Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (2026)

Duties of guardians generally

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaArk. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
    1. It shall be the duty of the guardian of the person, consistent with and out of the resources of the ward's estate, to care for and maintain the ward and, if he or she is a minor, to see that he or she is protected, properly trained and educated, and that he or she has the opportunity to learn a trade, occupation, or profession.
    2. The guardian of the person may be required to report the condition of his or her ward to the court, at regular intervals or otherwise, as the court may direct.
    3. The guardian of the person shall be entitled to the custody of the ward but shall not have the power to bind the ward or his or her property.
    1. It shall be the duty of the guardian of the estate:
      1. To exercise due care to protect and preserve it;
      2. To invest it and apply it as provided in this chapter;
      3. To account for it faithfully;
      4. To perform all other duties required of him or her by law; and
      5. At the termination of the guardianship, to deliver the assets of the ward to the persons entitled to them.
    2. To the extent applicable, the law of trusts shall apply to the duties and liabilities of a guardian of the estate.

History. Acts 1985, No. 940, §§ 25, 26; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 57-844, 57-845; Acts 1999, No. 517, § 2.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Matthew L. Brunson, Family Law—Providing for Those Who Cannot Provide for Themselves: A Proposal for the Arkansas General Assembly to Follow in the Footsteps of an Already Expansive Guardianship Law and Grant Guardians the Right to File for Divorce on Behalf of a Ward, 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 271 (2016).

Case Notes

Applicability.

Circuit court properly interpreted subdivision (a)(3) of this section to mean that the asserted limitations were placed upon a guardian of a person only, and not the guardian of an estate, where the statute's plain language stated that the guardian of a person did not have the authority to bind the ward or his property. Carmody v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 373 Ark. 79, 281 S.W.3d 721 (2008).

Corporations as Guardians.

A corporation was held as unsuitable to perform the duties of a guardian for the person. Bogan v. Ark. First Nat'l Bank, 249 Ark. 840, 462 S.W.2d 203 (1971) (decision under prior law).

Due Care.

Where the evidence showed that a ward went by her guardian's office each morning on her way to school and got small amounts in cash, ranging from 50 cents to a dollar, that she signed some receipts in blank, and that she did not receive the amounts shown in the several receipts, and that practically all of her estate was disposed of by the guardian in a little more than six months, there was not a substantial compliance with the “due care” provisions of former similar statute by the guardian. Robinson v. Hammons, 228 Ark. 329, 307 S.W.2d 857 (1957) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant also served as a co-executrix of her mother's estate, § 28-49-101(b)(2) permitted her to preserve and maintain real property in the estate, but where the title to the real property vested in defendant immediately on her mother's death, the circuit court erred in approving any expenditures for the property made after the mother's death. Monk v. Griffin, 92 Ark. App. 320, 213 S.W.3d 651 (2005).

Trial court did not clearly err in granting a mother's petition to replace a father as guardian of their 21-year-old son, who had Williams syndrome, because the son needed a guardian who was vigilant in ensuring that his needs were met; there were several occasions where the father delayed or denied the son medical attention. Hoffarth v. Harp, 2009 Ark. App. 240, 303 S.W.3d 96 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 684 (May 6, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 575 (Sept. 10, 2009).

Duties of the Guardian of an Estate.

Chapter 7 debtors who were guardians of a creditor had a fiduciary responsibility to the creditor created by subdivision (b)(2) of this section and § 28-73-303, and the debtors committed defalcation as fiduciaries by failing to hold the creditor's estate as directed by a court order and by failing to account for estate funds. Any debt that resulted from the debtors' defalcation was therefore nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(4). Anderson v. Sharp (In re Sharp), — B.R. —, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4270 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. Aug. 8, 2008).

Contract agreeing to binding arbitration did not violate public policy where the legislature had made clear in enacting this section that a guardian had a duty to invest the estate's funds and the circuit court properly found that the guardian had authority to execute account forms or client agreements necessary to deposit and invest estate funds. Carmody v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 373 Ark. 79, 281 S.W.3d 721 (2008).

