Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Criminal Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 849.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Former section penalizing persons who willfully cut down or destroyed trees referred to severing things attached to the freehold as part thereof, such as produce of the soil, timber, structures or fixtures and not to the tearing down of a temporary rent placard or notice. Whipple v. Gorsuch, 82 Ark. 252, 101 S.W. 735 (1907) (decision under prior law).

It was not necessary to show that the trespasser appropriated the timber alleged to be stolen; it was sufficient if the proof showed that he entered upon the land without lawful authority and willfully and knowingly cut down or destroyed standing or growing trees. Smith v. State, 127 Ark. 218, 191 S.W. 913 (1917) (decision under prior law).

The intent to convert trees cut down or destroyed to one's own use was not an element of the offense under the prior section imposing a penalty on anyone cutting or destroying trees. Davis v. State, 139 Ark. 175, 214 S.W. 6 (1919) (decision under prior law).

Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was liable as an accomplice where she made a statement that “we got in the bad attitude mood and decided to key cars and bust plants and paint on cars,” even though the only person she ever identified as keying a vehicle or damaging plants was one of her companions and she never identified the cars that were damaged or made reference to a particular vehicle. Pack v. State, 73 Ark. App. 123, 41 S.W.3d 409 (2001).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for commercial burglary, criminal mischief, and breaking and entering because the testimony of defendant's accomplice, who was defendant's son, was sufficiently corroborated, as required by § 16-89-111(e)(1), by an officer's testimony as to the items he found in defendant's truck, matching the description of items stolen from a convenience store. The accomplice admitted that he and defendant entered the store by using a cable to pull open the front doors and that he and defendant used bolt cutters and a pry bar to break into gaming machines, and these items, along with packages of cigarettes stolen from the store, were found by police officers in defendant's truck. Dunlap v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 582 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for first-degree criminal mischief under subdivision (a)(1) of this section was supported by substantial evidence as: (1) it was fair to presume that defendant purposely for § 5-2-202(1) purposes broke a former supervisor's car windows when defendant repeatedly swung a long, heavy metal object at them; (2) defendant's statement to the supervisor immediately prior to smashing the supervisor's windows that defendant should “kick (the supervisor's) ass” demonstrated defendant's anger and indicated a desire to express that anger with violence; and (3) defendant failed to support a claim that defendant's actions were justified. Warren v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 102 (2011).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of theft of scrap metal under § 5-36-123 and first-degree criminal mischief under this section because defendant's girlfriend admitted that she and defendant were depicted in photos taken by a motion-activated camera, and while her testimony did not have to be corroborated as to the misdemeanors pursuant to § 16-89-111(e), circumstantial evidence independently established the crimes and tended to connect defendant to the commission of those crimes. The photos indicated that defendant and his girlfriend were near the wire prior to its being stolen, a signal maintainer testified that he did not leave unused wire on the ground when replacing the stolen wire, and there was testimony that the theft of the wire stopped after defendant was caught. Procella v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 515, 504 S.W.3d 686 (2016).

Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's delinquency finding where two witnesses had identified the juvenile as the one who damaged the victim's car, and the court found the juvenile and her witnesses not credible. T.S. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 578, 534 S.W.3d 160 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motions for directed verdict on a count of first-degree criminal mischief and six other counts even though all the evidence was circumstantial; given the entirety of the circumstantial evidence, the jury could conclude without resorting to speculation or conjecture that defendant committed the offenses. Defendant had bypassed a locked gate to enter the victim's property and fled when confronted by the police, his explanation as to why he was on the property was improbable, and he had a backpack and ratchet in his hand that looked like the victim's property. Cobb v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 434, 585 S.W.3d 196 (2019).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's first-degree criminal mischief conviction where the testimony established that he was the only inmate in the pod, a dismantled speaker and various tools found in that pod had been used to create a hole through the ceiling of the cell and the roof of the building, and an invoice showed the cost of repair. Badger v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 490, 588 S.W.3d 779 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that defendant possessed the requisite intent for first-degree criminal mischief because the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, showed that defendant arrived at the home of a sheriff's deputy before daybreak, with the music blaring on her car radio, while high on methamphetamine; defendant knocked a hole in the vinyl siding of the deputy's home with a flashlight and damaged the door by hitting and kicking it, and continued this behavior even after the deputy threatened to shoot her if she did not stop. Sharp v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 506, 588 S.W.3d 770 (2019).

Trial court, acting as the factfinder, chose to credit the testimony of a sheriff's deputy that defendant was high on methamphetamine at the time of the criminal mischief offense over the opinion of a doctor, who performed psychological evaluations of defendant, that defendant was suffering from a mental disease, schizoaffective disorder. The court was entitled to believe the deputy's testimony over the doctor's testimony and to decide that defendant did not prove the defense of mental disease by a preponderance of the evidence. Sharp v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 506, 588 S.W.3d 770 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's first-degree criminal mischief conviction, where defendant had engaged in a high-speed chase, he had rammed his car into a trooper's car when officers attempted to slow him down, he continued to flee on foot after the car was disabled, and the trooper testified that it cost over $2,000 to repair his damaged car. Hooten v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 519, 588 S.W.3d 829 (2019).

—Admission.

