A person does not commit an offense unless his or her liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act that he or she is physically capable of performing.
A person does not commit an offense unless he or she acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires a culpable mental state.
However, a culpable mental state is not required if:
The offense is a violation unless a culpable mental state is expressly included in the definition of the offense;
An offense defined by a statute not a part of the Arkansas Criminal Code clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement for the offense or for any element of the offense; or
The offense is defined as a strict liability offense.
“(a)
It is the intent of the General Assembly with this act to address the Supreme Court's holding in Leeka v. State, 2015 Ark. 183 (2015), that the state must prove a culpable mental state in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated.
“(b)
The General Assembly intends for this act to establish that the current offenses of driving while intoxicated and underage driving under the influence, as well as the offenses of driving or boating while intoxicated and driving or boating under the influence while underage that were created by Acts 2015, No. 299, § 6, be strict liability offenses, which are offenses that require no culpable mental state be proven.”
Amendments.
The 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.) amendment added (c)(3).
Meaning of “Arkansas Criminal Code”.
See note to § 5-1-101.
Research References
Ark. L. Rev.
Case Note, Harbison v. State: Just Say No to a Usable Amount, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 425.
Article, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1.
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Notes, Criminal Law — Controlled Substances — Arkansas Adopts the Useable Amount Standard. Harbison v. State, 302 Ark. 315, 790 S.W.2d 146, 4 A.L.R.5th 1025 (1990), 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.
Case Notes
Child Maltreatment Act.
Neglect by inadequate supervision does not require a culpable mental state because it is defined in the Child Maltreatment Act, § 12-18-103, outside of the Arkansas Criminal Code.
W.N. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 346, 552 S.W.3d 483 (2018).
In a Child Maltreatment Act case involving the death of a child who was left in a car seat on a hot day, it was not clear that the administrative law judge (ALJ) incorrectly relied on the criminal-negligence standard; however, the father could not show prejudice because applying the criminal-negligence standard only heightened the standard by which the ALJ could find neglect by inadequate supervision under the Child Maltreatment Act.
W.N. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 346, 552 S.W.3d 483 (2018).
Exceptions to Culpable Mental State Requirement.
Circuit court erred in ruling that the Omnibus DWI Act of 1983 is a strict liability statute that does not require proof of a culpable mens rea. As the DWI statute, codified at § 5-65-103, does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state has to be imputed to the DWI offense through the plain language of § 5-2-203; and the offense is not subject to the statutory exception in subdivision (c)(2) of this section because the offense is included in the Criminal Code.
Leeka v. State, 2015 Ark. 183, 461 S.W.3d 331 (2015) (decision under prior law).
Intent.
Being aware of one's actions does not encompass the mental state required for a crime of specific intent as one may be cognizant of the circumstances and one's actions yet not intend the result of them. Bowen v. State, 268 Ark. 1088, 598 S.W.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1980).
Because of the difficulty in ascertaining a person's intent, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Tarentino v. State, 302 Ark. 55, 786 S.W.2d 584 (1990); Furr v. State, 308 Ark. 41, 822 S.W.2d 380 (1992), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 666 (Dec. 11, 2003).
Mental State.
Candidate for circuit court judge was not disqualified from running due to his conviction for a violation of § 27-14-306, the fictitious motor vehicle tags statute, as misdemeanor “infamous crimes” under Ark. Const. Art. 5, § 9 and § 7-1-101 are misdemeanor offenses in which “the finder of fact was required to find, or the defendant to admit, an act of deceit, fraud, or false statement”, and the appellate court could not say that a violation of § 27-14-306 required a finding or admission of deceit, fraud, or false statement. Weeks v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 64 (2020).
While deceit, fraud, or a false statement certainly can be present in a violation of § 27-14-306, a finder of fact is not required under the statute to find deceit, fraud, or a false statement. Furthermore, only one of the three ways a person can violate § 27-14-306 requires a culpable mental state—knowingly permitting; under this section, a culpable mental state is not required if the offense is a violation and a culpable mental state is not expressly included in the definition of the offense. Weeks v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 64 (2020).
Mental State Irrelevent.
Where mandatory language contained within § 27-53-101 did not explicitly enunciate any particular mental state, but instead stated that a driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in death or injury to any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, this mandatory language was a clear indication that the accident-causing driver's mental state was irrelevant. Stivers v. State, 354 Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003).
Because the failure to register as a sex offender was a strict liability offense under § 12-12-901 et seq. and the state proved that defendant was required to register but failed to do so, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
Adkins v. State, 371 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.3d 523 (2007).
