Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

What Is “Intent to Deprive” Sufficient to Establish Liability for Civil, or Statutory, Theft, 35 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Criminal Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 153.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 139.

Survey — Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 559.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, Theft of Debit Card, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 363.

Case Notes

Note. Many of the cases cited below were decided prior to the consolidation of offenses by § 5-36-102.

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutionally vague since the general class of offenses (theft by deception or false pretenses) is within the terms of the statute which promotes a long standing state interest in prohibiting deceptive schemes and confidence games. Hixson v. Housewright, 642 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1981).

In General.

Asportation and caption are not requisites of wrongful appropriation. Lee v. State, 264 Ark. 384, 571 S.W.2d 603 (1978).

Construction.

The term “exercises unauthorized control” in subdivision (a)(1) is directed at the bailee who lawfully takes control of the property, but subsequently appropriates it to his own use, but the term must be read in conjunction with the clause “purpose of depriving the owner thereof,” since a deviation from the terms of bailment is theft only if done with the requisite purpose to deprive the bailor. Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979).

Applicability.

The amendment of subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, which changed the dollar amount from $200 to $500, and which occurred after defendant committed his offense but before trial, did not apply to defendant; the governing statute was the one in effect at the time defendant committed the crime. Cody v. State, 326 Ark. 85, 929 S.W.2d 159 (1996).

Where the debtor was aware of the bank's security interest at the time he undertook to sell the bank's collateral, debtor's actions constituted both the tort of conversion and the state law statutory offenses of theft and defrauding secured creditors, and therefore he acted with malice in harming the bank's property when he misappropriated the sale proceeds in which he had no legal or equitable interest. Mercantile Bank of Ark.,N.A. v. Speers, 244 B.R. 142 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000).

Accomplices.

For cases discussing accessories or accomplices, see Lester v. State, 32 Ark. 727 (1878); Friend v. State, 109 Ark. 498, 160 S.W. 384 (1913); Monk v. State, 130 Ark. 358, 197 S.W. 580 (1917); Davidson v. State, 132 Ark. 116, 200 S.W. 137 (1917); Webb v. State, 206 Ark. 640, 176 S.W.2d 915 (1944); Mortensen v. State, 214 Ark. 528, 217 S.W.2d 325 (Ark. 1949) (preceding decisions under prior law) Franklin v. State, 311 Ark. 601, 845 S.W.2d 525 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to support a guilty finding on the theft of a firearm charge given the juvenile's possession of the hoverboard that was stolen at the same time, and he was riding the hoverboard alongside another juvenile who was carrying the stolen firearms. B.T. v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 471, 588 S.W.3d 387 (2019).

Appropriations.

Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 30 provides that appropriation acts can do nothing but appropriate funds for one specific subject; but that does not mean that someone cannot be charged with theft by deception for improperly taking money from an account created by an appropriation. Clark v. State, 308 Ark. 84, 308 Ark. 453, 824 S.W.2d 345 (1992).

Prosecuting a constitutional officer for theft by deception for violating an appropriation act does not violate due process of law because there is no criminal penalty in an appropriation act. Clark v. State, 308 Ark. 84, 308 Ark. 453, 824 S.W.2d 345 (1992).

Assistance of Counsel.

Defendant's constitutional right to counsel held violated when court refused request for continuance to obtain counsel. Murdock v. State, 291 Ark. 8, 722 S.W.2d 268 (Ark. 1987).

Attempted Theft.

For attempted theft by deception, the only issues are the defendant's state of mind and his belief as to what the facts are, not whether an item taken has actual value or whether the defendant actually deceived the victim. Wilson v. State, 56 Ark. App. 47, 939 S.W.2d 313 (1997).

Burden of Proof.

The burden was on the prosecution to prove the falsity of the representations in a prosecution for the offense of obtaining property by false pretense. Anderson v. State, 226 Ark. 498, 290 S.W.2d 846 (1956) (decision under prior law).

Charge.

Factual question not resolved whether probable cause to charge defendant with false swearing or theft by deception. First Commercial Bank v. Kremer, 292 Ark. 82, 728 S.W.2d 172 (1987).

Conspiracy.

Defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit kidnapping, aggravated robbery, theft of property, and aggravated residential burglary because he took another person to his residence and showed the person the inside of the premises, discussed how to break in the residence and how to subdue his wife, and identified the property to be taken from the residence. Winkler v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 704, 425 S.W.3d 808 (2012).

Conversion by Bailee.

Former section concerning conversion of property embraced all bailees, and was not confined to bailees of the generic class. Wallis v. State, 54 Ark. 611, 16 S.W. 821 (1891) (preceding decisions under prior law); Compton v. State, 102 Ark. 213, 143 S.W. 897 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Defendant held not to violate former section concerning conversion of property by a bailee where he obtained check from government due him under contract and failed to pay subcontractors and laborers out of this check but departed thenceforth even though he had promised to pay subcontractors and laborers when he received the check. Lewis v. State, 220 Ark. 259, 247 S.W.2d 195 (1952) (decision under prior law).

Use of employer's truck by employee to go to and from work constituted a bailment; and use by employee of employer's truck on a personal errand instead of going home as he was authorized to do constituted larceny so as to enable employer to recover under theft policy for loss of truck in collision with tree while driven by employee. Sullivant v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 223 Ark. 721, 268 S.W.2d 372 (1954) (decision under prior law).

The crux of former section concerning conversion of property by a bailee was not intent to convert the property to the use of the bailee but to use the property contrary to the agreement. Thrifty Rent-A-Car v. Jeffrey, 257 Ark. 904, 520 S.W.2d 304 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Deception.

State presented substantial evidence that defendant knowingly deceived a wholesale and retail distributor of petroleum products in an effort to get fuel for a convenience store and gas station owned by defendant's wife; there was substantial evidence that defendant deceived the distributor by falsely representing himself as owner of the store and property used as collateral, and the representations were made to induce the distributor to continue supplying fuel. Iqbal v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 221, 382 S.W.3d 755 (2011), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. LEXIS 394 (Ark. Apr. 21, 2011).

Substantial evidence supported appellant's theft of property convictions under subdivision (a)(2) of this section where the evidence allowed the jury to infer that he accepted boat deposits from victims, he was well aware of the lack of manpower at his boat manufacturing business and the increasing number of complaints against it, and he had taken on new business without regard for unfilled orders and had used the deposits to keep the business afloat. Flemister v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 180, 487 S.W.3d 386 (2016).

—In General.

Evidence held sufficient to show fraudulent scheme. Webb v. State, 206 Ark. 640, 176 S.W.2d 915 (1944) (decision under prior law).

Deliberate and consistent giving of checks with insufficient funds to pay them held to amount to knowingly making misrepresentations of material facts and was characterized as fraud instead of mismanagement. Hi-Pro Fish Prods., Inc. v. McClure, 346 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1965); Cox-Hilstrom v. State, 58 Ark. App. 109, 948 S.W.2d 409 (1997).

—Evidence.

Misrepresentations relating solely to the future did not constitute an offense. Kerby v. State, 233 Ark. 8, 342 S.W.2d 412 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to establish a misrepresentation of fact. Dean v. State, 258 Ark. 32, 522 S.W.2d 421 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction for theft by deception. Cates v. State, 267 Ark. 726, 589 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1979); Wiley v. State, 268 Ark. 552, 594 S.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1980).

Evidence held sufficient to support finding that defendant obtained the property by deception. Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 3, 603 S.W.2d 393 (1980).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction of theft by deception. Hixson v. Housewright, 642 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 43, 639 S.W.2d 45 (1982); Wilson v. State, 56 Ark. App. 47, 939 S.W.2d 313 (1997).

—False Pretenses.

False pretense could not relate to something to happen in the future. Conner v. State, 137 Ark. 123, 206 S.W. 747 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction of obtaining money or property by false pretenses or representations. Long v. State, 160 Ark. 607, 255 S.W. 300 (1923); Norris v. State, 170 Ark. 484, 280 S.W. 398 (1926); Hadley v. State, 196 Ark. 307, 117 S.W.2d 352 (1938); Mortensen v. State, 214 Ark. 528, 217 S.W.2d 325 (Ark. 1949); Kerby v. State, 233 Ark. 8, 342 S.W.2d 412 (1961) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The offense of obtaining property by false pretenses was complete when a thing of value had been obtained knowingly and designedly from another by false pretenses with an intent to defraud such person of such property and it was unnecessary to charge or prove an actual pecuniary loss or damage. Fisher v. State, 161 Ark. 586, 256 S.W. 858 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction for obtaining medical services by false pretenses. McLain v. State, 181 Ark. 730, 27 S.W.2d 518 (1930) (decision under prior law).

Actions held to constitute obtaining money under false pretense. Lamb v. State, 202 Ark. 931, 155 S.W.2d 49 (1941) (decision under prior law).

One of the essential elements of the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses was that the representation had to be false. Anderson v. State, 226 Ark. 498, 290 S.W.2d 846 (1956) (decision under prior law).

The false pretense which constituted an offense was a false representation of an existing fact or past event by one who knew that it was not true and of such nature as to induce the party to whom made to part with something of value. Karr v. State, 227 Ark. 777, 301 S.W.2d 442 (1957) (decision under prior law).

Defendants who falsely represented themselves to be qualified termite exterminators and who collected more than the approximate worth of the work done, were properly convicted of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses. Daley v. State, 236 Ark. 89, 364 S.W.2d 678 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Where the only false representation proved was that the victim would, in the future, have an exclusive distributorship for a certain area, no submissible issue was presented to the jury as to false representation of a past or existing fact. Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977) (decision under prior law).

—Identification.

Although codefendant gave varying statements about defendant's participation and the victim was unable to identify the defendant, the identification evidence held sufficient in view of the scientific evidence and the testimony of the codefendant. Wilson v. State, 332 Ark. 7, 962 S.W.2d 805 (1998).

—Sufficiency.

Evidence of theft held sufficient where defendant admitted that he took twenty-five dollars from the victim's purse, a witness identified the gun found in defendant's sister's apartment as belonging to the victim, and another witness saw the victim's gun in the defendant's pocket on the day of the offense. Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998).

Victim's eyewitness identification testimony and the officers' identification testimony based on the surveillance tape and a still photograph was sufficient to sustain convictions of aggravated robbery and theft of property; moreover, the victim's testimony that she was fearful and believed defendant was armed, based on his pointing his jacket at her and insinuating that he had a gun, supported the weapon requirement under § 5-12-103. Edwards v. State, 360 Ark. 413, 201 S.W.3d 909 (2005).

Dismissal Not Warranted.