Circuit court properly admitted hearsay, in the form of an invoice, to prove the amount of actual damages under the criminal mischief statute; while there was no testimony regarding how the invoice was prepared, it was introduced under Ark. R. Evid. 803(6), the business-records hearsay exception, through a qualified and knowledgeable witness who testified that she was authorized by the hospital administrator to submit the invoice, the invoice represented the actual replacement cost paid by the hospital to replace the tele-medicine device and glass cabinet that defendant damaged, the witness had knowledge of the process involved in paying for the equipment, and the invoice was created about two months after defendant destroyed the equipment. Patton v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 440, 586 S.W.3d 708 (2019).

Evidence Insufficient.

Jury resorted to speculation and conjecture to reach its guilty verdict on the charge of criminal mischief; defendant did not have permission to have possession of the vehicle over the weekend, the evidence reasonably indicated that he abandoned the vehicle after being pursued by law enforcement, and the car was not found for almost 24 hours, located along a public road, and although it was possible that defendant purposely damaged the owner's vehicle, it was equally possible and a reasonable hypothesis that another person did. Lemley v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 691, 477 S.W.3d 526 (2015).

Lesser-Included Offense.

Criminal mischief in the second degree is a lesser-included offense of criminal mischief in the first degree; the distinction between the two offenses is based upon grades of intent or degrees of culpability. McGill v. State, 60 Ark. App. 246, 962 S.W.2d 382 (1998).

Conviction for criminal mischief in the first degree reduced to criminal mischief in the second degree after appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, pursuant to § 16-67-325. McGill v. State, 60 Ark. App. 246, 962 S.W.2d 382 (1998).

Probable Cause to Arrest.

There was probable cause to arrest the defendant for criminal mischief where the defendant's brother admitted pouring formaldehyde on the victim's couch, the defendant was present at the time of the incident, and the formaldehyde belonged to the defendant. Hines v. State, 289 Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65 (1986).

Timber.

An indictment for cutting down trees and destroying and carrying away the timber was not defective by alleging the property as belonging to the estate of one deceased. Boarman v. State, 66 Ark. 65, 48 S.W. 899 (1898) (decision under prior law).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a first-degree criminal mischief conviction where defendant used a bulldozer to make roads throughout the owner's property, logged the entire 300 acres of its timber, and the jury was not obligated to believe that defendant was acting under what he believed was the owner's consent. Jester v. State, 367 Ark. 249, 239 S.W.3d 484 (2006).

In a criminal mischief case, the court properly ordered defendant to pay $180,000 in restitution as the land owner estimated his timber loss to be about $180,000 in his complaint that he filed with the Arkansas Forestry Commission, which was introduced into evidence at trial; further, his expert estimated that the remaining property value was worth $150,000, and defendant himself offered the owner $180,000 for the property in hopes to settle the dispute. Jester v. State, 367 Ark. 249, 239 S.W.3d 484 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying appellants a new trial or remittitur regarding a punitive damage award in favor of appellees, as the award was not in excess of federal due process standards, given that (1) appellees suffered economic harm, but the harm was much more than purely economic injury, as appellants cut down approximately 40 percent of appellees' future retirement homesite and the privacy afforded by the trees was very important to appellees, (2) appellants' action forced appellees to give up their plans to retire to the property and ultimately sell it, (3) the tree cutting was intentional and not an isolated incident, (4) the profit appellants received from the sale of their property was a direct result of the tree clearing on appellees' property, (5) the award was not so grossly excessive as to have violated federal due process, (6) each of appellants were on notice of and could have been charged with a Class C felony of criminal mischief under subdivision (b)(1) of this section with, under § 5-4-201(a)(2), a potential fine of $10,000, plus a violation of § 15-32-101(a)(1), (7) was a misdemeanor, with a potential fine and jail time, and (8) under § 18-60-102(a)(1), appellants had ample notice that their actions could result in a penalty of $25,000 punitive damages. Bronakowski v. Lindhurst, 2009 Ark. App. 513, 324 S.W.3d 719 (2009).

Willful Causation.

In a prosecution for criminal mischief in the first degree, it is not enough to show merely that the property was damaged or destroyed, for one essential element of this crime is that the damage was willfully caused and not accidental. Bray v. State, 12 Ark. App. 53, 670 S.W.2d 822 (1984).

Teenager who drove another's car without permission and accidentally totaled it was acting recklessly, but did not purposefully damage the car; as a consequence, he committed criminal mischief in the second degree rather than in the first degree. McGill v. State, 60 Ark. App. 246, 962 S.W.2d 382 (1998).

Defendant's conviction for first-degree criminal mischief under subdivision (a)(1) of this section was not supported by substantial evidence where the charge was premised on the theory that he purposely caused damage to another driver's jeep, because although there was abundant evidence to show that defendant was acting recklessly, there was nothing to show that he acted with the purpose of damaging the jeep. Ross v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 243 (2012).

Cited: Hawksley v. State, 276 Ark. 504, 637 S.W.2d 573 (1982); Ellis v. State, 4 Ark. App. 201, 628 S.W.2d 871 (1982); Garrison v. State, 13 Ark. App. 245, 682 S.W.2d 772 (1985); State v. Murphy, 315 Ark. 68, 864 S.W.2d 842 (1993).