Ark. Code Ann. § 18-12-301 (2026)
Considered life estate
In cases when, by common law, any person may become seized in fee tail of any lands or tenements, by virtue of any devise, gift, grant, or other conveyance, the person, instead of being, or becoming, seized thereof in fee tail, shall be adjudged to be, and become, seized thereof for his or her natural life only. The remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whom the estate tail would first pass according to the course of the common law by virtue of the devise, gift, grant, or conveyance.
History. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 1499; Pope's Dig., § 1799; A.S.A. 1947, § 50-405.
Case Notes
Conveyance.
Deed, devise, etc., held to create fee tail estate subject to this section. Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458 (1884); Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 19, 86 S.W. 830 (1905); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Adams, 95 Ark. 333, 129 S.W. 1101 (1910); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 208 Ark. 478, 187 S.W.2d 163 (1945); Tucker v. Walker, 246 Ark. 177, 437 S.W.2d 788 (1969).
Deed, devise, etc., held to create life estate with remainder in life tenant's children. Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 19, 86 S.W. 830 (1905); Fine v. McGowan, 186 Ark. 1035, 57 S.W.2d 565 (1933); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 208 Ark. 478, 187 S.W.2d 163 (1945); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 212 Ark. 242, 206 S.W.2d 26 (1947); Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 210 S.W.2d 284 (1948); Weatherly v. Purcell, 217 Ark. 908, 234 S.W.2d 32 (1950); Toney v. Toney, 218 Ark. 433, 236 S.W.2d 716 (1951); Robertson v. Sloan, 222 Ark. 671, 262 S.W.2d 148 (1953); Lewis v. Bowlin, 237 Ark. 947, 377 S.W.2d 608 (1964); Fletcher v. Hurdle, 259 Ark. 640, 536 S.W.2d 109 (1976); Spence v. Spence, 271 Ark. 697, 610 S.W.2d 264 (1981).
A grant by deed from husband to wife which in the habendum limited the estate to the wife and her heirs by the grantor born of her body held to create a life estate in the wife. Georgia State Sav. Ass'n v. Dearing, 128 Ark. 149, 193 S.W. 512 (1917).
—Words of Conveyance.
The term “heirs of the body” has an appropriate technical meaning as words of limitation to designate heirs in succession. Myar v. Snow, 49 Ark. 125, 4 S.W. 381 (1887).
The words “children, the natural off-spring of her body” are synonymous with “bodily heirs” or “heirs of her body” and exclude the idea that they are synonymous with the general word “heirs.” Dempsey v. Davis, 98 Ark. 570, 136 S.W. 975 (1911).
“Natural heirs” means “heirs of the body.” Maynard v. Henderson, 117 Ark. 24, 173 S.W. 831 (1915).
Language “unto their heirs only forever” did not destroy technical meaning of “unto their heirs” which creates a fee simple absolute, and change the limitation to mean “unto their bodily heirs” which under this section would create a life estate in the grantee with remainder in his bodily heirs. United States v. 48.9 Acres of Land, 85 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
The words “die without heirs” in devise of life estate and remainder meant the death without children of the remainderman before the termination of the life estate of the widow. In re Estate of Creekmore, 244 Ark. 1, 423 S.W.2d 548 (1968).
Remainder.
Where the grantee of a fee tail estate died leaving a husband and son surviving, the remainder in fee was in the son and the husband took no interest whatsoever in the estate. Maynard v. Henderson, 117 Ark. 24, 173 S.W. 831 (1915).
The entire estate, except the possibility of reverter, passes from the grantor of a fee tail who cannot thereafter defeat the rights of the remaindermen in the land, and this is without regard to whether the fee is considered in abeyance during the estate of the life tenant, or still held by the original grantor for purposes only of passing to the remaindermen upon termination of the life estate. Le Sieur v. Spikes, 117 Ark. 366, 175 S.W. 413 (1915).
Remaindermen held to take fee simple estate. Pletner v. Southern Lumber Co., 173 Ark. 277, 292 S.W. 370 (1927); Bowlin v. Vinsant, 186 Ark. 740, 55 S.W.2d 927 (1933); Cox v. Danehower, 211 Ark. 696, 202 S.W.2d 200 (1947).
The foreclosure of mortgage on land, part of which had been conveyed to the mortgagor and the heirs of her body, was ineffective as to the interest of her children. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 245 Ark. 742, 434 S.W.2d 266 (1968).
—Vesting.
An estate to the grantee and bodily heirs did not vest in remainder in anyone during the life of the grantee holding under the life estate, but vested in the surviving children and their issue at the death of the life tenant. Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458 (1884).
The grantee of a fee tail could not, by her conveyance before the birth of her children, convey more than an estate terminable upon her death, the remainder in fee immediately vesting in her children surviving at that time and their issue, and right of action will not accrue until death of the life tenant. Le Sieur v. Spikes, 117 Ark. 366, 175 S.W. 413 (1915).
An estate to the grantee and bodily heirs vests the remainder in the children living at the time of the conveyance subject to opening up to let in other children; and upon a showing that the life tenant is past the age of giving birth to a child, the remaindermen may join with the life tenant in giving merchantable title. Landers v. People's Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 190 Ark. 1072, 81 S.W.2d 917 (1935).
Where remainderman had only a contingent interest, deed by devisee and remainderman did not pass merchantable title. Peebles v. Garland, 221 Ark. 185, 252 S.W.2d 396 (1952).
Rule in Shelley's Case.
The rule in Shelley's Case is in force in this state except so far as repealed by this section. Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303, 24 S.W. 490 (1893); Ryan v. Ryan, 138 Ark. 362, 211 S.W. 183 (1919).
Rule held applicable. Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303, 24 S.W. 490 (1893); First Nat'l Bank v. Graham, 195 Ark. 586, 113 S.W.2d 497 (1938).
Rule held inapplicable. Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517, 55 S.W. 950 (1900); Rogers v. Ogburn, 116 Ark. 233, 172 S.W. 867 (1915); Georgia State Sav. Ass'n v. Dearing, 128 Ark. 149, 193 S.W. 512 (1917); Robertson v. Sloan, 222 Ark. 671, 262 S.W.2d 148 (1953).
The rule in Shelley's Case is only applicable when the language of the will or conveyance creates a limitation to the heirs of the devisees or grantee in general; if the limitation is to the bodily heirs or the heirs of the body of the grantee, then the rule in Shelley's Case has no application. Gray v. McGuire, 140 Ark. 109, 215 S.W. 693 (1919).
Cited: Sligh v. Plair, 263 Ark. 936, 569 S.W.2d 58 (1978); Sides v. Beene, 327 Ark. 401, 938 S.W.2d 840 (1997).