Where charges against defendant for alleging defrauding insurers were dismissed, this did not mandate a later dismissal of subsequently filed charges alleging Medicaid fraud under res judicata, issue preclusion, or § 5-1-113 because the crimes were not the same. Dilday v. State, 369 Ark. 1, 250 S.W.3d 217 (2007).

Due Process.

District court's grant of writ of habeas corpus was on the ground that the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to inform the jury of his prior acquittal on possession charges rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 964, 113 S. Ct. 1394 (1993).

Particular actions held to be embezzlement. Palmer v. State, 109 Ark. 411, 160 S.W. 204 (1913); Miller v. State, 155 Ark. 13, 243 S.W. 958 (1922) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Evidence need sufficient to sustain a conviction of embezzlement. Bratton v. State, 213 Ark. 537, 211 S.W.2d 428 (1948); Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 996, 363 S.W.2d 923 (1963); Pharr v. State, 246 Ark. 424, 438 S.W.2d 461 (1969) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Elements.

State had to prove that appellant took or exercised unauthorized control over another's property with the purpose of depriving him of that property, which was a debit card. Blakely v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 37 (2013).

Probation was properly revoked because a trial court's finding that probationer stole and pawned a window-unit air conditioner, violating the terms of the probationer's suspended sentence, was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the probationer admitted to stealing the air conditioner from the window of a homeowner who hired the probationer to mow the homeowner's yard. Collins v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 600, 474 S.W.3d 531 (2015).

Embezzlement.

Particular actions held not to be embezzlement. Johnson v. State, 102 Ark. 139, 143 S.W. 593 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Evidence.

Defendant's conviction for theft of property from a former employer, in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, was not supported by the evidence because the factfinder had to speculate to choose whether defendant stole a crane and winches or whether the equipment was sold outside a cashier's presence and the cashier did not see customers outside the store; the state presented no evidence, documentary or oral, of merchandise actually missing from the store's inventory. King v. State, 100 Ark. App. 208, 266 S.W.3d 205 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, residential burglary, and felony theft of property because an accomplice testified that he and defendant had a purpose of committing theft when they went to the victim's apartment, defendant used physical force upon the victim, defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, and a witness testified that she observed defendant carry out a television and load it into the car. Navarro v. State, 371 Ark. 179, 264 S.W.3d 530 (2007).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and theft were proper because defendant employed physical force upon the victim, admitted to stabbing the victim, and was armed with a deadly weapon. Further, the fact that defendant pawned the victim's tools and tried to sell other stolen items established a purpose to commit theft. Young v. State, 371 Ark. 393, 266 S.W.3d 744 (2007).

The state was not entitled to a rehearing of a decision overturning defendant's conviction for theft under subdivision (a)(1) of this section because the evidence was insufficient as it left the fact-finder to speculation and conjecture; the state proved only that a co-worker saw defendant moving a store's hardware out the front door. Defendant's job at the store, however, was to move hardware; without more, the co-worker's testimony did not prove that defendant was guilty of exercising unauthorized control over any store item with the purpose of permanently depriving the store of it. King v. State, 100 Ark. App. 211, 266 S.W.3d 205 (2007).

Substantial evidence indicated that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon for the purpose of committing theft, and defendant was part of a plan to take the victim's money; there did not have to be an actual transfer of property to take place for the offense of aggravated robbery to be complete, and defendant and another clearly followed through with the plan, whether or not they verbally acknowledged their agreement at the time the plan was conceived. Moore v. State, 372 Ark. 579, 279 S.W.3d 69 (2008).

In defendant's attempted capital murder case, the state presented substantial evidence of defendant's intent to commit theft because there was the victim's testimony, in which she stated that defendant told her that he was going to rob her, there was the fact that two twenty-dollar bills and some quarters were missing from the store after the attack, and there was also defendant's own videotaped statement in which he admitted to taking money from the cash register. Goodwin v. State, 373 Ark. 53, 281 S.W.3d 258 (2008).

Where the victim testified that he discovered that two jars of coins were missing from his house after a visit from defendant and his cohort, an employee of a grocery store saw defendant's cohort cash in the coins and then throw away a jar; the theft victim identified the jar as his. In the second case, the victim testified that a five-gallon water jug filled with coins was stolen from his house shortly after he had spoken with defendant and his cohort at a club; based on the circumstantial evidence, along with defendant's admission that he had stolen coins from the second victim before, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for two counts of theft under subsection (a) of this section. Mathis v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 181, 314 S.W.3d 280 (2009).

When a trailer was removed from the owner's property without her permission, defendant stated that he purchased the trailer from a third party and it was parked on his property. The evidence was sufficient to show that defendant possessed the trailer with the intent to deprive the owner of the property in violation of this section; defendant was properly convicted of the theft of property with a value between $500 and $2500 in violation of this section. Gray v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 572 (2009).

Where the state's witness testified that she and defendant drove to the victim's RV in order to rob the victim, defendant entered the residence, grabbed the victim's wallet, handed it to the witness, and then she heard a pop sound; a second witness testified that he had seen defendant with a handgun that day, and defendant told him that he had shot the victim in the head. After the victim was found dead, defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder in violation of § 5-10-102(a)(1) with theft as the underlying felony under this section; defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for theft was denied. Lockhart v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 587 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for residential burglary and theft of property where defendant pawned a gun and a pendant that were stolen from the victims' home and, according to a witness, defendant admitted that he participated in the burglary and theft. Stigger v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 596 (2009).

Under this section, the state failed to produce substantial evidence as to the value of the stolen property; however, the state produced substantial evidence to support a finding that defendant acted with the requisite intent to commit the offense of theft of property, a class A misdemeanor. Gines v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 628 (2009).

Appellants' convictions for theft of property were affirmed because substantial evidence supported the convictions where (1) while appellants maintained they were simply running a business and made some poor business decisions, the testimony of the victims established a pattern of taking and exercising unauthorized control over the victims' money with the purpose of depriving the victims of their money; (2) the pattern demonstrated that appellants sold items to the victims, accepted the victims' money, purposefully and knowingly delayed delivery of the merchandise, and offered multiple and most often untrue excuses for why the orders did not arrive; and (3) the evidence showed that appellants would tell customers that an item was in shipping, was shipped in the wrong color, back ordered, or damaged in shipping. Williams v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 848 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for misdemeanor theft of property in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section because he beat and kicked the victim, took his cell phone and wallet, asked for additional money, threatened to shoot him, and ran away; the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant either took the items in question or participated in taking them and that afterward he fled from the scene of the crime, and it was of no consequence whether defendant was the principal or an accomplice. Sims v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 133 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for breaking or entering and theft of property in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section were proper because there was substantial evidence showing that defendant, for the purpose of committing a theft or felony, broke into the victim's vehicle. Substantial evidence also existed to support the finding that defendant knowingly took and exercised unauthorized control over the victim's tow-truck keys with the purpose of depriving the victim of them. Washington v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 339, 374 S.W.3d 822 (2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 379 (June 24, 2010).

Bank customer properly charged with theft where while the customer did not bear any criminal intent when she deposited the check and withdrew the funds, she later realized that it was probably a fake and decidedly refused to repay the original owner, the bank, when the check was discovered to indeed be counterfeit. Brooks v. First State Bank, N.A., 2010 Ark. App. 342, 374 S.W.3d 846 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 518 (June 2, 2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 622 (Ark. Dec. 9, 2010).

Defendant admitted to taking credit cards without permission and unlawfully entering a home without permission, and that defendant drove a car and wrecked it; thus, the state offered sufficient proof that defendant committed theft of property under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Cody v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 542 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for breaking or entering, in violation of § 5-39-202(1), and theft of property, in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, were supported by the evidence because defendant's unlawful presence near a storage shed, flight from the victim, and association with persons involved in the crimes suggested that defendant jointly participated in the crimes under § 5-2-402(a)(2). Goforth v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 735 (2010).

Evidence that one of the victims of a home-invasion robbery gave defendant her cell phone after seeing him pull one of the other victims out from under a bed by her hair was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of theft of property. Morris v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 12 (2011).

Evidence that defendant took money from a store while openly brandishing a firearm was sufficient to support his conviction for theft of property. Lambert v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 258 (2011).

Evidence that defendant violated her employer's policy by rummaging in a stockroom where the purses she stole were kept was properly admitted under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) to demonstrate her plan, motive, opportunity, and intent, as her prior conduct was relevant to show that she knew where the purses were, how to get to them, and which ones she wanted. Howard v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 573, 386 S.W.3d 106 (2011), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 716 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. LEXIS 626 (Ark. Dec. 1, 2011).

Evidence that defendant coveted a certain brand of designer purse her employer sold; that she and a fellow employee were videotaped rummaging through a stockroom that contained such purses; that defendant bought a purse from her employer that was placed in an oversized shopping bag; that the bag proved to contained not only the purse that she had purchased, but three designer purses as well, was sufficient to establish under § 5-36-101 that she knew there were purses in the shopping bag that she had not paid for. Howard v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 573, 386 S.W.3d 106 (2011), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 716 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. LEXIS 626 (Ark. Dec. 1, 2011).

Defendant's conviction for theft of property under subdivision (a)(1) of this section was appropriate because the state's proof that the items he stole had a value in excess of $500 was adequate, § 5-36-101(12)(A)(i). The items were mostly purchased less than a year before the burglary, the purchase price so greatly exceeded the $500 statutory value threshold, and thus, the victim's testimony constitutes substantial evidence of value. Vault v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 283 (2012).

Where defendant was convicted for residential burglary and theft under §§ 5-39-201(a)(1) and subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict because the record showed that the victims returned from work to discover that their home had been burglarized; the back door of the residence had been kicked in and $3,000 worth of property was missing. As defendant's palm print was found on the entertainment table, the jury was not required to resort to speculation or conjecture in reaching its verdicts. Hicks v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 667 (2012).

Court agreed with the State's argument that the evidence presented by the victim that appellant put him in a headlock, demanded money, and took his credit card supported the verdict. Blakely v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 37 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's adjudication for theft because a witness saw the incident, identified the vehicle and the license-plate number, and provided a physical description of both the driver and the individual who pumped the gas. An officer testified that he took the witness's complaint and encountered defendant at the residence listed on the vehicle registration; defendant matched the physical description given by the witness of the individual who pumped the gas. K.A.S. v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 236 (2013).

Evidence was insufficient to compel a conclusion one way or another without speculation or conjecture, and thus the court reversed defendant juvenile's delinquency adjudication for the offense of accomplice to theft of property. F.C. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 196 (2014).

