Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (2026)

Voluntary presumptive standards

✓ current as of May 2026

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaArk. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

1. 1. When a person charged with a felony enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, enters a negotiated plea, or is found guilty in a trial before the judge, or when the trial judge is authorized to fix punishment following an adjudication of guilt by a jury pursuant to § 5-4-103, sentencing may follow the procedures provided in § 16-90-804.
  2. However, these sentencing procedures do not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
2. The voluntary presumptive sentence for any offender who committed a felony on or after January 1, 1994, may be determined by locating the appropriate cell of the sentencing standards grid.
The two (2) dimensions of the sentencing standards grid represent the primary determinants of a sentence, offense seriousness and offender history.
1. Offense Seriousness. The offense seriousness level is determined by the offense of conviction or the offense of which the person was found guilty or to which the person pleaded guilty or nolo contendere.
  1. Felony offenses are divided into ten (10) levels of seriousness, ranging from low, seriousness level I, to high, seriousness level X.
  2. The typical cases for the offenses listed within each level of seriousness are deemed to be generally equivalent in seriousness.
  3. The most frequently occurring offenses within each seriousness level are listed on the vertical axis of the sentencing standards grid.
  4. The seriousness level for infrequently occurring offenses can be determined by consulting the offense seriousness reference table.
  5. The seriousness level for inchoate offenses is one (1) level below the level for substantive offenses.
2. Offender History. An offender's criminal history score constitutes the horizontal axis of the sentencing standards grid.
  1. The offender's criminal history score shall be computed from the following:
    1. Prior felony records;
    2. Prior misdemeanor records;
    3. Prior juvenile records, under certain circumstances outlined below; and
    4. Custody status at the time of the offense.
  2. The term “records”, for the purpose of computing criminal history scores, shall include:
    1. Convictions;
    2. Findings of guilt;
    3. Acceptance of pleas of guilty or nolo contendere;
    4. Instances where the defendant has been placed on probation, suspended imposition of sentence, or suspended execution of sentence;
    5. Records which have been expunged after August 31, 1994; and
    6. Dismissals ordered after August 31, 1994, pursuant to the First Offender Act, § 16-93-301 et seq.
  3. The specific weights to be assigned to the various criteria are as follows:
    1. Weight is assigned to prior felony records according to seriousness level, as follows:
      1. Seriousness levels I, II, III, IV, and V = one-half (0.5) point; and
      2. Seriousness levels VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X = one (1) point;
    2. Weight is assigned only to Class A misdemeanors.
      1. Each Class A misdemeanor is worth one-quarter (0.25) point.
      2. No more than one (1) point may be accrued from misdemeanor records;
    3. Weight is assigned only to judicial adjudications of delinquency for offenses for which a juvenile could have been tried as an adult and which the trial court deem relevant to sentencing in the current proceeding.
      1. Each adjudication is worth one-quarter (0.25) point, except for offenses adjudicated as delinquent which if committed by an adult are worth one (1) point and would have constituted:
        
        Capital murder, § 5-10-101;
        
        Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;
        
        Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;
        
        Kidnapping in the first degree, § 5-11-102;
        
        Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
        
        Rape, § 5-14-103;
        
        Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201; or
        
        Aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer or an employee of a correctional facility, § 5-13-211, if a Class Y felony.
      2. No more than one (1) point may be accrued from juvenile offenses unless one (1) of the offenses adjudicated as delinquent would have constituted, if committed by an adult:
  4. Kidnapping in the first degree, § 5-11-102;
  5. Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
  6. Rape, § 5-14-103;
  7. Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201; or
  8. Aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer or an employee of a correctional facility, § 5-13-211, if a Class Y felony.
Felony offenses at seriousness levels I-V will not be counted if a period of fifteen (15) years has elapsed since the date of discharge from or expiration of the sentence to the date of the current offense; and

(A) Capital murder, § 5-10-101;

(B) Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;

(C) Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;

(2) An offender may receive no more than two (2) points for juvenile offenses;

(iv) One (1) point is to be added to an offender's score if the offender is under any type of criminal justice restraint for a felony offense at the time that he or she committed the crime for which he or she is being sentenced. Such restraint includes pretrial bond, suspended imposition of sentence, probation, parole, postprison supervision, and release pending sentencing for a prior crime;

(v) (a) Juvenile offenses must have occurred within ten (10) years of the time of the offense for which an offender is being currently sentenced.

(b) Misdemeanor offenses must have occurred within ten (10) years of the time of the offense for which an offender is currently being sentenced.

(vi) When multiple sentences for a single course of conduct were imposed, only the offense at the highest seriousness level is considered.

(3)(A)(i) The offense of conviction determines the appropriate seriousness level on the vertical axis.

