Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Application of Defense of Necessity to Murder, 23 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Derden, Survey of Arkansas Law: Evidence, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 232.

Case Notes

Assault.

A condition precedent to a plea of self-defense is an assault upon the defendant of such a character that it is with murderous intent, or places the defendant in fear of his life, or great bodily harm; a mere assault is not sufficient to justify the plea of self-defense. Girtman v. State, 285 Ark. 13, 684 S.W.2d 806 (1985); Heinze v. State, 309 Ark. 162, 827 S.W.2d 658 (1992).

Avoidance of Danger.

In order to justify the taking of life in self-defense, the party must have employed all means within his power and consistent with his safety to have avoided the danger and averted the necessity. McPherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225 (1874); Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 (1874); Fitzpatrick v. State, 37 Ark. 238 (1881); Dolan v. State, 40 Ark. 454 (1883); McDonald v. State, 104 Ark. 317, 149 S.W. 95 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

One resisting an assault must have employed all the means in his power consistent with his safety to avoid the danger and to avert the necessity of killing; however, where such an assault was so fierce as to make it, apparently, as dangerous for the person assaulted to retreat as it was to stand, it was not his duty to retreat but he could stand his ground and, if necessary to save his own life or to prevent great bodily injury, could slay his assailant. Duncan v. State, 49 Ark. 543, 6 S.W. 164 (1887) (decision under prior law).

A requested instruction that, although the defendant went to a house where he knew the deceased to be and that the deceased would probably attack the defendant, that if, in the encounter the defendant acted in self-defense, he must be acquitted, was properly refused as being opposed to the rule that one must have done everything possible to avoid a killing. Valentine v. State, 108 Ark. 594, 159 S.W. 26 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Preponderance of the evidence supported the district court's finding that defendant's use of deadly physical force under § 5-2-601(2) and (6)(B), which occurred when he pointed a loaded pistol at an undercover officer, was not justified or in self defense, and thus, he was guilty of the felony of aggravated assault under Arkansas law, and the four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5), now (b)(6), was properly imposed because (1) defendant did not act in self-defense within the meaning of § 5-13-204(c)(2) as he used deadly force against men who had obeyed his command to leave his property and who were loitering on the public sidewalk in front of his house as there was no evidence they were imminently endangering defendant's life under subsection (a) of this section; (2) under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, defendant could not use deadly force after he had retreated safely to his house and returned later, unprovoked, to threaten the men; (3) defendant's conduct was not justified as permissible defense of his property within the purview of § 5-2-608 because use of deadly physical force was not authorized by this section, and he had no reason to believe that the men who had quietly obeyed a command to leave his property would come back to commit arson or burglary; and (4) defendant's conduct was not justified to defend his home under § 5-2-620 because the men defendant assaulted were not attempting to enter his home, so the statute did not apply. United States v. Raglin, 500 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2007).

Directed Verdict.

Defendant convicted of murder did not preserve for review the denial of his directed verdict motion; in his motion, defendant failed to identify specifically how the State's proof was insufficient to negate defendant's claim of self-defense—e.g., whether the State failed to show that defendant lacked a reasonable belief that the victims were about to use deadly force; whether the State failed to demonstrate that defendant could not have retreated safely; or whether the State failed to demonstrate that the victims were not committing, or were about to commit, a felony involving force or violence. Kinsey v. State, 2016 Ark. 393, 503 S.W.3d 772 (2016).

Evidence.

Evidence of threats made by a third person against the defendant was incompetent when the same had no bearing upon the question whether or not the deceased was the aggressor. Carter v. State, 108 Ark. 124, 156 S.W. 443 (1913) (decision under prior law); Barker v. State, 21 Ark. App. 56, 728 S.W.2d 204 (1987).

Testimony showing victim had peaceful intentions toward defendant was admissible exception to hearsay rule where accused was claiming self-defense. Hill v. State, 255 Ark. 720, 502 S.W.2d 649 (1973) (decision under prior law).