Evidence supported the jury's conclusion that defendant employed a scheme to defraud, for purposes of this section, where patients testified that defendant had represented herself as a doctor, despite having no medical training or credentials from any United States institution, she charged patients for tests but did not show them the actual results, and she affirmatively and falsely represented that patient expenses would be reimbursed by insurance or Medicare. Gervais v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 161, 544 S.W.3d 590 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's theft of property conviction because the circuit court was not required to believe the self-serving evidence from defendant that he never possessed the undelivered boat since he was the person most interested in the outcome of the proceeding. Hamrick v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 298, 577 S.W.3d 734 (2019).

—In General.

A conviction for theft can be sustained upon evidence that property is missing, that the defendant had the opportunity to take it, and no one else had that opportunity. Green v. State, 269 Ark. 953, 601 S.W.2d 273 (Ct. App. 1980).

Admission of seized drugs in prosecution of burglary and theft was not barred by collateral estoppel because defendant's prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate fact in defendant's prosecution. Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 964, 113 S. Ct. 1394 (1993).

—Admissibility.

When the accused had opportunity to steal several pieces of jewelry, evidence was admissible that she had possession of some of the jewelry to show that she stole a particular ring which was one of the pieces taken. Lynch v. State, 95 Ark. 168, 128 S.W. 1053 (1910) (decision under prior law).

Evidence as to misrepresentations relating solely to the future were admissible where relevant in assisting the jury in understanding all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Davis v. State, 241 Ark. 646, 411 S.W.2d 531 (1967) (decision under prior law).

Testimony held admissible to show defendant's fraudulent scheme. Dean v. State, 258 Ark. 32, 522 S.W.2d 421 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Where the microfilm copies of bank records were adequately identified by the bank's officer as being copies of records kept in the normal course of business, they were competent evidence in a prosecution on two felony counts of theft of property and on one misdemeanor count of drawing and uttering an insufficient fund check with intent to defraud. Reed v. State, 267 Ark. 1017, 593 S.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1980).

Items which were seized pursuant to a search warrant and then identified by victim as those things which were in his automobile when it was stolen were relevant and admissible in prosecution for robbery and theft where there was testimony connecting defendant with items and vehicles. Phillips v. State, 271 Ark. 96, 607 S.W.2d 664 (1980).

Price tags of stolen clothes are hearsay and are not admissible. Williams v. State, 29 Ark. App. 61, 781 S.W.2d 37 (1989), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Ark. LEXIS 66 (Ark. Feb. 12, 1990).

The evidence of defendant's prior shoplifting conviction was relevant and admissible under Evid. Rule 404(b) to show a unique method of operation as well as the defendant's intent, preparation, plan, and absence of mistake or accident in committing the theft. Christian v. State, 54 Ark. App. 191, 925 S.W.2d 428 (1996).

Although the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of financial identity fraud and theft of property, because the search of defendant's purse, which contained the evidence necessary for those convictions, by the first victim came at the sheriff's request, the first victim was an agent of the police and the warrantless search of defendant's purse violated the Fourth Amendment. Whisenant v. State, 85 Ark. App. 111, 146 S.W.3d 359 (2004).

—Obtain by Threat.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of committing theft of automobile by threat where the victim's testimony established that defendant took unauthorized control of her automobile by threatening to cause physical injury to her by hitting her in the face and displacing her from the driver's seat, he continued to exercise unauthorized control by not allowing the victim to drive and refusing to let her out, and after the victim escaped, defendant continued to drive the automobile until he was pursued by the police, abandoned the vehicle, and fled on foot. Brown v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 480, 531 S.W.3d 417 (2017).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's directed-verdict motion as substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft of property because the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant threatened the victim when he pointed the shotgun at him; and this section does not require that the threat be verbalized or that the victim have any particular mental state. Fletcher v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 113, 543 S.W.3d 547 (2018).

—Sufficiency.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Jefferson v. State, 89 Ark. 129, 115 S.W. 1140 (1909); Duty v. State, 212 Ark. 890, 208 S.W.2d 162 (1948); Lindsey v. State, 229 Ark. 450, 316 S.W.2d 349 (1958); French v. State, 231 Ark. 677, 331 S.W.2d 863 (1960); Williams v. State, 251 Ark. 878, 475 S.W.2d 530 (1972); Cox v. State, 254 Ark. 1, 491 S.W.2d 802, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 923, 94 S. Ct. 230, 38 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1973); Higginbotham v. State, 260 Ark. 433, 541 S.W.2d 303 (1976) (preceding decisions under prior law); Hill v. State, 261 Ark. 711, 551 S.W.2d 200 (1977); Walker v. State, 262 Ark. 331, 556 S.W.2d 655 (1977); Lunon v. State, 264 Ark. 188, 569 S.W.2d 663 (1978); Lee v. State, 264 Ark. 384, 571 S.W.2d 603 (1978); Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979); Jeffers v. State, 268 Ark. 329, 595 S.W.2d 687 (1980); Reed v. State, 267 Ark. 1017, 593 S.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1980); Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 3, 603 S.W.2d 393 (1980); Boykin v. State, 270 Ark. 284, 603 S.W.2d 911 (1980); Williams v. State, 270 Ark. 513, 606 S.W.2d 75 (1980); Phillips v. State, 271 Ark. 96, 607 S.W.2d 664 (1980); Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 43, 639 S.W.2d 45 (1982); Beard v. State, 277 Ark. 35, 639 S.W.2d 52 (1982); Elkins v. State, 7 Ark. App. 166, 646 S.W.2d 15 (1983); O'Riordan v. State, 281 Ark. 424, 665 S.W.2d 255 (1984); Davis v. State, 284 Ark. 557, 683 S.W.2d 926 (1985); Williams v. State, 295 Ark. 18, 746 S.W.2d 44 (1988); Smith v. State, 300 Ark. 330, 778 S.W.2d 947 (1989); Muhammed v. State, 27 Ark. App. 188, 769 S.W.2d 33 (1989), cert. denied, Muhammed v. Arkansas, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S. Ct. 142 (1989); Williams v. State, 29 Ark. App. 61, 781 S.W.2d 37 (1989), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Ark. LEXIS 66 (Ark. Feb. 12, 1990); Traylor v. State, 304 Ark. 174, 801 S.W.2d 267 (1990); Sullivan v. State, 32 Ark. App. 124, 798 S.W.2d 110 (1990); Brown v. State, 309 Ark. 503, 832 S.W.2d 477 (1992); Franklin v. State, 311 Ark. 601, 845 S.W.2d 525 (1993); Long v. State, 294 Ark. 362, 742 S.W.2d 942 (1988); Robinson v. State, 317 Ark. 17, 875 S.W.2d 837 (1994); C.H. v. State, 51 Ark. App. 153, 912 S.W.2d 942 (1995); Turner v. State, 64 Ark. App. 216, 984 S.W.2d 52 (1998); Donovan v. State, 71 Ark. App. 226, 32 S.W.3d 1 (2000).

Trial judge could infer that defendant was exercising unauthorized control over the property with the intention of taking it out of the store. Jarrett v. State, 265 Ark. 662, 580 S.W.2d 460 (1979); Wilson v. State, 301 Ark. 342, 783 S.W.2d 852 (1990).

Evidence held sufficient to establish that defendant made use of the funds received for purposes other than for what was promised, consequently, the victims were deprived of the use and benefit of their property. Hixson v. State, 266 Ark. 778, 587 S.W.2d 70 (1979), cert. denied, Hixson v. Arkansas, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1030, 62 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1980).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction for theft by taking unauthorized control over the property of another person. Wiley v. State, 268 Ark. 552, 594 S.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1980).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. Green v. State, 269 Ark. 953, 601 S.W.2d 273 (Ct. App. 1980); Rolax v. State, 270 Ark. 197, 603 S.W.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1980); Hughes v. State, 3 Ark. App. 275, 625 S.W.2d 547 (1981); Pridgett v. State, 276 Ark. 52, 631 S.W.2d 833 (1982).

Evidence held sufficient to find that the defendant knowingly exercised unauthorized control over another person's property. Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 3, 603 S.W.2d 393 (1980).

Sufficient evidence to support a charge of theft may exist even though the object stolen cannot be produced at trial. Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 43, 639 S.W.2d 45 (1982).

Fingerprints can constitute evidence which is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Howard v. State, 286 Ark. 479, 695 S.W.2d 375 (1985).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Hardcastle v. State, 25 Ark. App. 157, 755 S.W.2d 228 (1988); Doby v. State, 28 Ark. App. 23, 770 S.W.2d 666 (1989).

Insufficient evidence of burglary and theft of property was presented to corroborate the testimony of an admitted accomplice. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993); Stipes v. State, 315 Ark. 719, 870 S.W.2d 388 (1994).

The testimony of witnesses, and the fact that defendant's truck was identified as the truck carrying the same brand and size of the tires that were stolen, was sufficient to support the convictions for burglary and theft of property. Winters v. State, 41 Ark. App. 104, 848 S.W.2d 441 (1993).

Victim's pretrial and in-court identifications of the defendant were unequivocal and clearly constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude without having to speculate that defendant was the perpetrator. Stipes v. State, 315 Ark. 719, 870 S.W.2d 388 (1994).

A single fingerprint of the defendant's on a mirror found in the stolen car, along with the proximity of the car to defendant's residence and the fact that defendant's relatives lived near the lot where the car was stolen, constituted sufficient evidence of guilt. Ashe v. State, 57 Ark. App. 99, 942 S.W.2d 267.

Where several employees noticed defendant entering a rented hotel room without authorization, defendant confessed to stealing two guns, and police were able to recover one of the guns in the location offered by defendant in a confession, there was substantial evidence presented to support a theft conviction. Gamble v. State, 351 Ark. 541, 95 S.W.3d 755 (2003).

Witness who testified that she was a manager-level employee, that she handled the store when the manager was absent, and that as such she was familiar with the store's merchandise pricing, had independent actual knowledge of the value of stolen articles. Polk v. State, 82 Ark. App. 210, 105 S.W.3d 797 (2003).

In an armed robbery and theft prosecution, testimony of the driver of the getaway car that directly linked defendant to the robbery, the corroborating testimony of a store employee that defendant took money from, and that of an officer that defendant fled from after the getaway car crashed, was sufficient to convict defendant under § 16-89-111. Parker v. State, 355 Ark. 639, 144 S.W.3d 270 (2004).

Circumstances surrounding defendant's actions demonstrated his intent or purpose to deprive the owners of their property where defendant, working as a salesman, specifically defied the owner's instruction to return the truck and unsold cases of meat and then defendant deliberately chose to leave the truck in a motel parking lot without any word to the owners as to the whereabouts of the property; further, when defendant failed to return the truck, along with the cases of meat that defendant had not yet paid for, his use and control over the property was unauthorized. Watson v. State, 358 Ark. 212, 188 S.W.3d 921 (2004).

