Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-607 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Consumer Goods and Services. 1 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Goods and Services: Distributorship, Franchise, and Similar Business Contracts. 8 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2015).

Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Business Goods and Services: Manufacturing, Construction, and Similar Contracts. 15 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2015).

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the Use of the Uniform Commercial Code by Analogy, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.

Smolla, What Types of Losses Are Recoverable Under Arkansas's Products Liability Law, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 11.

Ark. L. Rev.

Uniform Commercial Code — Buyers' Remedies After Acceptance, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 409.

Torts — Strict Liability in Products Cases, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 796.

The Return of Caveat Venditor as the Law of Products Liability, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 355.

Legislative Note — Act 111 of 1973: An Act to Impose Liability for Injury and Damages Done in Certain Circumstances by Defective Products, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 562.

The Personal Injury Action in Warranty — Has the Arkansas Strict Liability Statute Rendered It Obsolete? 28 Ark. L. Rev. 335.

Voucher to Products Liability: The Mechanics of U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a), 29 Ark. L. Rev. 486.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of the statutory notice requirement of a breach is twofold: first, it gives the seller an opportunity to minimize damages in some way, such as by correcting the defect; second, it gives immunity to a seller against stale claims. Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co., 318 Ark. 792, 888 S.W.2d 303 (1994).

Goods Accepted.

Seller could not rely on this section to argue that buyer had the burden of proving that seller had not substantially performed under the contract where the goods at issue were not accepted by buyer. TEC Floor Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 1993).

Notice of Breach.

The buyer of a combine with tires too narrow for use in his fields but which the seller assured him would give him satisfaction, was barred from any remedy unless he notified the seller of the breach of warranty within a reasonable time after discovery that the combine would not work in his fields. Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 428 S.W.2d 286 (1968).

The purpose of the statutory requirement of notice to the seller of breach of warranty is to enable the seller to minimize damages in some way such as correcting the defect and also to give the seller some immunity against stale claims. L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717 (1969).

The sufficiency of notice to the seller of breach of warranty and what is considered a reasonable time to give such notice are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury based on the circumstances of each case. L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717 (1969).

Notice to the seller of breach of warranty is a condition precedent to recovery and must be alleged in the complaint. L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717 (1969).

Notice to seller held to be timely and sufficient. Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Marquette Elecs., Inc., 630 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1980).

Lessee of equipment failed to give lessor notification of breach of warranty within a reasonable time, and thereby lost rights under any express or implied warranty. KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972).

Written notice is not required for a breach of warranty claim by the Code. Smart Chevrolet Co. v. Davis, 262 Ark. 500, 558 S.W.2d 147 (1977).

The intent of subdivision (3)(a) of this section is that the seller be notified that the buyer proposes to look to him for damages, which notice must either directly or inferentially inform the seller that the buyer demands damages upon an asserted claim of breach of warranty. James A. Rogers Excavating, Inc. v. R.A. Young & Son, 3 Ark. App. 297, 625 S.W.2d 560 (1981).

The standard of notification set out in this section was a reasonable one to be applied in claims of breach of implied warranty of habitability as to new house; the buyer is not required to list each and every objection that he would rely on as constituting the breach; notification need only be with sufficient clarity to apprise the vendor-builder that a breach of implied warranty is being asserted and to give him sufficient opportunity to inspect the premises and correct the defects; the sufficiency of the notice and whether it was given within a reasonable time are ordinarily questions of fact for a jury to determine. Pickler v. Fisher, 7 Ark. App. 125, 644 S.W.2d 644 (1983).

Where the buyer pled notice of the seller's breach of warranty, and counsel for the seller conceded this point in oral argument, the seller was not entitled to a directed verdict on the basis of the buyer's alleged failure to provide notice. Greenfield Seed Co. v. Bland, 18 Ark. App. 48, 710 S.W.2d 833 (1986).

Where there was sufficient evidence that notice of damage was, at the very least, inferentially given by the seed buyer to the seller, and the buyer filed his counterclaim seeking damages in May following the harvest, which was possibly the first time that the buyer could, with any degree of certainty, ascertain his damages, whether such notice of the seller's breach of warranty was sufficient and reasonable as to time, form, and substance was a question of fact properly submitted to the jury for its determination, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seller's motion for a directed verdict. Greenfield Seed Co. v. Bland, 18 Ark. App. 48, 710 S.W.2d 833 (1986).

Where material questions of fact remained regarding issue of whether defendant was given notice of its breach of warranty, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on that issue. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

For breach of warranty, no particular form of notice to the seller is required, and the notice need not be in writing. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

The giving of reasonable notice is a condition precedent to recovery under the provisions of the commercial code, and the giving of notice must be alleged in the complaint in order to state a cause of action; the complaint cannot be the notice. Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co., 318 Ark. 792, 888 S.W.2d 303 (1994).

Crop duster failed to give reasonable notice of the breach, as required by this section, to the seller after accepting the wrong fuel for the crop duster's airplane. Adams v. Wacaster Oil Co., 81 Ark. App. 150, 98 S.W.3d 832 (2003).

Trial court properly gave manufacturer a setoff on its counterclaim for breach of warranties as telephone calls from the manufacturer to the corporation were considered sufficient notice of the breach; notice is sufficient where it informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach and, thus, to open the way for negotiation of a normal settlement. Indus. Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Lytle Mfg., L.L.C., 94 Ark. App. 81, 226 S.W.3d 1 (2006).

—Applicability to Contracts for Services.

Circuit court's ruling that a car owner's breach of warranty claims against a repair shop failed for lack of notice was not clearly erroneous. While it was premature to decide whether express or implied warranties attach as a matter of law to a contract for services, the Uniform Commercial Code notice requirements apply if such warranties do exist. Testimony at trial indicated that the first notice the shop received was in the complaint, which was filed 33 months after the owner picked up his car and had driven it for almost 1,000 miles. Hartness v. Nuckles, 2015 Ark. 444, 475 S.W.3d 558 (2015).

Remedy Barred.

Where buyer made payment on two remaining notes on purchase price after discovering alleged defect, used the machine for over three years and made no effort to return it and rescind the sale, he was not entitled to recover damages on the theory that the warranty was breached. Continental Moss-Gordin, Inc. v. Beaton, 247 Ark. 426, 446 S.W.2d 226 (1969).

Third-Party Actions.

In an action by a third party for damages resulting from an automobile collision alleged to have resulted from defective brakes on the automobile, any error in dismissing the action as to the dealer became harmless when the jury found for the manufacturer, where the defect was latent and could have been discovered only by complete disassembly of the defective brake. Smith v. Goble, 248 Ark. 415, 452 S.W.2d 336 (1970).

Voluntary Payment Rule.

Where there was a contract for the sale of goods and buyer accepted the goods, this section made buyer responsible for payment, and this legal duty to pay rendered the voluntary-payment rule inapplicable. TB of Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign & Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688, 946 S.W.2d 930 (1997).

Cited: Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Stimson Tractor Co. v. Heflin, 257 Ark. 263, 516 S.W.2d 379 (1974); Cotner v. International Harvester Co., 260 Ark. 885, 545 S.W.2d 627 (1977); Bailey v. Matthews, 279 Ark. 117, 649 S.W.2d 175 (1983); Microsize, Inc. v. Ark. Microfilm, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 49, 780 S.W.2d 574 (1989); Heating & Air Specialists, Inc. v. Jones, 180 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 1999).