It was improper to exclude evidence which showed that decedents had inflicted, and threatened, harm to the defendant, since, under § 16-41-101, Rule 404, where a claim of justification is raised, such evidence is relevant to the issue of who was the aggressor and whether the accused reasonably believed he was in danger of suffering unlawful deadly physical force. Smith v. State, 273 Ark. 47, 616 S.W.2d 14 (1981).

Evidence sufficient to find that the killing was justified. Calaway v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 2 Ark. App. 69, 619 S.W.2d 301 (1981).

Evidence sufficient to find that the defendant could not rely upon self defense or justification as defenses. Graham v. State, 2 Ark. App. 266, 621 S.W.2d 4 (1981); Ricketts v. State, 292 Ark. 256, 729 S.W.2d 400 (1987); Heinze v. State, 309 Ark. 162, 827 S.W.2d 658 (1992).

The defendant in a murder prosecution was not entitled to have the jury instructed with regard to self-defense where (1) the defendant punched the victim in the face without provocation or aggressive action by the victim, (2) the victim did not pursue the defendant after that incident, (3) the defendant and his cohorts returned to the victim's truck, at which point the victim pointed a gun at their vehicle, (4) the defendant and his cohorts exited the vehicle and disarmed the victim, (5) the victim tried to punch the defendant, but the swing missed, (5) the defendant then knocked the victim to the ground, straddled him, and began punching him about the head and body, and (6) the defendant's cohorts then began kicking the victim about the head and body. Craig v. State, 70 Ark. App. 71, 14 S.W.3d 893 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to rebut a claim of justification under this section and to convict defendant of attempted-capital murder and first-degree battery as defendant shot at the victim while he was running away, and defendant then drove around the neighborhood, found the victim, and fired more shots that struck the victim. Green v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 700 (2011).

Substantial evidence existed to support a second-degree murder conviction because defendant's justification defense could have been reasonably rejected; the jury could have credited testimony indicating that defendant walked towards the victim holding a gun after being told that the girls present did not want to fight. It was up to the jury to determine if it was reasonable for defendant to believe that she was in danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury. Moody v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 538, 444 S.W.3d 389 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second-degree murder where the State's evidence rebutted defendant's claim of justification; defendant stabbed the victim, threw his knife in a creek, fled the scene, failed to alert law enforcement, and threw away his clothes in a dumpster at a hotel. Moreover, a jailhouse witness testified that defendant had stated that the crime was not committed in self-defense; rather, defendant stated he killed the victim during an attempted theft. Bailey v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 209, 489 S.W.3d 203 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree murder because defendant was not justified in using deadly force against the victim based on a belief that the victim was reaching for a gun; defendant was the first and only person to draw a weapon, and surveillance video showed that defendant was the initial aggressor and failed to retreat. Wade v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 157, 516 S.W.3d 772 (2017).

In a second-degree murder case, there was no abuse of discretion in granting the State's motion to exclude testimony from the medical examiner that the victim had illegal controlled substances in his system at the time of his death because the report's probative value was far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The toxicology report was irrelevant because defendant did not know at the time of the shooting that the victim had ingested drugs; moreover, defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling because he presented proof of the victim's erratic and aggressive behavior. Wade v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 157, 516 S.W.3d 772 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for first-degree murder under the felony murder rule because defendant shot and killed a responding auxiliary sheriff's deputy while defendant was hiding two hours after fleeing from a residential burglary with items taken in the burglary. Furthermore, the jury reasonably found that defendant was not justified in his use of deadly force. Kauffeld v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 440, 528 S.W.3d 302 (2017).

Trial court did not err in allowing pictures defendant took on the victim's cell phone after the victim was dead because the pictures went to defendant's state of mind and were relevant to the State's theory that he committed first-degree murder and did not kill the victim in self-defense. Roberts v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 332, 552 S.W.3d 446 (2018).