(ii) The offender's criminal history score determines the appropriate location on the horizontal axis.

(B) The voluntary presumptive fixed sentence for a felony conviction is found in the sentencing standards grid cell at the intersection of the column defined by the criminal history score and the row defined by the offense seriousness level.

(C) The statutory minimum or maximum ranges for a particular offense shall govern over a voluntary presumptive sentence if the voluntary presumptive sentence should fall below or above the statutory minimum or maximum ranges.

(4) This section shall not apply when a jury has recommended a sentence to the trial judge.

(5) Capital murder is excluded from the sentencing standards and is subject to the procedures in § 5-4-601 et seq.

(c) For all arrests or offenses occurring before July 1, 2005, that have not reached a final disposition as to judgment in the trial court, sentencing shall be in accordance with the law in effect at the time the offense occurred and not under the provisions of this section.

History. Acts 1993, No. 532, § 2; 1993, No. 550, § 2; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 59, § 1; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 60, § 1; 1995, No. 1170, § 7; 2001, No. 1179, § 1; 2005, No. 186, § 1; 2017, No. 367, §§ 12, 13; 2017, No. 423, §§ 13, 14.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment redesignated former (a)(1) as present (a)(1)(A); and added (a)(1)(B).

The 2005 amendment substituted “sentencing may” for “sentencing shall” in (a)(1)(A); deleted former (a)(2); redesignated former (a)(3) as present (a)(2); substituted “may be determined” for “is determined” in present (a)(2); and added (c).

The 2017 amendment by No. 367 added (b)(2)(C)(iii) (a)(8) and (b)(2)(C)(iii) (b)(1)(H)

The 2017 amendment by No. 423 inserted “voluntary” in (a)(2) and throughout (b)(3); substituted “who committed a felony” for “of a felony committed” in (a)(2); and, in (b)(3)(C), substituted “offense” for “crime” and “the statutory minimum or maximum” for “such”.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction and Application of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2A2.1(b)(1), 18 U.S.C., Providing Enhancement for Attempted Murder or Assault with Intent to Commit Murder Dependent Upon Nature or Degree of Injury. 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 385.

Construction and Application of “Official Victim” Sentencing Enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c) Concerning Law Enforcement Officers and Prison Officials. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 371.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(s) Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Fraud Offenses. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445.

Downward Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18 U.S.C. — Fraud Offenses. 33 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 477.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3, Concerning Mental and Emotional Conditions as Ground for Sentencing Departure. 34 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 457.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) Providing Sentencing Enhancement For Manager or Supervisor of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses — Cocaine. 35 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 467.

Validity, Construction, and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8, Providing for Upward Sentence Departure for Extreme Conduct. 36 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 95.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, Providing Sentencing Guideline for Conspiracy Not Covered by Specific Offense Guideline. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 449.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G., § 3B1.1(a), 18 U.S.C., Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses. 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 365.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section does not create presumptive sentencing standards that are violative under the due process and equal protection clauses, notwithstanding the contention that the statute creates two classes of defendants, one whose punishment is determined by a jury and one whose punishment is determined by the trial judge, and encourages defendants to waive their right to a jury trial, since a trial judge is not required to impose the presumptive sentence and has authority to depart from the presumptive sentence. Hutcherson v. State, 74 Ark. App. 72, 47 S.W.3d 267 (2001).

Construction.

Because this section, although enacted at a later date, contains no repealing clause and does not conflict with § 5-4-501, the state has the option of alleging specific habitual status in the information or simply charging the underlying offense. Mackey v. State, 56 Ark. App. 164, 939 S.W.2d 851, rev'd on other grounds, 329 Ark. 229, 947 S.W.2d 359 (1997).

Applicability.

The trial court did not err when it failed to sentence the defendant in a prosecution for manslaughter according to the sentencing guidelines promulgated in the statute where the jury's recommended sentence fell clearly within the statutory range for a Class C felony, such as manslaughter. Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633, 19 S.W.3d 16 (2000).

Defendant's sentence was not illegal on its face, even though she was given a sentence greater than the presumed one, because her sentence was authorized pursuant to the statute governing sentencing for habitual offenders, § 5-4-501; the statutory range for a habitual offender with four or more felony convictions convicted of a Class C felony was between three and 30 years and, since defendant's 20 year sentence fell squarely within this range, the trial court was authorized to impose it. Brown v. State, 85 Ark. App. 382, 155 S.W.3d 22 (2004).

