Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-403 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, A Brief Survey of Some Important 1990 Insurance Law Decisions, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 75.

Ark. L. Rev.

Construction of this section through American National Property and Casualty Co. v. Ellis, 315 Ark. 524, 868 S.W.2d 469 (1994), 47 Ark. L. Rev. 789.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Strother, Survey of Insurance Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 242.

Survey — Insurance, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 217.

Fifteenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 427.

Chamberlin & Holt, Why Arkansas Should Overturn its Anti-Stacking Precedent: A Look at Aggregating Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 413.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Insurance Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 577.

Case Notes

In General.

This section does not provide for personal insurance as opposed to vehicle coverage; instead, it provides automobile liability insurance coverage with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state. Crawford v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 294 Ark. 569, 745 S.W.2d 132 (1988); First Sec. Bank v. Doe, 297 Ark. 254, 760 S.W.2d 863 (1988).

This section requires uninsured motorist coverage be provided an employee using his employer's vehicle which is insured with uninsured motorist coverage. First Sec. Bank v. Doe, 297 Ark. 254, 760 S.W.2d 863 (1988).

Purpose.

The purpose of providing the mandatory offering of uninsured motorist coverage was to provide those who purchased liability insurance with protection for injuries caused by persons who did not purchase liability coverage. Howard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. Ark. 1972).

The purpose of this section is to put the injured party in as good position as it would have been in had the uninsured motorist been minimally insured as required by statute. Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248 (1998).

Applicability.

The purpose of this section was to require the same amount of coverage to one injured by the negligence of a motorist who carries no liability insurance as would be available had the motorist had the minimum coverage necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, set out in § 27-19-605. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Smith, 263 Ark. 849, 568 S.W.2d 11 (1978).

The legislature's intent was that uninsured motorist coverage should apply only where injury is the result of a collision involving the insured's car and a car owned by an uninsured motorist and that uninsured motorist coverage should not apply where the accident involves the insured's car only; therefore, that portion of the insured motorist coverage policy which denied recovery to “covered” persons injured by vehicles owned by themselves or their families was not void as against public policy. Davis v. Bean, 804 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1986).

As a matter of law, uninsured motorist coverage in a policy covers only accidents caused by drivers of uninsured automobiles. Williams v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 315 Ark. 701, 870 S.W.2d 387 (1994).

A garage owner's liability insurance policy acts also as an automobile liability insurance coverage and a garage owner should have been offered the opportunity to purchase uninsured motorist coverage. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Baker, 65 Ark. App. 22, 984 S.W.2d 829 (1999).

This section, which requires a written waiver of coverage, did not apply to insured's claim that summary judgment was improperly granted to insurer based on a named-driver provision where the insured had not provided a written waiver of uninsured motorist coverage resulting from the named-driver exclusion; the statute was modified to require the written waiver only after the insured executed the exclusion. Castaneda v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 357 Ark. 345, 166 S.W.3d 556 (2004).

Automobiles.

The term “motorcycle” was not recognized as included in the word “automobile” under Arkansas laws. Phillips ex rel. Phillips v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Ark. 1971).

Legislative Intent.

The General Assembly did not intend that rejection of uninsured motorist coverage in one insurance contract be binding in a subsequent one. American Nat'l Property & Cas. Co. v. Ellis, 315 Ark. 524, 868 S.W.2d 469 (1994).

Notably missing from this section are the words “private passenger” as a modifier of the term “automobile liability insurance”; the fact that the legislature chose to specifically require the offering of underinsured-motorist coverage only in conjunction with the issuance of “private passenger automobile liability insurance” policies demonstrates its desire to exclude commercial policies from the requirements of § 23-89-209. Monday v. Canal Ins. Co., 348 Ark. 435, 73 S.W.3d 594 (2002).

Liability of Insurer.

It was unclear, based on the current record, whether or not a district court could assert jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332(a) and (d) over a class action suit brought by an insured on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of fellow Arkansas policyholders who owned automobile liability policies issued by an insurance company. Although theoretically the amount that the insurance company would have to pay, if it was required to provide no fault coverage to all of the class members as required by § 23-89-202, this section, §§ 23-89-404, and 23-89-209, would exceed 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332(d) amount in controversy requirements, there was no evidence showing how much the company might actually have to pay, as not every class member would get in an accident or be entitled to no fault benefits. Toller v. Sagamore Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Policy Provisions.

“Other insurance coverage” clause was not violative of this section whether or not the insurance policies were carried by the same company or different companies. Treece v. Home Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Ark. 1969).

There was no reason why an insurer could not limit his coverage of vehicles owned by the insured to the automobile or motor vehicle only. Howard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. Ark. 1972).

A “hit-and-run” provision in an automobile policy which did not require insured to prove the hit-and-run automobile was uninsured when there was physical contact and the operator or owner of the automobile could not be ascertained was a valid liberalization of the coverage required by this section and thus the provision did not contravene public policy. Ward v. Consolidated Underwriters, 259 Ark. 696, 535 S.W.2d 830 (1976).

