Ark. Code Ann. § 18-16-108 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Property, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 605.

Case Notes

In General.

Prior to the enactment of this section, the only landlord's lien recognized in Arkansas, either by statute or common law, pertained to crops. Herringer v. Mercantile Bank, 315 Ark. 218, 866 S.W.2d 390 (1993).

The use of the word “shall” in the statute is mandatory and requires that property left in and about leased premises be considered abandoned and subject to whatever disposition made by the landlord. Harris v. Whipple, 63 Ark. App. 84, 974 S.W.2d 482 (1998).

Where a tenant moved her family and most of their belongings from a leased trailer, without notice to the landlord any items left in the trailer were deemed to be abandoned. Harris v. Whipple, 63 Ark. App. 84, 974 S.W.2d 482 (1998).

Applicability.

Finding against the appellant property owner in his conversion claim was improper, in part because there was no finding that appellant abandoned his personalty. Section 18-16-108 was inapplicable because, even if an oral lease existed, the appellee property owner was not a “lessor” whom the statute permitted to dispose of a tenant's property; if there was a lessor, it was appellee's son, and there was no evidence that, in taking dominion over the personalty, appellee was acting on his son's behalf. Schmidt v. Stearman, 98 Ark. App. 167, 253 S.W.3d 35 (2007).

Abandonded Property.

Trial court did not err in finding that appellant abandoned the property it left on premises after being afforded ample opportunity to accomplish its removal; with the termination of appellant's right as a lessee in a tenancy at will to remain on the property after the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of possession, any property left behind was abandoned. Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. C.A.G. Invs., Inc., 370 Ark. 220, 258 S.W.3d 374 (2007).

Abandoned Property.

Because a tenant's property was left in the leased premises and was therefore “abandoned” under this section, the landlord was free to dispose of it as she saw fit without recourse by the tenant. Derrick v. Haynie, 2017 Ark. App. 327, 522 S.W.3d 831 (2017).

Legislative Intent.

When the legislature adopted the landlord's lien in 1987, it was mindful of this state's longstanding aversion to a landlord's lien and of the strict construction that would be applied to such legislation, and was also aware of the law and policies embodied in the U.C.C.; the legislature never intended a landlord's lien which arose simultaneously with a purchase money security interest (see §§ 4-9-103 and 4-9-324) to have priority. Herringer v. Mercantile Bank, 315 Ark. 218, 866 S.W.2d 390 (1993).

Priority of Lien.

The Uniform Commercial Code specifically excludes landlord's liens. Herringer v. Mercantile Bank, 315 Ark. 218, 866 S.W.2d 390 (1993).

There is no mechanism under this section for filing a landlord's lien that would approximate the perfection requirement under the U.C.C.; therefore, under Arkansas law, the priority of a landlord's lien is dependent on the time of attachment. Herringer v. Mercantile Bank, 315 Ark. 218, 866 S.W.2d 390 (1993).

While a landlord's lien under this section is not a security interest under the U.C.C., and therefore not a “conflicting security interest” under § 4-9-322, the landlord's lien operates, in effect, as a floating lien on after-acquired property (see § 4-9-204); it was exactly this kind of lien for which § 4-9-322 was structured, in order to protect the purchase money lien creditor. Herringer v. Mercantile Bank, 315 Ark. 218, 866 S.W.2d 390 (1993).