Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

World wide web domain as violating state trademark protection statute or state unfair trade practices act. 96 A.L.R.5th 1.

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Development: Trade Regulation — Procedure, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 1005.

Nathan Price Chaney, The Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act: The Arkansas Supreme Court Should Adopt the Specific-Conduct Rule, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 299 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Business Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 351.

Case Notes

In General.

The Deceptive Trade Practices Act protects consumers and promotes the purposes of the Arkansas Constitution, Art. 19, § 13, by making its provisions effective for consumers who are not likely to have financial means to obtain legal assistance and who are unlikely to be aware of their legal rights to bring individual actions. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 336 Ark. 289, 985 S.W.2d 299 (1999).

Although the parent corporation's name and logo appeared on the master agreement that was executed between contractor and subsidiary company, the fact remained that the parties to the contract were clearly stated and that the contractor chose to make the assumption, without further investigation on his part, that subsidiary company was financially backed by the parent corporation, which subsequently sold its stock to a corporation that went bankrupt; the use of parent corporation's logo and company name by the subsidiary alone was not a deceptive trade practice. Little Rock Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Entergy Corp., 79 Ark. App. 337, 87 S.W.3d 842 (2002).

Section 4-88-113 limits a private cause of action for deceptive trade practices under this section to instances where actual damage or injury has occurred; hence, where the only alleged injury is the diminution in value of a product, a private cause of action is not cognizable. Wallis v. Ford Motor Co., 362 Ark. 317, 208 S.W.3d 153 (2005).

Health services company's policy which denied privileges to doctors that acquired or held an interest in a competitor hospital constituted a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and such a violation may satisfy the impropriety requirement for a claim of tortious interference; subdivision (a)(10) of this section makes illegal any trade practice which is unconscionable and includes conduct violative of public policy or statute. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 115, 226 S.W.3d 800 (2006).

Any Other Deceptive Act or Practice.

Subsection (a)(10) is not too vague for enforcement. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 336 Ark. 289, 985 S.W.2d 299 (1999).

A title-pawn corporation violated subsection (a)(10) where (1) it required borrowers to surrender their car titles as security for repayment and pay monthly interest, or a monthly pawn charge, (2) the monthly interest was typically equal to 25 percent of the entire loan amount each month that the loan was not paid in full, and which constituted an annual percentage rate of 304.17 percent, (3) the corporation's contracts further provided that upon the borrower's default, it had the right to take whatever steps may be necessary to take possession thereof at the borrower's risk and expense, and (4) borrowers were required to sign a power of attorney, allowing the corporation to sell the vehicle upon repossession. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 336 Ark. 289, 985 S.W.2d 299 (1999).

Plaintiff's claims regarding violations of Telephonic Sellers Act and School Calendar Act were actionable under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, even though neither Act provided a private cause of action for consumers because a violation of either statute constituted a deceptive trade practice under the ADTPA pursuant to §§ 4-88-503(a), 4-99-111(b), and any person who suffered actual damage as a result of such a practice had a cause of action under the ADTPA, § 4-88-113(f). M.S. Wholesale Plumbing, Inc. v. Univ. Sports Publs. Co., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4159 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008).

Applicability.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer in the employee's action alleging that he was fired for reporting inhumane workplace conditions was appropriate because the appellate court was unable to interpret subdivision (a)(1) of this section as applying to the employer's statements in its annual report about its factory-certification process, even if the employee's factual allegations were accepted as true. The employee simply failed to show a nexus between his reports of problems with the factory-certification process and any public policy of Arkansas; and, even if the employee's allegations did implicate public policy, his admitted violation of the employer's fraternization policy provided independent, sufficient grounds for his termination. Lynn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 102 Ark. App. 65, 280 S.W.3d 574 (2008).

Circuit court properly ruled that the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act was not applicable to appellant's case because appellant failed to assert that appellee engaged in any type of consumer-oriented act or practice that caused damages. Skalla v. Canepari, 2013 Ark. 415, 430 S.W.3d 72 (2013).

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) claim failed because ADTPA did not apply to practice of law in undertaking debt collections. Humes v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Humes), 496 B.R. 557 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2013).

District court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), as plaintiff failed to establish that defendants' acts of conversion and fraud were consumer-oriented or impacted consumers in any way. The ADTPA does not apply to deception and fraud claims regarding business between a manufacturer and its distributor when consumers are not deceived or defrauded. Stonebridge Collection, Inc. v. Carmichael, 791 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2015).

Collection and dissemination of license-plate data prohibited by the Automatic License Plate Reader System Act, § 12-12-1801 et seq., was not consumer-oriented, and thus did not constitute an unconscionable act subject to the Attorney General's enforcement authority under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 4-88-101 et seq.Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2015).

Trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the doctor's Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim because the operator's alleged conduct took advantage of physically infirm customers and was an unconscionable business practice; the doctor alleged actual damages sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss because he was allegedly terminated due to his resistance to take part in the operator's scheme to increase revenue. Hamby v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., 2015 Ark. App. 298, 462 S.W.3d 346 (2015).

