Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-105 (2026)
Territorial jurisdiction of certain courts generally
- The jurisdiction of the Senate and Supreme Court embraces the whole state.
- The local jurisdiction of circuit courts shall be of offenses committed within the respective counties in which they are held.
- The local jurisdiction of district courts shall be of offenses committed within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts, as prescribed by the statutes creating or regulating them.
History. Crim. Code, §§ 14-16; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2864-2866; Pope's Dig., §§ 3680-3682; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1407 — 43-1409; Acts 2007, No. 663, § 54.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution, adopted by voter referendum and effective July 1, 2001, in § 19(B)(2), provided:
“District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005. City Courts shall continue in existence after the effective date of this Amendment unless such City Court is abolished by the governing body of the city or by appropriate action of the General Assembly. Immediately upon abolition of such City Court, the jurisdiction of the City Court shall vest in the nearest District Court in the county where the city is located.”
Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:
“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.
“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.
“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:
“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and
“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”
Case Notes
In General.
The constitution and applicable statutes provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed. State v. Vaughan, 343 Ark. 293, 33 S.W.3d 512 (2000).
Circuit Court.
This section, § 16-13-210 and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 13 provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).
Defendant's territorial jurisdictional claim was dismissed where he presented no positive evidence that the offense occurred anywhere other than in the county of the circuit court in which it was filed. Cates v. State, 329 Ark. 585, 952 S.W.2d 135 (1997).
Circuit Court in Jefferson County had jurisdiction to enter a judgment convicting defendant of a rape that occurred in Arkansas County where the offense was a continuing episode that began with the kidnapping of the female victim by two men in Jefferson County and ended with the gang rape of the victim in Arkansas County by defendant and several accomplices; the fact that defendant was acquitted of the offense that occurred in Jefferson County did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. Cloird v. State, 352 Ark. 190, 99 S.W.3d 419 (2003).
Pursuant to State v. Osborn, 345 Ark. 196, 45 S.W.3d 373 (2001), and § 16-88-108(c), jurisdiction in defendant's case was proper in either Calhoun County or Dallas County; had defendant not committed the crimes of aggravated robbery and kidnapping in Calhoun County, he would not have been placed into custody in Dallas County, he could not have escaped from that custody, and the prosecution in Calhoun County would not have been delayed. Avery v. State, 93 Ark. App. 112, 217 S.W.3d 162 (2005).
Mayor's Courts.
Mayor's court has jurisdiction of offenses committed within the city limits, but has powers of process throughout the county. Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).
Proof.
Before the state is called upon to offer evidence on the question of jurisdiction, there must be positive evidence that the offense occurred outside the jurisdiction of the court. Richards v. State, 279 Ark. 219, 650 S.W.2d 566 (1983).
Although the murder instrument was found in a county other than where the crime was prosecuted and a police chief who investigated the crime testified it was his opinion that the victim had been killed in that other county, but he did not state his basis for that opinion, there was no positive evidence from which a juror could say where the crime occurred; therefore, the state did not have the burden to prove that the crime occurred in the county where it was prosecuted. Dix v. State, 290 Ark. 28, 715 S.W.2d 879 (1986).
Related Offenses.
Because the rape offenses charged in the second prosecution did not occur within the same jurisdiction and venue of the initial prosecution, the offenses were not “related offenses” under Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.3 and dismissal was not required; the requisite inquiry for purposes of Rule 21.3 was not whether the offenses were committed in Craighead County but whether the offenses were committed in the same separate judicial district of Craighead County. Schoolfield v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 575, 564 S.W.3d 558 (2018).
Venue.
Pursuant to subsection (c), where some of the acts requisite to the murder occurred within the county, venue was properly laid in the county. Patterson v. State, 306 Ark. 385, 815 S.W.2d 377 (1991).
Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.3 did not preclude a prosecution for second-degree sexual assault because it did not occur in the same jurisdiction and venue as other offenses; the sexual assault in Sebastian County did not arise from the same criminal episode as similar offenses charged in Crawford County, which allegedly occurred within a span of four years. Rape was not a continuing offense, § 16-88-108 did not apply because the charged offenses of sexual assault was alleged to have been committed entirely within Sebastian County, and the offenses were not related under Rule 21.3. Bean v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 643 (2012).
Cited: Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967); .