Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-203 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

J.H. Berry, Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a Difficult Statute, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 139 (2017).

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law, Criminal Law, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 700.

Case Notes

In General.

This section is merely illustrative, and not exhaustive, of the types of factors that may be considered in forming reasonable suspicion. Summers v. State, 90 Ark. App. 25, 203 S.W.3d 638 (2005).

Informant's Information.

Defendant's drug convictions were improper where the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him based only on an informant's information that defendant had just bought a “large quantity” of matches; the initial stop and the subsequent search of defendant's home were illegal seizures and, thus, inadmissible. Summers v. State, 90 Ark. App. 25, 203 S.W.3d 638 (2005).

Motion to suppress evidence was improperly granted because, where police had known an informant to give reliable information in the past, and accurate information was received from the informant about defendant and his vehicle, officers had specific, particularized, and articulable reasons for thinking that defendant was involved in criminal activity, which justified a stop under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1. Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the vehicle, any pretext on the part of the officers was irrelevant; moreover, the officers did not need any additional reasonable suspicion to justify a canine sniff, which was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Harris, 372 Ark. 492, 277 S.W.3d 568 (2008).

Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant based on a reliable confidential informant's information that he was going to deliver methamphetamine at a specified convenience store and defendant's arrival at the store, followed by the informant's call to defendant that he was at the wrong store and defendant's then leaving the first store and driving toward the other store. Owens v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 763, 387 S.W.3d 250 (2011).

Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and investigate drug-related criminal activity because a reliable known informant provided information about a delivery of methamphetamine. The fact that defendant arrived in a black car rather than a white car of the same make as described did not undermine reasonable suspicion. James v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 118, 390 S.W.3d 95 (2012).

Plain View.

Although this section would not justify a warrantless search where officer had no reason to believe defendant was armed and probably dangerous, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rendered the warrantless search lawful. Phillips v. State, 53 Ark. App. 36, 918 S.W.2d 721, 1996 Ark. App. LEXIS 166 (1996).

Reasonable Suspicion.

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress marijuana and contraband found on his person where the police officers had been called to a motel to investigate drug use on the premises, and the smell of raw and burnt marijuana emanating from defendant's person was sufficient to give the officers reasonable suspicion to stop him and determine if he was involved in the drug use. Spraglin v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 166 (2015).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's continued detention was not unlawful; the officer testified that he knew defendant, that he had received information from a reliable informant that defendant had drugs in the vehicle, and that defendant's demeanor continued to make him nervous, and defendant's fiancée stated to the officer that defendant placed a plastic bag under his seat after he had entered her vehicle. Rainey v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 427, 528 S.W.3d 288 (2017).

Consensual police-citizen encounter transformed into a seizure because a reasonable person in defendant's position would not believe he was free to leave based on the officers' 10-minute search for another individual who fled the scene, and an officer's request for permission to search for that individual in defendant's residence; however, the police had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant based on such factors as the prior reports of trespassing where defendant was parked, a black pouch containing plastic baggies in plain sight between the front seats of the truck, a determination that defendant had prior methamphetamine convictions, and the fact that the co-occupant fled the scene, and the 20-minute length of the detention was not unreasonable under these circumstances. Dye v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 545, 564 S.W.3d 299 (2018).

Reasonableness.

Evidence sufficient to justify police officer arresting defendant for intoxication. Holmes v. State, 262 Ark. 683, 561 S.W.2d 56 (1978).

Officer had adequate reason to stop vehicle. McDaniel v. State, 20 Ark. App. 201, 726 S.W.2d 688Certiorari or review denied by484 U.S. 838, 108 S. Ct. 121 (1987).

In determining whether an encounter with defendant was unconstitutional under Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court considered the factors listed in this section and determined that the officer did not have grounds to reasonably suspect defendant enough to warrant the detention and search. Jennings v. State, 69 Ark. App. 50, 10 S.W.3d 105 (2000).

Police officers were justified in stopping and searching defendant where defendant and another man were in a high crime area known for drug activity, they stood in a lot beside a vacant house and engaged in a hand-to-hand exchange, when they saw the police officers they separated and walked away, defendant was nervous, and the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient that defendant was engaged in illegal activity. Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003).