Concerning the second-degree murder conviction, there was substantial evidence to refute defendant's claim that she was justified in using deadly physical force because the eyewitness testified that the victim never struck or even touched defendant before she attacked him from behind with a knife as the victim was walking away from her holding his infant daughter; although defendant claimed to have been punched in the face and dragged on the ground by the victim, she had no injuries to substantiate those claims; and the medical examiner testified that the victim died as a result of being forcefully stabbed over the shoulder with a knife from behind and that, in addition to that fatal wound, the victim had been stabbed or cut multiple additional times with the knife. Gillard v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 438, 586 S.W.3d 703 (2019).

Instructions.

Refusal to give requested instruction substantially in the language of former section defining justifiable homicide was not an error where other instructions given sufficiently covered that defense. Hogue v. State, 194 Ark. 1089, 110 S.W.2d 11 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Instruction following the wording of former similar section held proper. Gentry v. State, 201 Ark. 729, 147 S.W.2d 1 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Defendant held entitled to an instruction on justifiable homicide. Jordon v. State, 238 Ark. 398, 382 S.W.2d 185 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to instruct the jury of self-defense held proper. Jackson v. State, 245 Ark. 331, 432 S.W.2d 876 (1968) (decision under prior law).

A permissible addition to a jury instruction on self-defense was where an assailant abandoned an attack which was later renewed voluntarily without justification by the person attacked, then the person renewing the attack could not prevail on a claim of self-defense. Chaney v. State, 256 Ark. 198, 506 S.W.2d 134 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Trial court held not required to include in its instructions to the jury the exceptions found in subdivision (b)(1). Ervin v. State, 262 Ark. 439, 557 S.W.2d 617 (1977).

Court did not err in giving justification instruction based on this section rather than defendant's proffered instruction, based on § 5-2-614, since defendant's instruction was a misapplication of § 5-2-614. Kendrick v. State, 6 Ark. App. 427, 644 S.W.2d 297 (1982).

The trial court did not err in refusing to give one of the defendant's proposed instructions, where the defendant offered a modification of the model instruction based on this section, which modification would have changed the law that a person doesn't have to retreat if in his dwelling, to, if in his dwelling or on his curtilage. David v. State, 286 Ark. 205, 691 S.W.2d 133 (1985).

Where the undisputed proof was that defendant walked away from the victim, went to the waiting car, got his loaded pistol from under the car seat, and then walked back to the place of confrontation and killed the victim, the defendant could have avoided the use of force with complete safety; therefore, he was not entitled to the instruction on justification. Martin v. State, 290 Ark. 293, 718 S.W.2d 938 (1986).

Trial court did not err in declining proffered instruction that “dwelling” included the curtilage, and it did not err in failing to instruct that “dwelling” included porch. AMCI 4105 instruction represents an accurate statement of Arkansas law. Hopes v. State, 294 Ark. 319, 742 S.W.2d 561 (1988).

Where there is evidence of self-defense it is error for the court not to give an appropriate instruction, but the question is one of fact for the jury. Taylor v. State, 28 Ark. App. 146, 771 S.W.2d 318 (1989).

Evidence did not warrant an instruction on the justified use of deadly physical force in self-defense. Walton v. State, 53 Ark. App. 18, 918 S.W.2d 192 (1996).

Jury instruction on justification should have been given where there was conflicting evidence on justification and the State had the burden of showing that it was the defendant's alleged excessive force, rather than his initial response, that resulted in the death of the victim. Humphrey v. State, 332 Ark. 398, 966 S.W.2d 213 (1998).

While § 5-2-606 and this section stated that the defendant was justified in using force or deadly force only if he reasonably believed that the situation necessitated the defensive force employed, both first-degree and second-degree assault were committed if defendant acted recklessly, under §§ 5-13-205 and 5-13-206, and § 5-2-614 provided that justification was not available as a defense to an offense for which recklessness suffices to establish culpability; therefore, defendant was not entitled to self-defense or justification instructions with regard to his charges for first and second-degree assault. Merritt v. State, 82 Ark. App. 351, 107 S.W.3d 894 (2003).