In a foreclosure action, in which borrowers asserted a counterclaim under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act based on subdivisions (a)(8)(A) and (a)(10) of this section, there was no showing that the lender co-trustees, who were the parents of one of the borrowers, were in the business, commerce, or trade of making loans; instead, there was testimony that the borrowers would not qualify for a conventional loan and this was simply a case of parents helping their child, and the circuit court found that borrowers were not damaged. Parker v. Parker, 2017 Ark. App. 242, 520 S.W.3d 693 (2017).

Class Action.

Class of consumers alleging a manufacturer falsely advertised light cigarettes as safer than regular cigarettes was properly certified because individual issues did not predominate, as (1) the key inquiry under § 4-88-101 et seq., was the manufacturer's deception, and (2) a bifurcated approach could be used to address individual causation and damages issues. Philip Morris Cos. v. Miner, 2015 Ark. 73, 462 S.W.3d 313 (2015).

When consumers claimed a manufacturer falsely advertised that light cigarettes were safer than regular cigarettes, a trial court sufficiently found a class was ascertainable because (1) the court's class definition referred to objective criteria, (2) the court did not have to separately find ascertainability, and (3) consumers did not have to provide receipts for purchases to show class membership. Philip Morris Cos. v. Miner, 2015 Ark. 73, 462 S.W.3d 313 (2015).

Class action was a superior method of adjudicating the claims of a class of consumers that a manufacturer falsely advertised that light cigarettes were safer than regular cigarettes because (1) the manufacturer would not have to litigate multiple lawsuits, and (2) the overarching issue of the manufacturer's misrepresentation could be conveniently determined. Philip Morris Cos. v. Miner, 2015 Ark. 73, 462 S.W.3d 313 (2015).

Elements of Claim.

Plaintiff's false representation/unfair competition claim under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, arising from the fact that defendant had begun using the same name that it used for its informal hunting club, failed as a matter of law because plaintiff did not offer any evidence showing that it suffered any actual damage or injury as a result of defendant's actions, which pursuant to § 4-88-113(f) was a necessary element of plaintiff's Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim. Ark. Trophy Hunters Ass'n v. Tex. Trophy Hunters Ass'n, 506 F. Supp. 2d 277 (W.D. Ark. 2007).

Consumers sufficiently alleged specific deceptive statements or omissions made by a refrigerator manufacturer, which was necessary to assert actionable claims under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, subdivision (a)(10) of this section and § 4-88-108(2). The consumers alleged: (1) that the manufacturer knew of defects in its refrigerators, which defects were a material fact; (2) the manufacturer failed to disclose that material fact to the public, knowing that its failure to do so would tend to deceive the public and cause them to purchase its refrigerators; (3) the manufacturer failed to disclose the defects with the intent of having the public rely on its omission to purchase its refrigerators; and (4) the consumers suffered an injury because they relied on the manufacturer's omission and would not have purchased its refrigerators if the defects had been disclosed. Rush v. Whirlpool Corp., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17210 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2008).

Claims stated by the contractor in Count I constituted ordinary breach-of-contract claims that did not rise to the level of violating the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, §§ 4-88-101 to 4-88-503, as they were devoid of any factual bases on which the appellate court could conclude that the subcontractor engaged in deceptive business practices. CEI Eng'g Assocs. v. Elder Constr. Co., 2009 Ark. App. 259, 306 S.W.3d 447 (2009).

Subdivision (a)(10) of this section and § 4-88-108(2) did not require knowing or intentional deception, and subdivision (a)(10) listed deception as unlawful, and since omitting an installation requirement from defendant supplier's rebate documents could be a deceptive trade practice, plaintiff retailer's claims under those sections, alleging the retailer lost profits and was forced to issue its own rebates to customers due to the supplier's refusal to honor its rebate program for the retailer's customers, should have survived summary judgment. Curtis Lumber Co. v. La. Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2010).

State-of-mind requirement for claims under subdivisions (a)(1), (3), and (5) of this section mirrored that of fraud, and thus, where plaintiff retailer alleged defendant supplier refused to honor its rebate program for the retailer's customers, but there was no evidence of fraudulent intent, and the fact that the supplier established and followed procedures for processing rebate applications in nearly all other instances showed no fraudulent scheme at work, those claims failed. Curtis Lumber Co. v. La. Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2010).

Appellee alleged that appellant made false representations and that its actions were deceptive and unconscionable under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. As appellee never explained what the false representations were or what acts appellant engaged in that violated the Act, and did not explain how it was damaged by appellant's actions, it failed to allege facts setting forth a cause of action under the Act. Forever Green Ath. Fields, Inc. v. Lasiter Constr., Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 347, 384 S.W.3d 540 (2011).

Circuit court erred in finding that a corporation violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), § 4-88-101 et seq., because there was simply no “consumer-oriented act” as required for a cause of action under the ADTPA; the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the plaintiff competitor was a consumer for purposes of the ADTPA because the corporation and the competitor were opponents in the market of selling counties' public data. Apprentice Info. Sys. v. DataScout, LLC, 2018 Ark. 149, 544 S.W.3d 536 (2018).