Defendant's nervous demeanor and the fact that he shifted his bag away from the drug dog were objective reasons for police officers to stop him and request his identification under Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2, even though they did not know at that point who defendant was. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468 (2004), cert. denied, Jackson v. Arkansas, 544 U.S. 1039, 125 S. Ct. 2266 (2005).

Motion to suppress evidence was properly denied, even though the trial court erred by finding that no seizure occurred when defendant was detained outside of a restaurant to wait on a canine sniff of his vehicle, because the officers had specific, particularized, and articulable reasons for suspecting defendant of involvement in the sale of methamphetamine based on the fact that he was following a known associate, who was driving a rental car, and they parked next to each other at the restaurant. Dowty v. State, 363 Ark. 1, 210 S.W.3d 850 (2005).

Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant for a canine sniff after a traffic stop where the officer based the further detention on a one-way rental, a rental in another person's name, nervousness, and the presence of air freshener. Lilley v. State, 362 Ark. 436, 208 S.W.3d 785 (2005).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a detention and a canine sniff of defendant's truck because an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant under subdivisions (1), (3), (6) and (9) of this section; after stopping defendant for driving a vehicle with a broken tail light, the officer noted that defendant refused to make eye contact, exhibited increased nervousness, and was known to have had prior drug problems. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 167, 392 S.W.3d 897 (2012).

“Reasonably Suspect.”

A reasonable suspicion has been defined as a suspicion based upon facts or circumstances that give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion. Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997).

There was no indication that defendant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a felony or a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, and the only factor present from this section, supporting a determination that the officer had grounds to “reasonably suspect”, was the fact that the neighborhood was a known drug area. Jennings v. State, 69 Ark. App. 50, 10 S.W.3d 105 (2000).

Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant where the only factors tending to lead to reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 were the time of day and the incidence of crime in the neighborhood, and where the officers failed to observe any criminal activity or observe a suspicious transaction; officers did not have reasonable suspicion as defined by Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.1, and they were not investigating a particular crime as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2. Davis v. State, 77 Ark. App. 310, 74 S.W.3d 671 (2002), rev'd, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003).

Where police were patrolling a trailer park known for drug trafficking at 2:00 a.m., and defendant appeared from between two trailers and attempted to evade police, there was a reasonable suspicion that something illegal was afoot to justify a stop; moreover, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine which fell to the ground when defendant pulled his hand from his pocket. Jefferson v. State, 349 Ark. 236, 76 S.W.3d 850 (Ark. 2002).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because an officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying a weapon and, therefore, a frisk of defendant was not an illegal search; the officer testified that defendant's shrugged shoulders, no eye contact, and tightening up indicated to the officer that defendant was lying about not having any weapons or anything illegal. Gilbert v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 857, 379 S.W.3d 774 (2010).

Circuit court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered in a search of her truck after she was stopped for a traffic violation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Factors that combined to give a state trooper a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity were: (1) one month earlier he had stopped the same truck and arrested defendant's passenger for drunk driving and possession of marijuana; (2) during a criminal history check, the trooper discovered defendant had been previously arrested; (3) the trooper had information from a local police department that defendant was suspected of drug dealing; (4) defendant was nervous; and (5) it was late at night. Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37, 386 S.W.3d 451 (2012).

In an aggravated robbery case, suppression of evidence was not warranted because there was a reasonable suspicion for stopping a vehicle; an officer spotted a car near the robbery that was seen at another robbery a few days earlier, and the owner of the car had been arrested previously for having a gun. Davis v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 658, 430 S.W.3d 190 (2013).

In a drug case, a motion to suppress should have been granted because a canine sniff was conducted on a vehicle without reasonable suspicion for a continued detention after a traffic stop. Defendant picked up a package that had a strong odor of dryer sheets, the package contained a California return address and was addressed to someone besides defendant, a package with the same return address had been previously intercepted by the post office, neither of the names on the package were associated with the respective street addresses, and defendant did not sign for the package with his own name. However, these facts did not give rise to anything more than bare suspicion. MacKintrush v. State, 2016 Ark. 14, 479 S.W.3d 14 (2016).

Cited: Stewart v. State, 332 Ark. 138, 964 S.W.2d 793 (1998); Hill v. State, 81 Ark. App. 178, 100 S.W.3d 84 (2003).