Defendant's conviction was not rendered infirm merely because fingerprint evidence was the only evidence presented against defendant; the fact-finder did not resort to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict as defendant's fingerprints were not found on an easily moveable object, but rather, were located at the apparent location of entry to the car, the location of the crime, on the interior of the car's window. Phillips v. State, 88 Ark. App. 17, 194 S.W.3d 222 (2004), aff'd, 361 Ark. 1, 203 S.W.3d 630 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for breaking or entering and theft of property were affirmed where defendant's fingerprints were found inside the passenger door along the top edge of the window of the car that was broken into. Phillips v. State, 88 Ark. App. 17, 194 S.W.3d 222 (2004), aff'd, 361 Ark. 1, 203 S.W.3d 630 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of breaking or entering and theft of property where (1) a prosecution witness testified that she saw defendants break into an apartment and take a table; (2) a police officer observed that the security door had been pried open and the wooden door was kicked in; and (3) a defense witness testified that they took the table for their own use, that none of them owned it, and that there was an owner, but no one knew where the owner was. Bush v. State, 90 Ark. App. 373, 206 S.W.3d 268 (2005).

Jurisdiction in Arkansas was proper for defendant's theft trial because sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to show that defendant took unauthorized control of a vehicle in West Memphis. King v. State, 361 Ark. 402, 206 S.W.3d 883 (2005), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 368 (June 15, 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for theft of property and to corroborate the accomplice's testimony where witnesses testified as to the role defendant played in the robbery and described his clothing and weapon, which were collected at the scene; further, defendant's jacket had blood stains on it and a hole corresponding to the location of a gunshot wound he received, and defendant was found hiding inside a dumpster near the site where his car became stuck in the mud. Flowers v. State, 92 Ark. App. 29, 210 S.W.3d 907 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of theft by deception where defendant stole tens of thousands of dollars from his mother's elderly neighbor; defendant added the victim to his savings account, deposited tens of thousands of dollars of her savings bonds and checks into it, withdrew money from this account and transferred it into his other accounts, and used the funds for his own personal expenditures. McEntire v. State, 363 Ark. 473, 215 S.W.3d 658 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's forgery and theft convictions where she did not offer a reasonable explanation of how she acquired the forged check; therefore, an inference that she committed the forgery or was an accessory to its commission was warranted and the court did not err in inferring defendant's intent. DeShazer v. State, 94 Ark. App. 363, 230 S.W.3d 285 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder and theft where, in addition to the testimony of defendant's wife, who was an accomplice, defendant's own statements to the police, his conduct before and after the crime, and statements of the victim's friends regarding her fear of defendant tended to connect him to the crimes; further, although there was no evidence that defendant ever drove victim's Cadillac or had the vehicle in his possession, the jury might have determined that defendant facilitated the theft by leaving the accomplice without a vehicle at the victim's house, and there was evidence that the theft of the Cadillac was part of the plan to murder the victim. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to prove the theft element of aggravated robbery; evidence showed that defendant used physical force to at least temporarily deprive victim of her car, which was sufficient proof. Winston v. State, 368 Ark. 105, 243 S.W.3d 304 (2006).

In a case in which defendant was convicted on theft of property, in violation of this section, and he argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to show that the value of the property exceeded $2,500 or more, he had not preserved that issue for appeal. His Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(b) motion for dismissal and renewal of that motion made no mention whatsoever of the value of the stolen property. Walker v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 63 (2010).

In a case in which defendant was convicted on theft of property, in violation of this section, even if he had preserved his claim that the evidence was insufficient to show that the value of the property was $2,500 or more, his conviction would be affirmed. The victim's testimony that he purchased the big-screen television for $1800 only four months prior to it being stolen was a factor that the court, as fact-finder, was permitted to consider, and the victim also testified that other items were stolen, including thousands of dollars in jewelry. Walker v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 63 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property valued in excess of $500 but less than $2,500, pursuant to subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, because a store owner based her calculation of the amount stolen on business records, under Ark. R. Evid. 803(6). Further, a police detective's testimony that over $670 was found on the persons of defendant and his accomplice following the theft, and that an additional $503, which defendant had hidden, was found the following day, was more than enough to prove that defendant stole over $500. Scott v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 114 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of aggravated robbery and theft of property because, while the store's employees identified another person in the first photographic spread, they both identified him in a second spread and in court, the jury had before it witness testimony, a videotape, and photographs showing that defendant brought a backpack into the store, left it there, he possessed and used a gun, and his DNA was on a mouthwash bottle found in the backpack. Turner v. State, 2014 Ark. 415, 443 S.W.3d 535 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of eight counts of theft for stealing horses, a horse trailer, and tack from a university and to deny her motion for directed verdict because several witnesses testified that defendant planned the thefts, gave a map of the stables to her boyfriend and his friend, provided the use of her truck for the thefts, assisted her boyfriend and his friend in hiding the trailer at her aunt and uncle's home, directed her boyfriend to kill one horse and hide the remaining four horses, and secured a place for her boyfriend and his friend to hide at her daughter's house. Cox v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 321 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft as an accomplice because defendant asked the complainant to give the back-seat passenger a ride; the back-seat passenger took the complainant's wallet and the $3700 it contained while defendant struggled with the complainant to take her cell phone; it was up to the circuit court to decide whether defendant and the back-seat passenger acted in concert to divert the complainant's attention and steal her money; defendant's account of events differed so significantly from the testimony of other witnesses that the trial court, as the trier of fact, could readily discount her entire testimony; and her attempt to flee from the crime scene was relevant to the issue of guilt. Cosey v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 441, 439 S.W.3d 731 (2014).

Defendant juvenile attempted to aid her boyfriend by shielding his actions and then looking around, she knew he was going to steal, and her actions aided the commission of the theft; the court affirmed defendant's delinquency adjudication for being an accomplice to theft of property based on the sufficient evidence. H.V. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 607, 447 S.W.3d 619 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's theft of property conviction, as she was the only employee who made bank deposits and who reported deposits in transit used to conceal the theft, plus there was no other explanation for how she was able to afford certain things on her income or for the significant cash deposits made to her accounts, which stopped after she was terminated; although the evidence was mostly circumstantial, it was more than sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, as she had access to the cash, she concealed the missing money during audits, and she benefitted from the crime. Henson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 703, 450 S.W.3d 677 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft by deception because defendant entered into a scheme to defraud by inflating a tax refund amount and then diverting the difference to an account she owned; there was substantial evidence that defendant knowingly obtained the property of another by deception. The taxpayer did not agree to have any of her refund deposited into any other account, and defendant was not forthcoming with information about the separate account, despite the taxpayer's multiple inquiries. McClellan v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 725, 452 S.W.3d 116 (2014).

Fact-finder could reasonably conclude, without resorting to speculation or conjecture, that defendant exercised unauthorized control over oil pipes and committed the offense of theft of property in violation of this section. Jackson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 164 (2015).

Evidence clearly pointed to defendant's unauthorized possession of the victim's property; defendant sold the recently stolen property in a pawn shop, and the unexplained, unsatisfactory, or improbable explanation for possession of recently stolen property may be considered as evidence of guilt of theft of property. Brickey v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 175 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient for aggravated robbery, first-degree battery, and theft of property under $1,000 convictions since defendant's arguments all presented questions of fact and involved the credibility and weight of the evidence, which were matters for the jury to decide; the jury heard all of the evidence, and defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses to point out the very weaknesses that defendant complained of on appeal. As to Facebook conversations, the appellate court was able to consider both properly and improperly admitted evidence on a sufficiency of the evidence review. Means v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 643, 476 S.W.3d 168 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and theft of property because the State introduced crucial evidence through a witness that defendant confessed to committing the robbery and to using a .40-caliber pistol to do so; in addition to that direct evidence, the State introduced ample circumstantial evidence that tied defendant to the crime. Chatmon v. State, 2015 Ark. 28, 467 S.W.3d 731 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient in relation to a carjacking to convict defendant of aggravated robbery and theft, and to enhance the sentence due to the use of a firearm during the robbery, because the victim testified that defendant approached the victim as she was about to get in her car and told her to move out of the way; when she did not immediately move away, defendant lifted his shirt, displaying the handle of a gun protruding from his pants; the victim thought defendant was going to pull out the gun, so she stepped back, and he entered her car and drove it away; the victim picked out defendant almost immediately from a photographic lineup; and the victim's unequivocal testimony identified defendant as the culprit. Davis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 274, 493 S.W.3d 339 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's robbery conviction where an undercover security guard testified that defendant placed a bottle of laundry detergent inside her flat purse, the purse bulged, defendant did not pay for the detergent before walking out of the store, she shoved the guard when he confronted her in the parking lot, and she fled the scene abruptly when confronted by loss-prevention officers. Horton v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 481, 530 S.W.3d 880 (2017).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict where a detective's testimony and cell-phone location data placed defendant's phone in the vicinity of the equipment company at the time of the theft, video surveillance showed that a white SUV was used in the theft of the lawn mower and that defendant owned a similar vehicle, and defendant had subsequently attempted to sell the mower. Mosley v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 487, 529 S.W.3d 657 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of misdemeanor theft of property as defendant admitted taking a stereo system, a chess set, and a CD cleaner kit; and there was no minimum value requirement for misdemeanor theft of property. Jeffries v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 62, 510 S.W.3d 267 (2017).

Defendant's theft-of-property conviction was affirmed where the victim's testimony that her home had been broken into, jewelry was missing, and she was emotionally affected as a result made clear that defendant and his accomplices were not authorized to take or exercise control over the victim's property. Hubbard v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 93, 513 S.W.3d 289 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for theft of property, where the witness testimony established that the agricultural pivot was in the possession, control, and use of a farm when the copper wires were stolen. Savage v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 261 (2017).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's directed verdict motions, as evidence that defendant was seen leaving the victim's residence and was found 30 minutes later in possession of recently stolen property taken from the residence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for residential burglary and theft of property. Owens v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 353 (2017).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for residential burglary and theft of property because the victim testified that defendant, whom the victim had never seen before, was walking down the driveway away from the victim's house when the victim returned after a short errand and that the victim discovered items were taken from the house. Defendant also gave a police detective an inconsistent explanation as to why defendant was in the victim's neighborhood and attempted to flee when officers arrived at the house where defendant was located (no-merit brief). Sanford v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 10, 567 S.W.3d 553 (2019).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motions for directed verdict on two theft counts and five other counts even though all the evidence was circumstantial; given the entirety of the circumstantial evidence, the jury could conclude without resorting to speculation or conjecture that defendant committed the offenses. Defendant had bypassed a locked gate to enter the victim's property and fled when confronted by the police, his explanation as to why he was on the property was improbable, and he had a backpack and ratchet in his hand that looked like the victim's property. Cobb v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 434, 585 S.W.3d 196 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support a guilty finding on the theft-of-property charge given the juvenile's admission that he possessed the hoverboard (although he claimed he only borrowed it). B.T. v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 471, 588 S.W.3d 387 (2019).

