Ark. Code Ann. § 5-37-201 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Evidence of intent to defraud in state forgery prosecution. 108 A.L.R.5th 593.

Case Notes

Purpose.

It was the intention of the drafters to broaden the scope of the crime of forgery. Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978).

Applicability.

A check need not be negotiable in order to come within the purview of this section. Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978).

Plaintiffs pleaded a facially plausible claim under § 16-118-107 where they alleged that the January patient notification letter defendants sent out could reasonably be construed as representing that plaintiffs were abandoning their patients or that defendants were terminating the physician-patient relationship between plaintiffs and the office's patients, the letter arguably constituted a written instrument that did or may have evidenced, created, transferred, terminated, or otherwise affected a legal right, interest, obligation, or status under this section. Murphy v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Ark. 2011).

Acts Constituting Forgery.

The term forgery had a fixed legal meaning; it was the fraudulent making or alteration of any writing to the prejudice of another man's rights. Van Horne v. State, 5 Ark. 349 (1843); Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark. 166 (1877) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Particular actions held to be forgery. Claiborne v. State, 51 Ark. 88, 9 S.W. 851 (1888); White v. State, 83 Ark. 36, 102 S.W. 715 (1907); Holloway v. State, 90 Ark. 123, 118 S.W. 256 (1909); Maloney v. State, 91 Ark. 485, 121 S.W. 728 (1909); Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 170 S.W. 225 (1914); Brashears v. State, 203 Ark. 1014, 160 S.W.2d 505 (1942) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Particular actions held not to be forgery. Binganan v. State, 180 Ark. 266, 21 S.W.2d 156 (1929) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant presented to a motel a check issued by a state government payable to his stepfather, an appellate court rejected his claim that he did not commit forgery because he had not “forged” anything, even though defendant conceded that he stole the check with the purpose to defraud; by purporting that he had the authority to cash the check, defendant “uttered” the check and was thus properly convicted of first-degree forgery. Ruffin v. State, 83 Ark. App. 44, 115 S.W.3d 814 (2003).

Defendant's attempt to pass a victim's stolen check at a store completed defendant's commission of second-degree forgery, in violation of subdivision (c)(1) of this section; indeed, defendant testified that defendant “tried giving the check” to the cashier. Turner v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 150, 391 S.W.3d 358 (2012).

Consolidation of Offenses.

When the state charged defendant with forgery, the charge was broad enough to cover the crimes previously known as forgery, uttering and possession of a forged instrument. Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978).

Any of the acts set forth in subsection (a) constitutes the single crime of forgery. Robinson v. State, 10 Ark. App. 441, 664 S.W.2d 905 (1984).

Defense.

It was no defense for a creditor to show that when he executed a forgery on his debtor, he intended to apply the money thus obtained to the payment of his debt. Claiborne v. State, 51 Ark. 88, 9 S.W. 851 (1888) (decision under prior law).

A belief that one whose name was forged to a check would pay it in order to protect defendant was no defense. Rose v. State, 80 Ark. 222, 96 S.W. 996 (1906) (decision under prior law).

In establishing his defense of intoxication to a charge of forgery, a crime which requires a “purposeful” mental state, the defendant was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he could not have entertained or formed the necessary intent or purposeful mental state to commit forgery; he simply failed to sustain that burden, and the trial judge so found. Gonce v. State, 11 Ark. App. 278, 669 S.W.2d 490 (1984).

While the trial judge's reference in a forgery prosecution to the defendant's intoxication as a “mitigating” circumstance was erroneous, it was insufficient to reverse the defendant's conviction in view of the clear factual findings made by the judge. Gonce v. State, 11 Ark. App. 278, 669 S.W.2d 490 (1984).

Evidence.

