Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-102 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages, Fifth Edition, Chapter 30: Real Property, 2004 Arkansas L. Notes 9.

Ark. L. Rev.

Agency — Independent Contractor — Liability of Employer for Trespass to Land, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 163.

Case Notes

In General.

This section is a re-enactment of Rev. Stat., ch. 153, § 1 [repealed], in haec verba, thereby placing it back in the statutes. Sturgis v. Nunn, 203 Ark. 693, 158 S.W.2d 673 (1942).

Applicability.

This section had no application where a tenant in common in possession cut timber on the land without the consent of his cotenants. Fitzhugh v. Norwood, 153 Ark. 412, 241 S.W. 8 (1922).

This section providing for treble damages and not § 15-32-301 providing for double damages, would be applicable to a case where trees were injured by a chemical spray. McLouth v. General Tel. Co., 164 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

This section cannot be applied extra-territorially to an action for damages to land in Oklahoma. Widmer v. Wood, 243 Ark. 457, 420 S.W.2d 828 (1967).

Appeals.

Where in an action against the defendants for wrongfully cutting timber from land owned by the plaintiffs, the trial court entered an order holding that the defendants could not be trespassers on the interest of their cotenants (the plaintiffs) and thus that this section did not apply, the court's ruling was not upon a separable branch of the litigation and thus an appeal was not permissible under ARAP 2(a)(2), since there had been no final or otherwise appealable order entered. Budd v. Davis, 289 Ark. 373, 711 S.W.2d 478 (1986).

Conversion.

Conversion does not necessarily involve damage to property, which would bring it within the reach of the statute and therefore, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 (CJRA), codified at §§ 16-55-201 — 16-55-220, does not automatically apply to actions under this section; the CJRA clearly evinces an intent to alter the common law regarding joint and several liability for the causes of action listed, such as personal injury or property damage, but it does not, however, display such an intent regarding causes of action involving the conversion of property, and thus, the trial court did not err in finding the company, owner, and related individual jointly and severally liable with the business and business owner and with each other for the value of the landowner's timber. Shamlin v. Quadrangle Enters., 101 Ark. App. 164, 272 S.W.3d 128 (2008).

Damages.

It was proper for the jury to consider the use which might be and was made of the trees, and if the trees added to the value of the land and their destruction detracted from that value, then the difference in value was the measure of recovery even against one who, without malice, destroyed them; and if the trees were maliciously destroyed, the damages recoverable were treble that value. Laser v. Jones, 116 Ark. 206, 172 S.W. 1024 (1915).

If timber has been unlawfully removed from land by a trespasser, the owner has two statutory remedies, for treble damages under this section and for double damages at the stump under § 15-32-301, and also the common law remedy whereby the owner may recover his property after it has been made into lumber or the value thereof. Peek v. Henderson, 208 Ark. 238, 185 S.W.2d 704 (1945).

The court was justified in submitting to the jury the issue of whether or not defendant had acted in good faith when he cut timber on plaintiff's land on the evidence when there was question whether he should be subjected to treble damages as a trespasser, double damages as a person who knowingly cut the timber of another, or common law simple damages. Stair v. Jones, 223 Ark. 882, 269 S.W.2d 297 (1954).

Where the plaintiffs' lawsuit was for damages to timber and common law trespass, and the plaintiffs also sought punitive damages in connection with the trespass, it amounted to a double punitive recovery for the illegal act; the elements of damages were the same, and such a recovery was prohibited. Stoner v. Houston, 265 Ark. 928, 582 S.W.2d 28 (1979).

Substantial evidence held to support award of compensatory damages. Arnold v. Lee, 296 Ark. 339, 756 S.W.2d 904 (1988).

Replacement cost of trees destroyed in violation of this section constituted a proper measure of damages. Revels v. Knighton, 305 Ark. 109, 805 S.W.2d 649 (1991).

Appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of plaintiff for defendant's trespass and destruction of marketable timber on plaintiff's land and the award of treble damages as two witnesses testified that a bulldozer was on plaintiff's property at the direction of defendant. Jackson v. Pitts, 93 Ark. App. 466, 220 S.W.3d 265 (2005).

Because both punitive damages and treble damages were not awarded against the company, owner, and related individual in the landowner's action under this section, they did not have standing to raise the issue on appeal. Shamlin v. Quadrangle Enters., 101 Ark. App. 164, 272 S.W.3d 128 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying appellants a new trial or remittitur regarding a punitive damages award in favor of appellees, as the award was not in excess of federal due process standards, given that (1) appellees suffered economic harm, but the harm was much more than purely economic injury, as appellants cut down approximately 40 percent of appellees' future retirement homesite and the privacy afforded by the trees was very important to appellees, (2) appellants' action forced appellees to give up their plans to retire to the property and ultimately sell it, (3) the tree cutting was intentional and not an isolated incident, (4) the profit appellants received from the sale of their property was a direct result of the tree clearing on appellees' property, (5) the award was not so grossly excessive as to have violated federal due process, (6) each of appellants were on notice of and could have been charged with a Class C felony of criminal mischief under § 5-38-203(b)(1) with, under § 5-4-201(a)(2), a potential fine of $10,000, plus a violation of § 15-32-101(a)(1), (7) was a misdemeanor, with a potential fine and jail time, and (8) under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, appellants had ample notice that their actions could result in a penalty of $25,000 punitive damages. Bronakowski v. Lindhurst, 2009 Ark. App. 513, 324 S.W.3d 719 (2009).

