Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-307 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Arkansas Recreational-Use Statute: Past, Present, and Future Application for Arkansas Landowners and Recreational Users of Land, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 849.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The changes from the previous provision (A.S.A. § 50-1106) to the current version of subdivision (1) of this section appear to indicate that: (1) mere negligent failure to warn or guard does not invoke the exception; (2) ultra-hazardous conditions, as opposed to mere dangerous conditions, structures, personal properties, uses or activities are required to invoke the exception; and (3) for invocation of the exception and resulting liability, the ultra-hazardous condition, structure, personal property, use, or activity must be actually known to the owner to be dangerous. Roten v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd without op., 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1994).

Charge.

Plain terms of subdivision (2) of this section and the definition of “charge” in § 18-11-302 removed immunity only when a fee was charged to enter a particular area; fees subsequent to entry, such as charges to access services such as water or electrical hookups, did not alter the initial grant of immunity. Under the plain language of the statutes, the charge exception did not apply to campsite fees paid by campers in an area that flooded. Moss v. United States, 895 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2018).

Failure to Warn.

Evidence held sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the willfulness or maliciousness of the United States in failing to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Mandel v. United States, 719 F.2d 963 (8th Cir. 1983) (decision prior to 1983 amendment).

In suit where plaintiff-sightseers on a public swinging bridge were injured or killed when the bridge collapsed, in order for the plaintiffs to prove their claim under the exception provided by subdivision (1) of this section, plaintiffs were required to prove not only that the swinging bridge was an ultra-hazardous structure actually known by the defendants to be dangerous, but also that the defendants maliciously, not merely negligently, failed to warn the plaintiffs of the dangerous condition. Carlton ex rel. Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 1996).

Lake owner's failure to warn swimmers and boaters of a submerged island in an apparently deep area of water was negligent at most. Jenkins v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 140 F.3d 1161 (8th Cir. 1998).

Injured persons met their burden of proof under the Arkansas Recreational Use Statute, § 18-11-301 et seq., by showing that the landowners maliciously failed to guard or warn against a known ultra-hazardous condition and, therefore, the landowners were not immune from liability to persons entering the landowners' property for recreational purposes, as provided in the immunity exception under subdivision (1) of this section. Carr v. Nance, 2010 Ark. 497, 370 S.W.3d 826 (2010).

For purposes of the exception to immunity in subdivision (1) of this section, plaintiffs' claims were based on a “500-year” flood event that went far beyond the scope of the flood risk of which plaintiffs alleged the United States either was or should have been aware. The limited evidence of knowledge of minor flooding events within a 100-year floodplain was insufficient to show actual knowledge of the danger to human life posed by a more serious flood event. Moss v. United States, 895 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2018).

Federal Government.

The tort liability of the United States for personal injuries sustained by a person in a swimming hole in a national park is limited by this subchapter to the same extent as the liability of a private person. Mandel v. United States, 719 F.2d 963 (8th Cir. 1983).

Defendant United States did not maliciously fail to guard or warn about high cliffs at White Rock so as to incur liability for decedent's death under the subdivision (1) exception of this section. Roten v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd without op., 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1994).

In an action arising from the deadly flooding of a federal campground, district court properly granted the United States' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the Federal Tort Claims Act removed immunity from the United States only in those circumstances in which a private landowner would be liable, and an individual landowner would have received immunity from plaintiffs' tort claims under the Arkansas Recreational Use Statute. Moss v. United States, 895 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2018).

Immunity.

Immunity under the Arkansas Recreational Use Statute, §§ 18-11-301 — 18-11-307, is in derogation of the common law, and any statute in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed. Roeder v. United States, 2014 Ark. 156, 432 S.W.3d 627 (2014).

Malice.

Malice is inferred where the negligent party knew, or had reason to believe, that his act of negligence was about to inflict injury, and that he continued on his course with a conscious indifference to the consequences. Carlton ex rel. Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 1996).

“Malicious” conduct includes conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences from which malice may be inferred; given that “malicious” was open to more than one construction, the statute was ambiguous, and “but not mere negligent” functioned as an explanatory phrase, and the legislature used those words to clarify what type of malice had to be shown to preclude immunity from liability (decided prior to 2015 amendment). Roeder v. United States, 2014 Ark. 156, 432 S.W.3d 627 (2014).

Natural Phenomena.

Since the purpose of this subchapter is to encourage landowners (including the United States) to make areas available to the public for recreational purposes and thus limit their liability, it is reasonable to conclude that a condition or structure which is natural, such as high cliffs, should not be considered ultra-hazardous within the meaning of the exception to this subchapter in subdivision (1) of this section. Roten v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd without op., 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1994).

The high cliff areas of White Rock Mountain, a natural phenomenon, should not be considered an ultra-hazardous condition as defined by the exception in subdivision (1) of this section. Roten v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd without op., 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1994).

Ultra-Hazardous Condition.

Whereas the cliffs areas in White Rock Mountain, from which at least four people have fallen, posed an obvious danger, the collapse of the swinging bridge was an unforeseen occurrence. Carlton ex rel. Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 1996).

There is an obvious danger associated with diving into water at night when one has not tested the water to see how deep it is; therefore an unexpected shallow area cannot be considered an ultra-hazardous condition in and of itself which requires a warning. Jenkins v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 140 F.3d 1161 (8th Cir. 1998).

Where an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) rider was injured when the rider drove the ATV into a steel cable on the landowners' property, it was not the hanging of a cable per se that constituted the ultra-hazardous activity, but the hanging of an unmarked cable at a dangerous height in an area in which the landowners knew there were people traveling on ATVs. Carr v. Nance, 2010 Ark. 497, 370 S.W.3d 826 (2010).