Since defendant was not at his own home and was by all accounts standing outside when he commenced the shooting, and defendant failed to proffer an instruction with a complete statement of the law regarding the use of deadly force only if retreat was not possible, the trial court did not err in declining to give an instruction on self-defense. Ghoston v. State, 84 Ark. App. 387, 141 S.W.3d 907 (2004).

Because second-degree battery has as one of its elements the infliction of serious physical injury, it is a “felony involving force or violence”; thus, in a second-degree murder case, the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction for justification that had both second-degree battery and unlawful deadly physical force alternatives since both were warranted by evidence that defendant was confronted by three men in an attack before he stabbed one of them in the heart with a pocket knife. Hamilton v. State, 97 Ark. App. 172, 245 S.W.3d 710 (2006).

Defendant's challenge to the jury instruction used by the trial court for justification and use of physical force in defense of a person was more lenient than the instruction that defendant requested, which was based upon the use of deadly physical force, pursuant to this section, and defendant did not have a cognizable habeas corpus claim based upon the use of the instruction. Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 2007).

In a case in which the jury was instructed on justification and the use of deadly force in defense of a person under Ark. Model Jury Instruction Crim. § 705 (2d ed.) that reflected the language of this section and defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and was sentenced to prison under the enhancement provision for a total of 540 months, defendant argued unsuccessfully that the circuit court erred by refusing the jury instruction he proffered on self-defense, a non-model jury instruction reflecting the language of § 5-2-620. There was no merit to his argument that mere technical changes to § 5-2-620 and the legislature's reaffirmation of the statute's public policy somehow translated into legislative intent that juries in criminal cases be instructed as to an individual's right to defend himself or herself against a person intruding into his or her home. Hutchinson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 235 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give defendant's proffered justification-defense jury instruction because § 5-2-606 and this section and the model jury instructions demonstrated that only the deadly physical force model jury instruction was appropriate, if any instruction was appropriate. Stalnaker v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 412, 437 S.W.3d 700 (2014).

In a second-degree murder case, a trial court did not err by refusing to give a proffered instruction on justification because the grassy area where defendant confronted the victim and shot her was not properly considered curtilage. Moody v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 538, 444 S.W.3d 389 (2014).

Circuit court did not err in refusing to give defendant's proffered instruction on self-defense where the model jury instruction was a complete statement of the law; the appellate court rejected defendant's argument that the model jury instruction incorrectly allocated the burden of proof on self-defense to the defendant. Kinsey v. State, 2016 Ark. 393, 503 S.W.3d 772 (2016).

Defendant's proffered instruction on self-defense was not a complete instruction of the law because it presumed that justification is an element of the offense when that is a question for the jury. Kinsey v. State, 2016 Ark. 393, 503 S.W.3d 772 (2016).

Necessity.

No one, in resisting an assault made upon him in the course of a sudden quarrel, or upon a sudden reencounter, or in a combat on a sudden quarrel, or which was made from anger suddenly aroused at the time the assault is made, was justified or excused in taking the life of his assailant, unless he was so endangered by such assault as to make it necessary to kill the assailant to save his own life or to prevent a great bodily injury. Duncan v. State, 49 Ark. 543, 6 S.W. 164 (1887) (decision under prior law).

Homicide was justifiable if it appeared necessary to defendant. Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 26 S.W. 712 (1894); Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S.W. 900 (1896) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Where deceased was a law enforcement officer and the jury was instructed that if defendant had no notice of the fact, or reasonable grounds to know that the deceased was an officer and the killing was apparently necessary to save his own life or to prevent his receiving great bodily injury, the killing of the deceased was homicide in self-defense, it was not prejudicial error to refuse a further instruction to the effect if the killing appeared to the defendant to be necessary, he was justified in taking the life of the deceased. Bruce v. State, 68 Ark. 310, 57 S.W. 1103 (1900) (decision under prior law).