Damages awarded on the property owners' conversion claim were properly set at the value of the timber taken, which was found to be $188.95 and then trebled under this section; the only credible evidence as to the value of the timber taken was the testimony of a timber company president estimating the value at $188.95 since the owners presented only their own opinion as to the value of the trees taken. Pope v. Overton, 2011 Ark. 11, 376 S.W.3d 400 (2011).

—Equity.

Neither double nor treble damages are recoverable in equity unless the action was originally brought in law. Augusta Cooperage Co. v. Bloch, 153 Ark. 133, 239 S.W. 760 (1922).

Treble damages under this section were not allowable in federal equity court since a forfeiture or penalty will not be enforced in equity. Williamson v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Corp., 59 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1932).

By proceeding in equity, rather than at law, plaintiffs waived the consideration of an award of treble damages under this section, as courts of equity will not aid in the enforcement of penalties. Gardner v. Robinson, 42 Ark. App. 90, 854 S.W.2d 356 (1993).

—Honest Mistake.

Treble damages were not recoverable from one who in good faith accepted a previous survey as marking the true line, not knowing there was an error in the survey. Upton v. Wimbrow, 148 Ark. 408, 230 S.W. 277 (1921).

Where removal of timber from another's land was the result of inadvertence and mistake and not a willful wrong, the landowner could recover only the value of the property when taken. Augusta Cooperage Co. v. Bloch, 153 Ark. 133, 239 S.W. 760 (1922); Sturgis v. Nunn, 203 Ark. 693, 158 S.W.2d 673 (1942).

Subsection (c) is applicable in mitigation of damages under subsections (a) and (b). Sturgis v. Nunn, 203 Ark. 693, 158 S.W.2d 673 (1942).

In action for treble damages under this section on account of cutting pine trees on plaintiff's land, verdict and judgment for single damages only were upheld on the ground that the timber was not knowingly, intentionally or willfully cut from plaintiff's land by defendant. Case v. Hunt, 217 Ark. 929, 234 S.W.2d 197 (1950).

Government was not entitled to treble damages for cutting of timber where defendants had presented in evidence a letter from a government department indicating that the timber had been sold to a company which thereafter purportedly sold the timber to defendant. United States v. Wheeler, 161 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Under this section, a good faith argument is a question of fact for the jury. Arnold v. Lee, 296 Ark. 339, 756 S.W.2d 904 (1988).

—Treble Damages.

Where defendant, under the authority of a presumed contract, entered the plaintiff's land and cut standing timber and thereafter the presumed contract was repudiated by the plaintiff and the defendant ordered from the land, defendant was responsible to the plaintiff for treble damages for all timber cut after defendant was ordered to leave. Dickson v. Love, 149 Ark. 669, 233 S.W. 800 (1921).

Where, shortly after defendant purchased land from rival claimant, plaintiff notified defendant of his title and warned him against trespass, especially the cutting of timber, defendant's cutting of timber thereafter was deliberate and willful, with full knowledge of the consequences should he fail to sustain his claim of title and he was subject to triple damages under this section. Zunamon v. Brown, 287 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1969).

Where two co-defendants cut plaintiff's timber, one at the direction of a third co-defendant, and one on his own, the third co-defendant could not be held liable for treble damages for all the timber so cut, but only that cut by the co-defendant whose actions he had directed. Russell v. Pryor, 264 Ark. 45, 568 S.W.2d 918 (1978).

In a proper case, either the jury or the court can treble the damages, but it is preferable for the court to do so. Arnold v. Lee, 296 Ark. 339, 756 S.W.2d 904 (1988).

An award of damages, which included restoration costs, was properly trebled under this section. Shamlin v. Shuffield, 302 Ark. 164, 787 S.W.2d 687 (1990).

Treble damages were properly awarded where defendant was apprised of neighboring property owner's property line claim before damages were incurred, but proceeded to have his bulldozer operator cross the line to clear property anyway. Revels v. Knighton, 305 Ark. 109, 805 S.W.2d 649 (1991).

In claim for treble damages trial court did not err in precluding plaintiff from recovering treble damages because the two-year limitation period of § 16-56-108 had expired. Kutait v. O'Roark, 305 Ark. 538, 809 S.W.2d 371 (1991).

In an action for the wrongful cutting of trees on plaintiffs' property, an award of treble damages would have been inappropriate in the absence of plaintiffs' pleading for them or the issue being tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. Linebarger v. Owenby, 79 Ark. App. 61, 83 S.W.3d 435 (2002).

