Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-313 (2026)
Acquittal based on lack of criminal responsibility report
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On the basis of the report filed under § 5-2-328 and after a hearing, if a hearing is requested, the court may enter judgment of acquittal on the ground of lack of criminal responsibility if the court is satisfied that the following criteria are met:
- The defendant currently has the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or her and to assist effectively in his or her own defense; and
- At the time of the conduct charged, the defendant lacked criminal responsibility.
- If the defendant did not raise the issue of lack of criminal responsibility as an affirmative defense under § 5-2-328, then the court is required to make a factual determination that the defendant committed the offense and that he or she lacked criminal responsibility at the time of the commission of the offense.
History. Acts 1975, No. 280, § 609; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-609; Acts 1989, No. 645, § 2; 1989, No. 911, § 2; 2001, No. 1554, § 4; 2017, No. 472, § 11.
Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 645, § 8, provided:
“It is the express intent of this act to adopt the standards for committing insanity acquittees and the automatic commitment procedures as authorized by Jones v. United States, 463 U. S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1903) and United States v. Wallace, 845 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1988).”
Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “lack of criminal responsibility” for “mental health” in the section heading; substituted “lack of criminal responsibility” for “mental disease or defect” and similar language throughout the section; substituted “§ 5-2-328” for “5-2-305” in (a) and (b); rewrote (a)(2); and made stylistic changes.
Research References
Ark. L. Rev.
Sullivan, Psychiatric Defenses in Arkansas Criminal Trials, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 439.
U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.
Case Notes
Acquittal Denied.
Where testimony was in decided conflict with respect to the defendant's mental capacity, the trial judge properly refused to take the issue from the jury and acquit the defendant on the ground of mental disease or defect pursuant to this section, since the section is intended to permit acquittal only in cases of extreme mental disease or defect where the lack of responsibility on the part of the defendant is clear. Westbrook v. State, 274 Ark. 309, 624 S.W.2d 433 (1981); Burns v. State, 323 Ark. 206, 913 S.W.2d 789 (1996).
Denial of motion for acquittal due to mental incapacity was appropriate where evidence showed the defendant took fairly elaborate steps to hide the crime, pleaded the fifth and requested a lawyer. Franks v. State, 306 Ark. 75, 811 S.W.2d 301 (1991).
Where psychiatric report stated that some of defendant's multiple personalities appeared to understand the wrongfulness of the alleged behavior and thus sought to avoid apprehension, but other alter egos had no memory of the events, it did not present a “clear” determination of lack of mental capacity, and there was no error in failure to acquit. Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1226, 116 S. Ct. 1861, 134 L. Ed. 2d 960 (1996).
Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for acquittal based on lack of capacity because the circuit court was confronted with conflicting forensic evaluations, and the existence of conflicting proof and the consequent questions of fact that arose from the conflicts supported the circuit court's discretionary decision to deny defendant's motion for acquittal. Russell v. State, 2013 Ark. 369 (2013).
Civil Commitment.
When the court terminated all proceedings against a defendant on grounds of mental disease, his status was as if he had never been charged with the crime upon which those proceedings were instituted; therefore, confinement, after acquittal, should have been ordered pursuant to the statute governing civil commitment. Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980).
By entering a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, defendant conceded that he engaged in the conduct charged; because he availed himself of the procedure afforded under § 5-2-313, defendant's due-process rights were not violated. Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Bailey, 368 Ark. 518, 247 S.W.3d 851 (2007).
Effect of Other Law.
Section 5-2-302 does not conflict with this section. Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980).
Evidence.
Medical evidence that a defendant lacks the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law does not obligate a judge to acquit under this section if there is substantial evidence presented that would support the judge's finding that the affirmative defense of mental defect was not proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Fields v. State, 36 Ark. App. 179, 820 S.W.2d 467 (1991).
Where the state hospital's expert witnesses offered opinions concerning defendant's mental status that were far from being clear, and where the state offered other evidence showing defendant did not exhibit any conduct which indicated to his co-workers that he was not able to control his behavior on the day of the shootings, court did not err in refusing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal. Burns v. State, 323 Ark. 206, 913 S.W.2d 789 (1996).
Factual Determination.
It is only when the defendant does not raise the issue of mental defect that the court is required to make a factual determination that the defendant committed the offense and that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time the offense was committed. Cleveland v. Frazier, 338 Ark. 581, 999 S.W.2d 188 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1173, 120 S. Ct. 1201 (2000).
Scope of Discretion.
The decision of whether to direct a verdict of acquittal is discretionary with the trial court under this section; a directed verdict of acquittal is properly denied where there are questions of fact remaining concerning the defendant's affirmative defense of insanity under § 5-2-312. Phillips v. State, 314 Ark. 531, 863 S.W.2d 309 (1993).
Cited: Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 625 S.W.2d 521 (1981); Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. 154, 823 S.W.2d 863 (1992); Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992).