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. Holloway v. State, 90 Ark. 123, 118 S.W. 256 (1909) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Tongs v. State, 130 Ark. 344, 197 S.W. 573 (1917); Keese v. State, 223 Ark. 261, 265 S.W.2d 542 (1954); Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 178, 359 S.W.2d 432 (1962), cert. denied, Edens v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 968, 83 S. Ct. 551 (1963) (preceding decisions under prior law) Muhammed v. State, 300 Ark. 112, 776 S.W.2d 825 (1989); Coley v. State, 304 Ark. 304, 801 S.W.2d 647 (1991); Washington v. State, 31 Ark. App. 62, 787 S.W.2d 254 (1990).

Appellant juvenile was properly adjudicated a delinquent for check forgery where evidence showed she took a checkbook out her classmate's purse and forged checks at a department store; at trial, a store employee testified that he took one of the forged check's from appellant and recognized her from her yearbook picture. Taylor v. State, 88 Ark. App. 269, 197 S.W.3d 31 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a forgery conviction where defendant made a statement to the police admitting that he had been engaged in a forgery scheme and that his price for forged checks varied according to the amount of the check. Dendy v. State, 93 Ark. App. 281, 218 S.W.3d 322 (2005).

In a first-degree forgery conviction, there was substantial evidence establishing that defendant acted with intent where he (1) repeatedly tried to pass counterfeit bills at local businesses and (2) offered an individual one of his bills in exchange for twenty dollars. Taylor v. State, 94 Ark. App. 21, 223 S.W.3d 80 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's forgery and theft convictions where she did not offer a reasonable explanation of how she acquired the forged check; therefore, an inference that she committed the forgery or was an accessory to its commission was warranted and the court did not err in inferring defendant's intent. DeShazer v. State, 94 Ark. App. 363, 230 S.W.3d 285 (2006).

Where the state failed to prove that the check was issued or presented for payment prior to the closure of the bank account upon which it was drawn, the trial court could not reasonably infer that the check was forged; therefore, the trial court erred in finding that defendant violated the terms of her probation by passing a forged instrument. Bedford v. State, 96 Ark. App. 38, 237 S.W.3d 516 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support appellants' convictions for second-degree forgery where appellants possessed not only checks bearing the names of the victims, but also a credit card and driver's license in one victim's name, the license bearing one of appellant's picture. Anderson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 804, 372 S.W.3d 385 (2009).

Evidence that defendant had the victim's credit card and driver's license and that he attempted to cash a forged check was sufficient to support his convictions for theft by receiving under § 5-36-106 and forgery under this section. Suggs v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 571, 377 S.W.3d 461 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for second-degree forgery under subsection (e) of this section was proper considering accomplice testimony along with the other evidence. Although the evidence was circumstantial given that it was the accomplice, rather than defendant, who cashed the forged check, circumstantial evidence could provide the basis to support the conviction. Benton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 71, 388 S.W.3d 488 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of first-degree-forgery under this section because she applied for a job using another woman's name and documents, she signed the other woman's name on the federal forms required for her application, and she intended to defraud and was not authorized to use the other woman's name and personal information. Barron-Gonzalez v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 120, 426 S.W.3d 508 (2013).

Defendant's conviction for forgery was supported by evidence that he was not authorized by the owner to use his checks, yet he put one into circulation electronically through the retailer's auto-check payment system. Todd v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 280, 494 S.W.3d 444 (2016).

Indictment or Information.

For cases discussing the sufficiency of an indictment or information, see Gabe v. State, 6 Ark. (1 English) 519 (1845); Bell v. State, 10 Ark. (5 English) 536 (1850); Quertermous v. State, 95 Ark. 48, 127 S.W. 951 (1910); Zachary v. State, 97 Ark. 176, 133 S.W. 811 (1911); Godard v. State, 100 Ark. 149, 139 S.W. 1131 (1911); Ary v. State, 104 Ark. 212, 148 S.W. 1032 (1912); Williams v. State, 131 Ark. 264, 198 S.W. 699 (1917) (preceding decisions under prior law).

In indictment, it was necessary to aver that the defendant had the fictitious note in his possession with intent to utter or pass it as and for a genuine bill, for the intent to impose the instrument on the community as good money constituted the essence of the offense. Gabe v. State, 6 Ark. (1 English) 519 (1845) (decision under prior law).

