Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-304 (2026)
Domestic battering in the second degree
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A person commits domestic battering in the second degree if:
- With the purpose of causing physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes serious physical injury to a family or household member;
- With the purpose of causing physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes physical injury to a family or household member by means of a deadly weapon;
- The person recklessly causes serious physical injury to a family or household member by means of a deadly weapon; or
- The person knowingly causes physical injury to a family or household member he or she knows to be sixty (60) years of age or older or twelve (12) years of age or younger.
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- Domestic battering in the second degree is a Class C felony.
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However, domestic battering in the second degree is a Class B felony if:
- Committed against a woman the person knew or should have known was pregnant;
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The person committed one (1) or more of the following offenses within five (5) years of the offense of domestic battering in the second degree:
- Domestic battering in the first degree, § 5-26-303;
- Domestic battering in the second degree;
- Domestic battering in the third degree, § 5-26-305; or
- A violation of an equivalent penal law of this state or of another state or foreign jurisdiction; or
- The person committed two (2) or more offenses of battery against a family or household member as defined by a law of this state or by an equivalent law of any other state or foreign jurisdiction within ten (10) years of the offense of domestic battering in the second degree.
History. Acts 1979, No. 396, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-1654; Acts 1995, No. 1291, § 2; 1999, No. 1365, § 2; 2001, No. 1553, § 9; 2003, No. 944, § 2; 2003, No. 1079, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 481; 2009, No. 194, § 2; 2013, No. 417, § 2.
A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 5-26-302. Former § 5-26-304 has been renumbered as § 5-26-306.
Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (a)(4) and made related changes.
The 2013 amendment rewrote the introductory language of (b)(2)(B); added “A violation of” at the beginning of (b)(2)(B)(iv); and rewrote (b)(2)(C).
Case Notes
Evidence.
Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for second degree domestic battery, and third degree domestic battery where a “family or household member” who could be a victim of these offenses included someone with whom defendant had cohabitated in the past, it was proved that defendant and the victim had previously cohabitated, and it was irrelevant that the victim was married to someone else at the time of the crimes. Brock v. State, 90 Ark. App. 164, 204 S.W.3d 562 (2005).
Defendant's conviction for second-degree domestic battery by stabbing a family or household member, in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section, was upheld where there was substantial evidence that the victim was a household member, as defined in § 5-26-302(2)(F); defendant stated that defendant recognized the knife with which the victim was stabbed because defendant “lived there” and “used it, cooked with it, every day.” Delamar v. State, 101 Ark. App. 313, 276 S.W.3d 746 (2008).
When defendant's infant son was taken to the emergency room, the treating physician found that his broken femur was indicative of child abuse; the infant had fourteen broken rib bones in various stages of healing. Defendant admitted that he would sometimes get mad and squeeze his son; defendant was convicted of three counts of battery in the second degree in violation of this section and one count of battery in the first degree under § 5-13-201(a)(7). Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 573 (2009).
Defendant's conviction for domestic battering under subdivision (a)(2) of this section was supported by sufficient evidence because the state showed that, with the purpose of causing physical injury, defendant caused injury to the victim, his brother, by means of a deadly weapon. While defendant contended that he was acting in self-defense when he struck the victim with a sickle, the testimony of the victim and the victim's brother established that the victim did not have the gun that he had when police arrived until after defendant had battered both the victim and the victim's brother. Brown v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 150, 381 S.W.3d 175 (2011).
Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probation for two counts of possession of a controlled substance because the evidence was sufficient to show that he committed domestic battering, in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section; an officer testified that the victim's ear “was basically cut in half” and that the officer “could see the ligaments inside.” Mahomes v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 215, 427 S.W.3d 123 (2013).
There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for domestic battery in the second degree under this section; although defendant contended that he was not in Arkansas on the night of the assault, his alibi was not found to be credible. There was enough streetlight and external apartment lighting for the victim to visually identify defendant as the assailant, and she also recognized defendant's voice. Harris v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 23, 480 S.W.3d 229 (2016).
Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict where the jury was free to believe the victim's testimony that defendant was a household member living with her, knew that she was 65 years old, and struck her with a gun and seashell, thereby committing domestic battering in the second degree under this section. Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 384, 499 S.W.3d 254 (2016).
Evidence supported the second-degree domestic battering conviction where neighbors heard sounds of loud banging and yelling, and defendant beat the child with a leather belt repeatedly for at least five minutes, causing welts and lashings. Jefferson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 492, 532 S.W.3d 75 (2017).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second-degree domestic battery because the victim testified that defendant said he was going to kill them both before intentionally yanking the steering wheel to the right and driving the car off the road; the victim's testimony was bolstered by the eyewitnesses' accounts that immediately after the couple changed seats in the car, the car sped off and darted abruptly off the road; the officers observed no indications that defendant had attempted to brake or avoid the accident; and the jury heard testimony about the victim's previous conviction for filing a false credit-card application and was free to consider it when determining how much weight to give the victim's account of the accident. Vines v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 496, 562 S.W.3d 246 (2018).
Even though the victim testified at trial that she initiated the fight with defendant, who was her husband, the evidence showed that she did not initially report her aggressive conduct to the officer, she was nervous and scared when she reported the incident, defendant apologized to her for his actions, and she suffered serious injuries to her face; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree domestic battery. Allen v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 603, 567 S.W.3d 93 (2018).
Sentence.
Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant after revoking his probation because defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree domestic battery, under this section, and third-degree domestic battery, under § 5-26-305, and his sentences of ten and six years, respectively, were sentences that could have been originally imposed for the offenses of which he was found guilty. Jones v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 69, 388 S.W.3d 503 (2012).
Cited: Green v. State, 79 Ark. App. 297, 87 S.W.3d 814 (2002).