Jury Instructions.

Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 405 accurately stated the burden of proof required in a misrepresentation action. McClard v. Crain Mgt. Group, Inc., 313 Ark. 472, 855 S.W.2d 929 (1993).

Misrepresentation.

Appellant claimed the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, but that claim required proof of a misrepresentation; the salesman's statement that the vehicle was in good condition was subject to interpretation by the individual and was more of an opinion than a misrepresentation. Epley v. John Gibson Auto Sales, 2016 Ark. App. 540 (2016).

Scope.

Even the most general catchall provision of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), making it unlawful to engage in any other unconscionable, false, or deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade. By its terms, subdivision (a)(10) of this section requires that the conduct occur in connection with business, commerce, or trade, not in connection with litigation. Thus, an ADTPA counterclaim based on an employment agreement which first surfaced as an exhibit to plaintiffs' response to defendants' motion to dismiss, was dismissed. Illumination Station, Inc. v. Cook, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89247 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 20, 2007).

Plaintiff's claim alleging a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(10) of this section, was actionable because plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the ADTPA's actual damage requirement under § 4-88-113(f); plaintiff was not alleging that it purchased a product with less economic value than represented by defendant, but instead, plaintiff claimed that it paid for a product that was not at all what defendant represented, that is, an advertisement sold on behalf of a university. M.S. Wholesale Plumbing, Inc. v. Univ. Sports Publs. Co., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4159 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008).

In Preston v. Stoops, 373 Ark. 591, 285 S.W.3d 606 (2008), the Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the client's claim against the attorney because it found that the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), § 4-88-101 et seq., did not apply to the practice of law; the basis for this holding was that the Arkansas General Assembly did not have the authority to create a law that would control the practice of law. However, that same protective rationale did not apply to the creditor here; it was a separate entity apart from the firm it hired to collect the debt, and Preston did not shield it from debtor's ADTPA cause of action. Humes v. LVNV Funding, L.L.C. (In re Humes), 468 B.R. 346 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).

Specific prohibitions enumerated in subdivisions (a)(1)-(9) of this section each involve false representation, fraud, or the improper use of economic leverage in a trade transaction; thus, the catch-all provision for “any other unconscionable, false, or deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade” in subdivision (a)(10) must be interpreted to reach similar instances of false representation, fraud, or the improper use of economic leverage in a trade transaction. Universal Coops., Inc. v. AAC Flying Serv., 710 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2013).

Herbicide distributor's complaint alleged that the crop dusters applied the herbicide in contravention of the label instructions, during inappropriate weather conditions, and without maintaining required records (but it did not allege that these actions included conduct in the nature of an improper use of economic leverage in a trade transaction); the alleged conduct simply failed to fit within the scope of the unconscionable trade practices prohibited by the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Universal Coops., Inc. v. AAC Flying Serv., 710 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2013).

Standing.

The Attorney General has standing to enforce the provisions of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 336 Ark. 289, 985 S.W.2d 299 (1999).

Trial court properly dismissed, for failure to state a claim, a class-action fraud and statutory deceptive trade practices lawsuit alleging that a concealed design defect caused a diminution in value of a vehicle; a private cause of action could not be maintained under this section because no actual damage or injury occurred within the meaning of § 4-88-113. Wallis v. Ford Motor Co., 362 Ark. 317, 208 S.W.3d 153 (2005).

Unconscionable Conduct.

Arkansas counties could not pursue a private action under § 4-88-113(f) against companies that produced and marketed cold remedies containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which were ingredients used in manufacturing methamphetamine (meth), because the counties failed to assert actionable claims under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), §§ 4-88-101 to 4-88-503: (1) the counties alleged that the companies engaged in unconscionable behavior under subdivision (a)(10) of this section, by failing to take action to prevent their remedies from being used to manufacture meth, by benefitting from that illegal use of their remedies, and by actively impeding measures to prevent the remedies from being used to manufacturer meth; (2) the ADTPA was limited to trade practices and did not protect consumers or the counties against third party criminal conduct involving the use of the companies' remedies; (3) the counties could not show that the companies caused their financial injury because the companies did not have any special relationship with the counties that rendered them liable for the criminal acts of the meth manufactures; and (4) the counties could not seek relief under the ADTPA because there injury was too remote, as there was no direct link between the companies' remedies and their alleged financial injuries. Independence County v. Pfizer, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Ark. 2008), aff'd, Ashley County v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2009).

Circuit clerk's Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim did not state a claim because Arkansas law did not impose a duty on assignees of real estate mortgages to record those assignments, and the court could not see how failing to record was false or unconscionable when no such duty existed. Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 738 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2013).

Cited: New Equity Sec. Holders Comm. ex rel. Golden Gulf, Ltd. v. Phillips, 97 B.R. 492 (E.D. Ark. 1989).