—Threat of Serious Physical Injury.

Directed verdict was properly denied as to the charge of Class B felony theft of property because substantial evidence supported that defendant brought about a transfer of a laptop by threat of serious physical injury when he pointed a firearm at the laptop owner's roommate and then grabbed the laptop. Hinton v. State, 2015 Ark. 479, 477 S.W.3d 517 (2015).

Indictment or Information.

—In General.

No allegation of value was necessary in an indictment for stealing of animals. Sanders v. State, 55 Ark. 365, 18 S.W. 376 (1892); Thompson v. State, 60 Ark. 59, 28 S.W. 794 (1894); Houston v. State, 66 Ark. 607, 53 S.W. 44 (1899); Leach v. State, 67 Ark. 314, 55 S.W. 15 (1900) (preceding decisions under prior law).

For cases discussing the sufficiency of the wording of an indictment or information, see State v. Boyce, 65 Ark. 82, 44 S.W. 1043 (1898); Marshall v. State, 71 Ark. 415, 75 S.W. 584 (1903); Bennett v. State, 73 Ark. 386, 84 S.W. 483 (1904); Cook v. State, 80 Ark. 495, 97 S.W. 683 (1906); Storms v. State, 81 Ark. 25, 98 S.W. 678 (1906); State v. Scoggin, 85 Ark. 43, 106 S.W. 969 (1907); State v. Perry, 94 Ark. 215, 126 S.W. 717 (1910); Osborne v. State, 96 Ark. 400, 132 S.W. 210 (1910); Wells v. State, 102 Ark. 627, 145 S.W. 531 (1912); McCool v. State, 149 Ark. 653, 233 S.W. 769 (1921); State v. Bond, 151 Ark. 203, 235 S.W. 801 (1921); Holden v. State, 156 Ark. 521, 247 S.W. 768 (1923); Gurley v. State, 164 Ark. 397, 262 S.W. 636 (1924); Smallen v. State, 168 Ark. 1128, 272 S.W. 858 (1925); Gurley v. State, 179 Ark. 1149, 20 S.W.2d 886 (1929); Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407, 36 S.W.2d 400 (1931); Reid v. State, 194 Ark. 422, 108 S.W.2d 464 (1937); Matz v. State, 196 Ark. 97, 116 S.W.2d 604 (1938); Baker v. State, 200 Ark. 688, 140 S.W.2d 1008 (1940); Davis v. State, 241 Ark. 646, 411 S.W.2d 531 (1967); Owen v. State, 263 Ark. 493, 565 S.W.2d 607 (1978) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The indictment had to allege ownership of money embezzled. Silvie v. State, 117 Ark. 108, 173 S.W. 857 (1915) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Value of property held inferentially alleged. Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Ownership of the property taken could be alleged in the information or subsequent bill of particulars either in the real owner or in the person in whose possession the property was at the time taken. Powell v. State, 251 Ark. 46, 471 S.W.2d 333 (1971), cert. denied, Powell v. Arkansas, 406 U.S. 917, 92 S. Ct. 1763 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Since the value of property went to the essence of the charge in the absence of allegations of value in the information, there was a duty to properly advise the defendant as to whether he was charged with the misdemeanor or a felony before requiring him to plead to the charge. Scoggins v. State, 258 Ark. 749, 528 S.W.2d 641 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Allegation of ownership in the indictment by one from whom money was obtained by false pretenses is sufficient and proof that it was actually owned by someone else is not a fatal variance. Hoover v. State, 262 Ark. 856, 562 S.W.2d 55 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Amending the charge to theft by deception changed neither the nature nor the degree of the crime charged, since both prior to and after the amendment, the defendant was charged with the theft of property having a value sufficient to charge a Class B felony; the only variation between the initial charge and the charge as amended was the alleged manner of the commission of the theft; however, the amendment was of great enough significance that the conduct of defendant's defense was prejudiced by lack of fair notice. Prokos v. State, 266 Ark. 50, 582 S.W.2d 36 (1979).

Where information alleged that defendant took unauthorized control of property of corporation by forging checks on company funds in bank, proof of ownership of property properly supported the allegation of the information so that defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal, since the provisions of § 5-36-102 allow a charge of theft to be proved notwithstanding specification of a different manner in the information or indictment. Martin v. State, 272 Ark. 376, 614 S.W.2d 512 (1981).

Information held to have given defendant sufficient notice of the charges that he faced. Drew v. State, 8 Ark. App. 120, 648 S.W.2d 836 (1983).

—Variance.

The allegation of false personation in an indictment was descriptive of the offense, and had to be proved as alleged; and proof that two were acting in concert, and one personated the assumed party with the assent of the other, did not sustain the charge of false personation against the latter. Kirtley v. State, 38 Ark. 543 (1882) (decision under prior law).

Proof that defendant stole a mare sustained an allegation that he stole a horse. State v. Gooch, 60 Ark. 218, 29 S.W. 640 (1895) (decision under prior law).

Where an indictment for grand larceny alleged generally that the accused stole a certain quantity of goods, and alleged specifically the quantities of the stolen goods belonging to various persons, the general allegations as to the quantity was controlled by the special allegations. Reeder v. State, 86 Ark. 341, 111 S.W. 272 (1908) (decision under prior law).

It was not a variance from the allegations of an indictment alleging the stealing of property from a partnership to prove the names of the partners other than as alleged nor was the failure to prove the names at all as alleged a fatal variance. Ivey v. State, 109 Ark. 446, 160 S.W. 208 (1913) (decision under prior law).

An allegation that defendant stole “one cow (bull)” was sustained by proof that he stole a bull. State v. Haller, 119 Ark. 503, 177 S.W. 1138 (1915) (decision under prior law).

Proof of the stealing of paper and silver money supported a conviction under an indictment charging the stealing of gold, silver and paper money. Cook v. State, 130 Ark. 90, 196 S.W. 922 (1917) (decision under prior law).

Upon an information for burglary and grand larceny, one could not be convicted for receiving stolen property. Pickens v. State, 236 Ark. 404, 366 S.W.2d 283 (1963) (decision under prior law).

In prosecution for obtaining money by false pretenses neither the failure to name the true owner of the money involved in the information, nor the absence of the owner from the trial was a denial of defendant's constitutional right of confrontation of the witnesses or a variance from the allegations of the information. Hoover v. State, 262 Ark. 856, 562 S.W.2d 55 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Although defendant who made false representations to obtain money did not receive the money personally, this fact does not constitute a fatal variance where the money was obtained solely for defendant's benefit to carry out a contract made by him and on which he personally assumed all obligations. Hoover v. State, 262 Ark. 856, 562 S.W.2d 55 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Trial court did not err when it allowed the state to go forward with an accomplice theory even though the information failed to allege such where the information in fact named the offense and the party to be charged, it contained the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and it apprised appellant of what he had to be prepared to meet. Polk v. State, 82 Ark. App. 210, 105 S.W.3d 797 (2003).

Instructions.

An instruction which told the jury that if they found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did intentionally convert moneys to his own use, then it was an unlawful and felonious conversion of said funds was not objectionable as an expression of opinion upon the facts. Gurley v. State, 164 Ark. 397, 262 S.W. 636 (1924) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to instruct that the state failed to establish ownership and defendant should be acquitted held proper. Threadgill v. State, 207 Ark. 478, 181 S.W.2d 236 (1944) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to instruct that if defendant had not intended to steal car, but had intended only to steal a part therefrom, he would only have been guilty of a misdemeanor held proper. Hall v. State, 242 Ark. 201, 412 S.W.2d 603 (1967) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to instruct the jury on petit larceny held error. Pierce v. State, 248 Ark. 204, 451 S.W.2d 219 (1970) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to give a requested instruction that the misrepresentation could not relate to future actions even if it were accompanied by a present intention not to perform held to be error. Dean v. State, 258 Ark. 32, 522 S.W.2d 421 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to submit the issue of petit larceny to the jury held not error and requested instruction on petit larceny held properly refused. Higginbotham v. State, 260 Ark. 433, 541 S.W.2d 303 (1976) (decision under prior law).

Court's erroneous statement in instruction that theft of property was a felony if value of the property was less than $100 but more than $10,000 held not prejudicial. Wilson v. State, 261 Ark. 820, 552 S.W.2d 223 (1977).

Where information charged defendant with theft of property, it was reversible error for court to instruct jury that it would consider guilt of defendant for violation of § 5-36-105 dealing with theft of property by mistake. Tate v. State, 269 Ark. 687, 600 S.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1980).

The trial court did not err in giving the jury instruction that theft of the property was a Class C felony where the owner of the stolen car testified that her parents paid $1500.00 for the vehicle, and there was a reasonable relation between the purchase price and the value of the car at the time it was stolen. Jones v. State, 290 Ark. 113, 717 S.W.2d 200 (1986).

Where the evidence was not so conclusive as to demonstrate that only the greater offense could have been committed by defendant, the jury was entitled to consider testimony of witness who valued stolen property at less than $2,500; therefore, it was error to refuse an instruction on the lesser degree of theft. Turley v. State, 32 Ark. App. 89, 796 S.W.2d 851 (1990).

Intent.

A felonious intent had to exist at the time of the taking. Fulton v. State, 13 Ark. 168 (1852); Gooch v. State, 60 Ark. 5, 28 S.W. 510 (1894) (decisions under prior law).

A felonious intent was an essential constituent of larceny, and had to be shown by circumstances connected with the taking. Mason v. State, 32 Ark. 238 (1877) (decision under prior law).

When one took another's horse without any intention of converting it to his own use, but to ride for some miles, which he did, and then abandoned it, it was a trespass, but not larceny. Dove v. State, 37 Ark. 261 (1881) (decision under prior law).

Where a bailee wrongfully sold property and subsequently took it secretly from the possession of the purchaser, intending in good faith to restore it to its true owner, he was not guilty of larceny for there was not only no intention to deprive the true owner of his property, but an intention to restore it to him. Gooch v. State, 60 Ark. 5, 28 S.W. 510 (1894) (decision under prior law).

A conviction would not be sustained where the evidence showed that defendant tried to prevent the property from being taken from the owner's possession. Henderson v. State, 79 Ark. 333, 96 S.W. 359 (1906) (decision under prior law).

