Whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent with this subchapter shall apply:
A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that movement can be made with safety; and
Official signs may be erected directing slower-moving traffic to use a designated lane or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving in the same direction, and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such sign.
In damage action growing out of a collision resulting when an automobile in the second lane from the curb attempted a right turn into a driveway and another behind it attempted to move into the curb lane preparatory to making a right turn at the intersection ahead, a jury instruction embodying subdivision (1) of this section was applicable and applied with equal force to both drivers. Moore v. Cook, 243 Ark. 502, 420 S.W.2d 905 (1967).
Probable Cause.
Where the Government mistakenly stated during a suppression hearing that it was not asserting this section as the basis for a traffic stop, the Government did not waive its right to argue that this section provided a valid basis for the traffic stop, because the Government asserted this section as a basis for the stop in its initial briefs, and the Government's misstatement at the hearing was not sufficient to support the conclusion that it intentionally relinquished or abandoned its right to resort to this section as a basis for the stop.
United States v. Demilia, 771 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2014).
Safety.
Road conditions in and of themselves do not constitute negligence; the issue, rather, is how people perform under those conditions. Sublett v. Hipps, 330 Ark. 58, 952 S.W.2d 140 (1997).
Cited:
Smith v. City of Little Rock, 305 Ark. 168, 806 S.W.2d 371 (1991); Hoay v. State, 75 Ark. App. 103, 55 S.W.3d 782 (2001).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1997–2026 · leading case: Sublett v. Hipps, 952 S.W.2d 140 (Ark. 1997).
Sublett v. Hipps, 952 S.W.2d 140 (Ark. 1997). · cites it 4ד” Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-302 (1) (Repl. 1994).”
State of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393 (Tenn. 2016). “2001) (holding that officer did not have probable cause to stop motorist for violating Arkansas’ version of Section 123(1) because there was no evidence that the motorist did not first ascertain that his twice crossing fog line could be made safely (citing Ark.Code Ann. §…”
United States v. Eric Williams, 39 F.4th 1034 (8th Cir. 2022). · cites it 2דSpecifically, he argues that the evidence does not demonstrate that Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-302 (1) was violated on either occasion.”
Hoay v. State, 55 S.W.3d 782 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2ד” and Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-302 (1) (Repl. 1994), which provides that “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, .”
Gaynell Baker v. State of Arkansas, 2022 Ark. App. 53 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022). “§ 27-51-302 (1) (Repl. 2010). Baker does not dispute Deputy Coleman’s testimony that she drove on the fog line, but she claims that driving on the fog line was an insufficient basis to form probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.”
United States v. $332,057.00 in US Currency (E.D. Ark. 2022). · cites it 2דIn Trooper May’s incident report, Trooper May alleges Sung Kim drove onto the fog line numerous times in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 27-51-302. In relevant part, Arkansas Code Annotated § 27-51-302 states: Whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more…”
State of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith (Tenn. 2016). “2001) (holding that officer did not have probable cause to stop motorist for violating Arkansas‟ version of Section 123(1) because there was no evidence that the motorist did not first ascertain that his twice crossing fog line could be made safely (citing Ark. Code Ann. §…”
United States v. Darrick Vaughan (8th Cir. 2026). “a motion to suppress” as “virtually unassailable on appeal” (citation omitted)). “[S]lower[],” in other words, than a reasonable officer might expect traffic to move on an uncongested highway in good weather, even at night.”
United States v. Phillip Pulliam (8th Cir. 2001). “Byrd stopped Pulliam for drifting over the fog line twice in two miles, a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-302 . Section 27-51-302 provides that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane .”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-302(1) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393 (Tenn. 2016). “2001) (holding that officer did not have probable cause to stop motorist for violating Arkansas’ version of Section 123(1) because there was no evidence that the motorist did not first ascertain that his twice crossing fog line could be made safely (citing Ark.Code Ann. §…”
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