Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-101 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of Public Domain Doctrine Allowing Courts to Disregard FOIA Law Enforcement Exemption Based on Prior Public Release of Requested Records. 3 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Adventures in FOIA Land, 1999 Ark. L. Notes 111.

Ark. L. Rev.

Article, The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records: Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 555.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw: Ethics and Professional Responsibility Law, 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 727.

Arkansas's Public Records Retention Program: Finding the FOIA's Absent Partner, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 175.

Case Notes

Construction.

Court liberally construes the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, § 25-19-101 et seq., to accomplish its broad and laudable purpose that public business be performed in an open and public manner, and the court broadly construes the Act in favor of disclosure. Fox v. Perroni, 358 Ark. 251, 188 S.W.3d 881 (2004).

Appellate Review.

Circuit court denied appellant's complaint against a police department and its police chief for violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Upon reviewing the FOIA request that appellant submitted, the appellate court concluded that the circuit court's finding that the police chief acted in good faith was not clearly erroneous. Daugherty v. Sipes, 2012 Ark. App. 233 (2012).

Fees And Costs.

Arkansas Department of Human Services was a department of the State of Arkansas and a suit against a state official in his official capacity was not a suit against that person but, rather, was a suit against that official's office, thus, even though the individual prevailed in obtaining certain public records under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, § 25-19-101 et seq., under § 25-19-107(d), no award of attorney's fees could be assessed against either the Department or the director, who was acting as a state official in his official capacity; further, as an individual, the director had no administrative control of the public records as he would have had control of the public records only in his official capacity. George v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 88 Ark. App. 135, 195 S.W.3d 399 (2004).

Because an inmate cited no postconviction remedy available to the inmate and otherwise made no showing of compelling need, the inmate failed to show that transcripts of the inmate's trial and appeal should be provided pursuant to §§ 25-19-101 to 109 at no cost. Cox v. State, 2011 Ark. 96 (2011).

Preemption.

Court was not persuaded that the Freedom of Information Act is incompatible with regulations that require the department to implement policies to prevent and mitigate identity theft; the court does not agree that, to prevent and mitigate identity theft, a person's home address is considered within the same family of other items in the definition or that a person's home address is akin to a person's social security number or date of birth, and the Act is not preempted by the Red Flags Rule because the laws do not conflict. Hopkins v. City of Brinkley, 2014 Ark. 139, 432 S.W.3d 609 (2014).

Public Records.

Litigation files prepared by an attorney hired by private medical malpractice liability insurance carriers to represent three doctors who worked for the state university were not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, §§ 25-19-101 to 25-19-110, because the documents were not public records for purposes of subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. As the doctors were sued in their personal capacity, simply changing the records request to name the doctors in their official capacity did not convert the documents from private to public; the documents were also attorney work-product and subject to the attorney-client privilege. Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Farrar, 2012 Ark. 180, 402 S.W.3d 511 (2012).

Standing.

Reviewing court disagreed with the county contractor's assertion that she had standing to raise an Arkansas Freedom of Information Act issue since she had a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding, because where the messages often contained both business matters and personal issues, the contractor waived any right of privacy she may have had. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 371 Ark. 217, 264 S.W.3d 465 (2007).

Cited: Cooper, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 289 Ark. 218, 711 S.W.2d 155 (1986); Morton v. City of Little Rock, 728 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Depoyster v. Cole, 298 Ark. 203, 766 S.W.2d 606 (1989); Martin v. Musteen, 303 Ark. 656, 799 S.W.2d 540 (1990); Byrne v. Eagle, 319 Ark. 587, 892 S.W.2d 487 (1995); Saline Mem. Hosp. v. Berry, 321 Ark. 588, 906 S.W.2d 297 (1995); Ark. Dep't of Health v. Westark Christian Action Council, 322 Ark. 440, 910 S.W.2d 199 (1995); Moore v. State, 324 Ark. 453, 921 S.W.2d 606 (1996); Loveless v. Tucker, 2009 Ark. 424 (2009); Scott v. State, 2009 Ark. 437 (2009).