Ark. Code Ann. § 16-65-501 (2026)

Case Notes

In General.

Scire facias is in the nature of a writ of summons. Alexander v. Steel, 13 Ark. (8 English) 392 (1853).

The writ of scire facias occupies the place of both declaration and writ of summons. Trapnall & Trapnall v. Terry & Steele, 27 Ark. 70 (1871).

A scire facias is both a complaint and summons, and should run in the name of all of the plaintiffs, if living, and against all of the defendants, if living. Calhoun v. Adams, 43 Ark. 238 (1884).

The statutory process is not the only way in which judgments can be revived; a circuit court also has jurisdiction to extend a judgment because a judgment may be revived by bringing an ordinary civil action thereon. Agribank v. Holland, 71 Ark. App. 159, 27 S.W.3d 462 (2000).

Purpose.

Purpose of reviving judgment by means of scire facias is to preserve lien acquired by prior judgment. Hinton v. Willard, 215 Ark. 204, 220 S.W.2d 423 (1949).

Heirs.

The proceeding must be against the executor or administrator, not against the heir. Powell v. Macon, 40 Ark. 541 (1883).

Where the plaintiff is dead and his estate fully settled and the administration closed, his heirs are the owners of the judgment, and, being the real parties in interest, can sue out scire facias to revive judgment in their names. Crane v. Crane, 51 Ark. 287, 11 S.W. 1 (1888).

Not Granted.

Writ of scire facias was not granted under this section because there was no foreclosure judgment from 2003 to revive; no judgment of foreclosure was entered, an order did not put the court's directive of sale into execution, and a trial judge still had to appoint a commissioner and set a date, time, and location for the sale. Bly v. Collister, 2014 Ark. App. 476 (2014).

Original Judgment.

Errors and irregularities in the original judgment cannot be set up in defense of a scire facias to revive. Calhoun v. Adams, 43 Ark. 238 (1884).

Probate Court.

The provisions for reviving judgments have no application to the judgments of the probate court. Rose v. Thompson, 36 Ark. 254, 1880 Ark. LEXIS 90 (1880), overruled in part, Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973).

Res Judicata.

If defendant in scire facias action fails to set up counterclaim for credits due him on the judgment, he cannot later set up counterclaim for alleged credits in action brought by judgment creditor to set aside certain deeds to real estate executed by judgment debtor to other parties. Hinton v. Willard, 215 Ark. 204, 220 S.W.2d 423 (1949).

Failure of defendant in second revival of judgment by scire facias to appear and contest revival on the ground that first revival had been obtained without service of a writ of scire facias barred subsequent attack on validity of second revival proceeding in suit by plaintiff involving garnishment of stock owned by defendant. Lewis v. Bank of Kensett, 220 Ark. 273, 247 S.W.2d 354 (1952).

Revival.

Scire facias issued by clerk started process of reviving judgment; from that date, rights, if any, were fixed and interested parties were on notice from that date. Bohnsack v. Beck, 294 Ark. 19, 740 S.W.2d 611 (1987).

Under § 16-65-117, a lien expires unless it is revived under this section. Lien expired pursuant to § 16-65-117 where the judgment creditor did not comply with this section, and the mere fact that it was made a party to a lawsuit during the existence of the lien did not in itself prevent the subsequent expiration of the lien. Refco, Inc. v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 295 Ark. 32, 746 S.W.2d 375 (1988).

Even though Arkansas provides a ten-year period for the enforcement of all judgments and that this period also applies to judgments revived in this state, where a judgment was revived in Illinois under that state's 20-year statute of limitations, and registration and enforcement were then sought in Arkansas, this state would give full faith and credit to the validly revived Illinois judgment. Durham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Services/Child Support Enforcement Unit, 322 Ark. 789, 912 S.W.2d 412 (1995).

This section does not provide for revival of a judgment by a subsequent acknowledgment of debt. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Under this section, the dealership owner's writ of scire facias to revive a ten-year-old judgment against the partner should have been granted because the owner's 1993 judgment had not been satisfied; the partner had twice tendered the cash and stock certificates but, despite his efforts, he had been unable to extinguish his judgment debt. Carder Buick-Olds Co. v. Wooten, 2009 Ark. App. 310, 308 S.W.3d 156 (2009).