One taking a pistol from another for the sole purpose of disarming him was not guilty of larceny. Bailey v. State, 92 Ark. 216, 122 S.W. 497 (1909) (decision under prior law).

A person who, in good faith, took property believing it to be his was not guilty of larceny, even though after learning it was not his, he converted it to his own use. Wilson v. State, 96 Ark. 148, 131 S.W. 336 (1910) (decision under prior law).

Any use by defendant of money of another was a conversion, and the state need not prove a specific intent to deprive the true owner permanently thereof. Russell v. State, 112 Ark. 282, 166 S.W. 540 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Intent held to be a jury question. Lucius v. State, 116 Ark. 260, 170 S.W. 1016 (1914); Schultz v. State, 219 Ark. 217, 242 S.W.2d 131 (1951) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The intent to steal could be inferred by the jury from proof that the defendant killed and sold livestock belonging to another. Collins v. State, 184 Ark. 20, 41 S.W.2d 781 (1931) (decision under prior law).

Fraudulent intent to convert property to the own use of the defendant could be inferred from the acts of wrongful conversion. Smith v. State, 219 Ark. 829, 245 S.W.2d 226 (1952) (decision under prior law).

The intention and design of the party were best explained by a complete view of every part of his conduct at the time, and not merely from the proof of a single and isolated act or declaration. Kerby v. State, 233 Ark. 8, 342 S.W.2d 412 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Guilt under former section defining larceny did not require an intent of the accused to convert the stolen property to his own use. Barker v. State, 248 Ark. 649, 453 S.W.2d 413 (1970) (decision under prior law).

Evidence that defendant defrauded bank by “kiting” checks written by another showed that he obtained check with intent to defraud. Stewart v. State, 256 Ark. 619, 509 S.W.2d 298 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient that the jury's determination that defendant had the essential criminal intent, despite his contention that because of his intoxication he was incapable of forming the specific intent to steal, would not be set aside. Johnson v. State, 259 Ark. 773, 536 S.W.2d 704 (1976).

Intent to deprive the owner of his property was an element of the offense of shoplifting. Smith v. State, 264 Ark. 874, 575 S.W.2d 677 (1979).

Evidence held insufficient to meet the reasonable doubt test on the question of intent. Smith v. State, 264 Ark. 874, 575 S.W.2d 677 (1979).

The crucial element of intent to deceive may be proven in many ways, such as by showing the nature of the false impressions or misrepresentations, by showing that the deceived party lacked the present or future ability to make good his representations, and by demonstrating an ongoing scheme or pattern of deception. Hixson v. Housewright, 642 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1981).

Where defendant had been observed placing merchandise in a companion's purse, and, when confronted, defendant threw all the merchandise on a shelf as he attempted to flee, nothing in his conduct indicated that defendant was renouncing an intent to commit theft. White v. State, 271 Ark. 692, 610 S.W.2d 266 (1981).

Intent necessary to convict held established by substantial circumstantial evidence. Wrather v. State, 1 Ark. App. 155, 613 S.W.2d 601 (1981).

Where one takes the property of another without his permission but with the present intention of returning it or of paying the owner for it later, he is not guilty of theft. Of course this rule is restricted to the borrowing of such items as are readily replaceable by a person who has the power to restore or replace them. Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982).

Evidence that defendant demanded a bank courier's cell phone, bags, and keys while armed with a gun was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft, despite his contention that he did not retain the items but took them only to facilitate his flight, and had no intent to permanently deprive the owner of them. Ali v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 758 (2011).

In his directed verdict motion, appellant did not argue that the State did not prove that he knew of the card's existence in the wallet when he stole it, and that he purposely deprived the owner of the card, and thus this argument was barred from appellate review; even if the court reached the argument, it lacked merit, because (1) the statute only required that one knowingly take unauthorized control over property, and it did not require that one know the value or character of the property that was taken, (2) appellant did not dispute that he knowingly took the owner's wallet with the intent of depriving him of it, (3) his knowledge of the contents of the wallet was not necessary for his conviction, and (4) his unauthorized taking of the wallet that had the debit card was one act and he was liable for all property taken, such that the evidence was sufficient to support his theft conviction. Blakely v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 37 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for theft of property; although defendant argued that he did not intend to deprive the owner of the property but only temporarily used the van for medical purposes, his argument was misplaced, as the theft statute made no exception for a temporary deprivation, and the jury could have concluded that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property, as the owner testified that tools were missing from the vehicle after it was recovered. Wolfe v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 338, 549 S.W.3d 926 (2018).

Jurisdiction.

There was no substantial evidence to support a finding of jurisdiction for the theft of personal property where no element of the crime was committed in Arkansas. Graham v. State, 34 Ark. App. 126, 806 S.W.2d 32 (1991).

Notwithstanding the fact that the affidavit referred to the stealing of an ATM card as opposed to a credit card, where the information charged the defendant with a crime under this section, a Class C felony, jurisdiction was appropriate in circuit court. Jensen v. State, 328 Ark. 349, 944 S.W.2d 820 (1997).

Arkansas trial court had jurisdiction over defendant, a Georgia resident, during his trial for theft of property and computer fraud where defendant caused the victim, an Arkansas resident, to access her computer by virtue of his email correspondence for the purpose of obtaining money with a false or fraudulent intent, representation, or promise. Powell v. State, 97 Ark. App. 239, 246 S.W.3d 891 (2007).

Jury.

Defendant's claim regarding the verdict form was rejected where he had not raised the issue below, the erroneous statement of theft by receiving was a clerical error, and the circumstances showed that defendant was convicted of, and sentenced for, the crime of theft of property. Savage v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 261 (2017).

Knowledge.

This section requires only that one knowingly take unauthorized control over the property of another; it does not require that he know either the value or the true character of the property taken. Chadwell v. State, 37 Ark. App. 9, 822 S.W.2d 402 (1992).

Larceny.

For cases discussing whether particular actions constitute larceny, see Coon v. State, 109 Ark. 346, 160 S.W. 226 (1913); Central Sur. Fire Corp. v. Williams, 213 Ark. 600, 211 S.W.2d 891 (1948); Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cagle, 214 Ark. 189, 214 S.W.2d 909 (1948); Edwards v. State, 244 Ark. 1145, 429 S.W.2d 92 (1968); Bridges v. State, 257 Ark. 527, 519 S.W.2d 756 (1975) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Larceny was included in robbery; under an indictment for the latter a conviction of the former could be had. Haley v. State, 49 Ark. 147, 4 S.W. 746 (1887); Cook v. State, 130 Ark. 90, 196 S.W. 922 (1917) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The offense of knowingly receiving stolen property was not a lesser offense of either burglary or larceny and therefore an indictment or information charging only the greater offense did not support a conviction of knowingly receiving stolen property. Pickens v. State, 236 Ark. 404, 366 S.W.2d 283 (1963) (decision under prior law).

To prove robbery the state only has to show that there was an intent to commit a theft; consequently, the offense of theft of property is not a lesser included offense in a charge of the crime of burglary. McDonald v. State, 266 Ark. 56, 582 S.W.2d 272 (1979).

The gist of the crime of theft of property delivered by mistake is the failure to take reasonable measure to restore the property to the person entitled thereto, and this is distinct and separate from any element contained in the crime of theft of property by knowingly taking or exercising unauthorized control over the property of another, with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof; therefore, a violation of § 5-36-105 is not a lesser included offense under this section. Tate v. State, 269 Ark. 687, 600 S.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1980).

The offenses of aggravated robbery and theft of property are separate and distinct and not dependent upon the same evidence to support the convictions; accordingly, defendant's conviction on both charges did not subject him to double jeopardy. Higgins v. State, 270 Ark. 19, 603 S.W.2d 401 (1980).

Refusal to give the instruction requested on the lesser included offense held error. Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982).

Theft and conspiracy to commit theft are not lesser included offenses within the definition of aggravated robbery. Savannah v. State, 7 Ark. App. 161, 645 S.W.2d 694 (1983).

Since kidnapping, theft, and escape involve proof of different elements and are punishable as separate crimes, the defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy due to the multiple sentences imposed by the trial court. Matthews v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1984).

The crime of theft is not a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery under § 5-12-103; thus, the defendant can be sentenced for both of these offenses without violating § 5-1-110, regarding multiple punishments, or the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Collins v. Lockhart, 771 F.2d 1580 (8th Cir. 1985).

Theft is the wrongful appropriation of the victim's property while robbery is the threat of physical harm to the victim; the offenses are of a different nature; they are not of the same generic class and, consequently, theft is not a lesser offense included within robbery. Thompson v. State, 284 Ark. 403, 682 S.W.2d 742 (1985), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

In a theft trial, it was not necessary to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted theft because defendant clearly exercised unauthorized control over a store's property when he threw it over a fence into an area off the store's parking lot; it was not necessary that defendant also “take” the property to complete the crime. Cole v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 492 (2013).

Ownership.

One committed larceny by taking the property of another with the intent to deprive the owner thereof, whether known or not. Blackshare v. State, 94 Ark. 548, 128 S.W. 549 (1910) (decision under prior law).

An allegation of ownership was material and had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but ownership could be proved by direct and positive testimony or by circumstantial evidence. Fletcher v. State, 97 Ark. 1, 132 S.W. 918 (1910); Rynes v. State, 99 Ark. 121, 137 S.W. 800 (1911); McLemore v. State, 111 Ark. 457, 164 S.W. 119 (1914) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Correctly naming the owners was essential to the identification of the stolen property. McIntosh v. State, 108 Ark. 418, 157 S.W. 1154 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to prove an allegation of joint ownership. Johnson v. State, 119 Ark. 124, 177 S.W. 428 (1915) (decision under prior law).

A special ownership which entitled one to the exclusive possession and control of the property stolen was sufficient to support an allegation of ownership. State v. Esmond, 135 Ark. 168, 204 S.W. 210 (1918) (decision under prior law) Jackson v. State, 37 Ark. App. 160, 826 S.W.2d 307 (1992).

Where the individual from whom money in an escrow account was obtained by false pretenses was an agent of his mother and aunt, the actual owners of the money, having such constructive possession of the money was sufficient to support an allegation of ownership by him. Hoover v. State, 262 Ark. 856, 562 S.W.2d 55 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Bankruptcy trustees right of possession and control satisfied the “owner” requirement of subdivision (a)(2). Muhammed v. State, 300 Ark. 112, 776 S.W.2d 825 (1989).

It is wholly immaterial who owns the stolen property if, at the time it is taken, it is in the possession and under the control of another person who is alleged to be the owner; possession and control in such a case constitutes special ownership. Jackson v. State, 37 Ark. App. 160, 826 S.W.2d 307 (1992).

