Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (2026)

Statute of limitations

✓ current as of May 2026

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaArk. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within five (5) years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within five (5) years after the accelerated due date.
Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within five (5) years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten (10) years.
Except as provided in subsection (d), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three (3) years after dishonor of the draft or ten (10) years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first.
An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three (3) years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be.
An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within five (5) years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the six-year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed.
An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced (i) within five (5) years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time, or (ii) within six (6) years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand.
Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion, (ii) for breach of warranty, or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this chapter and not governed by this section must be commenced within three (3) years after the cause of action accrues.

History. Acts 1991, No. 572, § 5; 1997, No. 1164, § 1.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment substituted “five (5) years” for “six (6) years” throughout the section.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Finding against the relatives in an action stemming from the relatives' default on a promissory note and security agreement previously executed was proper because the appellate court agreed with the circuit court's interpretation of the provision in the agreement to mean that the final payment, due on January 30, 2004, was to be a balloon payment of any unpaid balance on the note. Accordingly, the term “principal balance” was to include everything that remained unpaid on the date the last balloon payment came due; therefore, the damage claim included everything that remained unpaid throughout the course of the note and the circuit court's finding that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations was proper. Housley v. Hensley, 100 Ark. App. 118, 265 S.W.3d 136 (2007).

Certificate of Deposit.

Under § 4-3-104(j), a certificate of deposit is a negotiable instrument, and an action to enforce such an instrument under this chapter would be subject to the six-year limitation period under subsection (e) of this section, not the five-year limitation period under § 16-56-111. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

A demand is required to trigger the statute of limitations for a certificate of deposit (CD), regardless of whether the CD is a demand or due date CD. Landreth v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 F.3d 267 (8th Cir. 1995).

The trial court erred by construing subsection (e) to require a demand for payment be within a reasonable amount of time. Landreth v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 F.3d 267 (8th Cir. 1995).

Whether a certificate of deposit (CD) is a demand or due date CD is immaterial for the purpose of determining when the statute of limitations begins to run; the dispositive fact is whether or not the instrument is a CD. Landreth v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 F.3d 267 (8th Cir. 1995).

Cited: United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bank of Bentonville, 29 F. Supp. 2d 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 10 cases, 1988–2020 · leading case: Loewer v. Nat'l Bank, 870 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. 1994).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Loewer v. Nat'l Bank, 870 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 4× “One, it suggests the six-year limitations after demand for payment under Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (e) (Repl. 1991) should apply because Loewer’s action merely involves the enforcement of NBA’s obligation to pay Loewer the proceeds of its CD.”

Rogers v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 789 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 10× “The note remains unpaid, Kinder has taken bankruptcy, and the bank has sued Rogers on the note.”

UMLIC 2 Funding Corp. v. Butcher, 970 S.W.2d 211 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 3× “Appellant alternatively argued that the six-year statute of limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (Repl. 1991) applied.”

Housley v. Hensley, 265 S.W.3d 136 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). “” IV Statute of Limitations Arkansas Code Annotated § 4-3-118 (Repl. 2001) deals with the applicable statute of limitations for negotiable instruments and states that “an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced…”

Mobley v. Harmon, 803 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (f) (1987). That would authorize an extension for six months, or until April 30, 1984.”

McIlroy Bank & Trust v. Maestri, 759 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1988). · cites it 4× “On the question of consent, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (f) (1987) provides: Unless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a single extension for not longer than the original period.”

United States Fid. & Guar. Co. Ex Rel. Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Bank of Bentonville, 29 F. Supp. 2d 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998). “§ 4-3-118(g). Background. Plaintiff, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF & G), as subrogee and assignee of Cooper Communities, Inc.”

Galatia Cmty. State Bank v. Kindy, 821 S.W.2d 765 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 3× “The Trial Court reviewed Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (b) and (c) (1987) which has since been superseded by Ark.”

Mollenhour v. State First Nat'l Bank of Texarkana, 769 S.W.2d 28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “Section 4-3-118 (1987), handwritten terms control typewritten and printed terms, the word “individually” is not controlling.”

Lewis v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys. Inc (E.D. Ark. 2020). · cites it 2× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (a). “In suits to foreclose or enforce mortgages, deeds of trust, or vendor’s liens, it shall be sufficient defense that they have not been brought within the period of limitation prescribed by law for a suit on the debt or liability for the security…”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118(f) — 2 cases

Rogers v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 789 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1990). “The note remains unpaid, Kinder has taken bankruptcy, and the bank has sued Rogers on the note.”

McIlroy Bank & Trust v. Maestri, 759 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1988). “On the question of consent, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118 (f) (1987) provides: Unless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a single extension for not longer than the original period.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-118(g) — 1 case

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.