Short v. State, 79 S.W.3d 313 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 10דSection 5-2-204 provides in pertinent part: (b) A person does not commit an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires a culpable mental state.”
Stivers v. State, 118 S.W.3d 558 (Ark. 2003). · cites it 7ד1997) declares that a culpable mental state is not required in two situations: “(1) The offense is a violation, unless a culpable mental state is expressly included in the definition of the offense; or (2) An offense defined by a statute not a part of [the Arkansas Criminal]…”
Leeka v. State, 2015 Ark. 183 (Ark. 2015). · cites it 20ד” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (c)(1) (Repl. 2013).”
Arms. v. State, 2015 Ark. 364 (Ark. 2015). · cites it 8דArk. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (a) (Repl. 2013) (“A person does not commit an offense unless his or her liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act”).”
Phavixay v. State, 282 S.W.3d 795 (Ark. 2008). · cites it 4דSee Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (b) (Repl. 2006) and § 5-64-401(a) (Repl.”
Adkins v. State, 264 S.W.3d 523 (Ark. 2007). · cites it 3דThose exceptions are found in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (Repl. 2006), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (b) A person does not commit an offense unless he or she acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires a culpable…”
Hatley v. State, 5 S.W.3d 86 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2ד1997), a culpable mental state is not required if: “the offense is a violation, unless a culpable mental state is expressly included in the definition of the offense.” An offense is a violation, as opposed to a felony or misdemeanor, “if the statute defining the offense provides…”
Stephanie Cordero v. State of Arkansas, 2019 Ark. App. 484 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019). “2013): (b) Except as provided in §§ 5-2-204(b) and (c), if the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.”
In re Haynes, 426 S.W.3d 411 (Ark. 2013). “2006), “[ejxcept as provided in § 5-2-204(b) and (c), if the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.”
Henson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 450 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2דArk. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (b) (Repl. 1997).”
Anita Rowton v. State of Arkansas, 2020 Ark. App. 174 (Ark. Ct. App. 2020). “The circuit court was required to apply the following culpable mental state in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-203: (b) Except as provided in §§ 5-2-204(b) and (c), if the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable…”
Short v. State, 79 S.W.3d 313 (Ark. 2002). “Section 5-2-204 provides in pertinent part: (b) A person does not commit an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires a culpable mental state.”
Stivers v. State, 118 S.W.3d 558 (Ark. 2003). “1997) declares that a culpable mental state is not required in two situations: “(1) The offense is a violation, unless a culpable mental state is expressly included in the definition of the offense; or (2) An offense defined by a statute not a part of [the Arkansas Criminal]…”
Short v. State, 79 S.W.3d 313 (Ark. 2002). “Section 5-2-204 provides in pertinent part: (b) A person does not commit an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires a culpable mental state.”
Phavixay v. State, 282 S.W.3d 795 (Ark. 2008). “See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (b) (Repl. 2006) and § 5-64-401(a) (Repl.”
Stephanie Cordero v. State of Arkansas, 2019 Ark. App. 484 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019). “2013): (b) Except as provided in §§ 5-2-204(b) and (c), if the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.”
In re Haynes, 426 S.W.3d 411 (Ark. 2013). “2006), “[ejxcept as provided in § 5-2-204(b) and (c), if the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.”
Anita Rowton v. State of Arkansas, 2020 Ark. App. 174 (Ark. Ct. App. 2020). “The circuit court was required to apply the following culpable mental state in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-203: (b) Except as provided in §§ 5-2-204(b) and (c), if the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204(c) — 2 cases
Leeka v. State, 2015 Ark. 183 (Ark. 2015). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (c)(1) (Repl. 2013).”
Stivers v. State, 118 S.W.3d 558 (Ark. 2003). “1997) declares that a culpable mental state is not required in two situations: “(1) The offense is a violation, unless a culpable mental state is expressly included in the definition of the offense; or (2) An offense defined by a statute not a part of [the Arkansas Criminal]…”
Leeka v. State, 2015 Ark. 183 (Ark. 2015). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (c)(1) (Repl. 2013).”
Stivers v. State, 118 S.W.3d 558 (Ark. 2003). “1997) declares that a culpable mental state is not required in two situations: “(1) The offense is a violation, unless a culpable mental state is expressly included in the definition of the offense; or (2) An offense defined by a statute not a part of [the Arkansas Criminal]…”
Adkins v. State, 264 S.W.3d 523 (Ark. 2007). “Those exceptions are found in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (Repl. 2006), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (b) A person does not commit an offense unless he or she acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that requires a culpable…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204(e)(2) — 1 case
Leeka v. State, 2015 Ark. 183 (Ark. 2015). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-204 (c)(1) (Repl. 2013).”
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