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Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301 (2026)

Law governing perfection and priority of security interests

✓ current as of May 2026
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Except as otherwise provided in §§ 4-9-303 — 4-9-306, the following rules determine the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral:

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.
  2. While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4) of this section, while tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs:
    1. perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing;
    2. perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut; and
    3. the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral.
  4. The local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in as-extracted collateral.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1439, § 1; 2003, No. 204, § 2; 2007, No. 342, § 31.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 204, § 16, provided:

“Nothing in this act shall alter or diminish the Arkansas Public Service Commission's authority under otherwise applicable law.”

Case Notes

In General.

Former § 4-9-103 applied without regard to the debtor's residence, business address, or where the security agreement attached. Meeks v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. (In re Stinnett), 241 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999), aff'd, No. 00-1011, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14751 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 28, 2000), aff'd, 257 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2001) (decision under prior law).

Construction.

Although several provisions of Arkansas law may appear to conflict, a harmonious reading of the provisions of the Arkansas vehicle titling statutes and the pre-2001 version of the Uniform Commercial Code clearly demonstrates that it is the intention of the statutes to allow the security interest in a vehicle perfected in a state other than Arkansas, by required notation on a certificate of title issued by that state, to remain perfected in Arkansas for a period of four months, and so long thereafter as no certificate of title is issued by Arkansas. Meeks v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. (In re Stinnett), 241 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999), aff'd, No. 00-1011, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14751 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 28, 2000), aff'd, 257 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2001) (decision under prior law).

Purpose.

The purpose of the pre-2001 version of the commercial code is to promote the uniform recognition of security interests which have been noted on the certificate of title, and to provide notice to potential purchasers or creditors that the property is encumbered. Meeks v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. (In re Stinnett), 241 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999), aff'd, No. 00-1011, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14751 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 28, 2000), aff'd, 257 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2001) (decision under prior law).

Effect of Lapsed Filing.

A bank, rather than a judgment creditor, had priority with respect to objects of personal property, notwithstanding that the bank did not file a continuation statement when its security interest expired and that the judgment creditor obtained its judgment after the original filing by the bank, since the judgment creditor was not a purchaser or lien creditor within the meaning of the pre-2001 version of the statute. J-M Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Dewitt, 70 Ark. App. 60, 14 S.W.3d 534 (2000) (decision under prior law).

Foreign Titles.

The security interest that was properly noted on a currently effective foreign title also effective under the pre-2001 version of Arkansas law, was entitled to deference by the laws of the State of Arkansas. Meeks v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. (In re Stinnett), 241 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999), aff'd, No. 00-1011, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14751 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 28, 2000), aff'd, 257 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2001) (decision under prior law).

Purchasers of Farm Products.

Where a purchaser paid consideration and took delivery of a motor home several months before Louisiana and Arkansas issued the certificates of title that failed to show the bank's lien, the purchaser could not be considered a bona fide purchaser because he did not purchase relying on any certificate of title, since to allow him to retain the vehicle would defeat the general policy involved in certificate of title laws, which is that lien holders and third parties should be able to rely upon certificates of title. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. McWilliams, 270 Ark. 826, 606 S.W.2d 363 (1980) (decision under prior law).

An auctioneer is merely a selling agent, not a “purchaser,” and cannot claim the protection given to buyers of farm products in the ordinary course of business; accordingly, auctioneer who sold cattle in which bank had security interest to a buyer in another state was not a purchaser having priority over bank so as to avoid liability for conversion. Commercial Bank v. Hales, 281 Ark. 439, 665 S.W.2d 857 (1984) (decision under prior law).

Vendor's Lien.

Where the chancery court ordered the sale of a truck to satisfy a repairman's lien, but the truck had been subject to a finance company's perfected security interest when brought into the state, the interest acquired by the buyer at the judicial sale was subject to the finance company's vendor's lien, and a replevin action brought by the finance company was not a collateral attack on the chancery court order since the finance company was never made a party to that suit. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Chrestman, 270 Ark. 396, 605 S.W.2d 749 (1980) (decision under prior law).

The fact that the debtor may have avoided higher fees or taxes imposed by the State of Arkansas by registering and titling his vehicles in Oklahoma was of no consequence to the perfection question. Meeks v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. (In re Stinnett), 241 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999), aff'd, No. 00-1011, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14751 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 28, 2000), aff'd, 257 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2001) (decision under prior law).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1990–2001 · leading case: Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 6× “In pertinent part, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301 (l)(c) (Repl. 1991) provides as follows: (l)[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of: (c) .”
Meeks v. First Bank of South Arkansas (In Re Tracy's Flowers & Gifts, Inc.), 264 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001). · cites it 2× “This section of the Bankruptcy Code is referred to as the “strong arm clause,” and one of its purposes is to cut off unperfect-ed security interests. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 544.03 (Lawrence P.”
River Valley Bank of Russellville v. Ace Sports Mgmt., LLC (In Re Ace Sports Mgmt., LLC), 271 B.R. 134 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301 (l)(a)(Michie 1991 & Supp.”
Stotts v. Johnson, 791 S.W.2d 351 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 2× “Support for the Bank’s position is found in §§ 4-9-301 and 4-9-312, which provide that a perfected interest, as held by the Bank, takes priority over an unperfected security interest, held by Stotts.”
J-M Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Dewitt, 14 S.W.3d 534 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301 (3) (Supp. 1999).”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301(1)(c) — 1 case
Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994). “In pertinent part, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301 (l)(c) (Repl. 1991) provides as follows: (l)[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of: (c) .”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301(a) — 1 case
Meeks v. First Bank of South Arkansas (In Re Tracy's Flowers & Gifts, Inc.), 264 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001). “This section of the Bankruptcy Code is referred to as the “strong arm clause,” and one of its purposes is to cut off unperfect-ed security interests. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 544.03 (Lawrence P.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301(l)(c) — 1 case
Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994). “In pertinent part, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-301 (l)(c) (Repl. 1991) provides as follows: (l)[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of: (c) .”
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