Ark. Code Ann. § 18-12-601 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Transmissibility of Certain Contingent Future Interests, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 111.

Estoppel to Assert an After Acquired Title in Arkansas, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 67.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to conveyances made by corporations as well as individuals. Jones v. Green, 41 Ark. 363 (1883).

This section refers only to the voluntary sales of the person to be bound. Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458 (1884).

As the mortgage is, as at common law, the conveyance of a conditional estate, and this section applies to any conveyance purporting to convey a fee simple or less estate, the provisions must apply to mortgages equally as to conveyances absolute in form. Kline v. Ragland, 47 Ark. 111, 14 S.W. 474 (1886).

This section does not apply to conveyances made by state. St. Louis Refrigerator & Wooden Gutter Co. v. Langley, 66 Ark. 48, 51 S.W. 68 (1898).

This section is applicable to conveyance by deed of trust made by contingent remainderman. Jernigan v. Daughtry, 194 Ark. 623, 109 S.W.2d 126 (1937).

Although creditor banks argued that their lis pendens filings and quitclaim deeds given to debtor by her relatives related back to prior transfers and operated to perfect their interests in the properties prior to the preference period, because the bankruptcy court found that the lis pendens filings and quitclaim deeds were avoidable preferences under 11 U.S.C.S. § 547(b), the doctrine of after-acquired title was not effective to secure the banks' interests, if any, in the properties; moreover, the facts did not involve the simple defective acknowledgment of a mortgage, but rather, the entities that mortgaged these properties to the banks in fact had no legal interest in the properties themselves. Rice v. First Ark. Valley Bank (In re May), 310 B.R. 405 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004).

The common law doctrine of after-acquired title, codified in this section, did not apply to a case of a foundation and its representative granting a life estate to a grantee in property which the grantors did not own and did not later acquire. Jackson v. Smith, 2010 Ark. App. 681, 380 S.W.3d 443 (2010).

Adverse Possession.

An after-acquired title inures to the benefit of the grantee and all subsequent grantees who are presumed to hold under such title unless adverse occupancy is shown independent of that chain of title. Grayson-McLeod Lumber Co. v. Duke, 160 Ark. 76, 254 S.W. 350 (1923).

Constructive Trusts.

Where a purchaser of land conveyed the land by warranty deed, without paying the purchase money notes, and subsequently purchased the land on foreclosure of the vendor's lien, he became trustee for those deraigning title under him. Lewis v. Bush, 171 Ark. 192, 283 S.W. 377 (1926).

Delivery.

For a deed to take effect as a conveyance of an after-acquired title, there must be an irrevocable delivery. Rogers v. Snow Bros. Hdwe. Co., 186 Ark. 183, 52 S.W.2d 969 (1932).

Easements.

Where property owners granted a right-of-way to a gas company across a lot which they did not own, the subsequent acquisition of the north lot by the grantors immediately gave the gas company a right-of-way across the lot. Hatfield v. Arkansas W. Gas Co., 5 Ark. App. 26, 632 S.W.2d 238 (1982).

Escrow.

Merely by the delivery of the deed into escrow, the vendees obtained no interest in the property until they fulfilled the conditions of the escrow agreement and contract; the doctrine of after-acquired title requires a conveyance. White v. Cordes, 14 Ark. App. 104, 685 S.W.2d 524 (1985).

Interest Passed.

Where a grantor of land belonging to the state subsequently purchased it from the state and received certificates of entry which entitled him to a patent when the state's title should be confirmed, he acquired an equitable title which inured to the benefit of his grantee. Rozell v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 76 Ark. 525, 89 S.W. 469 (1905); Osceola Land Co. v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 84 Ark. 1, 103 S.W. 609 (1907).

Title acquired at a tax sale subsequent to the execution of a warranty deed to the land so purchased will pass to the grantee. Tupy v. Kocourek, 66 Ark. 433, 51 S.W. 69 (1899); Fox v. Three States Lumber Co., 85 Ark. 497, 108 S.W. 1137 (1908).

Where a grantor attempts to convey a greater estate in lands than he has a right and title to at the time of conveyance, then an after-acquired title passes to the grantee, but no greater estate than was attempted to be passed in the first conveyance. Henry v. Gulf Ref. Co., 176 Ark. 133, 2 S.W.2d 687 (1927); Henry v. Gulf Ref. Co., 179 Ark. 138, 15 S.W.2d 979 (1929).

Where deed purported to convey lands in fee simple absolute, although there was no warranty of title, any interest which grantor may have since acquired by inheritance or otherwise passed under the deed. DeLay v. Bond, 206 Ark. 762, 177 S.W.2d 772 (1942).

Conveyance by life tenant of “entire interest” in land also warranting “the title to my interest” was effective to transfer any alienable interest that life tenant may have had in the land. Hutchison v. Sheppard, 225 Ark. 14, 279 S.W.2d 33 (1955).

Where husband and wife conveyed property held by entirety to his sister, if the widow regained title after husband's death, it would have reverted to husband's sister under this section. Ellis v. Ashby, 227 Ark. 479, 299 S.W.2d 206 (1957).

Where deed contained covenants of general warranty, it would pass any rights grantors might then have and might thereafter have acquired in any part of the entire tract. Rose Lawn Cem. Ass'n v. Scott, 229 Ark. 639, 317 S.W.2d 265 (1958).

Liens and Mortgages.

If, between the date of the conveyance of real estate by a grantor who has no title or an imperfect title and the subsequent acquisition of perfect title, a judgment is rendered against the grantor, the title of the grantee is prior to the lien of the judgment. Watkins v. Wassell, 15 Ark. 73 (1854).