Employee had a possessory interest in employer's money taken in theft. Jackson v. State, 37 Ark. App. 160, 826 S.W.2d 307 (1992).

Removal of timber from property defendant was purchasing but did not own was theft and was not protected by the doctrine of equitable conversion. Higgins v. State, 326 Ark. 1030, 936 S.W.2d 740 (1996).

Property.

For cases discussing whether certain items constitute property, see State v. Parker, 34 Ark. 158 (1879); Haywood v. State, 41 Ark. 479 (1883); Hindman v. State, 72 Ark. 516, 81 S.W. 836 (1904); Wm. Fait Co. v. Anderson, 76 Ark. 237, 88 S.W. 905 (1905); Crossland v. State, 77 Ark. 544, 92 S.W. 776 (1906); Coon v. State, 109 Ark. 346, 160 S.W. 226 (1913) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A husband could be held guilty of stealing his wife's personal property. Hunt v. State, 72 Ark. 241, 79 S.W. 769 (1904) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant/debtor misappropriated the sale proceeds in which he had no legal or equitable interest, the debtor acted with malice in harming the creditor's property just as if he were a bank robber or an embezzler, and the fact that the debtor's conduct rose to the level of two separate criminal offenses under state law supported the conclusion that the debtor's act was malicious and the debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Mercantile Bank of Ark.,N.A. v. Speers, 244 B.R. 142 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000).

Reasonable Cause to Arrest.

Denial of motion to suppress was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, because the inventory search of defendant's vehicle was proper upon defendant's lawful arrest, and it was standard police policy to inventory the contents of any vehicle before having it towed; at the time of defendant's arrest theft of property was a Class C felony if the value of the property was less than $2,500 but more than $500, and criminal attempt was a Class D felony if the offense attempted was a Class C felony. Boykin v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 274, 409 S.W.3d 321 (2012).

Receiving.

Rings which were obtained by theft as defined by this section were stolen within the meaning of § 5-36-106. Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 3, 603 S.W.2d 393 (1980).

Selective Enforcement.

The Arkansas Employment Security Division's administrative policy of recommending criminal prosecution only when there has been a theft in excess of $500 of unemployment benefits is representative of a valid administrative decision-making function, does not create a new statute and is not improper since the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a constitutional violation. Mitchell v. State, 12 Ark. App. 263, 675 S.W.2d 373 (1984).

Sentence.

Where after the defendant entered a guilty plea to class C felony theft of property, for which the maximum sentence is 10 years, a sentence of 6 years in prison, with 2 years suspended on condition that she pay the sum of $135,000 at the rate of $200 per month, beginning 60 days after her release from prison, and continuing for 12 years, at which time a civil judgment would be entered for the outstanding balance, was not authorized. Brimer v. State, 295 Ark. 20, 746 S.W.2d 370 (1988).

The dollar amount required for a conviction under subdivision (b)(2)(A) does not put a ceiling on the amount of restitution. Nix v. State, 54 Ark. App. 302, 925 S.W.2d 802 (1996).

Because the sentence of 20 years' imprisonment with a 10-year suspended imposition of sentence, while falling within the statutory-sentencing range for Class A arson under §§ 5-38-301(b)(5), 5-4-401(a)(2), exceeded the range for Class B residential burglary and Class C theft of property, under § 5-39-201(a)(2), subdivision (b)(2) of this section, and § 5-4-401(a)(3), (4), the residential-burglary and theft-of-property sentences were illegal, and the case was remanded for resentencing. Wakeley v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 231 (2013).

Separate Offenses.

The legislature did not intend to create a statute that would merge an instance of theft-by-receiving, under § 5-36-106, that is committed in one jurisdiction with an instance of theft-of-property, under this section, committed in a second jurisdiction; clearly, the two crimes are separate and distinct, and an interpretation of § 5-36-102 that the two offenses merge is particularly untenable when applied to factual circumstances wherein the theft crimes are not committed in the same criminal episode. Nelson v. State, 350 Ark. 311, 86 S.W.3d 909 (2002).

Speedy Trial.

Where defendant stole a car in Pulaski County, then drove to Faulkner County and robbed a video store, the theft-by-receiving charge for which defendant was arrested in Faulkner County did not link to the distinct crimes, including the theft-of-property charge, for which defendant was subsequently arrested in Pulaski County, for purposes of the running of the speedy trial period in Pulaski County. Nelson v. State, 350 Ark. 311, 86 S.W.3d 909 (2002).

Statute of Limitations.

Theft by deception is generally not a continuing offense. State v. Gray, 2016 Ark. 411, 505 S.W.3d 160 (2016).

“Obtains” in subdivision (a)(2) of this section connotes a singular, discrete taking of possession that occurs at a given time. State v. Gray, 2016 Ark. 411, 505 S.W.3d 160 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in dismissing the charge of theft of property by deception under subdivision (a)(2) of this section as barred by the statute of limitations because, contrary to the State's contention, the offense did not constitute a continuing offense. Defendant knowingly obtained the victim's property by deception, with the purpose of depriving the victim of the property, when the victim made wire transfers into an account controlled by defendant. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run with the transfers and the limitations period expired before the prosecution commenced. State v. Gray, 2016 Ark. 411, 505 S.W.3d 160 (2016).

Where the State contended that even if theft by deception is not a continuing offense, the statute of limitations was extended due to fraud, that theory of the State's appeal was not properly before the appellate court under Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 3 because the State's argument on that point turned on facts unique to the case. State v. Gray, 2016 Ark. 411, 505 S.W.3d 160 (2016).

Transfer of Property.

A transfer of property is essential for the completion of the crime of theft; on the other hand no transfer of property is required for the completion of the crime of robbery, only physical force or the threat of physical force is necessary. Robinson v. State, 303 Ark. 351, 797 S.W.2d 425 (1990), appeal dismissed, Robinson v. Norris, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 21 (Jan. 10, 2008).

Unauthorized Taking.

Subdivision (a)(1) makes no exceptions for temporary deprivation. Moore v. State, 299 Ark. 532, 773 S.W.2d 834 (1989); Hickson v. State, 50 Ark. App. 185, 901 S.W.2d 868 (1995).

Defendant who admitted at trial that she took money out of her cash drawer and replaced it with a check and testified that she eventually replaced the money, admitted in open court to the unauthorized taking of the money from her cash drawer which amounted to a confession. Hickson v. State, 50 Ark. App. 185, 901 S.W.2d 868 (1995).

Plaintiff may recover under § 16-118-107 where (1) defendants made misrepresentations to plaintiffs with the intent of collecting the commitment fees; and (2) accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, defendants received the commitment fees with the purpose of depriving plaintiff of its money. Terra Renewal, LLC v. McCarthy, No. 4:11CV00653-BRW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94935 (E.D. Ark. July 10, 2012).

There was sufficient evidence to support malicious prosecution claims brought by two employees who were accused of theft, prosecuted, and fired from their jobs, because substantial evidence existed that the employer did not make a full, fair, and truthful disclosure to the prosecuting attorney concerning evidence that the employees had permission from their supervisor to sell trailers. If the employees had permission to make the sales, they were not guilty of making unauthorized transfers of the employer's property under this section. Family Dollar Trucking, Inc. v. Huff, 2015 Ark. App. 574, 474 S.W.3d 100 (2015).

Value.

Under former section providing penalty for stealing animals, the value of the animal was immaterial. Sanders v. State, 55 Ark. 365, 18 S.W. 376 (1892) (preceding decisions under prior law).

It was not necessary to prove the value of cattle when stolen in order for one to be guilty of a felony stealing same. Woodall v. State, 200 Ark. 665, 140 S.W.2d 424 (1940); Davis v. State, 202 Ark. 948, 154 S.W.2d 812 (1941) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to prove value of stolen property. Davis v. State, 202 Ark. 948, 154 S.W.2d 812 (1941) (decision under prior law) Ross v. State, 300 Ark. 369, 779 S.W.2d 161 (1989).

Where value of stolen goods was above the statutory minimum for a felony, defendants were guilty of grand larceny even though there was some evidence that goods had been stolen from various places. Richardson v. State, 221 Ark. 567, 254 S.W.2d 448 (1953) (decision under prior law).

It was necessary to show that the market value of the property stolen was more than the statutory minimum for a felony conviction, otherwise, a conviction for a felony could not be sustained. Hammond v. State, 232 Ark. 692, 340 S.W.2d 280 (1960) (decision under prior law).

Despite failure to prove the value of vehicle when appellant was charged with grand larceny, conviction for misdemeanor based on proof of taking with intent to steal was proper. Rogers v. State, 250 Ark. 68, 464 S.W.2d 56 (1971) (decision under prior law).

In a prosecution for possession of stolen credit cards, where defendant's theory was that there was no evidence that the value of the credit cards exceeded minimum value for a felony conviction or that he acquired any property in excess of minimum value for a felony conviction by using credit cards, a violation which constituted only a misdemeanor, he was entitled to present this theory of lesser offense to jury. King v. State, 250 Ark. 523, 465 S.W.2d 712 (1971) (decision under prior law).

Evidence as to value of stolen goods held to have failed to support a verdict of guilty of grand larceny. Courtney v. State, 252 Ark. 620, 480 S.W.2d 351 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to show that value of stolen goods was in excess of statutory minimum for felony conviction. Polk v. State, 252 Ark. 320, 478 S.W.2d 738 (1972) (decision under prior law); Bailey v. State, 266 Ark. 260, 583 S.W.2d 62 (1979); Watson v. State, 271 Ark. 661, 609 S.W.2d 673 (1980); Terry v. State, 271 Ark. 715, 610 S.W.2d 272 (1981).

Defendant was entitled to question the owner about the maintenance of a stolen tractor since a jury might have concluded that the tractor had little value. Sharron v. State, 262 Ark. 320, 556 S.W.2d 438 (1977) (decision under prior law).

Testimony by the owner of stolen property held sufficient to establish a value of more than minimum value for a felony conviction for the coins taken, and it was not necessary that the owner should have bought and sold coins up to the day of trial in order to be competent to testify. Ply v. State, 270 Ark. 554, 606 S.W.2d 556 (1980).

Testimony of the victim as to her opinion of the cumulative value of the property taken from her was admissible. Watson v. State, 271 Ark. 661, 609 S.W.2d 673 (1980).

Evidence of purchase price of property could be evidence of market value when admitted without objection, and the date of purchase of the articles in question was not too remote. Terry v. State, 271 Ark. 715, 610 S.W.2d 272 (1981).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction under subdivision (b)(2). Morrow v. State, 271 Ark. 806, 610 S.W.2d 878, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819, 102 S. Ct. 99, 70 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1981).

