
Ark. L. Rev.
Panel on Comparative Negligence — Third Party Practice, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 88.
Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Issued Interim Report of Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases Regarding Possible Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Because of the Invalidation of Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.
Case Notes
Comparative Fault.
No Arkansas cases suggest that Arkansas follow the substantive comparative fault rule that a plaintiff's degree of fault should always be compared with the fault of other possible wrongdoers, even if plaintiff has asserted no claim against those wrong doers; indeed, given the plain language of § 16-64-122 — that the plaintiff's fault should be compared to that of the parties from whom the plaintiff “seeks to recover damages” — it is hard to imagine how the legislature's words could be construed to reach such a result. Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).
Complaint.
It would have been more accurate for decedent's administrator to entitle his pleading a cross-claim rather than a third party complaint, but since the difference is merely one of form and can have no effect upon the administrator's statutory right to seek contribution, it would not be prohibited. Northwest Motors, Inc. v. Creekmore, 229 Ark. 755, 318 S.W.2d 614 (1958); Little Rock Land Co. v. Raper, 245 Ark. 641, 433 S.W.2d 836 (1968).
When the third-party complaint alleges a direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff on the claim set out in the plaintiff's complaint, the third party shall make his defenses to the complaint and no amendment to the complaint is necessary or required, and the parties are at issue as to their rights respecting the claim without any amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff. Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).
Entitlement to File.
The right of a defendant to seek contribution from a joint tortfeasor by making him a party to the suit is permissive and does not exclude the right of the defendant to seek contribution in a separate suit. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).
If a joint tortfeasor is not made a party to suit against a defendant the defendant does not have to seek contribution against such tortfeasor in that suit, but if the joint tortfeasor is also a party defendant, the defendant must seek contribution in that suit. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).
In action where wife recovered against defendants for damage to her car and husband recovered for personal injuries, defendants upon discharging judgment obtained against them by wife will be entitled to file motion for judgment for contribution from husband. Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W.2d 169 (1961).
—Discretion of Court.
The trial court has a measure of discretion in allowing or disallowing a defendant to have a joint tortfeasor made a party to the suit for the purpose of seeking contribution. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).
Where in suit against one tortfeasor a second alleged tortfeasor was not a party to the suit although the suits were consolidated with two suits in which alleged joint tortfeasor was a party, trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to seek contribution where question was not brought to the attention of the trial court until the attorneys were making their opening statements in the cases. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).
Federal Rule.
This section specifically makes the adjudication of the third-party defendant's liability to the plaintiff binding upon the third-party defendant; thus the section is different from those patterned after Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which the plaintiff “may” amend his pleadings to assert a claim against the third-party defendant. Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).
Limitation of Actions.
In suit by injured person to recover damages from defendant truck owner the latter was not prevented from filing third party complaint for contribution from joint tortfeasor notwithstanding right of plaintiff in suit against the third party defendant was barred by statute of limitations. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
Because the duty of the third-party defendant to defend against the allegations of the plaintiff, in the complaints against the defendants, existed at the time the third-party defendant was served with the pleadings, and because three years had not then elapsed after the plaintiff was injured, the cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations even though the plaintiff did not file complaint against third-party defendant until more than four years after injury. Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).
Because the Arkansas legislature has amended this section to provide that a plaintiff “may” rather than “shall” bring claims he has against a third-party defendant, it is unclear whether Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980) is still good law in Arkansas, even with respect to a plaintiff's untimely claims against third-party defendants. Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).
Reversible Error.
Error in directing verdict for one defendant while returning verdict for the other defendant was reversible, since the defendant who had the verdict returned against him could have moved for judgment for contribution against the other defendant if jury had returned a verdict against him. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Stracener, 239 Ark. 1001, 395 S.W.2d 745 (1965).
Settlement.
If administratrix of decedent files a damage suit against contractor and subcontractor to recover damages for death of decedent due to negligence of defendants, and thereafter before trial dismisses case against the subcontractor on payment of a sum, the contractor under this subchapter has the right to still make the subcontractor a third party defendant. Giem v. Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d 800 (1949).
Third-Party Defendants.
Although this section requires a plaintiff, if he has a claim against third party defendant, to assert it, it does not require that the plaintiff have an existing claim against the third party defendant, in order for the principal defendant to bring the third party defendant into the case. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
A cause of action held to be stated against person as a third party defendant. Applegate v. Riggall, 229 Ark. 773, 318 S.W.2d 596 (1958).
Where the defendants, in filing counterclaim, sought recovery against plaintiff and a third party alleging that the sole proximate cause of collision was their joint and concurrent negligence and filed a motion to make the third party a defendant, it was within the sound discretion of the court to grant the motion. Talley v. Morphis, 232 Ark. 91, 334 S.W.2d 652 (1960).
In action against installer of seat belt for injuries received when belt broke during automobile collision defendant installer was, under allegation of plaintiff's third party complaint, entitled under this subchapter to join supplier of seat belts as a third party defendant. Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962).
The plaintiff in an action to enforce an uninsured motorist clause against his insurance company cannot be compelled under this section or § 23-89-405 to join as third party defendants the alleged tortfeasors, although the defendant insurance company may make the alleged tortfeasors defendants by cross-complaint. Home Ins. Co. v. Williams, 252 Ark. 1012, 482 S.W.2d 626 (1972).
Subsection (1) enables one or more of several joint tortfeasors sued by the injured person to add as third-party defendants any fellow joint tortfeasors whom they believe to have been also responsible for the tort complained of and to litigate against them in the injured person's action any claims for contribution; in this way, the interests of justice may be promoted by obviating the necessity of a separate action for contribution. Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).
Under subdivision (1), the third-party plaintiff is not required to wait until he has paid the judgment to implead in the primary action other persons who are or may be jointly liable for the tort. Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).
Cited: Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Colvin, 252 Ark. 306, 478 S.W.2d 755 (1972); Davis v. General Motors Corp., 257 Ark. 983, 521 S.W.2d 214 (1975); Jack Wood Constr. Co. v. Ford, 258 Ark. 47, 522 S.W.2d 408 (1975); Bill C. Harris Constr. Co. v. Powers, 262 Ark. 96, 554 S.W.2d 332, 14 A.L.R.4th 812 (1977).