Uninsured Motorist Act was not violated by provision in policy insuring school bus which required that an insured have physical contact with the bus in order to be entitled to benefits under the policy. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fields, 262 Ark. 144, 553 S.W.2d 278 (1977).

Where insured paid premiums for uninsured motorist liability coverage and, at the time she purchased her policy, insurer did not even offer underinsured motor vehicle coverage, insured's receipt of the very type of insurance for which she paid premiums did not reduce her coverage, did not give a windfall to the insurer, and was not against the public policy of the state. Hawkins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Ark. 582, 792 S.W.2d 307 (1990).

Uninsured motorist coverage applies when the collision in question involves the operator of another vehicle which is uninsured; an insurance policy with this provision is not against public policy because this section states that uninsured motorist coverage only applies when an accident is caused by an uninsured automobile. Williams v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 315 Ark. 701, 870 S.W.2d 387 (1994).

Permissive driver of an insured vehicle, who lost control of the vehicle on a highway where the state department of transportation was performing road-construction work, presented sufficient evidence that the accident arose out of the operation, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle to survive a motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the insuring clause of the policy did not require a collision between plaintiff's vehicle and the state dump truck. Cross v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2018 Ark. App. 98, 541 S.W.3d 495 (2018).

—Exclusions.

Exclusion by insurer from the “uninsured motorist” coverage of its policy of automobiles owned by a government or a public agency is void and of no effect. Carter v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1969); Vaught v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 413 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1969).

A policy excluding recovery for any accident involving an uninsured vehicle and an uninsured motorist, which exclusion was not submitted to the insurance commissioner pursuant to this section, was not invalid since it did not violate the statutory provision that uninsured motorist protection be offered and the insurer made no attempt to secure liability insurance on the vehicle involved. Howard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. Ark. 1972).

This section does not restrict the provisions of insurance contracts so as to render void an exclusion provision providing that insured with uninsured motorist coverage in one automobile not be covered while driving another vehicle owned by him which did not have uninsured motorist coverage. Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155 (1973); Crawford v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 294 Ark. 569, 745 S.W.2d 132 (1988).

Exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person while occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by the insured or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under a policy which defined uninsured vehicle as a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type held valid. Crawford v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 294 Ark. 569, 745 S.W.2d 132 (1988).

Uninsured motorist insurance coverage may not be limited so as to exclude a user of an insured vehicle. First Sec. Bank v. Doe, 297 Ark. 254, 760 S.W.2d 863 (1988).

Insurer's government-owned-vehicle exclusion was void when the permissive driver of an insured vehicle lost control of her vehicle on a highway where the state department of transportation was performing road-construction work because the exclusion was contrary to the public-policy purpose behind the Arkansas uninsured-motorist statute. Cross v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2018 Ark. App. 98, 541 S.W.3d 495 (2018).

—Reduction of Coverage.

A clause in a policy providing that coverage under the “uninsured motorist” clause shall be reduced by the total of all amounts paid under any workmen's compensation, disability benefits, or any similar law is void. Carter v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1969); Travelers Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 252 Ark. 624, 480 S.W.2d 585 (1972).

A provision in an automobile policy that an insurer shall not be obligated to pay under uninsured motorist coverage for that part of damages which the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile, which represents expenses for medical services paid or payable under the medical payments coverage of policy, is void and against public policy in that it reduces the minimum coverage of uninsured motorist protection prescribed and required by law. Heiss v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 250 Ark. 474, 465 S.W.2d 699 (1971).

The 1991 amendment to § 23-89-209 makes it clear that the legislature intended the 1987 Act, when passed, to provide that an insured's recovery of underinsured motorist coverage should not be reduced or set-off by the amount received from the tortfeasor. Henderson v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1991).

Primary Coverage.

Circuit court erred in holding that uninsured motorist (UM) coverage existed under an injured driver's insurance policy where the driver was operating a vehicle owned by a third party and the vehicle was covered by another policy; the policy covering the vehicle that the injured driver was operating provided the primary UM coverage. The driver's claim was not covered under his own policy because he was injured in a non-owned vehicle that had primary coverage. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 Ark. App. 563, 506 S.W.3d 915 (2016).

Primary automobile-insurance coverage follows the vehicle, not the person. By reading §§ 23-89-215 and 23-89-403(a)(1) together, it can be inferred that the Legislature intended that uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, like liability insurance, follows the automobile because § 23-89-403(a)(1) requires that UM coverage be offered on every liability policy. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 Ark. App. 563, 506 S.W.3d 915 (2016).

Recoveries.

For cases discussing amount and distribution of coverage and recovery where other insurance clause is included in policy, see Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robey, 399 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1968); Childers v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Jones v. Morrison, 284 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D. Ark. 1968); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968); Harris v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 Ark. 961, 448 S.W.2d 652 (1970); Dugal v. Commercial Std. Ins. Co., 456 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Ark. 1978).

The injured policyholder should only receive the limits of his underinsured coverage if his total damages equal or exceed that limit plus the amount received from the tortfeasor. Henderson v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1991).

Rejection.