A title acquired after the execution of a mortgage inures to the mortgagee's benefit. Kline v. Ragland, 47 Ark. 111, 14 S.W. 474 (1886); Broadway v. Sidway, 84 Ark. 527, 107 S.W. 163 (1907).

One who, after executing a mortgage on a tract of land owned by another, acquired the interest of a mortgagee from the true owner, did not acquire such an interest in the land as would pass under this section as its value was dependent upon the debt and became worthless when the debt was paid. Turman v. Sanford, 69 Ark. 95, 61 S.W. 167 (1901).

Where one, intending to purchase certain lands, executes a mortgage to secure money with which to pay for it, but which money is not furnished, he may later mortgage the same land to another for the same purpose who, on furnishing the money, secures a lien on the land superior to the first mortgage, even though the first mortgage was recorded. Faulkner County Bank & Trust Co. v. Vail, 173 Ark. 406, 293 S.W. 40 (1927).

It would be a violation of the spirit of this section to permit mortgagor to acquire title from a prior mortgagee who had bought the land after sale under such mortgage, and then defeat the payment or hold that the land was not subject to the lien of the second mortgage. Stone v. Morris, 177 Ark. 745, 7 S.W.2d 796 (1928).

Where a husband and wife gave a bank a mortgage which was recorded, then construction began on a house on that lot, and finally the couple recorded their own deed on the land, the mortgage had priority over the materialmen's liens since title was in another at the time the materialmen's liens attached and no such lien could exist absent a valid contract with the landowner at the time of delivery, whereas title could relate back for the purposes of the mortgage. Katterjohn Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Coffman, 264 Ark. 503, 573 S.W.2d 306 (1978).

Mineral Rights.

Where widow executed warranty deed as her son's guardian conveying mineral rights in which she had only a life estate, title which she had attempted to convey and warrant passed to her grantee and his successors in interest when she acquired her son's interest by quitclaim deed after he became of age. Sheppard v. Zeppa, 199 Ark. 1, 133 S.W.2d 860 (1939).

Where owner of mortgaged land executed mineral deeds, each containing a covenant of general warranty, and thereafter the mortgage was foreclosed in suit which cut off rights of junior title claimants, and two years thereafter such owner reacquired the property, he was estopped from disputing the validity of the mineral conveyances which he executed. Hayes v. Coats, 218 Ark. 678, 238 S.W.2d 935 (1951).

Where husband and wife executed deeds to mineral interests in mortgaged property, although wife had only an inchoate interest therein, and later after death of husband, the mortgage was foreclosed in proceedings in which the mineral rights owners were not made parties, and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale conveyed an interest in the property to the wife, the title so acquired by the wife, as to the mineral interests passed to the purchasers under the previous mineral deeds. Robertson v. Griffin, 227 Ark. 969, 302 S.W.2d 773 (1957).

This section did not convey plaintiffs the mineral rights they alleged they obtained from defendant two in 2003, which had been conveyed to defendant two by defendant one in 1997, when the rights were conveyed to defendant one in 2004 as the deeds had been reformed deeds and related back to their original execution, and there was no mineral title to pass under this section. Mauldin v. Snowden, 2011 Ark. App. 630, 386 S.W.3d 560 (2011).

In a case involving the mineral rights to 220 acres of property, reformation of a warranty deed for the surface estate was proper based on mutual mistake because the deed failed to properly include a reservation of the mineral interest. There was no need to reform all of the deeds and conveyances subsequent to the conveyance at issue because, once that deed was reformed, there was no evidence that any of the deeds were not as intended by the parties to those deeds, and, because of the reformation, there were no mineral interests to pass under the after-acquired title statute. Longing Family Revocable Trust v. Snowden, 2013 Ark. App. 81, 426 S.W.3d 488 (2013).

Oil, Gas, and Mineral Rights.

Ruling in favor of a corporation that the decedent's wife did not hold title to the land or mineral rights at issue was proper because she possessed only a dower interest under § 28-11-301 at the time of the 1986 deed and the after-acquired title doctrine barred her from asserting a claim to the property. At most, she had only a dower interest in the oil, gas, and mineral rights reserved by her husband in the 1986 deed and even if the deed had specifically limited her conveyance to her actual interest at the time, that interest was inchoate when the deed was executed. Evans v. SEECO, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 739 (2011).

Quitclaim Deeds.

A quitclaim deed is insufficient to convey after-acquired title. Wells v. Chase, 76 Ark. 417, 88 S.W. 1030 (1905); Holmes v. Countiss, 195 Ark. 1014, 115 S.W.2d 553 (1938); Union Trust Co. v. Watts, 201 Ark. 1011, 148 S.W.2d 318 (1941).

A quitclaim deed, for a substantial consideration, purporting to convey all interest in the land “present or prospective” of a contingent remainderman, upon the death of the life tenant became fully effective to transfer title. Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 210 S.W.2d 284 (1948).

Where husband and wife were in possession of real estate by a deed with a faulty description as tenants by entirety and the husband deeded his interest to wife, and later acquired a quitclaim deed in his name to correct the description, the after-acquired title immediately vested title in wife. Hayes v. Gordon, 217 Ark. 18, 228 S.W.2d 464 (1950).

Wills.

Although this section refers to conveyances by deed, devises were always regarded as a mode of conveyance, and after-acquired property will be conveyed by a will. Patty v. Goolsby, 51 Ark. 61, 9 S.W. 846 (1888). (But see § 18-12-101 and notes thereto.).

Cited: Cocke v. Brogan, 5 Ark. 693 (1844); Shreve v. Carter, 177 Ark. 815, 8 S.W.2d 443 (1928); Levins v. Edwards, 228 Ark. 1111, 312 S.W.2d 447 (1958).