Ark. Code Ann. » Title 27 Chapter 53
Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 (2026)

Requirements in accidents involving death or personal injuries

✓ current as of May 2026
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    1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of § 27-53-103.
    2. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
    3. An accident of this nature shall include all accidents which occur upon the streets or highways, upon the parking area of private business establishments, or elsewhere throughout the state.
    1. Any person failing to comply with subsection (a) of this section or with § 27-53-103 shall upon conviction be deemed guilty of a Class D felony.
    2. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall revoke the driver's license or commercial driver's license of the person so convicted.

History. Acts 1937, No. 300, § 36; Pope's Dig., § 6694; Acts 1981, No. 918, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-901; Acts 1987, No. 88, § 1; 1995, No. 659, § 4.

Case Notes

Accomplices.

No accomplice criminal responsibility results from supplying an intoxicant to one allegedly responsible as a principal for violations of §§ 5-10-104(a)(1), 5-13-204(a), or subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993).

Failure to Comply.

Evidence supported the finding of jury that defendant did not comply with this section and § 27-53-103 where evidence was to the effect that defendant hurriedly left scene of accident before injured person was removed and after being requested not to do so even though his identity was known and others were rendering aid. Barnhill v. State, 247 Ark. 28, 444 S.W.2d 97 (1969).

Trial court did not err in finding that defendant committed two criminal violations by leaving the scene of the accident and driving with a suspended license, under this section and §§ 27-53-103 and 27-16-303(a)(1), or in revoking defendant's suspended sentence, based on evidence that he struck a pedestrian and left the scene. Jordan v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 859 (2009).

Instructions.

A refusal to instruct on this section does not amount to prejudicial error where the failure to comply with it bears no proximate relation to the cause of the collision. Carter v. Montgomery, 226 Ark. 989, 296 S.W.2d 442 (1956).

Refusal to give instruction setting out subsection (a) of this section was not prejudicial error where proof showed that the young driver stopped and returned to the scene as soon as he realized what had happened and there was no showing that he failed to satisfy the requirements of § 27-53-103. Carter v. Montgomery, 226 Ark. 989, 296 S.W.2d 442 (1956).

Defendant was not entitled to have his proffered instruction given to the jury based on the argument that due process required the state to prove that he knew the victim had been injured and that he purposely left the scene knowing that she had been injured as this section did not contain an element regarding defendant's knowledge of a victim's injuries. Stivers v. State, 354 Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003).

Manslaughter.

Evidence held sufficient to support verdict and judgment for manslaughter. Kirkendall v. State, 265 Ark. 853, 581 S.W.2d 341 (1979); Booth v. State, 26 Ark. App. 115, 761 S.W.2d 607 (1988), cert. denied, Booth v. Arkansas, 490 U.S. 1047, 109 S. Ct. 1956, 104 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1989).

Miranda Warnings.

Although defendant was required to remain at the crash scene, such compulsion was not akin to the restraint of a formal arrest, and defendant was not entitled to a Miranda warning before the investigating officer asked him if he was the driver at the time of the crash and if he had previously consumed alcohol; defendant was not restrained, and he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda merely because of his legal obligation to stay at the scene, and as his statements were not custodial, Miranda warnings were not necessary. Cain v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 398, 500 S.W.3d 786 (2016).

Sufficiency Review.

Corporal's testimony was substantial evidence that appellant was the driver of the vehicle, as the corporal spoke with the driver and recognized appellant as the driver, nothing contradicted the corporal's identification of appellant, and there could be no inference that appellant was not still the driver at the time of the accident, as a witness testified that he never lost sight of appellant's vehicle during the chase, and thus the court affirmed appellant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. Flemons v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 280 (2013).

Appellant's sufficiency argument was preserved only for his conviction of leaving the scene of an accident, as he did not challenge his identity in his directed verdict motion for the fleeing apprehension charge. Flemons v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 280 (2013).

Cited: Benson v. State, 212 Ark. 905, 208 S.W.2d 767 (1948); Tackett v. State, 298 Ark. 20, 766 S.W.2d 410 (1989).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Stivers v. State, 118 S.W.3d 558 (Ark. 2003).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Stivers v. State, 118 S.W.3d 558 (Ark. 2003). · cites it 13× “Harold Stivers appeals his conviction for fading to stop after an accident, a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 (Supp. 2001). On appeal, Stivers argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury his proffered instruction, and that the court improperly…”
Adkins v. State, 264 S.W.3d 523 (Ark. 2007). · cites it 4× “3d 558 (2003), in which this court found a strict-liability offense in a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 (Supp. 2003), which requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to return to and remain at the scene of the accident.”
Hicks v. State, 808 S.W.2d 348 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 4× “He was subsequently incarcerated and charged with violations of Ark.Code Ann. §§ 27-53-101 and 5-10-104 (1987).”
Tackett v. State, 766 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1989). · cites it 4× “1981), currently Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 (Supp.1987)). In September 1983 he was convicted of both offenses and sentenced to a term of eight years imprisonment on the manslaughter conviction and a $10,000.”
Fight v. State, 863 S.W.2d 800 (Ark. 1993). · cites it 2× “The latter is also true of the offense of leaving the scene of a personal injury accident as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 (a)(1) (Supp. 1991) making the “driver” responsible.”
State v. Rosario, 841 A.2d 254 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). “We note that many similar hit-and-run statutes of other jurisdictions provide that the operator shall immediately stop at the scene of the accident “or as close thereto as possible.”
Booth v. State, 761 S.W.2d 607 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989). “Appellant, Richard Booth, appeals from a judgment entered on July 22, 1987, wherein he was found guilty of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury, a violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 27-53-101 (Supp. 1987) and two counts of manslaughter, a…”
Cain v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 398 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “Here, although Cain was required to remain at the crash scene, see Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 (b)(l) (Repl. 2010) (making it a felony for a driver to leave the scene of an accident in which a personal injury or death has occurred), such compulsion is not akin to the restraint of…”
Ken Swindle v. the Benton Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney's Off., 2023 Ark. App. 98 (Ark. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “Duran-Macias was charged with leaving the scene of an accident under Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 , a Class D Felony, in State v.”
Ken Shino v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. App. 94 (Ark. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2× “Shino was accused of violating Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-53-101(b)(1) (Repl. 2022), which requires the driver “of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in physical injury” to stop and remain at or near the scene of the accident.”
Antonio Reid v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. App. 291 (Ark. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2× “2016), failure to stop after an accident resulting in serious physical injury or death in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-53-101(d) (Repl. 2022), and failure to stop after an accident with property damage greater than $10,000 pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated…”
Mulazim Muhammad v. State of Arkansas, 2026 Ark. App. 184 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 2× “Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-53-101 (Repl. 2022) provides: 5 (b)(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in physical injury or serious physical injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101(b)(1) — 1 case
Ken Shino v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. App. 94 (Ark. Ct. App. 2025). “Shino was accused of violating Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-53-101(b)(1) (Repl. 2022), which requires the driver “of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in physical injury” to stop and remain at or near the scene of the accident.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101(d) — 1 case
Antonio Reid v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. App. 291 (Ark. Ct. App. 2025). “2016), failure to stop after an accident resulting in serious physical injury or death in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-53-101(d) (Repl. 2022), and failure to stop after an accident with property damage greater than $10,000 pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated…”
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