An instruction that, if the defendant shot the deceased under compulsion by third parties to save his own life, the jury should acquit, was properly refused, as unlawful compulsion was not a sufficient justification for taking the life of an innocent person. Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S.W. 773 (1904) (decision under prior law).

A killing in self-defense was justifiable only when it was necessary. Thomas v. State, 74 Ark. 431, 86 S.W. 404 (1905) (decision under prior law).

In a prosecution for murder, an instruction on self-defense that “it must appear to the defendant at the time of the difficulty that the danger was so urgent and pressing that in order to save his own life or to prevent his receiving great bodily injury, the killing of the deceased was necessary” was not erroneous as taking away the right of one to stand his own ground in his own home and to resist assaults. Bealmear v. State, 104 Ark. 616, 150 S.W. 129 (1912) (decision under prior law).

It must have appeared to defendant that the killing was necessary to save his own life, or to prevent great bodily harm. Fisher v. State, 109 Ark. 456, 160 S.W. 210 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Preservation for Review.

In an appeal of convictions for second-degree battery and aggravated residential burglary, the appellate court could not address defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to negate self-defense because it was not preserved for appeal. Defendant's directed-verdict motion to the circuit court did not mention self-defense or the elements of self-defense the State failed to negate. Thompson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 391 (2019).

Prior Violent Acts of Victims.

Refusal to admit testimony of specific prior violent acts of the victims which were unknown to the defendant held proper. Halfacre v. State, 277 Ark. 168, 639 S.W.2d 734 (1982).

Exclusion of testimony purporting to prove a violent character trait of the victim by a specific instance of prior violent conduct which was not shown to have been within the knowledge of the defendant held proper; however, trial court properly admitted reputation evidence tending to show victim's trait for violence as probative of the issue of who was the aggressor. Britt v. State, 7 Ark. App. 156, 645 S.W.2d 699 (1983).

In those cases in which the specific acts of violence by the victim were directed at the defendant or were within his knowledge before the crime, they are admissible as being probative of what he reasonably believed and therefore directly relevant to his plea of self-defense; testimony of specific acts not shown to have been within the knowledge of the defendant are not directly probative of defendant's beliefs. Britt v. State, 7 Ark. App. 156, 645 S.W.2d 699 (1983).

The fact of the victim's aggressive character is probative of whether the victim was aggressor at the time of the crime, but the fact of who aggressed is not an element of the defense of justification. Britt v. State, 7 Ark. App. 156, 645 S.W.2d 699 (1983).

In a murder trial where defendant asserted self-defense and was convicted of manslaughter, evidence of specific instances of the victim's past violent conduct was not relevant for the purpose for which it was offered because events of which the defendant was not aware could not have affected his state of mind. Therefore, the exclusion of the evidence was not arbitrary and did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a complete defense. Schnarr v. State, 2017 Ark. 10 (2017).

In a murder trial where defendant asserted self-defense and was convicted of manslaughter, the circuit court did not err in excluding evidence of specific instances of the victim's past violent conduct where defendant had no knowledge of that past conduct and the purpose for which the evidence was offered pertained to defendant's state of mind. Schnarr v. State, 2017 Ark. 10 (2017).

When self-defense is asserted, the evidentiary rules governing the admissibility of specific instances of the victim's past violent conduct are Ark. R. Evid. 404(a)(2) and 405. Schnarr v. State, 2017 Ark. 10 (2017).

In a murder trial where defendant asserted self-defense and was convicted of manslaughter, defendant's contention that evidence of specific instances of the victim's past violent conduct was admissible to corroborate defendant's testimony that the victim was the aggressor was not made below and thus was not reviewable on appeal. Schnarr v. State, 2017 Ark. 10 (2017).