In light of the public policy favoring arbitration and the Legislature's decision to refrain from specifically limiting a guardian's ability to enter into arbitration agreements, a guardian of a patient's person and the patient's estate possessed the authority to enter into an arbitration agreement with a nursing home on behalf of the patient; therefore, the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration should have been granted. GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Lamb, 2016 Ark. 101, 487 S.W.3d 348 (2016).

Guardian failed to comply with her statutory responsibilities because she did not perform an inventory, nor did she provide the circuit court with an annual accounting; additionally, the guardian utilized two family bank accounts to pay all expenses. Rogers v. Ritchie, 2017 Ark. App. 420, 528 S.W.3d 272 (2017).

Expenditures.

Circuit court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed expenditures a guardian made during the pendency of a ward's guardianship for the benefit of the guardian because it did not consider whether the expenditures were reasonable, necessary, and proper for the care and maintenance of the ward; the guardian was the ward's spouse, and it was her testimony that the ward was the sole financial provider for almost the entirety of their 40-year marriage. Rogers v. Ritchie, 2017 Ark. App. 420, 528 S.W.3d 272 (2017).

Circuit court erred in ruling that money paid for life insurance premiums was an allowable expense of the guardianship because the money expended on the insurance premiums went toward policies on both the guardian's and the ward's lives; the circuit court was directed to consider whether the money expended for the guardian's insurance premiums was proper for the care and maintenance of the ward. Rogers v. Ritchie, 2017 Ark. App. 420, 528 S.W.3d 272 (2017).

Expenditures Improper.

Because the guardianship terminated at the ward's death, his funeral expenses were not proper expenses of the guardianship. Rogers v. Ritchie, 2017 Ark. App. 420, 528 S.W.3d 272 (2017).

Expenditures Proper.

In a case involving the management of an estate, a trial court erred by determining that certain expenditures of behalf of a ward were improper; the guardian was allowed to make gifts on behalf of the ward under § 28-65-308(b), he could continue the ward's practice of supporting family members, continuing donations to the ward's church was acceptable, and expenditures for food and clothing fell within the definition of what was required for maintenance. The law of trusts guided the evaluation of the duties and liabilities of the guardian of an estate. Stautzenberger v. Stautzenberger, 2013 Ark. 148, 427 S.W.3d 17 (2013).

Interference in Adoption Proceedings.

Where former similar statute gave the court appointed guardian the right of custody superior to that of the foster parents, and there was no allegation or proof that any of the prohibited acts were about to be performed by the guardian or the Commissioner of Arkansas Social Services, whom the foster parents sought to prevent from interfering with their adoption proceedings, the chancellor was in error when he issued an injunction against interference with the adoption proceedings of the foster parents. Toan v. Falbo, 268 Ark. 337, 595 S.W.2d 936 (1980) (decision under prior law).

Return of Child.

Where a grandmother was the guardian of an incompetent grandchild and the parents of the grandchild forcibly removed the child from the guardian to a location in Kentucky, it was proper for the court to order the return of the child to the grandparent, although she and her husband were over 80 years of age and deteriorating physically, where it was also shown that the father of the child was suffering from advanced stages of emphysema and an asthmatic condition and there was also evidence that the mother was hospitalized for significant health reasons on several different occasions. Mallory v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 909, 521 S.W.2d 215 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Tax Returns of Ward.

