Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Affiliate” means:
    1. as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
    2. solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
      1. property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
      2. property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
      3. an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
    3. a general partner in a partnership described in clause (B); or
    4. a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
    5. a general partner in a partnership described in clause (D); or
    6. a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
      1. to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
      2. to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.

(ii) a corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person that holds the securities:

(A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or

(B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;

(iii) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or

(iv) a person that operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.

(2) “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:

(3) “Claim”, except as used in “claim for relief”, means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.

(4) “Creditor” means a person that has a claim.

(5) “Debt” means liability on a claim.

(6) “Debtor” means a person that is liable on a claim.

(7) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.

(8) “Insider” includes:

(i) if the debtor is an individual:

(A) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;

(B) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(ii) if the debtor is a corporation:

(A) a director of the debtor;

(B) an officer of the debtor;

(C) a person in control of the debtor;

(D) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(iii) if the debtor is a partnership:

(A) a general partner in the debtor;

(B) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;

(C) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(D) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (C); or

(E) a person in control of the debtor;

(iv) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and

(v) a managing agent of the debtor.

(9) “Lien” means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien, including child support liens arising under §§ 9-14-230 and 9-14-231.

(10) “Organization” means a person other than an individual.

(11) “Person” means an individual, estate, partnership, association, trust, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal or commercial entity.

(12) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.

(13) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(14) “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.

(15) “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:

(16) “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.

(17) “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.

History. Acts 1987, No. 967, § 1; 1997, No. 1296, § 1; 2017, No. 1086, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted the definitions for “Electronic”, “Organization”, “Record”, and “Sign” and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; inserted “in fact” in (1)(i)(B); inserted “discretionary” in (1)(ii)(A); inserted “except as used in ‘claim for relief'” in (3); rewrote (11); inserted “license” in (16); and made stylistic changes.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Since creditor could enforce his judgment with a remedy of a resulting trust, the district court erred in finding that his claim was time-barred by this subchapter; the allegations were sufficient to argue that a resulting trust was formed, and the creditor, who was entitled to step into the debtor's shoes, timely filed his claim within the 10 years for enforcing a judgment pursuant to § 16-56-114 against defendant, the trustee/title holder of real property held for the benefit of the debtor. Imperato v. McMinn, 406 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2005).

Creditor.

In creditor's action to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance arising from a transfer-on-death (TOD) beneficiary designation, the creditor of the deceased had standing to pursue its claim under the Fraudulent Transfers Act, § 4-59-201 et seq., against the transferee beneficiary. Heritage Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Walt & Lee Keenihan Found., Inc., 2019 Ark. 371, 584 S.W.3d 685 (2019) (decided under pre-2017 version of § 4-59-201 et seq.).

Insider.

Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied in a case involving fraudulent transfers to a wife, as an insider, by a judgment debtor under § 4-59-204(a)(1) because the debtor and the wife were unable to substantiate the claim that wife purchased the stocks with money won at a horse race or that a transfer was due to the debtor's poor health. Laird v. Weigh Sys. South II, Inc., 98 Ark. App. 393, 255 S.W.3d 900 (2007).

Transfer.

This subchapter’s definition of “transfer” was similar to the definition in the Bankruptcy Code. While the Bankruptcy Code afforded the trustee the ability to avoid transfers made within two years of filing bankruptcy, the Arkansas statute allowed three years from the date of transfer. Despite the one-year difference in the look-back period, however, the statutes were in pari materia and the same analysis applied under both laws. Jacoway v. Svetc (In re Svetc), 521 B.R. 892 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2014) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Halliburton Co. v. E.H. Owen Family Trust, 28 Ark. App. 314, 773 S.W.2d 453 (1989); FDIC v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258 (8th Cir. 1997); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hogan, 208 B.R. 459 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1989–2022 · leading case: Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W.3d 113 (Ark. 2001).
Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W.3d 113 (Ark. 2001). · cites it 8× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201 (4) (Supp. 1999).”
Williams v. Marlar (In Re Marlar), 252 B.R. 743 (8th Cir. BAP 2000). · cites it 3× “§ 544 and the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act, Ark.Code Ann. § 4-59-201, et seq., to recover three parcels of farm property alleging a pre-petition fraudulent transfer by the debtor, John S.”
Halliburton Co. v. E.H. Owen Fam. Trust, 773 S.W.2d 453 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “It was replaced by Act 967 of 1987, codified as Ark.Code Ann. § 4-59-201 through 213 (Supp.”
Luker v. Eubanks (In Re Eubanks), 444 B.R. 415 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010). · cites it 2× “§ 544 (b), which allows the trustee to invoke the relevant state law of fraudulent transfers — here, the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act, Ark.Code Ann. § 4-59-201, et seq. — in order to avoid such transfers.”
McAdams v. Ellington, 970 S.W.2d 203 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 2× “, and the Arkansas Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-59-201 through 4-59-207 (Repl.”
Thomsen Fam. Trust, 1990 v. Peterson Fam. Enter., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “The Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-59-201 through 4-59-213 (Repl.”
Druyvestein v. Gean, 2014 Ark. App. 559 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “Van Divner and ap-pellee for the creation of a constructive trust and for relief pursuant to the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act, found in Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201 et seq. He filed an amended complaint on February 9, 2012.”
United States v. Jepsen, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (W.D. Ark. 2000). · cites it 2× “Count Two — Action to have Jack’s Release of the Mortgage on the Mallard Point Property Set Aside as Fraudulent Defendants move for summary judgment on this claim on the following grounds: (1) no fraudulent transfer within the meaning, of the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act,…”
Schieffler v. Beshears (In Re Beshears), 182 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995). “§ 4-59-201, et seq. If judgment is granted for the trustee, the property becomes the property of King, as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and thus, under section 541, property of the estate.”
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hogan (In Re Hogan), 208 B.R. 459 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997). “§ 4-59-201, et seq., if there is at least one creditor at the time who has standing under such law to challenge the transfer.”
Jacoway v. Svetc (In re Svetc), 521 B.R. 892 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2014). “§ 4-59-201(12). The relevant subsection of the Arkansas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent if the debtor made the transfer with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
Nash v. Nash, 574 S.W.3d 171 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “Under this heading, appellant raises four subpoints: (1) error in the substitution of parties following Norma's death; (2) an irregularity in the proceedings preventing appellant from having a fair trial; (3) trying appellant's contract claim against Norma without a proper…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201(12) — 1 case
Jacoway v. Svetc (In re Svetc), 521 B.R. 892 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2014). “§ 4-59-201(12). The relevant subsection of the Arkansas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent if the debtor made the transfer with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201(3) — 3 cases
Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W.3d 113 (Ark. 2001). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201 (4) (Supp. 1999).”
Southmark Corp. v. Cagan, 999 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1993).
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201(4) — 2 cases
Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W.3d 113 (Ark. 2001). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-201 (4) (Supp. 1999).”
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