Trial court did not err in limiting defendant's presentation of prior violent altercations between him and the victim, his brother, to those that occurred within five years of the murder because that was when defendant began to interact with the victim after a 35-year absence; defendant was still permitted to introduce multiple recent instances in which the victim had attacked him, and thus imposing the five-year limitation was harmless and did not prejudice defendant. Roberts v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 332, 552 S.W.3d 446 (2018).

Provocation by Defendant.

Where the defendant brought upon himself a difficulty in which he continued until he brought upon himself a necessity to kill, the law would not hold him guiltless, yet a person accused of crime could show in justification that, although he brought the danger upon himself, he changed his conduct and endeavored to escape but could not without striking the mortal blow. Aikin v. State, 58 Ark. 544, 25 S.W. 840 (1894); Wheatley v. State, 93 Ark. 409, 125 S.W. 414 (1910); Ferguson v. State, 95 Ark. 428, 129 S.W. 813 (1910); Price v. State, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Refusal to instruct that, although the defendant went to the room of the deceased for the purpose of bringing on a difficulty, and such difficulty was brought on by the defendant and such fight ensued, still if the deceased engaged in such fight with a chair, the same being a deadly weapon or one calculated to inflict great bodily injury upon the defendant and the defendant after being set upon with a chair, drew his pistol and fired the fatal shot, he should be acquitted held proper. Blair v. State, 69 Ark. 558, 64 S.W. 948 (1901) (decision under prior law).

A plea of self-defense could not be sustained where defendant called to deceased and made no effort to avoid a difficulty. Clingan v. State, 77 Ark. 141, 91 S.W. 12 (1905) (decision under prior law).

One using opprobrious words was not precluded from acting in self-defense, unless he used them to bring on the opportunity to kill. Wheatley v. State, 93 Ark. 409, 125 S.W. 414 (1910); Ferguson v. State, 95 Ark. 428, 129 S.W. 813 (1910) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Where the defendant had entertained a grudge against the deceased and had used language in his hearing to provoke him to anger and cause him to bring on a combat whereby the defendant might have the opportunity of killing him or doing him great bodily harm, the defendant would not be excused or justified in the killing unless he withdrew from the combat as far as he could and did all in his power consistent with his safety to avoid the danger and avert the necessity of the killing. Manasco v. State, 104 Ark. 397, 148 S.W. 1025 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Defendant could not provoke an assault, and then without making any effort to abandon the difficulty, shoot his assailant while his own life was not in danger. Arnott v. State, 109 Ark. 378, 159 S.W. 1105 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant claimed self-defense but the undisputed evidence showed him as an aggressor, there was no prejudice where the court modified the instruction on self-defense by fully explaining to the jury the applicability of such defense. Chaney v. State, 256 Ark. 198, 506 S.W.2d 134 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Although no mention of provocation is found in this section, obviously the provocation restriction on the defense of justification from § 5-2-605 applies equally to the use of “physical force” and “deadly physical force” is defined under § 5-2-601 to include “physical force.” Jones v. State, 1 Ark. App. 318, 615 S.W.2d 388 (1981).

A plea of self-defense is not justified where the evidence showed the defendant armed himself and went to a place in anticipation that the decedent would be there and would attack him; or that the defendant provoked an attack upon himself by the decedent with the intention of killing the decedent. Girtman v. State, 285 Ark. 13, 684 S.W.2d 806 (1985).

Reasonable Belief or State of Mind.

Where defendant acted too hastily and without due care in killing one whom he thought was about to assault him, he was guilty of manslaughter, and not justifiable or excusable homicide. Bruder v. State, 110 Ark. 402, 161 S.W. 1067 (1913) (decision under prior law).

It must have appeared that the circumstances were sufficient to have excited the fears of a reasonably prudent person; a bare fear that deceased would commit the act, to prevent which the homicide was committed, was not sufficient. Plumley v. State, 116 Ark. 17, 171 S.W. 925 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Where the defendant fired the fatal shot under the belief that it was necessary in order to protect himself from great harm, and he fired the shot for that purpose, he should be acquitted, although the jury believed that the accused was mistaken in his conclusion as to the danger to himself. Biddle v. State, 131 Ark. 537, 199 S.W. 913 (1917) (decision under prior law).