Defendant was properly given non-presumptive sentences for his convictions for second-degree domestic battery and third-degree domestic battery because the trial court was authorized to depart from the presumptive sentence pursuant to its written findings as to the severity of the victim's injuries; further, the sentencing procedure did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because a jury did not find the facts on which his non-presumptive sentence was based, the sentence was still within the statutory range, and defendant waived his right to a jury trial and consented to judicial sentencing. Brock v. State, 90 Ark. App. 164, 204 S.W.3d 562 (2005).

Guilty Plea.

Issues such as the trial court's upward departure from the sentencing guidelines contained in this section and § 16-90-804 are not appealable after an Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) conditional guilty plea. Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997).

Offender History.

Because defendant's prior felony records were more than 15 years old, and his prior misdemeanor record was more than 10 years old, they did not count toward his criminal history under the presumptive standards, and his criminal-history score was 0, rather than 2. Hunter v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 256, 522 S.W.3d 793 (2017).

Cited: Cupit v. State, 324 Ark. 438, 920 S.W.2d 853 (1996).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 18 cases, 1995–2017 · leading case: Hutcherson v. State, 47 S.W.3d 267 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Hutcherson v. State, 47 S.W.3d 267 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 24× “However, a trial judge is not required to impose the presumptive sentence in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 ; subsection (a)(2)(A) of that section clearly provides trial judges with the authority to depart from the presumptive sentence pursuant to Ark.”

Brown v. State, 155 S.W.3d 22 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 12× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (a)(l)(A) (Supp.”

Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1995). · cites it 8× “Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (a)(3) (Supp. 1993).”

Williams v. State, 217 S.W.3d 817 (Ark. 2005). · cites it 4× “Section 5-4-505 required imposition of an additional fifteen years where a firearm was used and was replaced by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (Supp.2005) which allows a judge to deviate from sentencing guidelines under certain conditions.”

Hagar v. State, 19 S.W.3d 16 (Ark. 2000). · cites it 5× “Furthermore, a defendant convicted of a Class C felony may be sentenced to probation instead of a term of imprisonment.”

Pickett v. State, 902 S.W.2d 208 (Ark. 1995). · cites it 8× “He was charged and, as he was preparing for trial, interpreted the new presumptive sentencing guidelines, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 and -804 (Supp.”

Hobbs v. Turner, 2014 Ark. 19 (Ark. 2014). · cites it 2× “Finally, Turner asserts that, based on the seriousness level of his offense and his criminal history, if sentenced today under the Arkansas Sentencing Guidelines, see Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-803 (Repl.2006), he would be sentenced to twenty-two years, even without…”

Wofford v. State, 952 S.W.2d 646 (Ark. 1997). · cites it 2× “Those arguments concern the Trial Court’s upward departure from the sentencing guideline contained in Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-90-803 and 16-90-804 (Supp.”

Burton v. State, 238 S.W.3d 111 (Ark. 2006). · cites it 2× “Appellant’s first argument on sentencing can be summarily dismissed by referencing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (b)(4), which states, “This section shall not apply when a jury has recommended a sentence to the trial judge.”

Lenard v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 186 (Ark. 2017). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (Repl. 2006) (authorizing the sentencing commission to determine the levels of the seriousness of offenses from levels I through X); 154-00-001 Ark.”

Martin v. State, 989 S.W.2d 908 (Ark. 1999). · cites it 2× “Specifically, the State refers to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (a)(1) (Supp. 1995), which provides: When a person charged with a felony enters a plea of guilty or no contest, enters a negotiated plea, or is found guilty in a trial before the judge, or when the trial judge is…”

Hunter v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 256 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 5× “Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-90-803 , -804(a)., Under the voluntary, presumptive standards, there is a grid.”

Show all 18 citing cases →

— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(a)(1) — 1 case

Hutcherson v. State, 47 S.W.3d 267 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). “However, a trial judge is not required to impose the presumptive sentence in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 ; subsection (a)(2)(A) of that section clearly provides trial judges with the authority to depart from the presumptive sentence pursuant to Ark.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(a)(3) — 1 case

Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1995). “Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (a)(3) (Supp. 1993).”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(a)(l) — 1 case

Mackey v. State, 939 S.W.2d 851 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).

— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(b) — 1 case

Hunter v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 256 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). “Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-90-803 , -804(a)., Under the voluntary, presumptive standards, there is a grid.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(b)(3)(C) — 2 cases

Pickett v. State, 902 S.W.2d 208 (Ark. 1995). “He was charged and, as he was preparing for trial, interpreted the new presumptive sentencing guidelines, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 and -804 (Supp.”

Burton v. State, 238 S.W.3d 111 (Ark. 2006).

— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(b)(3)(c) — 1 case

Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1995). “Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803 (a)(3) (Supp. 1993).”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(b)(4) — 2 cases

Burton v. State, 238 S.W.3d 111 (Ark. 2006).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.