An indictment for forging a school district warrant need not allege that the school district was a corporation. Ball v. State, 48 Ark. 94, 2 S.W. 462 (1886) (decision under prior law).

Where indictment described forged instrument as having certain figures on its face, it was necessary that such figures were on the instrument when it left the hands of defendant although it would have been unnecessary to describe the instrument by such figures in the indictment. McDonnell v. State, 58 Ark. 242, 24 S.W. 105 (1893) (decision under prior law).

An indictment for forging a deed of land with an intent to defraud the owner of the land need not show upon its face in what manner the owner was to be defrauded, that being a matter of proof upon the trial. Snow v. State, 85 Ark. 203, 107 S.W. 980 (1908) (decision under prior law).

Use of one word in setting out instrument in indictment, while bond introduced in evidence used another similar word held to be a clerical error and not a material variance. Holloway v. State, 90 Ark. 123, 118 S.W. 256 (1909) (decision under prior law).

An indictment for forgery of a certain writing which alleged that the writing was of the tenor and effect as followed, and set out the writing in detail was held to set out the writing according to its tenor. Evans v. State, 94 Ark. 400, 127 S.W. 743 (1910); Bennett v. State, 96 Ark. 101, 131 S.W. 213 (1910) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Where an indictment charged the appellant with uttering a forged check drawn on one bank while the instrument set out in the indictment as shown by the proof was drawn on another bank; it was held that there was no variance as the instrument as set out in the indictment controlled and the inconsistent statement in the indictment was treated as surplusage. Rawlings v. State, 117 Ark. 539, 174 S.W. 150 (1915) (decision under prior law).

Where the defendant was indicted for the forgery of a check but not for the forgery of an indorsement thereon, the indorsement on the check did not constitute in law a part of it and need not be set out in an indictment for forgery of the check. Finn v. State, 127 Ark. 204, 191 S.W. 899 (1917); McCoy v. State, 161 Ark. 658, 257 S.W. 386 (1924) (preceding decisions under prior law).

When an indictment for forgery alleged that the check was forged and counterfeited, it in effect alleged that it was made without the authority of the person whose name was signed thereto. Finn v. State, 127 Ark. 204, 191 S.W. 899 (1917) (decision under prior law).

Injured Party.

The forgery of a stay bond had the effect of injuring the judgment-creditor in his estate and in the enforcement of his lawful rights. Holloway v. State, 90 Ark. 123, 118 S.W. 256 (1909) (decision under prior law).

Where the defendant was charged with forgery of a check signed by the depositor with intent to defraud the depositor, proof that the depositor had previously overdrawn his account at the bank did not establish that the bank and not the depositor was the person intended to be defrauded. Pennell v. State, 170 Ark. 1119, 282 S.W. 992 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Instructions.

In a prosecution for forgery, the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal attempt to commit forgery; the crime of forgery was complete upon the defendant's being in possession of the forged instrument, or upon his attempt to pass the check, or upon his passing of the check, and the defendant was either guilty of forgery or nothing. McGirt v. State, 289 Ark. 7, 708 S.W.2d 620 (1986).

Knowledge and Intent.

To constitute the offense of uttering and publishing a forged writing, there had to be an intent to defraud and a knowledge of its falsity. Elsey v. State, 47 Ark. 572, 2 S.W. 337 (1886) (decision under prior law).

In order to constitute the offense of uttering and publishing a forged writing it was necessary that there was an intent to defraud and that there was a knowledge of the falsity of the instrument on the part of the defendant. Ferrell v. State, 165 Ark. 541, 265 S.W. 62 (1924) (decision under prior law).

An allegation which in effect alleged that the defendant unlawfully and feloniously uttered a note, knowing it to be forged with the intent feloniously to obtain possession of another's property necessarily imported that the note was uttered with a fraudulent intent. Teague v. State, 86 Ark. 126, 110 S.W. 224 (1908) (decision under prior law).