One who slew another under the honest belief that his life or limb was in imminent peril and committed the act to prevent the apprehended danger was in the exercise of a lawful act, but unless he acted with due caution and circumspection, he was guilty of manslaughter. Deatherage v. State, 194 Ark. 513, 108 S.W.2d 904 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Instruction regarding fear sufficient to justify killing was not improper nor in conflict with instruction on self-defense. Young v. State, 206 Ark. 19, 176 S.W.2d 151 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Defendant should have been permitted to testify that he had been told that the deceased had previously killed three people, since the testimony was offered to show defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting. Pope v. State, 262 Ark. 476, 557 S.W.2d 887 (1977).

The actor must have a reasonable belief that the situation necessitates the defensive force employed; in addition, the defense is available only to one who acts reasonably in administering such force. Kendrick v. State, 6 Ark. App. 427, 644 S.W.2d 297 (1982).

Who aggressed is only one factor or circumstance tending to shed light on the essential element of the defense, i.e., defendant's beliefs at the time of the crime and the fact of who aggressed does not prove defendant's beliefs directly. Britt v. State, 7 Ark. App. 156, 645 S.W.2d 699 (1983).

The question of justification is a matter of the defendant's intent, and is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Taylor v. State, 28 Ark. App. 146, 771 S.W.2d 318 (1989).

Because a juvenile's father had not resorted to use of a deadly weapon during an argument, because there had been an interlude of approximately five minutes since their last confrontation, because the father, at the time he was struck, had turned away from the juvenile, and because the juvenile did not testify as to whether the juvenile's beliefs were reasonable, the juvenile lacked justification under §§ 5-1-102(18), 5-2-606(a)(1), and subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) of this section, and was properly adjudicated as a delinquent for second-degree domestic battering. D.W. v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 187 (2011).

Requirement to Retreat.

Defendant's argument focused on her belief that she was in danger of great bodily harm, but it disregarded the requirement in this section that she attempt to retreat if she was not at her own residence and could do so safely; it was this requirement that the trial court found defendant was unable to satisfy in her defense of justification, which was not error. Graves v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 293 (2019).

Self-Defense.

Deadly physical force is justified as self-defense only if the use of such force cannot be avoided as by retreating. Girtman v. State, 285 Ark. 13, 684 S.W.2d 806 (1985).

Where the defendant was walking away when the victim aimed a pistol at his back, the victim admitted she would have shot him, and a bystander warned the defendant that he was about to be shot when the defendant turned around and shot the victim, the defendant could not have retreated with complete safety and was assaulted in a manner sufficient to cause a realistic fear for his life; therefore, justification was an available defense. Martin v. State, 290 Ark. 293, 718 S.W.2d 938 (1986).

One who claims self-defense must show not only that the person killed was the aggressor, but that the accused used all reasonable means within his power and consistent with his safety to avoid the killing. Ricketts v. State, 292 Ark. 256, 729 S.W.2d 400 (1987).

Neither § 5-1-111(d) nor subsection (a) of this section defines justification or self-defense as an affirmative defense. Patterson v. State, 306 Ark. 385, 815 S.W.2d 377 (1991).

Regardless of the trial court's mistake in describing justification or self-defense as an affirmative defense, there was no reversible error because no objection was made to the instruction. Patterson v. State, 306 Ark. 385, 815 S.W.2d 377 (1991).

Where defendant fired four to five shots at the victim from his car, the victim was in his car at the time and did not do anything threatening or pose any immediate harm to defendant and defendant presented little evidence to support his claim that the shooting was in self-defense, his claim was self-defense was properly rejected. Walker v. State, 91 Ark. App. 300, 210 S.W.3d 157 (2005).

