Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-607 (2026)
Parole eligibility — Felonies committed on or after April 1, 1983, but before January 1, 1994 — Definition
- As used in this section, “felony” means a crime classified as Class Y felony, Class A felony, or Class B felony by the laws of this state.
- A person who committed a felony prior to April 1, 1983, and who was convicted and incarcerated for that felony, shall be eligible for release on parole in accordance with the parole eligibility law in effect at the time the crime was committed.
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A person who commits felonies on or after April 1, 1983, and who shall be convicted and incarcerated for that felony, shall be eligible for release on parole as follows:
- An inmate under sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole is not eligible for release on parole but may be pardoned or have his or her sentence commuted by the Governor, as provided by law. An inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for release on parole unless the sentence is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency. Upon commutation, the inmate is eligible for release on parole as provided in this section;
- An inmate classified as a first offender under § 16-93-606, except one under twenty-one (21) years of age as described in subsection (d) of this section and except one who pleads guilty or has been convicted of a Class Y felony, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-third (1/3) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency is served, with credit for good-time allowances. However, if the trier of fact determines that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the crime, a first offender twenty-one (21) years of age or older is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-half (½) of the sentence is served, with credit for good-time allowances;
- An inmate classified as a second offender under § 16-93-606 and one who pleads guilty or was convicted of a Class Y felony, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, are not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-half (½) of his or her sentence shall have been served, with credit for good-time allowances, or one-half (½) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency is served, with credit for good-time allowances;
- An inmate classified as a third offender under § 16-93-606, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of three-fourths (¾) of his or her sentence shall have been served, with credit for good-time allowances, or three-fourths (¾) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency shall have been served, with credit for good-time allowances; and
- An inmate classified as a fourth offender under § 16-93-606, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for parole, but he or she shall be entitled to good-time allowances as provided by law.
- Any person under twenty-one (21) years of age who is first convicted of a felony and committed to the first offender penal institution or to the Department of Correction, as the Division of Correction was known as prior to July 1, 2019, now known as the “Division of Correction”, for a term of years is eligible for parole at any time unless a minimum time to be served is imposed consisting of not more than one-third (1/3) of the total time sentenced. In the event the individual is sentenced to a minimum time to be served, he or she is eligible for release on parole after serving the minimum time prescribed, with credit for good-time allowances, and for commutation by the exercise of executive clemency.
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- When any convicted felon, while on parole, is convicted of another felony, the felon is to be committed to the division to serve the remainder of his or her original sentence, including any portion suspended, with credit for good-time allowances. Upon conviction for the subsequent felony, the court shall require the sentence for the subsequent felony to be served consecutively with the sentence for the previous felony.
- Any person found guilty of a felony and placed on probation or suspended sentence therefor who is subsequently found guilty of another felony committed while on probation or suspended sentence is to be committed to the division to serve the remainder of his or her suspended sentence plus the sentence imposed for the subsequent felony. The sentence imposed for the subsequent felony is to be served consecutively with the remainder of the suspended sentence.
- For parole eligibility purposes, consecutive sentences by one (1) or more courts or for one (1) or more counts are to be considered as a single commitment reflecting the cumulative sentence to be served.
- Nothing in this section shall be construed to reduce, lessen, or in any manner take away or affect the good-time allowances earned by any individual prior to April 1, 1983.
History. Acts 1983, No. 825, §§ 1, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2830.1, 43-2830.3; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 94; 2019, No. 910, §§ 909, 910.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”
Amendments. The 2011 amendment added “Parole eligibility” and “but before January 1, 1994” in the section heading.
The 2019 amendment inserted “as the Division of Correction was known as prior to July 1, 2019, now known as the Division of Correction” in (d); substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (e)(1); and substituted “division” for “department” in (e)(2).
Research References
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Survey — Criminal Procedure, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 149.
Case Notes
Amendments to Statute.
Parole eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime is committed and, therefore, a more favorable version of the statute enacted after a defendant's crime will not apply to him. Boles v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 410, 12 S.W.3d 201 (2000).
Authority to Revoke Probation.
Where, while the defendant was serving probation imposed by the court of one county, he was convicted of an unrelated felony by the court of a second county, the court of the second county was without authority to revoke his probation; instead, the defendant should have been returned to the first county for a revocation hearing. Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 716 S.W.2d 746 (1986).
Felony Classification.
Inmate's petition for a writ of mandamus filed against officials of the Department of Corrections, in which he contended that the Department improperly classified him as a third offender for parole-eligibility purposes, was properly denied as the record was insufficient for the appellate court to determine whether a 1989 conviction for possession of crack cocaine, in violation of former § 5-64-401, fell under subsection (a) or (c) of the statute and, thus, the felony classification for the conviction; furthermore, the precise subsection under which inmate was convicted was a critical component in determining his status under this section. Robertson v. Norris, 360 Ark. 591, 203 S.W.3d 82 (2005).
Liberty Interest.
A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).
Subdivision (c)(1) of this section, which gives the Governor discretion to grant clemency, does not create a liberty interest in parole eligibility. Arkansas statutes have not created a liberty interest in parole eligibility. Millsap v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 406 (2016).
Sentence.
There is no provision under Arkansas law or the United States Constitution which prohibits a sentence of a term of years which exceeds usual life span of human beings. Malone v. State, 294 Ark. 127, 741 S.W.2d 246 (1987).
Although subdivision (e)(1) of this section speaks in terms of revoking parole and returning a felon to the Department of Correction, there is no material difference between parole from a state sentence and parole from a federal institution where the defendant is serving state time concurrently with the federal sentence; therefore, where the circuit court ordered that its 30-year sentence should run consecutively to such state sentences, its order was not in error. Kelley v. Washington, 311 Ark. 73, 843 S.W.2d 797 (1992).
Defendant's sentence that required defendant to serve his Class D and Class C felony convictions consecutively with a sentence for revocation of parole was not illegal because the restrictions on imposing a consecutive sentence under subdivision (e)(1) of this section applied only to convictions for a Class Y, Class A, or Class B felony. Campea v. State, 87 Ark. App. 225, 189 S.W.3d 459 (2004).
Cited: Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984); Smith v. State, 300 Ark. 291, 778 S.W.2d 924 (1989); Blanks v. State, 300 Ark. 398, 779 S.W.2d 168 (1989); Cranford v. State, 303 Ark. 393, 797 S.W.2d 442 (1990); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1991); Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1993); Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 941 S.W.2d 411 (1997).