Where minor purchased insurance coverage on his motorcycle but rejected uninsured motorist protection and paid the premium accordingly, he could not thereafter sue on the uninsured motorist provision of the policy on the ground that, being a minor, he had the right to disaffirm such rejection. Lamb v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Ark. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1970).

Where, after the insured had rejected uninsured motorist coverage, the insurer issued an endorsement for a substitute vehicle, the rejection of uninsured motorist coverage was not effective as to the coverage provided under the endorsement. Lucky v. Equity Mut. Ins. Co., 259 Ark. 846, 537 S.W.2d 160 (1976).

Summary judgment was improperly granted where evidence was insufficient to find that there had been a knowing rejection of the uninsured motorist coverage. Tisdale v. Hicks, 268 Ark. 1111, 599 S.W.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1980).

When the parties to an insurance contract agree to a policy endorsement which has the effect of substituting coverage of one automobile for that of another, the transaction constitutes new insurance “delivered or issued for delivery in this state”; the addition of the words “and this rejection shall continue until withdrawn in writing by the insured” to subsection (b) of this section did not change this holding. American Nat'l Property & Cas. Co. v. Ellis, 315 Ark. 524, 868 S.W.2d 469 (1994).

Where the insured requested that his insurance policy be renewed with the same coverage as his previous policy, which did not include uninsured motorist coverage, there was no clear, intentional, and knowing rejection of uninsured motorist coverage. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Baker, 65 Ark. App. 22, 984 S.W.2d 829 (1999).

Written rejection of uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage is not required. Estate of Baker v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Ark. App. 345, 32 S.W.3d 36 (2000).

Uninsured Motorist or Vehicle.

Where the question of whether the driver of an automobile constituted an uninsured motorist was controverted, the burden was upon the insured to make proof of such fact, and such proof could not be supplied by pleadings. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gottsponer, 245 Ark. 735, 434 S.W.2d 280 (1968).

Where plaintiff was unable to prove the hit-and-run automobile was uninsured he was denied recovery under the uninsured motorist provision. Ward v. Consolidated Underwriters, 259 Ark. 696, 535 S.W.2d 830 (1976).

Where driver of truck which struck insured's vehicle was not an agent or employee of the corporation which hired the truck driver's employer to haul gravel, the corporation was not legally responsible for the truck; therefore, the truck was uninsured to the extent of the difference between the amount of coverage the employer had no the truck and the amount required by the Financial Responsibility Act. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cates, 261 Ark. 129, 546 S.W.2d 423 (1977).

Evidence held to be insubstantial that the car was “uninsured” at the time of the accident within the meaning of this section. Home Ins. Co. v. Harwell, 263 Ark. 884, 568 S.W.2d 17 (1978).

Nothing in this section suggests that the General Assembly intended to allow an insured to purchase a liability policy, which included uninsured motorist coverage, for one of his vehicles and to extend that coverage to other uninsured vehicles owned by the insured. Crawford v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 294 Ark. 569, 745 S.W.2d 132 (1988).

Uninsured motorist policy that relieved insured of the burden of proving that another driver was uninsured only in cases where there was actual physical contact does not violate Arkansas public policy because the policy exceeds the requirements of this section; therefore, a trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of insured in a case involving insurer's failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits where the insured sustained injuries after running off the road due the negligence of an unidentified driver. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 356 Ark. 335, 150 S.W.3d 276 (2004).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to insurers in a motor vehicle passenger's action to recover uninsured motorist benefits after a car in which the passenger was riding was involved in an accident where Acts 2003, No. 1043, amending § 27-19-503, did not amend this section. The law under § 27-19-503 remained that a plaintiff had to prove that the other vehicle was uninsured. Kelley v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 344, 266 S.W.3d 734 (2007).

Insured was not entitled to underinsured-motorist coverage under a personal umbrella liability policy endorsement to an insurance policy issued by the insurer because an obligation to offer uninsured-motorist coverage was a prerequisite to an insurer's obligation to offer underinsured-motorist coverage under § 23-89-209, an insurer was not obligated under subdivision (a)(3)(B) of this section to offer uninsured-motorist coverage in conjunction with an umbrella policy, and thus, an insurer issuing an umbrella policy had no obligation to offer underinsured-motorist coverage to its insured. Econ. Premier Assur. Co. v. Everhart, 623 F. Supp. 2d 988 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

Cited: Pinkus v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Ark. 1968); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 245 Ark. 95, 431 S.W.2d 252 (1968); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinley, 245 Ark. 326, 245 Ark. 795, 432 S.W.2d 484 (1968); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 307 F. Supp. 743 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Edmundson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 249 Ark. 350, 459 S.W.2d 112 (1970); Alexander v. Pilot Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Howard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. Ark. 1972); Barnhill v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Ark. App. 123, 671 S.W.2d 233 (1984); Edens v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1991); Gullett v. Brown, 307 Ark. 385, 820 S.W.2d 457 (1991); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Irvin, 309 Ark. 331, 831 S.W.2d 135 (1992); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Worthey, 314 Ark. 185, 861 S.W.2d 307 (1993); Warford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 1085 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Fimpel v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Ark. 797, 911 S.W.2d 950 (1995).