Probate courts were held to have the power to order a guardian of the person to surrender the tax returns of an incompetent ward over to the court for inspection by the guardian of the estate, as well as other parties to the litigation. Ratterree v. White, 277 Ark. 318, 642 S.W.2d 288 (1982) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Brasel v. Estate of Harp, 317 Ark. 379, 877 S.W.2d 923 (1994); Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Sheffield, 2016 Ark. 235, 495 S.W.3d 69 (2016).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1994–2017 · leading case: Ggnsc Holdings, LLC v. Lamb Ex Rel. Williams, 2016 Ark. 101 (Ark. 2016).
Ggnsc Holdings, LLC v. Lamb Ex Rel. Williams, 2016 Ark. 101 (Ark. 2016). · cites it 17× “Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1). Noting the General Assembly’s established public policy in favor of arbitration, we held that a guardian of the estate has the authority to bind a ward to an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from the above duties.”
Carmody v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 281 S.W.3d 721 (Ark. 2008). · cites it 31× “The circuit court found that the arbitration agreements contained in the client agreements did not violate Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-65-301 (a)(3) and 28-65-302(a)(l)(G) (Repl.”
Martin v. Decker, 237 S.W.3d 502 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 8× “See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1) (Repl. 2004).”
Rogers v. Ritchie, 2017 Ark. App. 420 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (Repl. 2012). Barbara failed to comply with her statutory responsibilities.”
Stautzenberger v. Stautzenberger, 427 S.W.3d 17 (Ark. 2013). · cites it 9× “See Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-301. His duty was not to Ms.”
Butcher v. Beatty, 345 S.W.3d 216 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 6× “Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-301(b)(1) (Repl. 2004).”
Brasel v. Est. of Harp, 877 S.W.2d 923 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (1987). Pursuant to the letters of guardianship as presented to the bank, the son exercised his powers to protect and preserve the ward’s personal property.”
Johnson v. Guardianship of Ratcliff, 34 S.W.3d 749 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “Appellant also argues that the fee contract was invalid because Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (a) (3) (1987) provides that a guardian of the person does not have the power to bind the ward or his property, and the guardian in this instance was only the guardian of the minor’s…”
Monk v. Griffin, 213 S.W.3d 651 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1)(A) (Repl.”
Hoffarth v. Harp, 303 S.W.3d 96 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (Repl.2004). A guardian may be removed on the same grounds and in the same manner for the removal of a personal representative of an estate.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301(a)(3) — 2 cases
Ggnsc Holdings, LLC v. Lamb Ex Rel. Williams, 2016 Ark. 101 (Ark. 2016). “Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1). Noting the General Assembly’s established public policy in favor of arbitration, we held that a guardian of the estate has the authority to bind a ward to an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from the above duties.”
Carmody v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 281 S.W.3d 721 (Ark. 2008). “The circuit court found that the arbitration agreements contained in the client agreements did not violate Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-65-301 (a)(3) and 28-65-302(a)(l)(G) (Repl.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301(a)(l) — 1 case
Stautzenberger v. Stautzenberger, 427 S.W.3d 17 (Ark. 2013). “See Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-301. His duty was not to Ms.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301(b) — 2 cases
Ggnsc Holdings, LLC v. Lamb Ex Rel. Williams, 2016 Ark. 101 (Ark. 2016). “Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1). Noting the General Assembly’s established public policy in favor of arbitration, we held that a guardian of the estate has the authority to bind a ward to an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from the above duties.”
Carmody v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 281 S.W.3d 721 (Ark. 2008). “The circuit court found that the arbitration agreements contained in the client agreements did not violate Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-65-301 (a)(3) and 28-65-302(a)(l)(G) (Repl.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301(b)(1) — 2 cases
Martin v. Decker, 237 S.W.3d 502 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). “See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1) (Repl. 2004).”
Butcher v. Beatty, 345 S.W.3d 216 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). “Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-301(b)(1) (Repl. 2004).”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301(b)(2) — 1 case
Stautzenberger v. Stautzenberger, 427 S.W.3d 17 (Ark. 2013). “See Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-301. His duty was not to Ms.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301(b)(l) — 2 cases
Ggnsc Holdings, LLC v. Lamb Ex Rel. Williams, 2016 Ark. 101 (Ark. 2016). “Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1). Noting the General Assembly’s established public policy in favor of arbitration, we held that a guardian of the estate has the authority to bind a ward to an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from the above duties.”
Butcher v. Beatty, 345 S.W.3d 216 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). “Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-301(b)(1) (Repl. 2004).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.