Evidence held insufficient to establish value. Hughes v. State, 3 Ark. App. 275, 625 S.W.2d 547 (1981).

No minimum value is required for the jury's finding of theft as a misdemeanor. O'Riordan v. State, 281 Ark. 424, 665 S.W.2d 255 (1984).

Where deputy municipal clerk testified that $4,675 was missing, she was unable to state from the daily journal sheets how much of the total amount was made up of cash or checks, and she testified that the money had not been recovered or returned to her office, there was substantial evidence of value in excess of $2,500. LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986).

Stolen property in which victim has either a proprietory or possessory interest may be aggregated to determine grade of offense. Phillips v. State, 297 Ark. 368, 761 S.W.2d 933 (1988).

In trial for theft of car, owner's testimony with respect to the purchase price, her knowledge of what she owed on her car, the fact that it was three years old, and a photograph introduced showing the car to be in apparently excellent condition, were substantial evidence of the value of the car. Stewart v. State, 302 Ark. 35, 786 S.W.2d 827 (1990).

To prove the value of stolen merchandise it is necessary to have someone testify who has actual knowledge of the property's fair market value. Brooks v. State, 303 Ark. 188, 792 S.W.2d 617 (1990).

A security guard's testimony as to value, based on a price tag, is hearsay and is inadmissible to prove the value of stolen property. Brooks v. State, 303 Ark. 188, 792 S.W.2d 617 (1990).

Evidence held sufficient to support the court's finding that the value of the stolen property exceeded the amount required by subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section. Hardrick v. State, 47 Ark. App. 105, 885 S.W.2d 910 (1994) (decision under prior law).

Although witness did not testify specifically to the retail price of the merchandise at the time of the offense, she did testify to the value of the merchandise based on the wholesale cost, which was sufficient to establish the value of the property and therefore, sufficient to support the defendant's theft conviction. Christian v. State, 54 Ark. App. 191, 925 S.W.2d 428 (1996).

Evidence that the value of an automobile was over $2,500.00 held sufficient where an invoice showed that the automobile was purchased for over $19,000.00, the automobile was stolen just over one year after it was purchased, and photographs showed the automobile in good condition and without any obvious defects or damage. Ayers v. State, 334 Ark. 258, 975 S.W.2d 88 (1998), opinion substituted for withdrawn opinion reported at, 334 Ark. 258, 975 S.W.2d 88 (Ark. 1998).

Although the preferred method of establishing value is through expert testimony, the price paid by an owner can be used to determine market value of property when the purchase is not too remote in time and bears a reasonable relation to present value. Williams v. State, 65 Ark. App. 176, 986 S.W.2d 123 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminal attempt to commit theft of property where the victim testified as to the purchase price of the boat motor, his use and maintenance of it, and its condition at the time of the crime. Wright v. State, 80 Ark. App. 114, 91 S.W.3d 553 (2002).

One witness's testimony regarding minor improvements to a 1978 vehicle, coupled with 11 photographs, did not constitute substantial evidence of a value greater than $ 500. Reed v. State, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 217 (May 1), substituted opinion, 353 Ark. 22, 109 S.W.3d 665 (2003).

There was insufficient evidence to have convicted defendant of theft of property with a value greater than $ 500 but less than $ 2,500 where the only witness, a mechanic, stated car was not worth $ 50, there was no evidence of what the victim had paid for the car, and the state's produced only photographs of the car at trial; however, there was there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of misdemeanor theft, which carried a term of one year's imprisonment. Reed v. State, 353 Ark. 22, 109 S.W.3d 665 (2003).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss two charges for theft of property in excess of $2,500, in violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section, on the ground that the charges were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for Class B felonies in § 5-1-109(b)(2) because the amended information was filed within three years of the earliest unauthorized withdrawal from a client's account that was made by defendant, an attorney. Cameron v. State, 94 Ark. App. 58, 224 S.W.3d 559 (2006), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 496 (Sept. 27, 2007).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of theft of property with a value less than $2,500 but more than $500 in violation of subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(2)(A) of this section for stealing merchandise from a department store because a manager's testimony, in conjunction with the testimony of another employee, who was also a manager, was sufficient to lay the foundation for the introduction of a register receipt under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule, Ark. R. Evid. 803(6), as proof of the value of the stolen merchandise; the employee's testimony indicated that he knew the recovered items were stolen because they did not bear certain labels or electronic receipts that the store regularly places on all merchandise, the manager testified that he knew the value of the stolen merchandise by following the store's standard practice of adding up the value by ringing it up on the store's register, and the receipt bore an electronic date and time stamp, as well as other numeric information about the merchandise, including the label information from each item. Pace v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 491, 375 S.W.3d 751 (2010).

State only had to prove that appellant knowingly took another's property to deprive him of the property; simply put, the value of the property stolen is not an element of a theft offense involving a credit or debit card. Blakely v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 37 (2013).

Defendant's conviction for theft of property as a Class B felony, in violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section, was supported by the evidence because there was evidence that the car was valued at $2,500 or more; the car was four years old, and the victim stated that the victim paid $20,000 for it. Moore v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 107 (2013).

In a case involving stolen university exams, the trial court did not err in finding that the requirements of the commercial burglary statute, § 5-39-201(b), were met because misdemeanor theft is punishable by one year imprisonment; no minimum value was required to be shown, and the testimony supported the State's assertion that the exams had inherent value to the students, to the professors themselves, and to the university as an academic institution. Gillean v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 698, 478 S.W.3d 255 (2015).

Defendant's appeal of a conviction for theft of property was frivolous as, inter alia, defendant acknowledged that there had been some evidence of the value of stolen items. Guthrie v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 681 (2017).

Evidence supported defendant's Class B felony conviction under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section where credit card statements from a patient's father established the amounts paid for alleged “treatments” for his daughter at defendant's purported naturopathic medical clinic. Gervais v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 161, 544 S.W.3d 590 (2018).

Evidence supported defendant's Class C felony conviction under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section where the victim testified that she wrote defendant a check for $9,100, defendant gave her a check in return for $9,100 purportedly until the victim's insurance money came, and the victim was never able to cash defendant's check and was thus clearly deprived of $9,100. Gervais v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 161, 544 S.W.3d 590 (2018).

Evidence supported defendant's Class A misdemeanor conviction under subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this section where the victim specifically testified at least three times that he knew he paid defendant upward of $1,500, an amount that included the alleged DNA report from Germany, which cost $600. Gervais v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 161, 544 S.W.3d 590 (2018).

Venue.

A defendant guilty of larceny was guilty in every county into which he carried the goods. State v. Alexander, 118 Ark. 357, 176 S.W. 315 (1915) (decision under prior law).

Cited: McIntosh v. State, 262 Ark. 7, 552 S.W.2d 649 (1977); International Trading, Ltd. v. Bell, 262 Ark. 244, 556 S.W.2d 420 (1977); Wilson v. State, 263 Ark. 764, 569 S.W.2d 87 (1978); Chandler v. State, 264 Ark. 175, 569 S.W.2d 660 (1978); Kozal v. State, 264 Ark. 587, 573 S.W.2d 323 (1978); Sutton v. State, 265 Ark. 645, 580 S.W.2d 195 (1979); Noland v. State, 265 Ark. 764, 580 S.W.2d 953 (1979); Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979); Elmore v. State, 267 Ark. 952, 592 S.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1980); Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 830, 593 S.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1979); Klimas v. Mabry, 599 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1979); Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 409, 601 S.W.2d 845 (1980); Schwindling v. State, 269 Ark. 388, 602 S.W.2d 639 (1980); Thrasher v. State, 270 Ark. 322, 604 S.W.2d 931 (1980); Hammon v. State, 270 Ark. 307, 605 S.W.2d 6 (1980); Jones v. State, 270 Ark. 328, 605 S.W.2d 7 (1980); Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 897, 606 S.W.2d 746 (1980); Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980); Terry v. Housewright, 659 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1981); Lingo v. State, 271 Ark. 776, 610 S.W.2d 580 (1981); Tolley v. State, 1 Ark. App. 1, 611 S.W.2d 798 (1981); Sutton v. State, 1 Ark. App. 58, 613 S.W.2d 399 (1981); Shelton v. State, 275 Ark. 40, 627 S.W.2d 18 (1982); State v. Jamison, 277 Ark. 349, 641 S.W.2d 719 (1982); Christian v. State, 6 Ark. App. 138, 639 S.W.2d 78 (1982); Wright v. Burton, 279 Ark. 1, 648 S.W.2d 794 (1983); Golden v. State, 10 Ark. App. 362, 664 S.W.2d 496 (1984); Armstrong v. State, 12 Ark. App. 143, 671 S.W.2d 772 (1984); Daniels v. State, 12 Ark. App. 251, 674 S.W.2d 949 (1984); Mendenhall v. Skaggs Cos., 285 Ark. 236, 685 S.W.2d 805 (1985); Wing v. State, 286 Ark. 494, 696 S.W.2d 311 (1985); Tiggs v. State, 16 Ark. App. 241, 700 S.W.2d 65 (1985); Johnson v. State, 289 Ark. 589, 715 S.W.2d 441 (1986); Graham v. State, 290 Ark. 107, 717 S.W.2d 203 (1986); In re Hoffman, 70 B.R. 155 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986); Burris v. State, 291 Ark. 157, 722 S.W.2d 858 (1987); Hester v. Langston, 297 Ark. 87, 759 S.W.2d 797 (1988); Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989); Noel v. State, 28 Ark. App. 158, 771 S.W.2d 325 (1989); Hill v. State, 303 Ark. 462, 798 S.W.2d 65 (1990); Sanders v. State, 305 Ark. 112, 805 S.W.2d 953 (1991); Crutchfield v. State, 306 Ark. 97, 812 S.W.2d 459 (1991); State v. Hill, 306 Ark. 375, 811 S.W.2d 323 (1991); Shibley v. State, 324 Ark. 212, 920 S.W.2d 10 (1996); Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996); Bayless v. State, 326 Ark. 869, 935 S.W.2d 534 (1996); Coleman v. State, 327 Ark. 381, 938 S.W.2d 845 (1997) (decision under prior law); Jenkins v. State, 60 Ark. App. 1, 959 S.W.2d 57 (1997); Greer v. State, 77 Ark. App. 180, 72 S.W.3d 893 (2002); McEntire v. State, 363 Ark. 473, 215 S.W.3d 658 (2005); Hendricks v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 109 (2013); Cartwright v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 425, 501 S.W.3d 849 (2016); Whitworth v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 462, 531 S.W.3d 407 (2017).