Court did not err in finding that appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree, because the Arkansas Supreme Court had previously found Ark. R. Civ. P. 58 effectively superseded § 16-65-121, and there was no reason not to extend this finding, which involved the more generally applicable § 16-65-121, to this section. Middleton v. Lockhart, 2012 Ark. 131, 388 S.W.3d 451 (2012).

Court did not err in concluding that the 1999 decree could be revived by a writ of scire facias under this section, because the 1999 decree was entitled to the same footing as a judgment, and chancery courts had the statutory power to issue writs of execution to enforce their decrees. Middleton v. Lockhart, 2012 Ark. 131, 388 S.W.3d 451 (2012).

Second Judgment.

In a scire facias to revive a judgment, it is error to render a new judgment for the debt or damages. Hanly v. Adams, 15 Ark. (2 Barber) 232 (1854).

In scire facias proceeding upon a judgment of a justice of the peace which has been filed with circuit clerk as provided by law, it is not error to allow an amendment to the justice's judgment. Crane v. Crane, 51 Ark. 287, 11 S.W. 1 (1888).

Service of Process.

Constructive service on a nonresident in the mode provided by this and the following section is sufficient. Waldstein v. Williams, 101 Ark. 404, 142 S.W. 834 (1912).

Personal service is not required. Bohnsack v. Beck, 294 Ark. 19, 740 S.W.2d 611 (1987).

Judgment debtors were properly granted summary judgment in the judgment creditor's foreclosure action because the judgment was not revived in accord with the statute governing the issuance of a writ for scire facias as a writ had not been served on the debtors as required by the statute; thus, the order of revivor was void. Rose v. Harbor East, Inc., 2013 Ark. 496, 430 S.W.3d 773 (2013).

Judgment creditor's complaint to foreclose on a judgment lien was dismissed because (1) no writ of scire facias to revive the judgment lien was served on the judgment debtor, now deceased, as required by this section, before orders reviving the judgment were entered, so the orders were void ab initio, and (2) more than 10 years had elapsed since the judgment lien was validly revived, so the lien had expired and the complaint had no basis. Horne v. Cuthbert, 2015 Ark. App. 592, 473 S.W.3d 559 (2015).

Several Defendants.

A scire facias to revive and continue the lien of a judgment must be issued against all the defendants jointly, if all are living; and a judgment in favor of one defendant on the plea of nul tiel record enures to the benefit of and discharges the others. Bolinger v. Fowler, 14 Ark. (1 Barber) 27 (1853).

Timeliness.

In a scire facias to revive a judgment, it is error to render a new judgment for the debt or damages; also, to adjudge that it be revived from the date of the issuance of the writ, where the lien has expired before the suing out of the scire facias. Hanly v. Adams, 15 Ark. (2 Barber) 232 (1854).

Where a scire facias is sued out before the termination of the lien of a judgment but the judgment reviving the lien was not entered until after the period of three (now ten) years had expired since the judgment was rendered, the judgment of revival relates back to the issuance of the scire facias. Waldstein v. Williams, 101 Ark. 404, 142 S.W. 834 (1912).

The date of payment on a judgment is the time from which a new period of life for ten years begins to run. Pepin v. Hoover, 205 Ark. 251, 168 S.W.2d 390 (1943).

In suit by judgment debtor to set aside revival of judgment on ground that order of revivor was entered more than ten years after original judgment, although suit to revive judgment had been started prior to end of ten year period, the judgment cannot be set aside, as statute of limitations is governed by issuance of writ, and not by entry of order of revivor. General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Cox, 215 Ark. 860, 223 S.W.2d 775 (1949).

A scire facias writ was properly issued by the trial court for the revival of a judgment where the ten-year limitation period on the effectiveness of the judgment had not yet run, even though the original judgment lien had expired. Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982).

No time limit is placed on service of writ of scire facias; ARCP 4(i) is not intended to govern writs under this section. Bohnsack v. Beck, 294 Ark. 19, 740 S.W.2d 611 (1987).

No scire facias to revive a judgment for accrued child support arrearages could be filed more than 10 years after the date of the judgment. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Cited: Waldstein v. Williams, 101 Ark. 404, 142 S.W. 834 (1912); Epperson v. Singleton, 247 Ark. 1006, 449 S.W.2d 203 (1970); United States v. Plant, 56 F.R.D. 613 (W.D. Ark. 1972); Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982); Ewing v. Cargill, Inc., 324 Ark. 217, 919 S.W.2d 507 (1996).