Statutory changes made in 1995 to § 18-11-106, which required one who sought to claim land by adverse possession to show payment of taxes on the property, were found to not be applicable to property owners whose rights to the disputed land had vested prior to that time; thus, where a neighboring property owner was found to have deliberately trespassed onto the land and destroyed a fence, caused ruts in the grass, and drove over a vegetable garden, all in violation of a prior trial court order restricting his right to be on that land, awards of treble damages pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and attorney's fees and costs were proper. Schrader v. Schrader, 81 Ark. App. 343, 101 S.W.3d 873 (2003).

Elements of Claim.

The treble-damage remedy under subsection (a) of this section requires a showing of intentional wrongdoing while the double-damage remedy of § 20-22-304 requires something less than intentional misconduct; an effective defense waged in opposition to § 20-22-304 would be markedly different from one mounted against this section. Hackleton v. Larkan, 326 Ark. 649, 933 S.W.2d 380 (1996).

Evidence.

In a trespass to timber action, a circuit court did not err in allowing the landowner's expert to testify as to the fair market value of all of the timber removed from the property, including that which was removed prior to the date the land was transferred to a trust, even though the landowner could not recover for timber removed prior to that date, because the evidence was relevant to prove defendants' wrongful conduct under Ark. R. Evid. 401 for purposes of an award of treble damages under this section, of double damages under § 15-32-301, and of punitive damages. Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239 (2009).

Jury Instructions.

Instruction construing section held proper. Fogel v. Butler, 96 Ark. 87, 131 S.W. 211 (1910); Case v. Hunt, 217 Ark. 929, 234 S.W.2d 197 (1950).

Instruction that jury must find the timber was willfully and intentionally cut and removed and that it was not cut by mistake was not misleading to the jury, since the jury understood that cutting timber by mistake would mean the same thing as cutting with probable cause to believe a party was cutting his own land. Freeze v. Hinkle, 229 Ark. 714, 317 S.W.2d 817 (1958).

Where there was jury question as to whether defendant was liable for treble or single damages, it was reversible error to instruct jury that if it found for plaintiff it would award treble damages, even though court had previously quoted section on single damages. Callaway v. Perdue, 238 Ark. 652, 385 S.W.2d 4 (1964).

In a trespass and conversion of timber action, the trial court did not err in wording two interrogatories to the jury regarding a timber company's knowledge of a forged timber deed and whether the company removed the timber with probable cause to believe that it owned the timber, because these interrogatories followed the language of § 15-32-301, which authorized double damages if the timber cutting was “knowing,” and this section, which provided for single damages only if the timber company had probable cause to believe that the timber was its own. Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239 (2009).

Statute of Limitations.

Estate administrator's amended complaint for the wrongful conversion of timber, brought on behalf of the estate, was time-barred under § 16-56-105(4) and (6), the three-year statute of limitations for trespass and conversion, and § 16-56-108, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to penal statutes where the penalty goes to the person suing, which included claims brought pursuant to this section. It was also barred because the administrator failed to meet the bond requirement of § 28-42-103. Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239 (2009).

Trespass.

Where timber purchasers did not know the boundary lines of a tract of land, did not have the land surveyed, and relied on an employee to determine the lines, the evidence warranted a finding that the purchaser committed willful trespass where it was shown that the employee, without the owner's consent, cut trees on the adjoining land. Lewis v. Mays, 208 Ark. 382, 186 S.W.2d 178 (1945).

Where the adjacent landowner with a prescriptive easement over the plaintiff landowners' property moved dirt around on the plaintiffs' property in his effort to improve the easement road, thereby changing the topographic structure of the plaintiffs' land, the defendant's actions amounted to a trespass, but it was not the sort of trespass envisioned in this section and treble damages could not be awarded. Foran v. Molitor Ford, 279 Ark. 121, 649 S.W.2d 177 (1983).

It was not error for the trial court to have granted summary judgment against an individual in a landowner's action under this section; the case the individual cited had no application to an action like this one because of the nature of the statutory action, which was not the common law action for trespass. Shamlin v. Quadrangle Enters., 101 Ark. App. 164, 272 S.W.3d 128 (2008).

Whether the related individual was an independent contractor or an employee of the company was irrelevant under this section; the company was a sole proprietorship belonging to the owner and had no separate identity apart from the owner, and thus, when the individual, operating on behalf of the company, trespassed on the landowner's property, they were acting as one person and became liable as joint tortfeasors. Shamlin v. Quadrangle Enters., 101 Ark. App. 164, 272 S.W.3d 128 (2008).

Cited: Pearson v. Ponder, 225 Ark. 400, 283 S.W.2d 343 (1955); Callaway v. Perdue, 238 Ark. 652, 385 S.W.2d 4 (1964); Zunamon v. Brown, 418 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1969); McGee v. Wilson, 275 Ark. 466, 631 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Lemay v. Baldridge, 5 Ark. App. 221, 635 S.W.2d 4 (1982).