One who, with intent to defraud, passed a check known to him to have been forged was guilty of forgery. Moulton v. State, 105 Ark. 502, 152 S.W. 132 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Fraudulent intent was an essential ingredient in the crime of uttering a forged instrument. Rickman v. State, 135 Ark. 298, 205 S.W. 711 (1918) (decision under prior law).

It was not error to admit other checks of similar nature to those charged in indictment since they were admissible to prove criminal intent, design, or part of a common plan on the part of the defendants to defraud. Keese v. State, 223 Ark. 261, 265 S.W.2d 542 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Lesser Included Offense.

Court held to have properly refused to give instruction on the lesser offense of criminal simulation. Lewis v. State, 267 Ark. 933, 591 S.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1979).

Trial court erred in finding defendant guilty of second-degree forgery as it was not a lesser-included offense of first-degree forgery, set forth in the charging instrument and under which the trial proceeded; as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, second-degree forgery requires proof of documents different from those for first-degree forgery and does not meet the requirements of the tests set out in § 5-1-110(b) for a lesser-included offense, therefore, they are two separate crimes. Eagle v. State, 92 Ark. App. 328, 213 S.W.3d 661 (2005).

Possession.

Simultaneous possession of several forged checks was a single offense and a defendant could not be prosecuted separately for each check. Yarbrough v. State, 257 Ark. 732, 520 S.W.2d 227 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Possession of a forged instrument by one who offers or seeks to utter it without any reasonable explanation of the manner in which he acquired it warrants an inference that the possessor committed the forgery or was a guilty accessory to its commission. Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978).

Evidence held sufficient to support the finding of the jury that the defendant was in possession of the contraband. Lee v. State, 270 Ark. 892, 609 S.W.2d 3 (1980).

Sentence.

Sentence for forgery in the second degree, a class C felony, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, since the sentence was within the limits imposed by statute. Conti v. State, 10 Ark. App. 352, 664 S.W.2d 502 (1984).

Revocation of a defendant's probation on an underlying charge of forgery in the second degree was supported by a preponderance of the evidence: defendant admitted to more than one violation of defendant's probation and a judge was not required to believe defendant's explanations or excuse defendant's failure to comply with the conditions of defendant's probation. Ingram v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 729, 363 S.W.3d 6 (2009).

Signature or Endorsement.

An instrument may be forged by signing the name of a fictitious person. Maloney v. State, 91 Ark. 485, 121 S.W. 728 (1909) (decision under prior law); Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978).

Proof that the defendant indorsed another's name to a check payable to the latter representing himself to be the payee would not justify an inference that he did not have authority to sign the payee's name as indorser of the check. Ferrell v. State, 165 Ark. 541, 265 S.W. 62 (1924) (decision under prior law).

Convictions for forgery and theft of property must be overturned where State failed to prove that checks, which were passed by defendant in exchange for merchandise, were signed by defendant or that signatures which appeared thereon were unauthorized. Askew v. State, 280 Ark. 304, 657 S.W.2d 540 (1983).

Uttering.

Particular actions held to be uttering of a forged instrument. Crain v. State, 45 Ark. 450 (1885); Claiborne v. State, 51 Ark. 88, 9 S.W. 851 (1888); Arnold v. State, 71 Ark. 367, 74 S.W. 513 (1903) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The delivery, or attempted delivery, of a paper, document or other material containing written or printed matter or its equivalent that purports to be or is calculated to become, or to represent if completed, the act of a person who did not authorize the act and that may evidence, create, transfer or otherwise affect a legal right, interest or status constitutes uttering under this section. Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978).

“Utter,” as used in subsection (a) of this section, includes the delivery or attempted delivery of a written instrument. Faulkner v. State, 16 Ark. App. 128, 697 S.W.2d 537 (1985).

Cited: David v. State, 286 Ark. 205, 691 S.W.2d 133 (1985); Walker v. Lockhart, 807 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1986); Williams v. State, 2015 Ark. 466 (2015).