When defendant shot and killed the victim outside his aunt's home, she testified that the victim took a few steps backward, and defendant raised his shirt, brandished a weapon, and fired upon the victim; she did not see a gun in the victim's hand, and her son also testified that defendant was the first to draw a weapon. In defendant's criminal prosecution for murder, the trial court made a credibility determination, found that defendant was the initial aggressor in the deadly altercation, and rejected his self-defense claim under subdivision (a)(2) of this section; the Court of Appeals of Arkansas found substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision. Dishman v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 715 (2009).

Substantial evidence negated defendant's claim of self-defense under subdivision (a)(2) of this section in his trial for first degree battery, under § 5-13-201, because there was no evidence that the victim was armed when defendant shot him and, although defendant testified that the victim attacked him earlier in the day, there was no evidence of an injury to defendant and defendant testified that he was not afraid of the victim; although defendant testified at trial that he was afraid that the victim was going to attack him at the time that he shot him, defendant never made a similar claim in his statement to the police after the incident. Metcalf v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 55 (2011).

During petitioner's capital murder trial, counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to present the affirmative defense of self-defense; evidence showed that petitioner initiated the encounter on the day of the shooting by traveling to his former wife's home while carrying a firearm. Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 297, 193 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2015).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give a justification of deadly force jury instruction as defendant offered an incorrect version of the law. Gould v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 543, 444 S.W.3d 408 (2014).

Defendant argued that because there were only two witnesses to the actual shooting, and one was not credible and another's testimony was that the victim was the aggressor, the State failed to disprove the justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt, but this argument was rejected; because there was evidence from which the jury could have found defendant not to be justified in his use of deadly force in this instance, the court affirmed on this point. Lewis v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 730, 451 S.W.3d 591 (2014).

Petitioner was not entitled to a writ of error coram nobis on the ground that the prosecutor withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady because the presentation of the witness's account of events would not have changed the outcome of the trial by establishing that petitioner fired in self-defense; petitioner admitted that he did not see a gun in the victim's possession and that he could have retreated. Stenhouse v. State, 2016 Ark. 295, 497 S.W.3d 679 (2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 837, 197 L. Ed. 2d 75 (2017).

In a first-degree murder trial, there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict that the State disproved defendant's justification defense; there was no other weapon found in the car with the victim, who was shot in the head from behind, defendant immediately fled the scene, defendant admitted it was his immediate reaction to shoot in response to the victim's grabbing him, and justification was a question of fact for the jury to resolve. Jimmerson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 578, 590 S.W.3d 764 (2019).

Withdrawal of Aggressor.

One who killed his adversary while the latter was manifestly seeking to retire from the combat was guilty of murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances; but, where one was defending himself from an unlawful attack, it was not incumbent upon him to suspend his defense because assailant was withdrawing himself from the immediate locality of the attempt if such withdrawal was apparently for the purpose of securing a position from which to renew the combat with effect. Luckenbill v. State, 52 Ark. 45, 11 S.W. 963 (1889); Weaver v. State, 83 Ark. 119, 102 S.W. 713 (1907); McDonald v. State, 104 Ark. 317, 149 S.W. 95 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Even if the jury believed that the victim was the original aggressor, it was not established, as a matter of law, that the use of deadly physical force by the defendant was justified even though, as an occupant of the house, he was not required to retreat; and even if the victim was the original aggressor, if he had, in good faith, withdrawn from the encounter, and the danger to the defendant was no longer immediate, urgent and pressing, the defendant was not justified in pursuing him to continue the fight or to use deadly physical force on him. Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 583 S.W.2d 32 (1979).

Cited: Hampton v. State, 6 Ark. App. 245, 639 S.W.2d 754 (1982); Smith v. State, 30 Ark. App. 111, 783 S.W.2d 72 (1990); Sharp v. State, 90 Ark. App. 81, 204 S.W.3d 68 (2005); Stocker v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 624 (2012).