Ark. Code Ann. § 28-53-119 (2026)

Case Notes

Construction.

Section 28-50-101(f) does not repeal this section by implication. Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

Applicability.

This section, concerning reopening administration of an estate, did not apply where the estate had been dismissed for failure of the executrix to administer the estate, it was not settled, and the personal representative had not been discharged. Dawson v. Dawson, 2017 Ark. App. 584 (2017).

Petition to Reopen Administration.

Where legatees' petition to reopen administration alleged that the administrator was not legally appointed, that she did not qualify for letters testamentary, although the will was admitted to probate, that they received no notice of the filing of accounting, or hearing thereon, and that the administrator, who claimed all of the proceeds of the estate, had a personal interest which conflicted with her official duties, such facts were sufficient to require the taking of proof. Holt v. Moody, 234 Ark. 245, 352 S.W.2d 87 (1961).

Circuit court improperly granted niece's petition to reopen probate of her aunt's estate under as she failed to file the petition within the 90-day limitation period set forth in Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a) or provide “other cause,” such as fraud or lack of notice. Bullock v. Barnes, 366 Ark. 444, 236 S.W.3d 498 (2006).

Probate court did not err in reopening a decedent's estate in order to reform the probate file and a deed to show that real property was conveyed to purchasers with a reservation of one-half the mineral rights on each tract of land because the president of the bank that administered the estate testified that one-half of the mineral rights were not to be sold to purchasers, and his testimony was supported by the notice of sale, the installment note signed by the purchasers, the certificate of purchase, and two deeds, one reserving one-half the mineral rights in each tract and the other conveying one-half the mineral rights to a church; § 28-1-115 was inapplicable and did not limit this section because § 28-1-115 did not speak to reopening the estate, which was authorized by this section. Moore v. First Presbyterian Church of Searcy, Ark., Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 269 (2010).

Ark. R. Civ. P. 60 does not limit the probate court's authority to reopen the estate under this section because this section authorizes the reopening of an estate on the grounds allowed in the statute, separate and apart from the grounds for reopening a case provided under Rule 60. Moore v. First Presbyterian Church of Searcy, Ark., Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 269 (2010).

That an amended petition to have a special administrator appointed and the related amended order were not filed under the original probate case docket number was not an outcome-determinative point when deciding whether the original probate case was reopened. Both the original case and the petition to reopen the case were filed in the same division—the probate division of the Garland County Circuit Court, and court clerks, not the parties, assign case numbers. Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731 (2019).

Purposes of Reopening Estate.

A probate court has the authority to reopen the administration of an estate for the purpose of determining the proper distribution of personal property alleged to have been omitted from the settlement. Wilson v. Davis, 239 Ark. 305, 389 S.W.2d 442 (1965).

Where a son who exercised an option to purchase a decedent's real property paid less than the amount required by the decedent's will, the estate was properly reopened pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for the limited purpose of allowing the personal representative to collect the deficiency from the son, as opposed to permitting rescission of the deed, because the personal representative had an adequate remedy at law and the amount of damages was readily ascertainable. Moreland v. Lonzell Dodds, 2012 Ark. App. 10, 388 S.W.3d 73 (2012).

Probate division of the circuit court had the authority under this section to appoint a special administrator for the limited purpose of pursuing unliquidated tort claims that were not addressed before the estate of the special administrator's parent was closed. Although the circuit court did not use the word “reopen” in its order, its intent was clear enough because it found that the decedent's estate was opened and closed without resolving wrongful death or survival claims and that a special administrator was necessary to pursue the claims. Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731 (2019).

Special administrator of a reopened probate case could file survival claims because the claims belonged to the decedent's estate and had to be filed by the personal representative of the estate or a special administrator. The trustee that had served as the estate's personal representative did not have to file the claims. Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731 (2019).

Standing to Petition.

A claimant having a personal injury claim resulting from an accident involving an automobile driven by a decedent had no standing to petition for a reopening of the decedent's estate after its administration had been completed, the executor discharged, and there had been no attempt to assert a claim which was barred by statute. Doepke v. Smith, 248 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.2d 627 (1970).

An estate may not be reopened upon the petition of one claiming damages for the alleged negligence of the decedent who alleges that he was induced to delay filing a claim against the estate within the statutory period by the fraudulent representations of decedent's liability insurance carrier that it would settle his claim as soon as his injuries could be evaluated. Doepke v. Smith, 248 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.2d 627 (1970).

Cited: White v. Welsh, 323 Ark. 479, 915 S.W.2d 274 (1996); Skaggs v. Cullipher, 57 Ark. App. 50, 941 S.W.2d 443 (1997); Tatro v. Langston, 328 Ark. 548, 944 S.W.2d 118 (Ark. 1997).